Article 16237 of alt.activism Subject INTRO +quot;Foreign Relations of the U.S., Vol 4, Vi

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Article 16237 of alt.activism: From: dave@ratmandu.esd.sgi.com (dave "who can do? ratmandu!" ratcliffe) Newsgroups: alt.activism,alt.conspiracy.jfk,alt.conspiracy Subject: INTRO: "Foreign Relations of the U.S., Vol 4, Vietnam Aug-Dec'63" Keywords: if we don't read available books, it won't matter about the rest Message-ID: <1992Feb25.143141.14919@odin.corp.sgi.com> Date: 25 Feb 92 14:31:41 GMT Sender: news@odin.corp.sgi.com (Net News) Organization: Silicon Graphics, Inc. Lines: 1428 Nntp-Posting-Host: ratmandu.esd.sgi.com I recently purchased an amazing resource, sections of which I want to share. It is a new volume in the "Foreign Relations of the United States" (FRUS) series, published by the U.S. Government Printing Office. This is "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume IV, Vietnam August-December 1963" published in 1991. It contains hundreds of pages of documents which, taken as a whole, constitute the record of the formulation of U.S. foreign policy with regard to Vietnam during the uniquely critical period of August-December, 1963. In this volume, each document has its own number and is listed chronologically. The first paragraph of the Preface (included below in this post) lays out the basis for this official record: The publication Foreign Relations of the United States constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with appropriate materials concerning the facts that contributed to the formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of State are supplemented by papers from other government agencies involved in the formulation of foreign policy. This volume also includes documents from the private collections of various government officials connected with U.S. policy toward Vietnam. Initially, I will be posting ascii-versions of the following documents: 194. National Security Action Memorandum No. 263 this is the 10/11/63 NSAM that recorded JFK's approval of withdrawing 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963, as well as other recommendations from the Taylor/McNamara Memo (document #167, 10/2/63, listed below) which included withdrawal of "the bulk of U.S. personnel by . . . the end of 1965." 167. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) and the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the President NSAM #263 (document #194, above) approves Section I B (1-3) of this Memorandum created as a result of the Taylor/McNamara trip to South Vietnam in late September-beginning of October. 169. Summary Record of the 519th Meeting of the National Security Council, White House, Washington, October 2, 1963, 6 p.m. More background on the policy decision made in light of the Taylor/McNamara Report presented to JFK earlier in the day. 170. Record of Action No. 2472, Taken at the 519th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 2, 1963 NSC confirmation of the endorsements made by JFK of the Taylor/ McNamara Report. 179. Memorandum for the Files of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 5, 1963 NSAM #263 directly refers to this Memorandum. 181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam NSAM #263 directly refers to this Telegram. 331. National Security Action Memorandum No. 273 this is the 11/26/63 NSAM that initiated LBJ's alteration of the plans JFK had been implementing for the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. 321. Memorandum of Discussion at the Special Meeting on Vietnam, Honolulu, November 20, 1963 NSAM #273 is purported to have grown out of the discussion that took place in Honolulu on 11/20/63 with the majority of the Kennedy cabinet in attendance. * * * * * * * * * Today in the major media, the mouthpieces for the lords of the official reality consortium are constantly complaining about how Oliver Stone is engaged in flights of fantasy when he says that JFK was beginning the process of getting the United States out of Vietnam by the time he was murdered. They misinform and disinform the public when they claim there is no such record of this, and that no one can really say what Kennedy was planning to do. They are either ignorant of what *is* available in the public record--indicating unequivocably and precisely what JFK *was* planning to do--or they are aware of the documentation but are willfully and actively engaged in a campaign to keep the public ignorant about the documents that *already* have been released. The present day mainstream press--rather than fulfilling its original role of "watchdog" and "fourth estate of the government" bringing to public attention what the government is up to--is acting like nothing so much as a mouthpiece for the state, making sweeping pronouncements littered with falsehoods and saying more about their actual objectives by what they omit than what they include. They are another component of the sorry state of "checkbook democracy" we currently "enjoy". I had the occassion to discuss some of the rich details included in this FRUS volume with Fletcher Prouty recently. We got into talking about the current push to open up the sealed files from the House Select Committee on Assassinations and documents still sealed from the Warren Commission. He had this to say: I was doing a TV show to Australia, live, night before last. And there was a man from Los Angeles talking about the subject [JFK and Vietnam], and, my word he hadn't even read this stuff. At the end of the show the man from Australia--the host of the show--asked me, "What do think is going to be the value of opening the files with respect to the Kennedy murder?" And I said, "Well I can't see it being worth a darn. Here we are listening to people who haven't even cracked the books that *are* opened, and if they have, they don't understand what's in them. I don't see that this will make a damn bit of difference. If people aren't going to read books that are available, why talk about reading books that aren't available?" This is the key to the subject if people don't read the stuff--now you've got this, you can see that 263 is all spelled out. All of the meetings that were held--there were over 50 meetings held before NSAM 263 was published. Well, here are these clowns that are professors in college, important writers in big magazines, and they haven't even read this stuff. The remainder of this post includes the title page and following 22 pages including the Preface, Contents, List of Sources, List of Abbreviations and List of Persons. It is felt this beginning segment of the volume will be useful to convey what this volume contains and offers to the reader. I urge any of you interested in reading the full record for yourselves to contact the Government Printing Office in W.D.C. at 202/783-3238 and ask to speak to the Superintendent of Documents. You want to request a copy of "DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION #9857." You can purchase it ($30) with a credit card over the fown. In the Preface below the explication of use of font-type is significant: "Obvious typographical errors are corrected, but other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type (denoted in this ascii version with asterisks just inside the two surrounding brackets --ratitor); an omission in roman type. Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate text that has been omitted because it deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or because it remained classified after the declassification review process (in italic type)." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 __________________________________________________________________ Volume IV Vietnam August-December 1963 Editor in Chief John P. Glennon Editor Edward C. Keefer United States Government Printing Office Washington 1991 DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 9857 OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS __________________________________________________________________ For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 Preface The publication Foreign Relations of the United States constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with appropriate materials concerning the facts that contributed to the formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of State are supplemented by papers from other government agencies involved in the formulation of foreign policy. This volume also includes documents from the private collections of various government officials connected with U.S. policy toward Vietnam. The basic documentary diplomatic record printed in the volumes of the series is edited by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The editing is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and in accordance with the following official guidance first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925: There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating the place in the text where the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons: a. To avoid publication of matters that would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business. b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details. c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments. d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals. e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification: in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made. Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume IV Document selection for this volume proceeded on the basis of a research plan developed by the editors after a preliminary review of repositories in both governmental and private agencies. From the outset the editors approached their research realizing the need to supplement the written record of U.S. policy during the Vietnam war with interviews of officials who participated in the policy process. Early attention was also given to those oral history interviews of participants already in existence and available in various locations. Oral history citations are provided in the footnotes to the text. On the basis of their preliminary research and review of already- published documentation, including the 1971 "Pentagon Papers," the editors developed the following five areas of focus for the research and selection of documents for inclusion in this volume: 1) Discussion and formulation of policy in Washington; 2) Policy implementation in South Vietnam; 3) The relationship among the United States Government, the Diem government, and dissident elements in South Vietnam; 4) U.S. intelligence assessments of the viability of the Diem government and the prospects of potential coup plotters; and 5) U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. Discussion and formulation of policy in Washington: President John F. Kennedy and, after his assassination on November 22, 1963, President Lyndon B. Johnson, made the important policy decisions on Vietnam. They received advice from the Washington foreign affairs community, either orally at meetings or in documents. The records of these meetings with the Presidents and advice provided to them in writing are the focus of this volume. The editors are confident that they have had complete access to all the Presidential written records bearing on Vietnam. The most important repositories for records on the formulation of U.S. policy toward Vietnam are the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Libraries. The records of the Department of State, to which the editors had complete access, include a large segment of Presidential and National Security Council documentation, but the Kennedy and Johnson Libraries remain the single most comprehensive sources. The papers of the President's Military Representative, General Maxwell D. Taylor, at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., are also of unusual importance. The documents in the Taylor Papers provide a unique record of Taylor's advice to the President on Vietnam and records of some meetings both at the White House and at the Department of Defense for which there are no other accounts. Department of Defense records, especially files and papers of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, located at the Washington National Records Center, are an important subsidiary source. A private collection, the W. Averell Harriman Papers, are also of considerable interest. Used with the permission of the late Ambassador Harriman when they were still in his possession, they are now housed at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. The Roger Hilsman papers, located at the Kennedy Library, also proved an important source of documents not found in official files. Policy implementation in Vietnam: The editors also selected documentation that covered the implementation of Presidentially- established policy and a small range of lesser policy decisions that did not reach the White House or were resolved in the Department of State or other agencies of the foreign affairs community. The files of the Department of State, the Kennedy and Johnson Libraries, and the United States Information Agency are the primary documentary sources for these decisions. The relationship among the United States Government, the Diem government, and dissident elements in South Vietnam: From late August 1963, when this volume begins, to the overthrow of the Diem government on November 1, 1963, the United States strongly supported the Republic of Vietnam, but the relationship was strained. The extensive reports of U.S. Embassy relations with the Diem government come primarily from the central files of the Department of State. The fact that the United States was in close contact with dissident elements in South Vietnam makes events in Saigon crucial to understanding U.S. policy. The editors have, therefore, included a considerable number of telegraphic reports from the Embassy and the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon on relations with dissident Vietnamese. Central Intelligence Agency records were obtained from the Kennedy Library, Department of State files, the Taylor Papers, Department of Defense records, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff files. The CIA provided full access to the Department historians to Agency documents in the Presidential libraries, and many of these documents are printed here. Some access was eventually provided to documentation retained by the Agency itself, but too late for documents to be included in this volume. Significant declassified material obtained from the CIA archives for 1963 will be printed in a subsequent volume in the "Foreign Relations" series. U.S. intelligence estimates of the viability of the Diem government and the potential prospects of coup plotters: The ability of the U.S. Government to estimate the viability of the Diem government and the prospects for potential coup plotters are of central importance during a period in which there was extensive planning for a coup and then a successful overthrow of President Diem. This volume and its companion, documenting the first part of 1963 (volume III), include communications between the Central Intelligence Agency and its Station in Saigon. In addition to these telegrams, a representative selection of finished intelligence assessments prepared by the U.S. intelligence community is printed. U.S. military involvement in Vietnam: The editors sought to include documentation that illustrated the relationship between military planning and strategy and the conduct of relations with the Republic of Vietnam and other countries. No attempt was made to document operational details of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. The Taylor Papers, the files of the Secretary of Defense and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs at the Washington National Records Center, and the decentralized files of the Department of State's Vietnam Working Group are the principal sources for this topic. The question of press coverage of developments in Vietnam and U.S. involvement became less sensitive during the latter part of 1963, but still remained an important issue. Documentation relating to public affairs and press relations is located in the files of the United States Information Agency. The editors of the volume are confident that the documents printed here provide a comprehensive and accurate foreign affairs record of United States policy toward and involvement in Vietnam during the last four months of 1963. The declassification review process for the documents selected for this volume, outlined in more detail below, resulted in withholding from publication only 1.7 percent of the original manuscript. The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the National Archives and Records Administration's John F. Kennedy Library and Lyndon B. Johnson Libraries, in particular Suzanne Forbes and David Humphries. Susan Lemke at the National Defense University and Sandra Meagher at the Department of Defense deserve special thanks, as do former government officials who consented to oral history interviews for this volume. Editorial Methodology The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Incoming telegrams from U.S. missions are placed according to time of receipt in the Department of State or other receiving agency, rather than the time of transmission; memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted. The editors were not always able to determine the precise chronological order of documents produced during periods of crisis and intense activity, particularly during the November 1 coup. In these cases they used their best judgment. Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the Editor in Chief and the chief technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Obvious typographical errors are corrected, but other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an omission in roman type. Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate text that has been omitted because it deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or because it remained classified after the declassification review process (in italic type). The amount of material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of source text that were omitted. All ellipses and brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by footnotes. The first footnote to each document indicates the document's source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. The source footnote also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates if the President and/or his major policy advisers read it. Every effort has been made to determine if a document has been previously published and this information has been included in the source footnote. If two or more different accounts of a meeting or event of comparable value are available and one or more is already declassified and published, the editors chose to print the still unpublished one and obtain its declassification. Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in this volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and summarize and provide citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when applicable to supplement the official record. Declassification Review Procedures Declassification review of the documents selected for publication was conducted by the Division of Historical Documents Review, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Department of State. The review was made in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act, and the criteria established in Executive Order 12356 regarding: 1) military plans, weapons, or operations; 2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security; 3) foreign government information; 4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods; 5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States; 6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security; 7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; 8) cryptology; and 9) a confidential source. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and appropriate foreign governments regarding documents of those governments. The principle guiding declassification review is to release as much information as is consistent with contemporary requirements of national security and sound foreign relations. Edward C. Keefer compiled and edited the volume under the supervision of Charles S. Sampson, the Vietnam project leader, and Editor in Chief John P. Glennon. Suzanne E. Coffman of the Office of the Historian prepared the lists of names and abbreviations. Rita M. Baker performed the technical editing. Barbara A. Bacon of the Publishing Services Division (Paul M. Washington, Chief) oversaw production of the volume. Max Franke prepared the index. William Z. Slany The Historian Bureau of Public Affairs Contents Page Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III List of Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XVII List of Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXI Vietnam I. Reassessment in Washington and inaction in Saigon, August 28-September 7: The coup stalls, President Kennedy's public statement, attempts to negotiate Nhu's removal and change South Vietnam's policies . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 II. Period of interlude, September 7-0ctober 22: Assessment of the progress of the war, U.S. efforts to reform the Diem government, the McNamara-Taylor mission to Vietnam and report, U.S. policy on coup plotting in Vietnam . . . . 133 III. The coup against the Diem government, October 23-November 2: Differing interpretations of U.S. policy toward coup plotting, efforts to obtain information on a potential coup, Lodge-Diem discussions, U.S. assessments of a coup, the coup, the deaths of Nhu and Diem . . . . . . 427 IV. U.S. relations with the Provisional Government of Vietnam, November 2-22: U.S. recognition of the Provisional Government, the fate of remaining Ngo family members and Tri Quang, U.S. advice to the new government, rejection of a neutralized South Vietnam, the special Honolulu meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 538 V. The Johnson presidency, November 22-December 31: Lodge- Johnson meeting on Vietnam, NSAM 273, McNamara visit, year-end observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 627 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 759 List of Sources Unpublished Sources Department of State 1. Subject-Numeric Indexed Central Files. In February 1963, the Department changed its decimal central files to a subject-numeric central file system. This volume and its companion, volume III, are the first to be published in the Foreign Relations series in which the Department's central files come exclusively from the new system. As part of the transition from the old to two system, the Department of State encouraged its indexers to cross references extensively and to include the first page of the referenced document in the cross referenced file. The system allows the researcher to begin in a basic file and by noting the cross references discover other pertinent files. The subject-numeric system was divided into broad categories: Administration, Consular, Culture and Information, Economic, Poltical [sic] and Defense, Science, and Social. Within each of these divisions were subcategories. For example, Political and Defense contained four subtopics: POL (politics), DEF (Defense), CSM (Communism), and INT (Intelligence). Numerical subdivisions further defined them. For example, POL 15-1 was used for documentation concerning the head of state and/or the Executive Branch of any country. Therefore POL 15-1 S VIET contains documentation on South Vietnam's President; POL 15-1 CAMB would contain documentation of Cambodia's Head of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The following were the principal files used in this volume: POL S VIET and POL 1 S VIET, both containing background material for general policy POL 2 S VIET, general reports and statistics POL 14 S VIET, elections POL 15 S VIET, government POL 15-1 S VIET, head of government/Executive branch POL 16 S VIET, recognition of the new government POL 18 S VIET, provincial and municipal government POL 26 5 VIET, undesignated but used in Vietnam for coup planning POL 27 5 VIET, military operations POL 27-10 5 VIET, chemical weapons POL 30-15 VIET, asylum. POL 27 VIET, military operations POL 32-4 VIET, territorial waters The system could also combine two countries or a country and an indivudual [sic]. Files of these types cited in this volume were: POL 8 S VIET-US, U.S.-South Vietnmese [sic] discussions of neutralism and non-alignment POL US-MCNAMARA and POL 7 US-MCNAMARA, documentation relating to the Secretary of Defense generally and to his trips POL CAMB-S VIET, general South Vietnamese-Cambodian relations POL 27-13 CAMB, Cambodia's neutrality in the Vietnam war The POL Files comprise the most cited sources in the volume, but there are other files containing important documentation. Much of the documention [sic] on the Buddhist opposition to the Diem government are found in the social category, SOC (social relations) 12-1 S VIET, churches and sects including clergy (bonzes) and SOC 14-1 5 VIET, general human rights policies in South Vietnam. Most military-related documents were in DEF 19 S VIET, the general file for military assistance to Vietnam or in DEF 19 US-S VIET, U.S. military assistance to South Vietnam. The CSM S VIET file was surprisingly sparse, indicating that it was little used by indexers during this period. Documentation on economic assistance was found almost exclusively in AID (US) S VIET. ORG 7 OSD is a administrative file used for the visits of Secretary of Defense McNamara; PER-LODGE, HENRY CABOT is Ambassador Lodge's personnel file; INF 8 US is the basic psychological operations file; FT 1 S VIET is the general policy file for South Vietnam's finances. 2. Lot Files. Documents from the central files have been supplemented by materials from decentralized office files, the lot files of the Department of State. A list of the major lot files used or consulted follows: Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240 Files of William P. Bundy for the 1960s, first as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and then Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs after 1964. Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110 Collection of documentation on international conferences abroad attended by the President, the Secretary of State, and other U.S. officials, May 1961-December 1964. Har-Van Files Files created for Ambassador Averell Harriman and Cyrus Vance, Delegates to the Paris Peace Conference in 1968. Background documents beginning in the early 1960s. The file contains texts of documents found nowhere else. Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204 Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments, 1953-1964, as maintained by the Excecutive [sic] Secretariat. Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149 Cleared memoranda of Presidential conversations with foreign vistors, [sic] 1956-1964, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192 Files of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 1961-1969, including texts of speeches, miscellaneous correspondence files, White House correspondence, chronological files, and memoranda of telephone conversations. Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330 Memoranda of the Secretaries of State and Under Secretaries of State, 1961-1964 Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147 Records of the Secretary of State's Staff Meetings, 1961-1963, and additional ad hoc meetings, reports, papers, and memoranda of Chester Bowles' telphone [sic] conversations. S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199 Files of the Policy Planning Council for the years 1963-1964. Special Group for Counterinsurgency Files: Lot 68 D 451 Minutes and memoranda of the Special Group for Counterinsurgency, January 1962-December 1963. S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265 Master set of papers pertaining to National Security Council meetings, including policy papers, position papers, and administrative documents for the years 1961-1966, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316 Master file of National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs) for the years 1961-1968, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95 Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, 1947-1963, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 67 D 54 Files of the interagency Vietnam Working Group, 1963-1964. Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219 Top Secret files of the interagency Vietnam Working Group, 1963-1967. National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. Record Group 46, Records of the U.S. Senate Files of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Record Group 59 Files of the Office of Public Opinion Studies, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland Record Group 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the United States Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 67 A 677 Classified records of the Embassy in Saigon for the years 1962-1963 (formerly Lot 66 F 57). Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159 Top Secret files of the Embassy in Saigon for the years 1955-1963. Record Group 306, Records of the United States Information Agency USIA/IOP Files: FRC 67 A 222 Subject files of the Office of Policy for the years 1963-1965. Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense McNamara Files: FRC 31 A 3470 Files of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara for the years 1961- 1968. OSD Files: FRC 69 A 3131 Official records of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary for 1963. OSD Files: FRC 71 A 6489 Miscellaneous records of the Secretary, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and their assistants for the years 1951, n. 1966. Record Group 334, Records of Interservice Records of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 1962 and after. National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. Taylor Papers Papers of General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff of the Army, 1955-1959; Military Adviser to the President, 1961-1962; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1962-1964. John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts Hilsman Papers National Security Files Chester V. Clifton Series Departments and Agencies Series Meetings and Memoranda Series Regional Security Series Trip and Conference Series Country Series, Vietnam President's Appointment Book (cited as President's Log Book) President's Office Files Staff Memoranda Vietnam Security Schlesinger Papers Sorenson Papers Thompson Papers Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas Papers of President Lyndon B. Johnson, National Security File Heads of Staff Correspondence Meeting Notes Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy NSAMs Country File, Vietnam Rusk Appointment Book Vice Presidential Security File Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C. Harriman Papers Special Files of W. Averell Harriman, Public Service, Kennedy and Johnson administrations Published Sources Documentary Collection, Congressional Documents, and Periodicals "The Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalog" and microfiche. Woodbridge, CT: Research Publications (formerly Washington: Carrollton Press), 1977 onwards. "The Pentagon Papers: The Department of Defense History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam" [The Senator Gravel Edition]. 4 vols. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. U.S. Department of Defense. "United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967" [The Pentagon Papers]. 12 vols. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971. U.S. Department of State. "American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963." Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967. _______. Department of State "Bulletin," 1963. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963. U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. "Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963." Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964. U.S. Senate. "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders. An Interim Report of the Select Committee To Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities." U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session, Report No. 94-465. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. Memoirs Note: The Department of State takes no responsibility for the accuracy of these memoirs nor endorses their interpretation of the events. Ball, George. "The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs." New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982. Colby, William, and Forbath, Peter. "Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA." New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978. Galbraith, John Kenneth. "Ambassador's Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years." Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969. Hilsman, Roger. "To Move a Nation." Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1967. Johnson, Lyndon Baines. "The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency," 1963-1969. New York: Holt, Reinhardt and Winston, 1971. Mecklin, John. "Mission in Torment." Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1965. Nolting, Frederick E. "From Trust to Tragedy: The Political Memoirs of Frederick Nolting, Kennedy's Ambassador to Diem's Vietnam." Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1988. Salinger, Pierre. "With Kennedy." Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1966. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. "A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House." Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965. Sorenson, Theodore C. "Kennedy." New York: Harper & Row, 1965. Taylor, Maxwell D. "Swords and Plowshares: A Memoir." New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1972. Tran Van Don. "Our Endless War: Inside Vietnam." San Raphael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978. List of Abbreviations "AAA," anti-aircraft artillery "ABN," airborne "AC&W," aircraft control and warning "ACSI," Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence) "addee," addressee "Admino," series indicator for administrative telegrams from CINCPAC "AF," Air Force "AFCIN," Air Force Chief of Intelligence "AFRS," Armed Forces Radio Service "AID," Agency for International Development "Aidto," series indicator for telegrams from the Agency for International Development to its missions abroad "Amb," Ambassador "ammo," ammunition "AP," Associated Press "APC," armored personnel carrier "ARPAC," U.S. Army, Pacific "ARVN," Army of the Republic of Vietnam "BG," Brigadier General "bn," battalion "CAS," Controlled American Source "CG," Civil Guard "ChiCom," Chinese Communists "ChiNat," Chinese Nationalist "CHMAAG," Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group "CI," counterinsurgency; commercial imports "CIA," Central Intelligence Agency "CIB," Combined Intelligence Board "CIDG," Citizen's Irregular Defense Group "CINCPAC," Commander in Chief, Pacific "CINCPACAF," Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force "CINCPACFLT," Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet "CINCUSAPAC," Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific "CIP," Commercial Import Program "CM," Chairman's Memorandum "Cmdr," Commander "CNO," Chief of Naval Operations "CO," Commanding Officer "COMUSARPAC," Commander, United States Army, Pacific "COMUSMACV," Commander, U.S. Military Advisory Command, Vietnam "CONUS," continental United States "COPROR," Committee on Province Rehabilitation "CPSVN," Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam "CSA," Chief of Staff, Army "CSAF," Chief of Staff, Air Force "CSCC," Coastal Surveillance Command Center "CT," Country Team "CVN," Central Vietnam "CVTC," Confederation of Vietnamese Trade Congresses "CY," calendar year "DA," Department of the Army; Defense Attache; defense assistance "DAC," Development Assistance Committee, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development "DCFBA," Director General of Budget and Foreign Aid "DCI," Director of Central Intelligence "DCM," Deputy Chief of Mission "Deptel," Department of State telegram "desp," despatch "DGI," Director General of Information "DIA," Defense Intelligence Agency "dissem," dissemination "DLF," Defense Loan Fund "DMZ," demilitarized zone "DOD," Department of Defense "DOD/PRO," Public Relations Office, Department of Defense "DRV," Democratic Republic of Vietnam "DTG," date-time-group "E & E," emergency and evacuation "ECCO," Eastern Construction Company "Embtel," Embassy telegram "FAR," Forces Armees Royales (Royal Armed Forces, Laos) "FBIS," Foreign Broadcast Information Service "FE," Far East; Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State "FOS," follow-on spares "FRC," Federal Records Center "FSO," Foreign Service officer "FY," fiscal year "FYI," for your information "G," Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs "GAO," General Accounting Office "G/PM," Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs "GVN," Government of Vietnam "helo," helicopter "HQS," headquarters "HSAS," Headquarters, Support Activity, Saigon "IAF," Far East Branch, United States Information Agency "ICA," International Cooperation Administration "ICC," International Control Commission "ICSH," International Committee on Strategic Hamlets "ILO," International Labor Organization "INR," Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State "IOP," Office of Policy and Research, United States Information Agency "ISA," Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs "JAOC," Joint Air Operation Center "JCS," Joint Chiefs of Staff "JGS," Joint General Staff "JOC," Joint Operations Center "KIA," killed in action "LAS," Long-Range Assistance Strategy "LOC," lines of communication "MA," military assistance "MAAG," Military Assistance Advisory Group "MACV," Military Assistance Command, Vietnam "MAP," Military Assistance Program "MEC," Military Executive Committee "MRC," Military Revolutionary Council "MSP," Mutual Security Program "NACO," National Agricultural Credit Office "NBC," National Broadcasting Company "NCO," non-commissioned officer "NCP," National Campaign Plan "NEA," Near East and Africa; Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State "NFLSVN," National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam "Niact," night action "NIE," National Intelligence Estimate "NLHX," Neo Lao Hak Xat "NOA," new obligational authority "Noforn," no foreign dissemination "NRM," National Revolutionary Movement "NSA," National Security Agency "NSAM," National Security Action Memorandum "NSC," National Security Council "NVN," North Vietnam "OASD," Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense "OCI," Office of Current Intelligence "ODMA," Office of the Director for Military Assistance "OPCON," operational control "OPNL," operational "OPSUM," Operations Summary "P," piaster; Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State "PACAF," Pacific Air Force "PACFLT," Pacific Fleet "PACOM," Pacific Command "PAO," Public Affairs Officer "PCHT," packing, crating, handling, and transportation "PIC," person in command "P10," Public Information Officer "PIOPS," public information operations "PL," Pathet Lao; Public Law "plt," platoon "PNG," persona non grata "POL," petroleum, oil, and lubricants "POLAD," Political Adviser "POW," prisoner of war "psywar," psychological warfare "psyops," psychological operations "PTT," post, telephone, telegraph "reftel," reference telegram "RG," Record Group "rgt," regiment "RKG," Royal Khmer Government "RLG," Royal Lao Government "RVN," Republic of Vietnam "RVNAF," Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces "S," Office of the Secretary of State "SACSA," Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, Joint Chiefs of Staff "SDC," Self Defense Corps "SEA," Southeast Asia; Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State "SEATO," Southeast Asia Treaty Organization "SecDef," Secretary of Defense "Secto," series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State or his party to the Department of State "Secy," Secretary "SEPES," Service des Etudes Politiques et Sociales (Political and Social Studies Service) "septel," separate telegram "SFHCVN," Special Forces, High Command, Vietnam "SH," Strategic Hamlet "SOA," Office of South Asian Affairs, Department of State "S/P," Policy Planning Staff, Department of State "sqdn," squadron "S/S," Executive Secretariat, Department of State "Stat.," United States Statutes at Large "SVN," South Vietnam "TF/Saigon," Task Force in Saigon "TF/SEA," Task Force on Southeast Asia "TF/VN," Task Force on Vietnam "TIAS," Treaties and Other International Agreements Series "Toaid," series indicator for telegrams to the Agency for International Development from its missions abroad "TOC," Tactical Operations Center "Tosec," series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State or his party from the Department of State "Tousi," series indicator for telegrams to the United States Information Agency from its missions abroad "UN," United Nations "UNESCO," United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization "UPI," United Press International "USA," United States Army "USAF," United States Air Force "USASGV," United States Army Support Group, Vietnam "USIA," United States Information Agency "USIB," United States Intelligence Board "USIS," United States Information Service "Usito," series indicator for telegrams from the United States Information Agency to its missions abroad "USMACV," United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam "USMC," United States Marine Corps "USN," United States Navy "USOM," United States Operations Mission "USSR," Union of Soviet Socialist Republics "UST," United States Treaties "VC," Viet Cong "VM," Viet Minh "VN," Vietnam "VNAF," Vietnam Armed Forces; Vietnam Air Force "VNMC," Vietnam Marine Corps "VNN," Vietnam Navy "VNQDD," Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (National Party of Vietnam) "VNSF," Vietnamese Special Forces "VNSFHC," Vietnamese Special Forces High Command "VOA," Voice of America "WG/VN," Working Group on Vietnam "WSM," Women's Solidarity Movement List of Persons Alphand, Herve, French Ambassador to the United States Alsop, Joseph, syndicated columnist Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State Barnett, Robert W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Economic Affairs from February 3, 1963 Bell, David E., Administrator of the Agency for International Development and member of the Counterinsurgency Group Blake, Lieutenant General Gordon A., USAF, Director of the National Security Agency Bohlen, Charles E., Ambassador to France Bowles, Chester A., President's Special Representative, Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs, and Ambassador at Large until July 19, 1963; thereafter Ambassador to India Brent, Joseph L., Director, Operations Mission in Vietnam Buffum, William B., Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Social Affairs, Department of State, until November 10, 1963; thereafter Director Bui Diem, Dai Viet oppositionist Bui Van Luong, Vietnamese Minister of the Interior Bundy, McGeorge, President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Bundy, William P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Buu Hoi, Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States Carroll Lieutenant General Joseph F., USAF, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Carter, Lieutenant General Marshall S., USA, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Church, Frank, Democratic Senator from Idaho; member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Cleveland, Harlan, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Clifton, Major General Chester V., USA, President's Military Aide Colby, William, Director of the Far East Division, Operations Directorate, Central Intelligence Agency Conlon, Thomas F., Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, after September 1, 1963, and member of the Vietnam Working Group Cooper, Chester L., Assistant for Policy Support to the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, until November 1963; thereafter Assistant Deputy Director for Policy Support Couve de Murville, Maurice, French Foreign Minister De Gaulle, Charles, President of France Diem, see Ngo Dinh Diem Dillon, C. Douglas, Secretary of the Treasury Dingeman, Major James W., USA, Executive Secretary of the Special Group for Counterinsurgency Dinh, see Ton That Dinh Do Mau, Colonel (after November 1963, Brigadier General), ARVN, Military Security Service Chief; also political member of the Executive Committee of the Military Revolutionary Council Do Vang Ly, Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States after September 30, 1963. Don, see Tran Van Don D'Orlandi Giovanni, Italian Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam Dungan, Ralph A., President's Special Assistant Duong Ngoc Lam, Colonel, ARVN, Director, Civil Guard/Self Defense Corps Duong Van Hieu, Assistant Director for Special Police of the Republic of Vietnam until November 1, 1963 Duong Van ("Big") Minh, Major General (after November 4, 1963, Lieutenant General), ARVN, Military Adviser to President Diem until November 1, 1963; thereafter Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Revolutionary Council; President of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Vietnam after November 4, 1963 Dutton, Frederick G., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs Felt, Admiral Harry D., USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific Forrestal Michael V., member, National Security Council Staff Fraleigh, Albert S., Deputy Assistant Director for Rural Affairs, Operations Mission in Vietnam Fulbright, J. William, Democratic Senator from Arkansas and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Gilpatric, Roswell L., Deputy Secretary of Defense and member of the Counterinsurgency Group Halberstam, David, "New York Times" correspondent in Vietnam Harkins, General Paul D., USA, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Harriman, W. Averell, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs until April 3, 1963; thereafter Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and Chairman of the Special Group for Counterinsurgency Helble, John J., Consul in Hue Helms, Richard, Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency Hieu, see Ngo Trong Hieu Higgins, Marguerite, "New York Herald Tribune" correspondent Hilsman, Roger, Jr., Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research until April 25, 1963; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; also Chairman and General Secretary of Dang Lao Dong, Workers' Party of Vietnam Hoang Van Lac, Colonel, ARVN, Permanent Commissioner, Interministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets; Special Commissioner for Strategic Hamlet Program Hughes, Thomas L., Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research until April 28,1963; thereafter Director Huynh Van Cao, Brigadier General, ARVN, IV Corps Commander Imhof, Johannes, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State Janow, Seymour J., Assistant Administrator for the Far East, Agency for International Development Johnson, Lyndon B., Vice President until November 22, 1963, thereafter President Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Jorden, William, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Kattenburg, Paul M., Deputy Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, and Chairman of the Vietnam Interdepartmental Working Group from August 4, 1963 Kaysen, Carl, President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Kennedy, John F., President of the United States until November 22, 1963 Kennedy, Robert F., Attorney General Kent, Colonel J. R., USA, Assistant Director, Far East Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Khanh, see Nguyen Khanh Khiem, see Tran Thien Khiem Khiet, see Tien Khiet Khuong, see Nguyen Khuong Kim, see Le Van Kim Koren, Henry L. T., Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State Krulak, Major General Victor H., USMC, Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Ky, see Nguyen Cao Ky La, see Nguyen Van La Lac, see Hoang Van Lac Lalouette, Roger, French Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam Lansdale, Maj. Gen. Edward G., USAF, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Lausche, Frank J., Democratic Senator from Ohio and Chairman of the Far Eastern Subcommittee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Le Quang Trieu, Special Forces Commander after November 1, 1963 Le Quang Tung, Colonel ARVN, Special Forces Commander until November 1, 1963 Le Van Kim, Brigadier General (after November 1, 1963, Major General), ARVN, Secretary General and Foreign Affairs member, Executive Committee of the Military Revolutionary Council, after November 1, 1963 Le Van Nghiem, Brigadier General ARVN, Commander, I Corps Lippmann, Walter, columnist Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr., Ambassador to South Vietnam from August 26, 1963 Luong, see Bui Van Luong Mai Huu Xuan, Brigadier General (after November 1963, Major General), ARVN, Commander, Quang training camp; member, Executive Committee of the Military Revolutionary Council, after November 1, 1963; Chief of National Police Maneli Mieczyslaw, Polish member of the International Control Commission Manning, Robert J., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Mansfield, Mike, Democratic Senator from Montana; Majority Leader and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Mau, see Vu Van Mau McCone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense Mecklin, John, Counselor for Public Affairs at the Embassy in Vietnam Mendenhall, Joseph A., United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, from June 23, 1963 Minh, see Duong Van Minh Montgomery, James M., Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, and member of the Vietnam Working Group Morse, Wayne, Democratic Senator from Oregon and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Murrow, Edward R., Director, United States Information Agency Nes, David G., Deputy Chief of Mission in Saigon from December 1963 Nghiem, see Le Van Nghiem Ngo Dinh Can, brother of President Diem Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Republic of Vietnam until November 1, 1963 Ngo Dinh Luyen, brother of President Diem; Ambassador of the Republic of Vietnam to the United Kingdom until November 2, 1963 Ngo Dinh Nhu, brother of President Diem; Presidential Counselor and Head of the Interministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets until November 1, 1963 Ngo Dinh Nhu, Madame (Tran Le Xuan), wife of Ngo Dinh Nhu and member of the Vietnamese National Assembly; official hostess for President Diem Ngo Dinh Thuc, brother of President Diem; Archbishop of Hue Ngo Trong Hieu, Vietnamese Minister of Civic Action until November 1, 1963 Nguyen Cao Ky, Lieutenant Colonel Vietnamese Air Force, Transport Squadron Commander; Air Force Commander from December 17, 1963 Nguyen Dinh Thuan, Vietnamese Secretary of State at the Presidency and Assistant Secretary of State for National Defense Nguyen Khanh, Major General, ARVN, Commander of II Corps until November 29 1963; thereafter Commander of IV Corps Nguyen Khuong, Colonel ARVN, coup leader Nguyen Luong, Vietnamese Minister of Finance Nguyen Ngoc Tho, Vietnamese Vice President until November 4, 1963; thereafter Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and National Economy of the Provisional Government Nguyen Van La, Major General, ARVN, Civil Guard Commander Nguyen Van Thieu, Colonel (Brigadier General after November 1, 1963), ARVN, Commanding Officer of the 5th Infantry Division Nhu, see Ngo Dinh Nhu Nhu, Madame, see Ngo Dinh Nhu, Madame Nolting, Frederick E., Jr., Ambassador to Vietnam until August 15, 1963 Pham Dang Lam, Secretary General of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry until November 4,1963; thereafter Foreign Minister in the Provisional Government Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Phan Huy Quat, former Vietnamese Defense Minister under Bao Dai and leader of Dai Viet Party Phillips, Rufus C., Assistant Director for Rural Affairs, Operations Mission in Vietnam Reston, James, syndicated columnist Rice, Edward E., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Richardson, John H., Chief of Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon until October 5, 1963 Rostow, Walt W., Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State Salinger, Pierre E. G., President's Press Secretary Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr., President's Special Assistant Sheehan, Neil, United Press International correspondent in Vietnam Sihanouk, Prince Norodom, Cambodian Chief of State Smith, Bromley, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Souvanna Phouma, Laotian Prime Minister Stevenson, Adlai, Representative at the United Nations Stilwell, Major General Richard G., USA, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, from April 1963 Stoneman, Walter G., Director of the Office of Vietnam Affairs, Bureau for the Far East/Vietnam, Agency for International Development Sullivan, William H., U.N. Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until April 28, 1963; thereafter Assistant to the Under Secretary of State Sylvester, Arthur, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Tam Chau, bonze, member of Buddhist delegation from Hue; became Chairman of the Intersect Committee for the Defense of Buddhism Taylor, General Maxwell D., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Tho, see Nguyen Ngoc Tho Thompson, Brigadier Robert G. K., head of the British Advisory Mission in Vietnam Thuan, see Nguyen Dinh Thuan Thuc, see Ngo Dinh Thuc Timmes, Major General Charles J., Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam Tinh Khiet, chief bonze in Hue Ton That Dinh, Major General ARVN, Military Governor of Saigon, August 21-November 1, 1963; thereafter Commander of III Corps, Second Deputy Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Military Revolutionary Council, and Minister of Public Security of the Provisional Government Tran Kim Tuyen, head of the Service des Etudes Politiques et Sociales Tran Le Quang, Vietnamese Minister of Rural Affairs until November 4, 1963; thereafter Minister of Rural Affairs of the Provisional Government Tran Le Xuan, see Ngo Dinh Nhu, Madame Tran Thien Khiem, General, ARVN, Chief of Staff after November 1, 1963, Military Affairs member, Executive Committee of the Military Revolutionary Council Tran Tu Oai, Brigadier General, ARVN, Director of Psychological Warfare, Vietamese [sic] Ministry of Defense; Chief of Public Information; Minister of Information in the Provisional Government after November 4, 1963 Tran Van Chuong, Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States until August 22, 1963 Tran Van Don, Major General, ARVN, Commander of III Corps until July 1963; thereafter Commander of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam; Acting Chief of the Joint General Staff after August 1963; First Deputy Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Military Revolutionary Council after November 1, 1963; Minister of National Defense after November 4, 1963 Tri Quang, bonze, Buddhist opposition leader Trueheart, William C., Minister-Counselor and Deputy Chief of Mission in Vietnam Tung, see Le Quang Tung Tuyen, see Tran Kim Tuyen Unna, Warren, "Washington Post" correspondent Vu Van Mau, Vietnamese Foreign Minister until August 22, 1963; Ambassador to the United Kingdom after December 24, 1963 Wheeler, General Earle G., USA, Chief of Staff Xuan, see Mai Huu Xuan Zablocki Clement J., Democratic Representative from Wisconsin and member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee -- daveus rattus yer friendly neighborhood ratman KOYAANISQATSI ko.yan.nis.qatsi (from the Hopi Language) n. 1. crazy life. 2. life in turmoil. 3. life out of balance. 4. life disintegrating. 5. a state of life that calls for another way of living. Article 16236 of alt.activism: From: dave@ratmandu.esd.sgi.com (dave "who can do? ratmandu!" ratcliffe) Newsgroups: alt.activism,alt.conspiracy Subject: memorandum by J.E. Hoover on 11/29/63 re: his meeting with LBJ Keywords: J.E. Hoover's FBI "spoon fed" the Warren Comission its data Message-ID: <1992Feb25.135308.14104@odin.corp.sgi.com> Date: 25 Feb 92 13:53:08 GMT Article-I.D.: odin.1992Feb25.135308.14104 Sender: news@odin.corp.sgi.com (Net News) Organization: Silicon Graphics, Inc. Lines: 556 Nntp-Posting-Host: ratmandu.esd.sgi.com Summary: The second half of this post includes the copy of a memorandum written by J. Edgar Hoover immediately after he met w/LBJ in the Oval Office seven days after President Kennedy had been murdered. The first half analyzes some of the more remarkable details of this memo. In 1963, John Edgar Hoover and Lyndon Baines Johnson knew each other very well. They had lived across the street from each other for the past 19 years. A professional bureaucrat of formidable talents, a 29- year-old Hoover was appointed director of the Bureau of Investigation in 1924 (Hoover added "Federal" to the title in 1935) by then Attorney General Harlan F. Stone to clean up a corrupt organization. During WWII, President Roosevelt expanded the FBI's reach charging Hoover with investigations of Nazi and Communist activities in the U.S. The Cold War gave the Bureau new power and Hoover new glory. Hoover's dossiers continued to grow as well as his command of Congress, his manipulation and intimidation of the press, and his stature in the country. Hoover supplied Joe McCarthy with a great deal of the ammunition which enabled McCarthy to sustain his "crusade" far longer than would have been possible without Hoover's connivance. When Robert Kennedy became Attorney General in 1961, Hoover's entrenched power-structures suffered a two-year, 10-month setback. Long before 1961, Hoover had created a direct channel of communication with whoever was the current occupant of the Oval Office--bypassing the actual chain of command which went from the President, through the Attorney General, to Director of the FBI. When LBJ assumed the Presidency, Hoover's direct link into the White House was re-established. Johnson's official relationship with Hoover was enhanced by personal friendship as well. "As majority leader [in the Senate], Johnson already had neen receiving a steady stream of reports and dossiers from the Director . . . which he prized both as a means of controlling difficult senators and as a gratification of earthier instincts. For President Johnson, secrets were in themselves perquisites of power . . . No chief executive praised the Director so warmly. In an executive order exempting Hoover, then sixty nine, from compulsory retirement at seventy, Johnson hailed him as `a quiet, humble and magnificent public servant . . . a hero to millions of citizens and an anathema to all evil men. . . . The nation cannot afford to lose you . . . No other American, now or in our past, has served the cause of justice so faithfully and so well' ("Johnson Hails Hoover Service, Waives Compulsory Retirement," NYT, May 9, 1964)." -- from "The Age of Surveillance, The Aims and Methods of America's Political Intelligence System," by Frank Donner, (c) 1980, Knopf. The following memorandum, written by Hoover immediately after his meeting with President Johnson, just seven days after the assassination of President Kennedy, is a remarkable document to say the least. There is much information imparted in the memo regarding just how fluid and unstable the cover story about who killed JFK still was shaping up to be at that time. By analyzing the discrepancies between the story Hoover briefed Johnson about on November 29th, and what the final cover story handed down by the Warren Commission would claim almost a year later, we can better appreciate the degree to which the final "official report" was sculpted to fit the constraints the Commission was forced to adhere to, regardless of the actual facts of the assassination. This document is what is known in bureaucracy-speak as a "memo for the record." It was a customary practice in the upper levels of the bureaucracy in the days before electronic technology in Washington, D.C. An official of high rank would usually return to her or his office after such a meeting and dictate a memorandum of as many details of the discussion as could be remembered. It was a way of recording one's own professional dealings for future reference. Hoover starts out recounting that Johnson brings up "the proposed group" --what will become the Warren Commission--to study the report Hoover is trying to complete by the end of the same day. This has been initiated by Johnson to prevent an independent investigation by Congress of the assassination (Reagan tried to do the same thing with the Tower Commission). Johnson would publically announce the creation of the Warren Commission later that same day. This was a critical move by Johnson: by appointing the Warren Commission, they effectively bottled up Bobby Kennedy, they bottled up the Senate, and they bottled up Texas. The Tower Commission didn't succeed in pre-empting an investigation by Congress. In the end, Warren Commission didn't either, but it did keep the cork in place preventing any other "official" examination for well over another decade. It is interesting to note that of all the people listed at the bottom of page one, retired General Lauris Norstad (who had been head of the NATO forces at SHAPE headquarters in Europe before his retirement) was the only one who somehow succeeded in not serving on this Presidential Commission. Earl Warren did NOT want the job and had sent a memo ahead to the Oval Office, before he answered LBJ's summons, stating he would not participate in such a commission. But when push came to shove, Johnson's formidable powers of persuasion turned Warren's no into a yes. Apparently even such focused persuasion could not win Norstad's agreement. The six topic bullets at the bottom of page one are file listings. This is important for anyone ever finding themself searching for documents from the government through Freedom Of Information Act requests. This type of listing is very useful beccause it lets you know that these files exist, and that you might be able to find documents using this method which you might not find (or even know about) any other way. In the middle of the first paragraph on page 3, Hoover relates how the Dallas police didn't even make a move to stop Ruby. This is a pretty heavy line by Hoover. He implies the Dallas cops must have somehow been in collusion to silence Oswald from living to stand trial. But the implication is never fleshed out. The second half of page three contains some of the most enlightening statements of the whole memo. Hoover tells Johnson three shots were fired. Johnson asks "if any were fired at him." This question goes a long way towards explaining the duress under which he served as president. LBJ had heard bullets flying overhead--he had been that close to the action. It was completely out of keeping with the standard security procedures the Secret Service employed to have any such parade appearance be attended by *both* the president and the vice president. Johnson heard the sounds of those guns very clearly and the message they conveyed. He lived out the rest of his public life always aware of their possible return. Not long before he died, LBJ was interviewed by his friend and writer Leo Janos. In the July, 1973 issue of "The Atlantic Monthly," Janos relates that LBJ told him: 1. "that the assassination in Dallas had been part of a conspiracy; 2. "I never believed that Oswald acted alone . . .; 3. "we had been operating a damned Murder Inc. in the Carribean." The presence of the vice president 2 cars behind the president in the parade in Dallas was a fundamental breach of the level of security normally adhered to by the Secret Service. He took the experience back to the White House and never forgot its meaning. He could just as easily be snuffed out if he ever got out of line. Then there follows a most curious and confused explanation by Hoover of the three shots fired: "the President was hit by the first and third bullets and the second hit the Governor". Obviously Hoover did not yet know about the injury suffered by James Tague. Tague's face was nicked by a bullet fragment (or a fragment of the curb it hit) which missed the limousene entirely and struck the curb at his feet, approximatety 160 feet past the location of the president's car. This shot would end up having to be one of "the three bullets fired" in the official story. Johnson then explicitly asks again "were they aimed at the President." It would appear that LBJ needed repeated assurance by Hoover that no one had intended to shoot him. Hoover then says a mouthful when he states "I further advised him that we have also tested the fact you could fire those three shots in three seconds." Apparently they did not yet understand the implications of the Zapruder film (or perhaps they were confident they would be successful in never allowing the public to gain any kind of access to it) and that it would be used as a clock. Probably the most confused statements Hoover recounts making are when he describes for Johnson's benefit how Connally was hit: "I explained that Connally turned to the President when the first shot was fired and in that turning he got hit. The President then asked, if Connally had not been in his seat, would the President have been hit by the second shot. I said yes." All we can conclude about this muddled explanation is that Hoover was doing his best to explain things that he himself did not understand or appreciate the complexity of. Hoover goes on to claim they found the gun and three shells on the fifth floor. As you can see at this point, the number of variations on what would become the official cover story are quite numerous. All of the the facts of the assassination were working against them. They had a story all worked out--3 seconds, 3 shots, fifth floor--and yet they didn't know the facts. Fletcher Prouty commented on this issue to me while we were discussing this memo recently. "It reminds me so much of when the U-2 was lost and the guys from NASA began to explain the U-2 flight until a couple of days later when somebody told them, `hey--it wasn't a NASA flight, we can't do it that way.' And they began to change the cover story. But then Kruschev said, `look, I've got the pilot, I know the story.' The U-2 boys used to work across the hall from me--I'd see them coming and going--oh they were shattered, because their cover story had been totally wrong. So Hoover is in the same kind of a box here--he is trying to explain something that is nothing but a cover story, and almost everytime he turns around, he finds theres another hole in it." Near the end Johnson extolls the virtues of his relationship to Hoover stating "I was more than head of the FBI - I was his brother and personal friend; that he knew I did not want anything to happen to his family; that he has more confidence in me than anybody in town." Pretty laudatory words which substantiate the unusally close rapport these two men had. Then Hoover writes that Johnson tells him "he would not embroil me in a jurisdictional dispute. . . " This was the reference to Bobby Kennedy and the pre-empting of any other legitimate, independent and official investigation that would NOT be under the control of the FBI. They would see to it that there would not be the kind of "rash of investigations" Hoover said at the beginning of this meeting "would be a three-ring circus." It is a known fact that in his later years Hoover's meglomania approached epic proportions. He had various reasons why he did not want any independent investigation which would *not* be dependent upon his agency for the collection of data and use of his investigative staff. Johnson was feeling quite vulnerable in these first days and was very dependent on Hoover to tell him what to do concerning how to consolidate his position and "reassure" the nation the assassination was not political in any way, but rather the random occurence of a lone sick mind. That was the only approach to take if they wanted to avoid having to deal with why Kennedy had been killed. By de-politicizing the assassination, they were able to ignore the basic question of why. This memorandum shows that the people in the federal government who were responsible for creating the Warren Commission, and giving it only a very selected and specific set of "data" by which they reached the conclusions that became the official report, that they did not start with the final cover story--they created it later because even Hoover and Johnson didn't know about it a week after the event. They were still making things up a week later. It goes back to the old truth that it's a big mistake to overestimate the abilities and knowledge of people--even in high office. They can make pretty stupid mistakes and then when they have to recant their stories, you are left with the kind of contrivance we know as the Warren Report. --ratitor -- daveus rattus yer friendly neighborhood ratman KOYAANISQATSI ko.yan.nis.qatsi (from the Hopi Language) n. 1. crazy life. 2. life in turmoil. 3. life out of balance. 4. life disintegrating. 5. a state of life that calls for another way of living. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON __, D.C. 1:39 p.m. November 29, 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON MR. BELMONT MR. MOHR MR. CONRAD MR. DE LOACH MR. EVANS MR. ROSEN MR. SULLIVAN The President called and asked if I am familiar with the proposed group they are trying to get to study my report - two from the House, two from the Senate, two from the courts, and a couple of outsiders. I replied that I had not heard of that but had seen reports from the Senate Investigating Committee. The President stated he wanted to get by just with my file and my report. I told him I thought it would be very bad to have a rash of investigations. He then indicated the only way to stop it is to appoint a high-level committee to evaluate my report and tell the House and Senate not to go ahead with the investigation. I stated that would be a three-ring circus. The President then asked what I think about Allen Dulles, and I replied that he is a good man. He then asked about John McCloy, and I stated I am not as enthusiastic about McCloy, that he is a good man but I am not so certain as to the matter of publicity he might want. The President then mentioned General (Lauris) Norstad, and I said he is a good man. He said in the House he might try (Hale) Boggs and (Gerald R.) Ford and in the Senate (Richard B.) Russell and (John Sherman) Cooper. I asked him about Cooper and he indicated Cooper of Kentucky whom he described as a judicial man, stating he would not want (Jacob K.) Javits. I agreed on this point. He then reiterated Ford of Michigan, and I indicated I know of him but do not know him and had never seen him except on television the other day and that he handled himself well on television. I indicated that I do know Boggs. Johnson, President Lyndon B. Assassination of President John F. Kennedy Presidential Commission on Assassination of President John F. Kennedy Security - Presidential Presidential Conferences Presidential Travel Security Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, November 29, 1963 Conrad, DeLoach, Evans, Rosen, Sullivan The President then mentioned that (Walter) Jenkins had told him that I have designated Mr. DeLoach to work with them as he had on the Hill. He indicated they appreciated that and just wanted to tell me they consider Mr. DeLoach as high class as I do, and that they salute me for knowing how to pick good men. I advised the President that we hope to have the investigation wrapped up today but probably won't have it before the first of the week as an angle in Mexico is giving trouble - the matter of Oswald's getting $6500 from the Cuban Embassy and coming back to this country with it; that we are not able to prove that fact; that we have information he was there on September 18 and we are able to prove he was in New Orleans on that date; that a story came in changing the date to September 28 and he was in Mexico on the 28th. I related that the police have again arrested Duran, a member of the Cuban Embassy; that they will hold her two or three days; will confront her with the original informant; and will also try a lie detector test on her. The President then inquired if I pay any attention to the lie detector test. I answered that I would not pay 100% attention to them; that it was only a psychological asset in investigation; that I would not want to be a part of sending a man to the chair on a lie detector test. I explained that we have used them in bank investigations and a person will confess before the lie detector test is finished, more or less fearful it will show him guilty. I said the lie detector test has this psychological advantage. I further stated that it is a misnomer to call it a lie detector since the evaluation of the chart made by the machine is made by a human being and any human being is apt to make the wrong interpretation. I stated, if Oswald had lived and had take a lie detector test, this with the evidence we have would have added that much strength to the case; that these is no question he is the man. I also told him that Rubenstein down there has offered to take a lie detector test but his lawyer must be consulted first; that I doubt the lawyer will allow him to do so; that he has a West Coast lawyer somewhat like the Edward Bennett Williams type and almost as much of a shyster. The President asked if we have any relationship between the two (Oswald and Rubenstein) as yet. I replied that at the present time we have - 2 - Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, November 29, 1963 Conrad, DeLoach, Evans, Rosen, Sullivan not; that there was a story that the fellow had been in Rubenstein's nightclub but it has not been confirmed. I told the President that Rubenstein is a very seedy character, had a bad record - street brawls, fights, etc.; that in Dallas, if a fellow came into his nightclub and could not pay his bill completely, Rubenstein would beat him up and throw him out; that he did not drink or smoke; that he was an egomaniac; that he likes to be in the limelight; knew all of the police officers in the white light district; let them come in and get food and liquor, etc.; and that is how I think he got into police headquarters. I said if they ever made any move, the pictures did not show it even when they saw him approach and he got right up to Oswald and pressed the pistol against Oswald's stomach; that neither officer on either side made any effort to grab Rubenstein - not until after the pistol was fired. I said, secondly, the chief of police admits he moved Oswald in the morning as a convenience and at the request of motion picture people who wanted daylight. I said insofar as tying Rubenstein and Oswald together, we have not yet done so; that there are a number of stories which tied Oswald to the Civil Liberties Union in New York in which he applied for membership and to the Fair Play for Cuba Committee which is pro-Castro, directed by communists, and financed to some extent by the Castro Government. The President asked how many shots were fired, and I told him three. He then asked if any were fired at him. I said no, that three shots were fired at the President and we have them. I stated that our ballistic experts were able to prove the shots were fired by this gun; that the President was hit by the first and third bullets and the second hit the Governor; that there were three shots; that one complete bullet rolled out of the President's head; that it tore a large part of the President's head off; that in trying to massage his heart on the way into the hospital they loosened the bullet which fell on the stretcher and we have that. He then asked were they aimed at the President. I replied they were aimed at the President, no question about that. I further advised him that we have also tested the fact you could fire those three shots in three seconds. I explained that there is a story out that there must have been more than one man to fire several shots but we have proven it could be done by one man. The President then asked how it happened that Connally was hit. I explained that Connally turned to the President when the first shot was fired and in that turning he got hit. The President then asked, if Connally had not been in his seat, would the President have been hit by the second shot. I said yes. - 3 - Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, November 29, 1963 Conrad, DeLoach, Evans, Rosen, Sullivan I related that on the fifth floor of the building where we found the gun and the wrapping paper we found three empty shells that had been fired and one that had not been fired. that he had four but didn't fire the fourth; then threw the gun aside; went down the steps; was seen by a police officer; the manager told the officer that Oswald was all right, worked there; they let him go; he got on a bus; went to his home and got a jacket; then came back downtown, walking; the police officer who was killed stopped him, not knowing who he was; and he fired and killed the police officer. The President asked if we can prove that and I answered yes. I further related that Oswald then walked another two blocks; went to the theater; the woman selling tickets was so suspicious - said he was carrying a gun when he went into the theater - that she notified the police; the police and our man went in and located Oswald. I told him they had quite a struggle with Oswald but that he was subdued and shown out and taken to police headquarters. I advised the President that apparently Oswald had come down the steps from the fifth floor; that apparently the elevator was not used. The President then indicated our conclusions are: (1) he is the one who did it; (2) after the President was hit, Governor Connally was hit; (3) the President would have been hit three times except for the fact that Governor Connally turned after the first shot and was hit by the second; (4) whether he was connected with the Cuban operation with money we are trying to nail down. I told him that is what we are trying to nail down; that we have copies of the correspondence; that none of the letters dealt with any indication of violence or assassination; that they were dealing with a visa to go back to Russia. I advised the President that his wife had been very hostile, would not cooperate and speaks only Russian; that yesterday she said , if we could give assurance she would be allowed to remain in the country, she would cooperate; and that I told our agents to give that assurance and sent a Russian-speaking agent to Dallas last night to interview her. I said I do not know whether or not she has any information but we would learn what we could. The President asked how Oswald had access to the fifth floor of the building. I replied that he had access to all floors. The President asked where was his office and I stated he did not have any particular place; that he - 4 - Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, November 29, 1963 Conrad, DeLoach, Evans, Rosen, Sullivan was not situated in any particular place; that he was just a general packer of requisitions that came in for books from Dallas schools; that he would have had proper access to the fifth and sixth floors whereas usually the employees were down on lower floors. The President then inquired if anybody saw him on the fifth floor, and I stated he was seen by one of the workmen before the assassination. The President then asked if we got a picture taken of him shooting the gun and I said no. He asked what was the picture sold for $25,000, and I advised him this was a picture of the parade showing Mrs. Kennedy crawling out of the back seat; that there was no Secret Service Agent on the back of the car; that in the past they have added steps on the back of the car and usually had an agent on either side standing on the bumper; that I did not know why this was not done - that the President may have requested it; that the bubble top was not up but I understand the bubble top was not worth anything because it was made entirely of plastic; that I had learned much to my surprise that the Secret Service does not have any armored cars. The President asked if I have a bulletproof car and I told him I most certainly have. I told him we use it here for my own use and, whenever we have any raids, we make use of the bulletproof car on them. I explained that it is a limousine which has been armorplated and that it looks exactly like any other car. I stated I think the President ought to have a bulletproof car; that from all I understand the Secret Service has had two cars with metal plates underneath the car to take care of hand grenades or bombs thrown out on the street. I said this is European; that there have been several such attempts on DeGaulle's life; but they do not do that in this country; that all assassinations have been with guns; and for that reason I think very definitely the President ought to always ride in a bulletproof car; that it certainly would prevent anything like this ever happening again; but that I do not mean a sniper could not snipe him from a window if he were exposed. The President asked if I meant on his ranch he should be in a bulletproof car. I said I would think so; that the little car we rode around in when I was at the ranch should be bulletproofed; that it ought to be done very quietly. I told him we have four bulletproof cars in the Bureau: one on the West Coast, one in New York and two here. I said this could be done quietly without publicity and without pictures taken of it if handled properly and I think he should have one on his ranch. - 5 - Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, November 29, 1963 Conrad, DeLoach, Evans, Rosen, Sullivan The President then asked if I think all the entrances should be guarded. I replied by all means, that he had almost to be in the capacity of a so-called prisoner because without that security anything could be done. I told him lots of phone calls had been received over the last four or five days about threats on his life; that I talked to the Attorney General about the funeral procession from the White House to the Cathedral; that I was opposed to it. The President remarked that the Secret Service told them not to but the family wanted to do it. I stated that was what the Attorney General told me but I was very much opposed to it. I further related that I saw the procession from the Capitol to the White House on Pennsylvania and, while they had police standing on the curbs, when the parade came, the police turned around and looked at the parade. The President then stated he is going to take every precaution he can; that he wants to talk to me; and asked if I would put down my thoughts. He stated I was more than head of the FBI - I was his brother and personal friend; that he knew I did not want anything to happen to his family; that he has more confidence in me than anybody in town; that he would not embroil me in a jurisdictional dispute; but that he did want to have my thoughts on the matter to advocate as his own opinion. I stated I would be glad to do this for him and that I would do anything I can. The President expressed his appreciation. Very truly yours, [signed J. E. H.] John Edgar Hoover Director - 6 - Article 16238 of alt.activism: From: dave@ratmandu.esd.sgi.com (dave "who can do? ratmandu!" ratcliffe) Newsgroups: alt.activism,alt.conspiracy.jfk,alt.conspiracy Subject: FRUS, Vietnam v.IV, Aug-Dec'63: NSAM #263 (document #194) Keywords: an informed citizenry will behave in a responsible manner - Jefferson Message-ID: <1992Feb25.143836.15031@odin.corp.sgi.com> Date: 25 Feb 92 14:38:36 GMT Sender: news@odin.corp.sgi.com (Net News) Organization: Silicon Graphics, Inc. Lines: 79 Nntp-Posting-Host: ratmandu.esd.sgi.com NSAM #263 though very brief, was critical in setting down exactly what President Kennedy had begun to implement with regard to rejecting the pursuit of a military solution to the conflict in Vietnam. Although this Memorandum is short, it directly refers to and builds from the Taylor/McNamara report of October 2, 1963 (document #167 which follows this post) as well as document numbers 179 and 181 (following #167). NSAM #263 was signed by McGeorge Bundy, JFK's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Bundy's role was very heavy in the Kennedy administration in ways JFK, apparently, was not aware of. His signature is also the only one at the bottom of NSAM #273, approved by LBJ just 4 days after JFK was murdered. NSAM #273 was the first evidence of changes in the policies President Kennedy had been putting into place. It did not take long for the new administration to begin to alter JFK's policies, even though LBJ's favorite and most commonly use catch-phrase in the days and months after the assassination--as well as during his own 1964 campaign--was "let us continue," the implication being that Johnson's only interest was in continuing the policies and agendas set forth by his predecessor. __________________________________________________________________ 194. National Security Action Memorandum No. 263 [1] Washington, October 11, 1963. TO Secretary of State Secretary of Defense Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff SUBJECT South Vietnam At a meeting on October 5, 1963,[2] the President considered the recommendations contained in the report of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor on their mission to South Vietnam. The President approved the military recommendations contained in Section I B (1-3) of the report, but directed that no formal announcement be made of the implementation of plans to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963. After discussion of the remaining recommendations of the report, the President approved an instruction to Ambassador Lodge which is set forth in State Department telegram No. 534 to Saigon.[3] McGeorge Bundy ___________ [1] Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAMs. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Administrator of AID also received copies. Also printed in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 12, p. 578. [2] See Document 179. [3] Document 181. -- daveus rattus yer friendly neighborhood ratman KOYAANISQATSI ko.yan.nis.qatsi (from the Hopi Language) n. 1. crazy life. 2. life in turmoil. 3. life out of balance. 4. life disintegrating. 5. a state of life that calls for another way of living. Article 16239 of alt.activism: From: dave@ratmandu.esd.sgi.com (dave "who can do? ratmandu!" ratcliffe) Newsgroups: alt.activism,alt.conspiracy.jfk,alt.conspiracy Subject: FRUS, Vietnam v.IV, Aug-Dec'63: Taylor/McNamara Report (doc. #167) Keywords: if we don't read available books, it won't matter about the rest Message-ID: <1992Feb25.144002.15093@odin.corp.sgi.com> Date: 25 Feb 92 14:40:02 GMT Sender: news@odin.corp.sgi.com (Net News) Organization: Silicon Graphics, Inc. Lines: 565 Nntp-Posting-Host: ratmandu.esd.sgi.com This is the complete "Report of McNamara-Taylor Mission to South Vietnam". It was fundamental to National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) #263, approved by JFK on October 5, 1963. Kennedy approved the military recommendations contained in Section I B (1-3), below. NSAM #263 was the the culmination of many months of seeking a solution to the yawning quagmire of Vietnam that Kennedy had concluded must not be solved militarily by committing U.S. combat troops. Kennedy had a great deal to do with the creation of this report. There had been many months of work already completed before he ever even sent McNamara and Taylor to Vietnam in late September to bring back the "report" which had already been created from the visit Major General Victor H. Krulak and a senior Foreign Service officer, Joseph Mendenhall, made to Vietnam in early September under Kennedy's direction. JFK knew exactly what he wanted it to say, and dispatched Krulak knowing that he would come home with all the current data essential for final decision-making. But Kennedy wanted to move the decision level up to the top and so sent McNamara and Taylor. With the McNamara/Taylor report--which Krulak's office wrote--that they publically gave to JFK upon their return, Kennedy had effectively laid the groundwork for the enunciation of his intended plans, formalized three days later in NSAM #263. __________________________________________________________________ 167. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) and the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the President [1] Washington, October 2, 1963. SUBJECT Report of McNamara-Taylor Mission to South Vietnam Your memorandum of 21 September 1963[2] directed that General Taylor and Secretary McNamara proceed to South Vietnam to appraise the military and para-military effort to defeat the Viet Cong and to consider, in consultation with Ambassador Lodge, related political and social questions. You further directed that, if the prognosis in our judgment was not hopeful, we should present our views of what action must be taken by the South Vietnam Government and what steps our Government should take to lead the Vietnamese to that action. Accompanied by representatives of the State Department, CIA, and your Staff, we have conducted an intensive program of visits to key operational areas, supplemented by discussions with U.S. officials in all major U.S. Agencies as well as officials of the GVN and third countries. We have also discussed our findings in detail with Ambassador Lodge, and with General Harkins and Admiral Felt. The following report is concurred in by the Staff Members of the mission as individuals, subject to the exceptions noted. I. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS A. Conclusions. 1. The military campaign has made great progress and continues to progress. 2. There are serious political tensions in Saigon (and perhaps elsewhere in South Vietnam) where the Diem-Nhu government is becoming increasingly unpopular. 3. There is no solid evidence of the possibility of a successful coup, although assassination of Diem or Nhu is always a possibility. 4. Although some, and perhaps an increasing number, of GVN military officers are becoming hostile to the government, they are more hostile to the Viet Cong than to the government and at least for the near future they will continue to perform their military duties. 5. Further repressive actions by Diem and Nhu could change the present favorable military trends. On the other hand, a return to more moderate methods of control and administration, unlikely though it may be, would substantially mitigate the political crisis. 6. It is not clear that pressures exerted by the U.S. will move Diem and Nhu toward moderation. Indeed, pressures may increase their obduracy. But unless such pressures are exerted, they are almost certain to continue past patterns of behavior. B. Recommendations. We recommend that: 1. General Harkins review with Diem the military changes necessary to complete the military campaign in the Northern and Central areas (I, II, and III Corps) by the end of 1964, and in the Delta (IV Corps) by the end of 1965. This review would consider the need for such changes as: a. A further shift of military emphasis and strength to the Delta (IV Corps). b. An increase in the military tempo in all corps areas, so that all combat troops are in the field an average of 20 days out of 30 and static missions are ended. c. Emphasis on "clear and hold operations" instead of terrain sweeps which have little permanent value. d. The expansion of personnel in combat units to full authorized strength. e. The training and arming of hamlet militia to an accelerated rate, especially in the Delta. f. A consolidation of the strategic hamlet program, especially in the Delta, and action to insure that future strategic hamlets are not built until they can be protected, and until civic action programs can be introduced. 2. A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time. 3. In accordance with the program to train progressively Vietnamese to take over military functions, the Defense Department should announce in the very near future presently prepared plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963. This action should be explained in low key as an initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort. 4. The following actions be taken to impress upon Diem our disapproval of his political program. a. Continue to withhold commitment of funds in the commodity import program, but avoid a formal announcement. The potential significance of the withholding of commitments for the 1964 military budget should be brought home to the top military officers in working level contacts between USOM and MACV and the Joint General Staff; up to now we have stated $95 million may be used by the Vietnamese as a planning level for the commodity import program for 1964. Henceforth we could make clear that this is uncertain both because of lack of final appropriation action by the Congress and because of executive policy. b. Suspend approval of the pending AID loans for the Saigon- Cholon Waterworks and Saigon Electric Power Project. We should state clearly that we are doing so as a matter of policy. c. Advise Diem that MAP and CIA support for designated units, now under Colonel Tung's control (mostly held in or near the Saigon area for political reasons) will be cut off unless these units are promptly assigned to the full authority of the Joint General Staff and transferred to the field. d. Maintain the present purely "correct" relations with the top GVN, and specifically between the Ambassador and Diem. Contact between General Harkins and Diem and Defense Secretary Thuan on military matters should not, however, be suspended, as this remains an important channel of advice. USOM and USIA should also seek to maintain contacts where these are needed to push forward programs in support of the effort in the field, while taking care not to cut across the basic picture of U.S. disapproval and uncertainty of U.S. aid intentions. We should work with the Diem government but not support it.[3] As we pursue these courses of action, the situation must be closely watched to see what steps Diem is taking to reduce repressive practices and to improve the effectiveness of the military effort. We should set no fixed criteria, but recognize that we would have to decide in 2-4 months whether to move to more drastic action or try to carry on with Diem even if he had not taken significant steps. 5. At this time, no initiative should be taken to encourage actively a change in government. Our policy should be to seek urgently to identify and build contacts with an alternative leadership if and when it appears. 6. The following statement be approved as current U.S. policy toward South Vietnam and constitute the substance of the government position to be presented both in Congressional testimony and in public statements. a. The security of South Vietnam remains vital to United States security. For this reason, we adhere to the overriding objective of denying this country to Communism and of suppressing the Viet Cong insurgency as promptly as possible. (By suppressing the insurgency we mean reducing it to proportions manageable by the national security forces of the GVN, unassisted by the presence of U.S. military forces.) We believe the U.S. part of the task can be completed by the end of 1965, the terminal date which we are taking as the time objective of our counterinsurgency programs. b. The military program in Vietnam has made progress and is sound in principle. c. The political situation in Vietnam remains deeply serious. It has not yet significantly affected the military effort, but could do so at some time in the future. If the result is a GVN ineffective in the conduct of the war, the U.S. will review its attitude toward support for the government. Although we are deeply concerned by repressive practices, effective performance in the conduct of the war should be the determining factor in our relations with the GVN. d. The U.S. has expressed its disapproval of certain actions of the Diem-Nhu regime and will do so again if required. Our policy is to seek to bring about the abandonment of repression because of its effect on the popular will to resist. Our means consist of expressions of disapproval and the withholding of support from GVN activities that are not clearly contributing to the war effort. We will use these means as required to assure an effective military program. [Here follow Sections II, "Military Situation and Trends," III, "Economic Situation and Trends," IV, "Political Situation and Trends," and V, "Effect on Political Tension."] VI. OVERALL EVALUATION From the above analysis it is clear that the situation requires a constant effort by the U.S. to obtain a reduction of political tensions and improved performance by the Vietnamese Government. We cannot say with assurance whether the effort against the Viet Cong will ultimately fail in the absence of major political improvements. However, it does seem clear that after another period of repressive action progress may be reduced and indeed reversed. Although the present momentum might conceivably continue to carry the effort forward even if Diem remains in power and political tensions continue, any significant slowing in the rate of progress would surely have a serious effect on U.S. popular support for the U.S. effort. VII. U.S. LEVERAGES TO OBTAIN DESIRED CHANGES IN THE DIEM REGIME A. Conduct of U.S. Representatives. U.S. personnel in Saigon might adopt an attitude of coolness toward their Vietnamese counterparts, maintaining only those contacts and communications which are necessary for the actual conduct of operations in the field. To some extent this is the attitude already adopted by the Ambassador himself, but it could be extended to the civilian and military agencies located in Saigon. The effect of such action would be largely psychological. B. Economic Leverage. Together, USOM's Commodity Import Program (CIP) and the PL 480 program account for between 60 and 70 percent of imports into Vietnam. The commitment of funds under the CIP has already been suspended. CIP deliveries result in the generation of piastres, most of which go to the support of the defense budget. It is estimated that CIP pipelines will remain relatively large for some five or six months, and within this time period there would not be a serious material effect. Even within this period, however, the flow of piastres to support the defense budget will gradually begin to decline and the GVN will be forced to draw down its foreign exchange reserves or curtail its military expenditures. Within the domestic economy the existing large pipelines would mean that there would be no material reason for inflation to begin in the short term period. However, the psychological effect of growing realization that the CIP program has been suspended might be substantial in 2-4 months. Saigon has a large number of speculative traders, and although there is considerable police effort to control prices, this might not be able to contain a general trend of speculation and hoarding. Once inflation did develop, it could have a serious effect on the GVN budget and the conduct of the war. Apart from CIP, two major AID projects are up for final approval--the Saigon-Cholon Waterworks ($9 million) and the Saigon Electric Power Project ($4 million). Suspension of these projects would be a possible means of demonstrating to Congress and the world that we disapprove of GVN policies and are not providing additional aid not directly essential to the war effort. C. Paramilitary and Other Assistance. (1) USOM assistance to the Combat Police and USOM and USIS assistance to the Director General of Information and the ARVN PsyWar Program could be suspended. These projects involve a relatively small amount of local currency but their suspension, particularly in the case of USIS, might adversely affect programs which the U.S. wishes to see progress. (2) However, there would be merit in a gesture aimed at Colonel Tung, the Special Forces Commander, whose forces in or near Saigon played a conspicuous part in the pagoda affair and are a continuing support for Diem. Colonel Tung commands a mixed complex of forces, some of which are supported by MAP and others presently through CIA. All of those now in or near Saigon were trained either for combat missions or for special operations into North Vietnam and Laos. Purely on grounds of their not being used for their proper missions, the U.S. could inform Diem that we would cut off MAP and CIA support unless they were placed directly under Joint General Staff and were committed to field operations. The practical effect of the cut-off would probably be small. The equipment cannot be taken out of the hands of the units, and the pay provided to some units could be made up from the GVN budget. Psychologically, however, the significance of the gesture might be greater. At the least it would remove one target of press criticism of the U.S., and would probably also be welcomed by the high military officers in Vietnam, and certainly by the disaffected groups in Saigon. At the same time, support should continue, but through General Harkins rather than CIA, for border surveillance and other similar field operations that are contributing to the war effort. We have weighed this cut-off action carefully. It runs a risk that Colonel Tung would refuse to carry out external operations against the Lao corridor and North Vietnam. It might also limit CIA's access to the military. However, U.S. liaison with high military officers could probably be fully maintained through the U.S. military advisors. On balance, we conclude that these possible disadvantages are outweighed by the gains implicit in this action. (3) Consideration has been given both by USOM and the military (principally the JCS in Washington) to the possibility of redirecting economic and military assistance in such a fashion as to bypass the central government in Saigon. Military studies have shown the technical feasibility, though with great difficulty and cost, of supplying the war effort in the countryside over lines of communications which do not involve Saigon, and it is assumed that the same conclusions would apply to USOM deliveries to the filed under the rural strategic hamlet program. However, there is a consensus among U.S. agencies in Saigon that such an effort is not practical in the face of determined opposition by the GVN unless, of course, a situation had developed where the central government was no longer in control of some areas of the country. Nor is it at all clear that such diversion would operate to build up the position of the military or to cut down Nhu's position. D. Propaganda. Although the capability of USIS to support the United States campaign of pressure against the regime would be small, the Ambassador believes consideration must be given to the content and timing of the United States pronouncements outside the country. He has already suggested the use of the Voice of America in stimulating, in its broadcasts to Vietnamese, discussions of democratic political philosophies. This medium could be used to exploit a wide range of ascending political pressure. In addition, a phased program of United States official pronouncements could be developed for use in conjunction with the other leverages as they are applied. We must recognize the possibility that such actions may incite Diem to strong countermeasures. E. The Leverage of Conditioning Our Military Aid on Satisfactory Progress. Coupled with all the above there is the implicit leverage embodied in our constantly making it plain to Diem and other that the long term continuation of military aid is conditioned upon the Vietnamese Government demonstrating a satisfactory level of progress toward defeat of the insurgency. F. Conclusions. A program of limited pressures, such as the CIP suspension, will not have large material effects on the GVN or the war effort, at least for 2-4 months. The psychological effects could be greater, and there is some evidence that the suspension is already causing concern to Diem. However, the effect of pressures that can be carried out over an extended period without detriment to the war effort is probably limited with respect to the possibility of Diem making necessary changes. We have not analyzed with care what the effect might be of a far more intensive level of pressure such as cessation of MAP deliveries or long continued suspension of the commodity import program. If the Diem government should fail to make major improvements, serious consideration would have to be given to this possible course of action, but we believe its effect on the war effort would be so serious--in psychological if not in immediate material terms--that it should not be undertaken at the present time. VIII. COUP POSSIBILITIES A. Prospects of a Spontaneous Coup. The prospects of an early spontaneous replacement of the Diem Regime are not high. The two principal sources of such an attempt, the senior military officers and the students, have both been neutralized by a combination of their own inability and the regime's effective countermeasures of control. The student organizations have been emasculated. The students themselves have displayed more emotion than determination and they are apparently being handled with sufficient police sophistication to avoid an explosion. The generals appear to have little stomach for the difficult job of secretly arranging the necessary coalescence of force to upset the Regime. Diem/Nhu are keenly aware of the capability of the generals to take over the country, utilizing the tremendous power now vested in the military forces. They, therefore, concentrate their manipulative talent on the general officers, by transfers, and by controls over key units and their locations. They are aware that these actions may reduce efficiency, but they tolerate it rather than risk the prospect that they be overthrown and their social revolution frustrated. They have established a praetorian guard to guarantee considerable bloodshed if any attack is made. The generals have seen slim hope of surmounting these difficulties without prohibitive risk to themselves, the unity of the Army and the Establishment itself. Despite these unfavorable prospects for action in the short term, new factors could quickly arise, such as the death of Diem or an unpredictable and even irrational attack launched by a junior officer group, which would call urgently for U.S. support or counteraction. In such a case, the best alternative would appear to be the support of constitutional continuity in the person of the Vice President, behind whom arrangements could be developed for a more permanent replacement after a transitional period. B. Prospects for Improvement under an Alternative Government. The prospects that a replacement regime would be an improvement appear to be about 50-50.[4] Initially, only a strongly authoritarian regime would be able to pull the government together and maintain order. In view of the pre-eminent role of the military in Vietnam today, it is probable that this role would be filled by a military officer, perhaps taking power after the selective process of a junta dispute. Such an authoritarian military regime, perhaps after an initial period of euphoria at the departure of Diem/Nhu, would be apt to entail a resumption of the repression at least of Diem, the corruption of the Vietnamese Establishment before Diem, and an emphasis on conventional military rather than social, economic and political considerations, with at least an equivalent degree of xenophobic nationalism. These features must be weighed, however, against the possible results of growing dominance or succession by Nhu, which would continue and even magnify the present dissension, unhappiness and unrest. C. Possible U.S. Actions. Obviously, clear and explicit U.S. support could make a great difference to the chances of a coup. However, at the present time we lack a clear picture of what acceptable individuals might be brought to the point of action, or what kind of government might emerge. We therefore need an intensive clandestine effort, under the Ambassador's direction, to establish necessary contacts to allow the U.S. to continuously appraise coup prospects. If and when we have a better picture, the choice will still remain difficult whether we would prefer to take our chances on a spontaneous coup (assuming some action by Diem and Nhu would trigger it) or to risk U.S. prestige and having the U.S. hand show with a coup group which appeared likely to be a better alternative government. Any regime that was identified from the outset as a U.S. "puppet" would have disadvantages both within South Vietnam and in significant areas of the world, including other underdeveloped nations where the U.S. has a major role. In any case, whether or not it proves to be wise to promote a coup at a later time, we must be ready for the possibility of a spontaneous coup, and this too requires clandestine contacts on an intensive basis. IX. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE POLICIES Broadly speaking, we believe there are three alternative policies the U.S. could pursue to achieve its political and military objectives: 1. Return to avowed support of the Diem regime and attempt to obtain the necessary improvements through persuasion from a posture of "reconciliation." This would not mean any expression of approval of the repressive actions of the regime, but simply that we would go back in practice to business as usual. 2. Follow a policy of selective pressures: "purely correct" relationships at the top official level, continuing to withhold further actions in the commodity import program, and making clear our disapproval of the regime. A further element in this policy is letting the present impression stand that the U.S. would not be averse to a change of Government--although we would not take any immediate actions to initiate a coup. 3. Start immediately to promote a coup by high ranking military officers. This policy might involve more extended suspensions of aid and sharp denunciations of the regime's actions so timed as to fit with coup prospects and planning. Our analysis of these alternatives is as follows: 1. Reconciliation. We believe that this course of action would be ineffective from the standpoint of events in South Vietnam alone, and would also greatly increase our difficulties in justifying the present U.S. support effort both to the Congress and generally to significant third nations. We are most unlikely, after recent events, to get Diem to make the necessary changes; on the contrary, he would almost certainly regard our reconciliation as an evidence that the U.S. would sit still for just about anything he did. The result would probably be not only a continuation of the destructive elements in the Regime's policies but a return to larger scale repressions as and when Diem and Nhu thought they were necessary. The result would probably be sharp deterioration in the military situation in a fairly short period. 2. Selective Pressures. We have examined numerous possibilities of applying pressures to Diem in order to incline him to the direction of our policies. The most powerful instrument at our disposal is the control of military and economic aid but any consideration of its use reveals the double-edged nature of its effects. Any long-term reduction of aid cannot but have an eventual adverse effect on the military campaign since both the military and the economic programs have been consciously designed and justified in terms of their contribution to the war effort. Hence, immediate reductions must be selected carefully and be left in effect only for short periods. We believe that the present level of pressures is causing, and will cause, Diem some concern, while at the same time not significantly impairing the military effort. We are not hopeful that this level (or indeed any level) of pressure will actually induce Diem to remove Nhu from the picture completely. However, there is a better chance that Diem will at least be deterred from resuming large scale oppressions. At the same time, there are various factors that set a time limit to pursuing this course of action in its present form. Within 2-4 months we have to make critical decisions with the GVN about its 1964 budget and our economic support level. In addition, there is a significant and growing possibility that even the present limited actions in the economic field--more for psychological than for economic reasons--would start a wave of speculation and inflation that would be difficult to control or bring back into proper shape. As to when we would reverse our present course, the resumption of the full program of economic and military aid should be tied to the actions of the Diem government. As a foundation for the development of our long-term economic and military aid programs, we believe it may be possible to develop specific military objectives to be achieved on an agreed schedule. The extent to which such objectives are met, in conjunction with an evaluation of the regime's political performance, would determine the level of aid for the following period. 3. Organizing a Coup. For the reasons stated earlier, we believe this course of action should not be undertaken at the present time. On balance we consider that the most promising course of action to adopt at this time is an application of selective short-term pressures, principally economic, and the conditioning of long-term aid on the satisfactory performance by the Diem government in meeting military and political objectives which in the aggregate equate to the requirements of final victory. The specific actions recommended in Section I of this report are consistent with this policy. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Secretary of Defense [5] ___________ [1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, Memos and Miscellaneous. Top Secret. Also printed in "United States-Vietnam Relations," 1945-1967, Book 12, pp. 554-573. [2] Document 142. [3] Mr. Colby believes that the official "correct" relationship should be supplemented by selected and restricted unofficial and personal relationships with individuals in the GVN, approved by the Ambassador, where persuasion could be fruitful without derogation of the official U.S. posture. [Footnote in the source text.] [4] Mr. Sullivan (State) believes that a replacement regime which does not suffer from the overriding danger of Nhu's ambition to establish a totalitarian state (the control of which he might easily lose to the Communists in the course of his flirtations) would be inevitably better than the current regime even if the former did have the deficiencies described. [Footnote in the source text.] [5] The source text bears no signatures. -- daveus rattus yer friendly neighborhood ratman KOYAANISQATSI ko.yan.nis.qatsi (from the Hopi Language) n. 1. crazy life. 2. life in turmoil. 3. life out of balance. 4. life disintegrating. 5. a state of life that calls for another way of living. Article 16240 of alt.activism: From: dave@ratmandu.esd.sgi.com (dave "who can do? ratmandu!" ratcliffe) Newsgroups: alt.activism,alt.conspiracy.jfk,alt.conspiracy Subject: FRUS, Vietnam v.IV, Aug-Dec'63: doc #179 (ancilary to #194--NSAM #263) Keywords: an informed citizenry will behave in a responsible manner - Jefferson Message-ID: <1992Feb25.144515.15210@odin.corp.sgi.com> Date: 25 Feb 92 14:45:15 GMT Sender: news@odin.corp.sgi.com (Net News) Organization: Silicon Graphics, Inc. Lines: 164 Nntp-Posting-Host: ratmandu.esd.sgi.com This memorandum, referred to at the beginning of NSAM #263 (doc #194), describes a conference held 3 days after the return by Robert McNamara and Maxwell Taylor from a fact-finding mission to Vietnam, and, immediately upon their arrival at the White House, presentation of the McNamara/Taylor report to President Kennedy. The discussion here centered on ways of applying selected pressure on the Diem government to be more responsive to the needs of its people, and to stop the imprisonment and persecution of many in South Vietnam, particularly the Buddists who were very much politically alligned with the peasants and very public in their protests. This strategy of pinpointing the most effect means of applying such persuasive pressure is summed up in the sentence, "The most likely and desirable result of any U.S. pressures would be to bring Diem to talk seriously to Lodge about the whole range of issues between us." __________________________________________________________________ 179. Memorandum for the Files of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 5, 1963, 9:30 a.m. [1] SUBJECT Presidential Conference on South Vietnam A conference on South Vietnam was held in the Cabinet Room at 9:30 a.m., October 5, 1963. Present were the Vice President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Harriman, General Taylor, Mr. McCone, Administrator Bell, Mr. Bundy and Mr. Forrestal. The meeting discussed the report of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor and considered draft instructions to Ambassador Lodge. The President asked what would be the impact of a suspension of the Commodity Import Program. Mr. Bell replied that the Commodity Import Program accounted for approximately 40 percent of South Vietnam's imports. He emphasized that the real effect of a suspension would be an interruption of the flow of commodities into the country. A suspension would not necessarily have an impact upon the government budget. A continued suspension, however, would have a serious effect on the economy. Mr. McCone said that he believed that the principal effect of a suspension would be to cause an economic crisis in the Saigon business community. This would be more pronounced than the political effects such a suspension might have upon Diem and Nhu. Secretary McNamara pointed out that since we have already suspended the funding of imports under the program, it would be difficult to resume now. The President agreed and asked Mr. Bell what would be the impact of a suspension of the two capital projects, the Saigon water works and the Saigon power project. Mr. Bell replied that a suspension of these projects would not have an effect upon the economy or upon the military effort. But, he pointed out, both projects were already started and near their final stages of completion. The water project was complete except for the construction of a filtration plant; and the power station needed only a building to house the turbines, which had already been ordered. The President suggested that the contractors in each case simply be told that a decision on the final stages of the two projects would be delayed for policy reasons for an indefinite, but not necessarily long, period of time. Our public posture should be that the two projects were being suspended for further review. The President noted that the recommendations with respect to the PL 480 program were tantamount to taking no substantive action at this time. In this connection he suggested that, for the present, we say only that we were not in a position to make forward decisions. The discussion then turned to recommendations concerning a suspension of assistance to those forces under Colonel Tung which were located in Saigon rather than in the field. The President emphasized that we should make clear the basis upon which we were suspending aid to these forces, i.e. that they were not directly contributing to the war effort and therefore we could not support them. The President asked Secretary McNamara for his opinion on the nature of the controversy between the Buddhists and the Government. Secretary McNamara replied that in his opinion the controversy was now more political than it was religious. After a discussion with General Taylor, the President observed that the military improvements which we wished to press upon Diem be taken up as soon as possible by General Harkins rather than by Ambassador Lodge. It would be preferable if discussions of political improvements and possible U.S. pressure actions were undertaken by Ambassador Lodge. The President also said that we should not consider the political recommendations to be in the nature of a hard and fast list of demands, and that this point should be made more clear in the draft instructions.[2] The most likely and desirable result of any U.S. pressures would be to bring Diem to talk seriously to Lodge about the whole range of issues between us. The Secretary of State agreed that the military matters should be pressed and that they stood the best chance of being accepted by the GVN. Nevertheless, he felt that we should not forget the importance of obtaining an improvement in the political climate in Saigon. The President said that no formal or public statement should be made at the conclusion of the meeting. Instead he felt that the Secretaries of State and Defense in executive session before Congressional committees next week should confine themselves to saying that U.S. programs were under continuing review in light of the President's previously announced policy that we supported those things which furthered the war effort and would not support those things which do not. It was agreed that Section 5 of the McNamara/Taylor Report be approved and that appropriate instructions implementing the recommendation in this section be transmitted via CAS channels. Mr. McCone said that any such activity should be carried on under the tightest security under the direction of the CAS station chief. The President agreed, but added that these activities should be subject to the Ambassador's general guidance. The President also said that our decision to remove 1,000 U.S. advisors by December of this year should not be raised formally with Diem. Instead the action should be carried out routinely as part of our general posture of withdrawing people when they are no longer needed. There is attached to this memorandum a copy of the McNamara/Taylor report and the final telegraphic instructions to Ambassador Lodge.[3] M. V. Forrestal ___________ [1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings on Vietnam. Top Secret. Drafted by Forrestal on October 7. Forrestal sent this memorandum to Bromley Smith under cover of a memorandum of October 8 which reads in part as follows: "I also attach a draft NSAM together with a memorandum to Secretary McNamara. If the NSAM looks okay to you, will you shoot it off to McNamara for his clearance? "Should copies of the NSAM go to anybody else (Secretary Dillon, the Attorney General, the Vice President)? I should think perhaps not." Smith indicated on the memorandum that he had obtained McNamara's clearance and agreed with Forrestal that no copies should be sent to any one else. The draft NSAM referred to comprised a draft report to the NSC, October 4 (see footnote 3, Document 174), an annex to the report (Document 175), and a draft of telegram 534 to Saigon (Document 181), which was essentially the draft report to the NSC in cable form. [2] The changes made in the draft at the instruction of President are explained in the footnotes to Document 181. See also infra. [3] Neither attached, but see Documents 167 and 181. -- daveus rattus yer friendly neighborhood ratman KOYAANISQATSI ko.yan.nis.qatsi (from the Hopi Language) n. 1. crazy life. 2. life in turmoil. 3. life out of balance. 4. life disintegrating. 5. a state of life that calls for another way of living. Article 16241 of alt.activism: From: dave@ratmandu.esd.sgi.com (dave "who can do? ratmandu!" ratcliffe) Newsgroups: alt.activism,alt.conspiracy.jfk,alt.conspiracy Subject: FRUS, Vietnam v.IV, Aug-Dec'63: doc #181 (ancilary to #194--NSAM #263) Keywords: if we don't read available books, it won't matter about the rest Message-ID: <1992Feb25.144714.15299@odin.corp.sgi.com> Date: 25 Feb 92 14:47:14 GMT Sender: news@odin.corp.sgi.com (Net News) Organization: Silicon Graphics, Inc. Lines: 419 Nntp-Posting-Host: ratmandu.esd.sgi.com The following Telegram to Ambassador Lodge, signed by Secretary of State Rusk, was approved after being slightly modified by President Kennedy (see footnotes 2-6) in NSAM #263 (document #194) signed on October 11. It details a set of strategies the White House wanted Lodge to pursue vis a vis attempts to reverse the evolution toward an increasingly authoritarian Government of Vietnam (GVN). Summarizing: . . . We believe it of great importance that there should be no public impression of a package of sanctions and a package of demands. We are seeking necessary but limited improvements from a government very difficult to move, and we do not wish to encourage unjustified sense of optimism or of triumph from those who wish this situation was easier than it is. In particular, we would prefer press to consider us inactive than to trumpet a posture of "major sanctions" and "sweeping demands." __________________________________________________________________ 181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam [1] Washington, October 5, 1963--5:39 p.m. 534. Eyes only for Ambassador Lodge. 1. Following is overall instruction resulting from NSC consideration of McNamara/Taylor report and recommendations together with those you have submitted in recent weeks. These instructions have the President's personal approval. At any time you feel it is necessary you may state to GVN that you are acting under the specific instructions of the President as recommended by the National Security Council. 2. Actions are designed to indicate to Diem Government our displeasure at its political policies and activities and to create significant uncertainty in that government and in key Vietnamese groups as to future intentions of United States. At same time, actions are designed to have at most slight impact on military or counterinsurgency effort against Viet Cong, at least in short term. 3. The recommendations on negotiations are concerned with what US is after, i.e., GVN action to increase effectiveness of its military effort; to ensure popular support to win war; and to eliminate strains on US Government and public confidence. The negotiating posture is designed not to lay down specific hard and fast demands or to set a deadline, but to produce movement in Vietnamese Government along these lines. In this way we can test and probe effectiveness of any actions the GVN actually takes and, at same time, maintain sufficient flexibility to permit US to resume full support of Diem regime at any time US Government deems it appropriate. 4. We recognize that recommended actions cannot be continued more than a limited period--tentatively estimated at two to four months--before they begin to have substantial impact on counterinsurgency effort. Even within this period, they will require careful and constant evaluation. As they begin to have substantial impact on war effort, further major decisions will be needed. 5. It is not possible to specify with precision the criteria that we should use in determining whether this proposed course of action has brought about adequate changes in performance of Diem Government and should, therefore, be modified or withdrawn, or whether on contrary response of the Diem Government is clearly inadequate so that more drastic action should be considered. The desired GVN measures in this report are grouped under three headings: (1) military actions, (2) political actions, and (3) actions with respect to US itself. Test of adequacy of these actions should be whether, in combination, they improve effectiveness of GVN effort to point where we can carry on in confident expectation that war effort will progress satisfactorily. Since we cannot now foresee interlocking impact of possible actions both in GVN and here, we obviously do not expect that GVN will or even can perform on entire list and for this reason this is in no sense a package of demands. While general view here is that some action in each of three areas will be necessary, we do not now wish to prejudge question of balance or quantity of actions which may justify resumption of full cooperation with GVN.[2] A. Actions: 6. AID Commodity Import Program. Existing suspension of new commitments will be maintained, and under this policy the presently due second-quarter allocation of $20-25 million will be withheld. You should make this continued suspension clear in an appropriate manner to the GVN. No public announcement will be made. In addition, US working levels should inform Vietnamese military that commodity import assumptions being used for budget planning purposes must now be considered uncertain not only from previously stated standpoint of Congressional uncertainty, but because of executive review of program. 7. PL 480. Presently pending supplementary agreement for $2.9 million worth of condensed milk (5-months' requirement) will be handled by making month-to-month agreements for appropriate portions of this amount until further notice, but outright suspension will not be undertaken. Action on other pending items in PL 480 account will become due with respect to wheat flour ($6 million annually) and raw cotton ($12 million annually) approximately 1 November, and these items will then be submitted for action by Washington. Remainder of presently planned PL 480 for FY 1964, comprising tobacco ($2.5 million) and miscellaneous items ($2.5 million), does not require any action in next 60 days. Discussions with GVN on PL 480, especially with respect to food, should take note of fact that no deliveries are being held up or negative decisions made; we are simply not able to make forward decisions in October. 8. AID Project Loans. Presently pending balance of loan projects for Saigon-Cholon Waterworks ($10 million) and Saigon electric power project ($4 million) will be "suspended for review," and you should inform GVN in appropriate manner to this effect without making public announcement. If this becomes publicly known here or in field, explanation will be limited strictly to bare statement of suspension for review.[3] 9. Assistance to Forces Commanded by Colonel Tung in or near Saigon. You should inform GVN, through whatever channel you deem appropriate, that US can no longer furnish support to these forces unless they are placed under effective operational control of Joint General Staff and committed to field operations. (This applies to MAP [*less than 1 line not declassified*] support for certain airborne ranger, Civil Guard, and "civilian airborne ranger" units.) Again no public announcement will be made, but if action becomes known explanation here and in field will be that we cannot assist forces that are not contributing to the war effort. Notion that action is a reprisal for political use of these forces should be discouraged.[4] 10. Handling of GVN Inquiries in Saigon: US representatives in Saigon should make clear that these matters must be taken up with you personally. B. Negotiating Tactics: Your policy toward the GVN of cool correctness in order to make Diem come to you is correct. You should continue it. However, we realize it may not work and that at some later time you may have to go to Diem to ensure he understands over-all US policy. Decision of when this becomes imperative rests with you, in light of your assessment of situation. 12. If, as we hope, Diem seeks clarification of US policies and actions, you should present an exposition of how our actions are related to our fundamental objective of victory. There are three issues at root of strained relations between GVN and US and of our judgment that victory may be jeopardized. The first concerns military effort; GVN must take steps to make this more effective. The second is crisis of confidence among Vietnamese people which is eroding popular support for GVN that is vital for victory. The third is crisis of confidence on the part of the American public and Government. Heart of problem is form of government that has been evolving in Viet-Nam. Diem's regime has trappings of democracy, but in reality it has been evolving into authoritarian government maintained by police terrorist methods. What GVN must do is to reverse this process of evolution. 13. To preserve flexibility and provide an opportunity for testing and probing on effectiveness of measures GVN actually takes, you should avoid laying down specific demands, but consider actions listed below as illustrative examples of general proposition outlined above, picking and choosing particular items as situation warrants. 14. Purpose of all actions listed below is to increase effectiveness of war effort, to ensure popular support, and to relieve strains in GVN/US relations. 15. Specific military actions listed below are probably most acceptable to Diem, but serve as a test of his commitment to furthering war effort. They should increase effectiveness of war effort and this in turn should feed back to improve political climate. We believe that burden of pressure for military actions should be assumed by General Harkins in direct conversation with Diem and others under your general guidance and that these conversations should not await initiative by Diem, since our continuing posture of cooperative consultation on military matters should not be broken. Conversely, Harkins should not be channel of a discussion on relation between improvements by GVN and resumption of full US support.[5] 16. Political actions are not arranged in order of importance. First of political actions, i.e., entering into negotiations to normalize university life, etc., should set stage for later political actions, such as broadening government. 17. If, in fact, GVN does begin to move along lines we desire, an opportunity will be provided to test and probe effectiveness of the actions in improving war effort, ensuring popular support, and easing strain in GVN/US relations. Paramount need, however, is for GVN to set a psychological tone and image that will make specific actions both real and credible. Although we cannot at this time in complete confidence predict the exact point in this complex of actions at which we will be sure war effort will proceed to successful conclusion, it seems probable its achievement will require some restriction of role of Nhus. As practical matter, we would expect that Diem would not take such action at outset, but only after he had proceeded a considerable distance down the path we desire. 18. Military a. Further shift of military emphasis and strength to Delta (IV Corps). b. Increase in military tempo in all corps areas, so that all combat troops are in field an average of 20 days out of 30 and static missions are ended. c. Emphasis on "clear and hold operations" instead of terrain sweeps which have little permanent value. d. Expansion of personnel in combat units to full authorized strength. e. Training and arming of hamlet militia at accelerated rate, especially in the Delta. f. Consolidation of strategic hamlet program, especially in the Delta, and action to insure that future strategic hamlets are not built until they can be protected, and until civil action programs can be introduced. 19. Political a. Resumption of normal university life. Detained students should be released; school and university classes should be universally resumed. Diem should sit down with rector and faculty of Saigon University to work out conditions of normalization of university life. Since students are fearful of arrests and inclined to riots, this will involve significant negotiations on a variety of police-terrorist techniques, including secret arrests, torture, beatings, etc. For this reason, it is an excellent technique to get Diem to focus on the core issues. Similar action should be taken in regard to Hue University, including reinstatement of ex-rector. In both universities, at least some faculty members who have resigned, been fired or jailed should be reinstated. b. Specific concessions should be made to Buddhists. Those still jailed should be processed for release with all possible speed. Repair of pagodas should be facilitated with government sponsorship. GVN-sponsored "Union Committee for Pure Buddhism" should be expanded and genuinely representative Buddhist leaders given responsible positions. Assembly action should eliminate laws which deny equal status to Buddhism. c. Renewed activity in land reform program. This was an early Diem achievement but stopped short of completion. It could be revitalized and attract rural support for the GVN and improve its international image. d. Joint re-emphasis on political aspects of strategic hamlet program. Phasing and security aspects of strategic hamlet program are dealt with under section 1 above. Following is concerned with aspects of strategic hamlet program affecting popular attitudes. This would require an effort to gain more support from peasants through increasing payments to them for their labor and other services and through weeding out graft by local officials. In addition, particularly in Delta, redesigning the program to avoid unnecessary relocation of population and increased emphasis on social and economic programs that are likely to elicit peasant support. e. Police techniques. GVN should abandon its present practices of controlling populace by instilling fear through night-time arrests, brutal interrogation (including women) and other police-terrorist methods which contribute to growing resentment and unrest and diminishing acceptance of regime. f. Civil liberties should be restored. Arbitrary arrests should cease and those arrested speedily released or given fair public trial. Religious freedom should be implemented as guaranteed by constitution. Public gatherings should be permitted and controlled only to insure safety of life and property. g. Refurbishing GVN image. Government should be broadened so as to include respected individuals, including some within Viet- Nam who have not participated in government and some, such as Vu Van Mau, who have departed. It should be pointed out that these respected individuals are not likely to participate in government or return to Viet-Nam until changes such as those described above convince them that GVN has in fact reversed trend towards authoritarian government. Their willingness to accept posts in government or return to Viet-Nam will in turn be convincing evidence to mass of population that changes are, in fact, meaningful. h. "Changes in personnel." Specific "reforms" described above are apt to have little impact without dramatic symbolic move which convinces Vietnamese that reforms are real. As practical matter this can only be achieved by some feasible reduction in influence of Nhus, who are--justifiably or not--a symbol of authoritarianism. Future role of Nhus in government is therefore of paramount importance. At this point it is impossible to tell whether Nhu must be permanently removed or merely confined to well-defined and limited role. In either case, some device must be found both to restrict his activities and to symbolize this restriction by his absence from power center in Saigon. In addition, similar devices must be found for those individuals, such as Colonel Tung, who are most closely associated with Nhu and his authoritarianism. i. Public and official statement by Diem before National Assembly which would set new tone for government by pointing to steps being taken to respond to popular sentiment, and by making a call for total mobilization of effort on part of officials and people equally. 20. US/GVN Relations a. Avoid divisive press attacks, e.g. "Times of Viet-Nam" story attacking CIA, etc. b. Cease public statements slandering the US effort and the role of US military and civilian personnel. c. Cease undercover efforts to discredit the US and weaken the will of US individuals to give their full support to programs, e.g. "mendacious briefings" of GVN troops and rumors of physical danger to US families and other personnel. d. Re-cast GVN propaganda in such a way as to gain foreign support of its socio-economic program. C. Congress, Press, and Public: 21. No public statement will be issued here for the present. 22. At President's next press conference, he expects to repeat his basic statement that what furthers the war effort we support, and what interferes with the war effort we oppose. If questioned on actions US may take, he expects to say only that US programs are being reviewed to insure consistency with this policy.[6] 23. Similar responses will be given if information about any US actions leads to detailed inquiries. If detailed inquiries pinpointing specific actions are made, they will be dealt with as indicated in each paragraph of A., above. 24. On Tuesday and Wednesday[7] in meetings with Congressional committees in executive session, Rusk, McNamara and Bell will follow same line. They will explain our three-fold concern as outlined in para 5, above, but they will avoid as you should any listing of desired actions which could be construed as a package of US demands. We believe it of great importance that there should be no public impression of a package of sanctions and a package of demands. We are seeking necessary but limited improvements from a government very difficult to move, and we do not wish to encourage unjustified sense of optimism or of triumph from those who wish this situation was easier than it is. In particular, we would prefer press to consider us inactive than to trumpet a posture of "major sanctions" and "sweeping demands." (You should follow same line in briefing Zablocki Codel.)[8] D. Coordination in Saigon: 25. Separate cables to Harkins and Brent lay out their areas of these instructions in detail.[9] You should, of course, coordinate all actions by country team representatives. Suggest you pass this cable to them individually. Rusk ___________ [1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 S VIET. Top Secret; Immediate. Prepared by Hilsman with clearances of Harriman and Bundy. Cleared in draft with Rusk and McNamara. Regarding the drafting of this cable, see Document 179. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD exclusive for Felt. [2] The last sentence in paragraph 5 was in neither the Draft Report to the NSC of October 4 nor the attached cable. Its inclusion reflects the President's concern as expressed at the 9:30 a.m. meeting of October 5; see Document 179. The changes noted in footnotes 3-6 below also reflect the President's concern. [3] The last sentence in paragraph 8 is in neither the Draft Report to the NSC nor the draft cable. [4] The last two sentences in paragraph 9 replace the following sentence in the Draft Report to the NSC and the draft cable: "Concurrently MACV should assume operational relationships with border surveillance and mountain scout forces [*less than 1 line not declassified*] commanded by Colonel Tung." [5] The last two sentences of paragraph 15 were neither in the Draft Report to the NSC nor the draft cable. [6] The draft of telegram 534 to Saigon expanded President Kennedy's statement: "that in line with this policy Secretary McNamara and General Taylor have recommended that certain programs be reviewed; and that, on your additional recommendation, a small number of programs have been held up in order to permit review to determine their consistency with policy he has enunciated. He will say all other programs are being continued, in line with US policy of supporting war effort against the Communist aggression." The draft continues: "In the meantime, you will have informed GVN through appropriate channels, as outlined in the section concerning actions above, of the steps US is taking." "If, as a result of your actions, inquiries are made about the programs under review, by either GVN or press, replies will state that certain programs have been held up, on your recommendation, to permit review for consistency with policy President has enunciated of supporting what furthers war effort and opposing what interferes with it; and that the bulk of the programs, which clearly further war effort, are being continued. "At some point, after you have appropriately informed GVN, and after the President has made the statements described above, inquiries concerning Tung's forces should be made with statement that, in line with its policy, United States has terminated support to certain military units which are not contributing to the prosecution of the war." [7] October 8-9. [8] Congressman Clement J. Zablocki chaired a special study mission to Southeast Asia, composed of members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which traveled to Laos, Malaysia, and Vietnam October 3-19. Also on the mission were Congressmen Harris B. McDowell, Jr., Ronald Brooks Cameron, William T. Murphy, William S. Broomfield, J. Irving Whalley, Vernon W. Thomson, and Peter H.B. Frelinghuysen. See Document 222. [9] The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Harkins and Felt these instructions in JCS 2792, October 5. The cable was substantively the same as the first three numbered paragraphs of section B of the Taylor-McNamara Report, Document 167. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 S VIET) The instructions to Brent were in Aidto 915, October 5, and were essentially a reiteration of AID-related actions and tactics. (Ibid., AID (US) S VIET) -- daveus rattus yer friendly neighborhood ratman KOYAANISQATSI ko.yan.nis.qatsi (from the Hopi Language) n. 1. crazy life. 2. life in turmoil. 3. life out of balance. 4. life disintegrating. 5. a state of life that calls for another way of living.

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