CHAPTER EIGHT Part Eight: The In-accordance-with-the-Rule Chapter 71. Should any bhikkhu,

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CHAPTER EIGHT Part Eight: The In-accordance-with-the-Rule Chapter ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 71. Should any bhikkhu, admonished by the bhikkhus in accordance with a rule, say, "Friends, I will not train myself under this training rule until I have put questions about it to another bhikkhu, experienced and learned in the discipline," it is to be confessed. Bhikkhus, (a training rule) is to be understood, is to be asked about, is to be pondered. This is the proper course here. This rule deals with cases where a bhikkhu tries to excuse himself from following any of the training rules, without showing out-and-out disrespect for the rule or the person admonishing him. (If he showed out-and-out disrespect, the case would come under Pacittiya 54.) The factors for the full offense here are three. 1) //Object//: One has been admonished by a fellow bhikkhu who cites a rule formulated in the Vinaya. 2) //Intention//: One does not want to train oneself in line with the rule. 3) //Effort//: One says something to the effect that one will not train in line with the rule. Only two of these factors -- object and effort -- require explanation. Object. Only if the other bhikkhu cites a rule in the Vinaya is this factor grounds for a pacittiya. If he criticizes one's actions, citing standards of behavior outside of the Vinaya -- e.g., he says that one has been acting out of greed, anger, delusion, or fear -- this factor becomes grounds for a dukkata. If the person admonishing one is not a bhikkhu, then regardless of whether he/she cites a rule in the Vinaya or standards of behavior outside of the Vinaya, this factor is again grounds for a dukkata. As under Pacittiya 54, whether or not one views the admonition as valid is not an issue here. Effort. Looking at the Vibhanga's discussion of this factor, it would appear to cover only cases where one used the precise words mentioned in the training rule, but the K/Commentary -- drawing probably on the Great Standards -- expands it to cover any case where one says something as a ploy to excuse oneself from following the rule without showing disrespect. Examples might include: "I'll worry about that rule when I come to it." "I don't have time for that right now." "I've been wondering: Do you really think that that rule applies in this day and age? It gets in the way of our spreading the Dhamma." In other words, this factor closes any loopholes left by Pacittiya 54. Non-offenses. According to the Vibhanga, the only way to avoid an offense in situations like this is to say that one will learn about the rule and train in line with it. As the no-offense clauses to Pacittiya 54 make clear, though, if one has been admonished with any interpretation of a rule that differs from one's teachers', one may avoid an offense simply by stating that one's teachers taught differently. Summary: Saying something as a ploy to excuse oneself from training under a training rule when being admonished by another bhikkhu for a breach of the rule is a pacittiya offense. * * * 72. Should any bhikkhu, when the Patimokkha is being repeated, say, "Why are these lesser and minor training rules repeated when they lead only to anxiety, bother and confusion?" the criticism of the training rules is to be confessed. "Now at that time the Blessed One gave a talk to the bhikkhus on the subject of discipline. He spoke in praise of discipline, in praise of the mastery of discipline, and in praise of Ven. Upali, referring to him again and again. The bhikkhus (said), '...Come, friends, let's study discipline with Ven. Upali.' They and many other bhikkhus -- elders, newly ordained, and those in between -- studied discipline with Ven. Upali. "Then the thought occurred to some group-of-six bhikkhus: 'Now, friends, many bhikkhus...are studying discipline with Ven. Upali. If they become well-versed in the discipline, they will push us and pull us around however they like, whenever they like, and as long as they like. Come, friends, let's criticize the discipline.' Then the group-of-six bhikkhus, approaching the bhikkhus, said, 'Why are these lesser and minor training rules repeated when they lead only to anxiety, bother, and confusion?'" The full offense here has three factors. 1) //Object//: another bhikkhu. 2) //Effort//: One criticizes the discipline in his presence 3) //Intention//: so as to discourage the study of the discipline. Object & effort. There is a pacittiya for criticizing the discipline in the presence of a bhikkhu; and a dukkata for criticizing the Dhamma in his presence, or criticizing either the discipline or the Dhamma in the presence of an unordained person. The training rule would seem to indicate that these actions are grounds for an offense only while the Patimokkha is being recited or rehearsed, but the no-offense clauses in the Vibhanga give no allowance to criticize the discipline at other times, and the K/Commentary follows the Vibhanga in not making the recitation of the Patimokkha a necessary factor for the offense here. In other words, the factor of effort here is fulfilled if one criticizes the discipline at //any// time. Intention. This factor is fulfilled either if one's intention is to keep that particular bhikkhu from studying or mastering the discipline, or if one wants the discipline in general to disappear from lack of study. Further action. A bhikkhu who makes a concerted effort to speak in dispraise of the Dhamma or discipline may be subject to an act of censure or banishment, depending on the seriousness of the case (Cv.I.4.1; Cv.I.14.2). Non-offenses. There is no offense if, without intending to criticize the discipline, one suggests to another person that he/she master the Suttas or the Abhidhamma first, before mastering the discipline. Summary: Criticizing the discipline in the presence of another bhikkhu, in hopes of preventing its study, is a pacittiya offense. * * * 73. Should any bhikkhu, when the Patimokkha is being recited every half-month, say, "Just now have I heard that this case, too, is handed down in the Patimokkha, is included in the Patimokkha, and comes up for recitation every half-month;" and if other bhikkhus should know, "That bhikkhu has already sat through two or three recitations of the Patimokkha, if not more," the bhikkhu is not exempted for being ignorant. Whatever the offense he has committed, he is to be dealt with in accordance with the rule; and in addition, his deception is to be exposed: "It is no gain for you, friend, it is ill-done, that when the Patimokkha is being recited, you do not pay proper attention and take it to heart." Here the deception is to be confessed. To summarize the Vibhanga: If a bhikkhu -- when the recitation of the Patimokkha comes to a rule he has violated -- tries to excuse himself through the sort of pretence cited in the rule, he immediately incurs a dukkata if he has already listened to the Patimokkha in full three times or more. The other bhikkhus may then expose his deception through a formal act of the Community. If he then continues with the pretence, he incurs a pacittiya. If they do not bring the formal act against him, though, he incurs a dukkata for each effort he makes in keeping up the pretence. There is no offense, though, if he is not feigning ignorance or if he has not yet heard the Patimokkha in full at least three times. Obviously, these explanations were written when Pali was the bhikkhus' native language, and the recitation of the Patimokkha in Pali offered the opportunity to learn the rules, along with the opportunity to feign ignorance without telling an out-and-out lie. In other words, one could say immediately after the recitation of a particular rule, "Just now have I heard that this rule is in the Patimokkha," and strictly speaking it would be true: One //has// just heard it, even if for the umpteenth time, but one hopes that the other bhikkhus will be deceived into inferring that one has just heard it for the first time. At any rate, the discussion of this rule in the Vibhanga and commentaries makes no exceptions for bhikkhus whose native language is not Pali, and since the Patimokkha is available in a number of translations, the "grace period" in which one is expected to be ignorant -- three recitations covers a month to a month and a half -- is not too short a time for a new bhikkhu to read and remember the rules in translation. The factors for the full offense here are three. 1) //Object//: One has heard the Patimokkha in full for at least three times, one has tried to feign ignorance, but the bhikkhus have brought a formal act against one, exposing one's deceit. 2) //Intention//: One wants to deceive the bhikkhus into believing that one is ignorant of the rule one has broken. 3) //Effort//: One says a half-truth to deceive them. (Out-and-out lies would come under Pacittiya 1.) Perception is not a mitigating factor here. If the act exposing one's deceit has been properly carried out, then regardless of whether or not one perceives it as valid, one incurs a pacittiya for trying to deceive the bhikkhus any further. If it has been improperly carried out, one incurs a dukkata for trying to deceive them further, regardless of how one perceives the act. Non-offenses. There is no offense if one has heard the Patimokkha in full less than three times, or if one is not intending to deceive anyone. Summary: Using half-truths to deceive others into believing that one is ignorant of the rules in the Patimokkha, after one has already heard the Patimokkha in full three times, and a formal act exposing one's deceit has been brought against one, is a pacittiya offense. * * * 74. Should any bhikkhu, angered and displeased, give a blow to (another) bhikkhu, it is to be confessed. The factors for the full offense here are three. 1) //Object//: another bhikkhu. 2) //Effort//: One gives him a blow 3) //Intention//: out of anger. Object. A bhikkhu is grounds for the full offense here; anyone unordained, grounds for a dukkata. According to the Commentary, //anyone unordained// includes animals as well as higher forms of life, such as human or celestial beings. Effort. This factor is fulfilled whether one gives a blow -- with one's own body (hitting with a fist, jabbing with an elbow, kicking with a foot); with something attached to the body (e.g., a stick, a knife); or with something that can be "thrown" (this includes such things as throwing a rock, shooting an arrow, or firing a gun). According to the Vibhanga, this last category includes throwing "even a lotus leaf," which shows that the blow need not be painful in order to fulfill this factor. This factor also includes such things as twisting the other person's arm behind his back or wringing his neck: It is fulfilled as soon as one touches his body with the intent to do these things. Intention. If one gives a blow for reasons other than anger, the action does not fall under this rule. Thus, for instance, if one thumps a fellow bhikkhu on the back to help dislodge something caught in his throat, there is no offense. And as the Commentary notes, if -- motivated by lust -- one gives a blow to a woman, one incurs the full penalty under Sanghadisesa 2. For some reason, the Commentary says that if one cuts off the nose or ear of a fellow bhikkhu in order to disfigure him, one incurs only a dukkata. As the Vinaya Mukha points out, though, there is no basis in the Vibhanga or in reason for this statement. It is hard to imagine anyone doing this unless motivated by anger, and cutting another person would come under the factor of giving a blow with something connected with the body. "Result" is not a factor here. Whether or not the other person is hurt -- or how badly he/she is hurt -- does not affect the offense. If one intends simply to hurt the other person, but he/she happens to die from one's blow, the case is treated under this rule, rather than under Parajika 3. In other words, the penalty is a pacittiya if the victim is a bhikkhu, and a dukkata if not. Non-offenses. According to the Vibhanga, there is no offense for a bhikkhu who, trapped in a difficult situation, gives a blow "desiring freedom." The Commentary's discussion of this point shows that it includes what we at present would call self-defense; and the K/Commentary's analysis of the factors of the offense here shows that even if anger or displeasure arises in one's mind in cases like this, there is no penalty. Summary: Giving a blow to another bhikkhu when motivated by anger is a pacittiya offense. * * * 75. Should any bhikkhu, angered and displeased, raise his hand against (another) bhikkhu, it is to be confessed. This rule is similar to the preceding one, differing only in the factor of effort: //Raising one's hand// means raising any part of one's body (the hand, the foot, etc.) or anything attached to the body (a stick, a rock, a gun, a bow and arrow) in a threatening manner. The Commentary notes that if one intends only to raise one's hand, but then accidentally gives a blow, one incurs a dukkata. The Sub-commentary explains this in the only way that would make sense: One incurs the dukkata for the blow, but a pacittiya for raising the hand in the first place. The Sub-commentary also notes that if an animal, for example, is making a mess and a bhikkhu raises his hand against it, this would be included under "desiring freedom" -- i.e., from the mess -- and so would not be an offense. Summary: Making a threatening gesture against another bhikkhu when motivated by anger is a pacittiya offense. * * * 76. Should any bhikkhu charge a bhikkhu with an unfounded sanghadisesa (offense), it is to be confessed. Here again the factors for the full offense are three. 1) //Object//: another bhikkhu. 2) //Perception//: One perceives him to be innocent of the offense one is charging him with. 3) //Effort//: One accuses him in his presence -- or gets someone else to accuse him in his presence -- of having committed a sanghadisesa offense. If one makes an unfounded charge accusing another bhikkhu of having committed a lesser offense or of falling away from right views, one incurs a dukkata. The same penalty holds for making an unfounded charge accusing an unordained person of having committed a wrong doing or of falling away from right views. The topic of unfounded charges is a complex one, and has already been covered in detail under Sanghadisesa 8. Additional points may be inferred from the discussion of that rule, the differences being that intention is not a factor here, and the change in effort -- one is accusing the other bhikkhu of a sanghadisesa or lesser offense -- changes the seriousness of the penalty. Non-offenses. As under Sanghadisesa 8, there is no offense if one makes the accusation -- or gets someone else to make the accusation -- when one thinks it to be true, even if it turns out that the other bhikkhu is actually not guilty of the offense. Summary: Making an unfounded charge to another bhikkhu -- or getting someone else to make the charge to him -- that he is guilty of a sanghadisesa offense is a pacittiya offense. * * * 77. Should any bhikkhu purposefully provoke anxiety in (another) bhikkhu, (thinking,) "This way, even for just a moment, he will have no peace" -- if doing it for just this reason and no other -- it is to be confessed. The Vinaya Mukha's explanation for this rule is worth quoting at length: "There are people who normally tend to be anxious about one thing or another....If someone speaks to a bhikkhu such as this of contingencies that run counter to the Buddha's ordinances and are impossible to know -- e.g., 'When you were ordained, how can you know that all the qualifications (for a valid formal act) were fulfilled? If they were lacking, doesn't that mean you aren't really ordained?' -- even this is enough to set him worrying, giving him all sorts of anguish. A bhikkhu who is unrestrained and who -- looking for fun with no concern for how his friends will suffer -- takes such matters to tell them, is penalized with a pacittiya in this rule." The full offense here has three factors. 1) //Object//: another bhikkhu. 2) //Effort//: One mentions that he might have broken a rule unknowingly. 3) //Intention//: One's purpose is to cause him anxiety, even if just for a moment. Object. A bhikkhu here is grounds for a pacittiya; an unordained person, grounds for a dukkata. Effort. The Vibhanga gives a few examples of rules the other person might have broken unknowingly: He may have drunk liquor, may have eaten food at the wrong time, or may have sat in private with a woman, all without knowing it. (Although this last would not be an offense if done unknowingly, it is close enough to an offense that the mention of the possibility would cause an ignorant bhikkhu anxiety.) In the origin story, some group-of-six bhikkhus made insinuating remarks to the group of 17 that since they were ordained when they were less than 20 years old, they were not really ordained. (Again, since the group of 17 were the instigators for that rule, they were not subject to it.) All of this shows that this factor is fulfilled by any statement one might make to another bhikkhu insinuating that he may have broken a rule, even if the action one mentions is not strictly speaking an offense. Intention. If, not wanting to cause the other person anxiety, one has other reasons for mentioning rules he/she might have broken unknowingly -- e.g., one seriously thinks that he may have been improperly ordained -- there is no offense. Summary: Saying to another bhikkhu that he may have broken a rule unknowingly, simply for the purpose of causing him anxiety, is a pacittiya offense. * * * 78. Should any bhikkhu stand eavesdropping on bhikkhus when they are arguing, quarreling, and disputing, thinking, "I will overhear what they say" -- if doing it for just this reason and no other -- it is to be confessed. "Now at that time some group-of-six bhikkhus were quarreling with the well-behaved bhikkhus. The well-behaved bhikkhus (meeting among themselves) said, 'These group-of-six bhikkhus are shameless. There's no way you can argue with them.' "Later, the group-of-six bhikkhus said to them, 'Why do you disgrace us by calling us shameless?' "'But how did you overhear?' "'We stood eavesdropping on you.'" The factors for the full offense here are three. 1) //Object//: other bhikkhus who are involved in an argument over an issue. 2) //Effort//: One stands eavesdropping on them, 3) //Intention//: with the purpose of using what they say against them, either in a formal act (reproving, reminding, or reprimanding them) or simply to make them feel remorseful or ashamed. Object. According to the Vibhanga, the words, //arguing, quarreling, and disputing// refer to arguments over issues (see Pacittiya 63). The Commentary says that this refers to one kind of issue -- disputes -- but accusations would appear to fit here as well. This factor is fulfilled regardless of whether the two parties in the dispute/accusation are confronting each other or -- as in the origin story -- one party is talking in private. It is also fulfilled regardless of whether or not one is already involved in the dispute oneself. Bhikkhus involved in an argument are grounds for a pacittiya; unordained people involved in an argument, grounds for a dukkata. Perception -- e.g., whether or not one perceives the bhikkhus as bhikkhus -- is not a mitigating factor here. People who are not involved in an argument are not grounds for an offense. Thus there is no penalty in eavesdropping on a Dhamma talk or on a bhikkhu sitting in private with a woman, to see what they will say to each other. Effort. The Vibhanga goes into a fair amount of detail on this factor, allotting the offenses as follows (assuming the other factors to be fulfilled as well): One goes with the purpose of eavesdropping on the other party (%): a dukkata. One stays in one place eavesdropping on them: a pacittiya. One is walking behind the other part, and speeds up one's steps to overhear them: a dukkata. One stays in one place eavesdropping on them: a pacittiya. One is walking ahead of the other party and slows down to overhear them: a dukkata. One stays in one place eavesdropping on them: a pacittiya. One is sitting, standing, or lying down in place, and the other party happens to walk past (%): One should cough, clear one's throat, or (the K/Commentary states) say, "I'm here." Not to do so entails a pacittiya. At present, surreptitiously reading another person's mail would seem to fulfill this factor as well. Intention. According to the Vibhanga, there is no offense if one happens to overhear bhikkhus arguing and goes away thinking, "I won't get involved," or "I will free myself" ("by declaring my innocence," says the Commentary). Summary: Eavesdropping on bhikkhus involved in an argument over an issue -- with the intention of using what they say against them -- is a pacittiya offense. * * * 79. Should any bhikkhu, having given consent (by proxy) to a formal act carried out in accordance with the rule, later complain (about the act), it is to be confessed. "Now at that time some group-of-six bhikkhus were indulging in bad habits but protested when a formal act was being carried out against any one of their group. Now it happened that the Community was meeting on some other business, and the group-of-six bhikkhus, involved in making robes, sent their consent with one of their members. Then the Community, thinking, 'Look, friends, one of the group-of-six has come alone. Let's carry out a formal act against him,' did just that. "He then returned to where the group-of-six bhikkhus were staying. They asked him, 'What, friend, did the Community do?'" "'They carried out a formal act against me.' "'That wasn't what we gave our consent for, that they would carry out a formal act against you. If we had known that they would carry out a formal act against you, we wouldn't have given our consent!'" Formal acts. A formal act is a procedure the Community follows in settling any of the four kinds of issues: disputes, accusations, offenses, or duties. The Vinaya gives the pattern for settling each of the various issues falling into these four categories: the minimum number of bhikkhus that has to be present, the qualifications (positive or negative) of the individual or situation warranting the act, and the formal procedure -- a declaration, a motion, a motion with one announcement, or a motion with three announcements -- to follow in carrying out the act. An act carried out in accordance with these patterns is said to be carried out in accordance with the rule. However, for a formal act to be valid and irreversible, it must be carried out not only in accordance with the rule, but also by a complete assembly (Mv.IX.2.4). This point is to prevent small factions from carrying out acts as they like. When this point was first raised, the question arose, How many bhikkhus are needed for an assembly to be complete? All the bhikkhus in the world? All the bhikkhus in a particular monastery? The Buddha's answer was, All the bhikkhus in a monastery, and he gave permission for the bhikkhus to delineate boundaries (//sima//) so as to determine who did and did not have to join in the act for the assembly to be complete (Mv.II.5.2,6.1,12.7). Later, he gave permission that an ill bhikkhu living within the boundary did not have to attend the meeting, but could give his consent by proxy, through word or gesture, and the assembly would still be regarded as complete (Mv.II.23.1-2). Thus a complete assembly is defined as follows: All the bhikkhus within the boundary are either present at the meeting (sitting within 1.25 meters of one another in the meeting) or have given their consent by proxy, and no one makes a valid protest against the act's being carried out (Mv.IX.3.5-6). (An invalid protest would be one made by someone who is not a bhikkhu, by a bhikkhu who is insane, possessed by a spirit, outside the boundary, or suspended from the Community, or by the bhikkhu against whom the act is being carried out (Mv.IX.4.7-8).) Before we go on to discuss this rule, there are a few added points concerning the origin story we should touch on: 1) When a bhikkhu makes a valid protest, he does not need to justify it. In other words, he can make protest simply because he doesn't agree with the act, and his protest stands regardless of whether or not he can find any basis for it in the Dhamma and Vinaya. 2) One Community may not carry out a formal act against another Community (Mv.IX.2.3). What this means is that they may carry it out against no more than three bhikkhus at a time. This is why the group-of-six bhikkhus were able to protect one another from being subject to a formal act, for there were usually more than three of them at any one meeting of the Community. Even though the ones against whom the formal act was being carried out had no right to protest, their friends did, and they took advantage of their right. 3) In the passage where the Buddha gives permission for bhikkhus to give their consent by proxy (Mv.II.23.1-2), he states that this permission applies to ill bhikkhus. Yet in the origin stories to this rule and the following one, the group of six are not ill, they give their consent by proxy, and the act carried out with their consent is considered to be valid. None of the texts make note of this point, but it seems to indicate that //ill// in this context covers not only physical illness, but also any other serious inconvenience that prevents one from joining in the meeting. The factors for the offense under this rule are three. 1) //Object//: a valid formal act to which one has given one's consent. 2) //Perception//: One perceives it as valid. 3) //Effort//: One complains about it. Object & perception. The various permutations of these factors are as follows: a valid act that one perceives to be valid: grounds for a pacittiya; an invalid act that one perceives to be valid: grounds for a dukkata; an act that one is doubtful about, regardless of its actual validity: grounds for a dukkata; an act that one perceives to be invalid, regardless of its actual validity: grounds for no offense. Effort. Any expression of displeasure with the act would fulfill this factor. If, however, one states that the act was not carried out in accordance with the rule, then regardless of whether or not one had given one's consent, the case would fall under Pacittiya 63, rather than here. Non-offenses. There is no offense in complaining about the act if one perceives it as having been carried out not in accordance with the rule, by an incomplete assembly, or against someone who did not warrant such an act. This exemption holds regardless of whether, in fact, the act was valid or not. Summary: Complaining about a formal act of the Community to which one gave one's consent -- if one knows that the act was carried out in accordance with the rule -- is a pacittiya offense. * * * 80. Should any bhikkhu, when deliberation is being carried on in the Community, get up from his seat and leave without having given consent, it is to be confessed. The origin story here is a sequel to the one for the preceding rule. "Now at that time the Community was meeting on some business, and the group-of-six bhikkhus, involved in making robes, sent their consent with one of their group. Then the Community, thinking, 'We'll carry out the formal act (against the one member of the group-of-six) that was our //real// purpose in meeting,' set forth a motion. The bhikkhu -- thinking, 'It's just in this way that they carry out formal acts against us one at a time. Well, who are you going to carry out //this// act against?' -- without giving his consent, got up from his seat and left." As explained under the preceding rule, a bhikkhu has no right to protest when the Community is carrying out a formal act against him. However, the Community may not carry out an act against a bhikkhu who is not in its midst (see Adhikarana-Samatha 1), and any act is invalid if carried out when there is a bhikkhu within the boundary who is not in the meeting and who has not given his consent. The bhikkhu in the origin story took advantage of these two principles to escape from the formal act being carried out against himself, and the Buddha then formulated this rule to impose a penalty on any bhikkhu who tried the same maneuver in the future. There are four factors for the full offense. 1) //Object//: A formal act has been started but has yet to be finished, and is being carried out in a valid manner. 2) //Perception//: One perceives it as being carried out in a valid manner. 3) //Intention//: One wants to invalidate the act or to keep the group from carrying it out. 4) //Effort//: One goes beyond one //hatthapasa// (1.25 m.) from the bhikkhus sitting in the meeting, without having first given one's consent. Object & perception. The various permutations of these two factor are as follows: a valid act that one perceives to be valid: grounds for a pacittiya; an invalid act that one perceives to be valid: grounds for a dukkata; an act that one is doubtful about, regardless of its actual validity: grounds for a dukkata; an act that one perceives as invalid, regardless of its actual validity: grounds for no offense. According to the Vibhanga, the time period covered by this factor begins at the point where the matter has been brought up in the Community -- or a motion has been set forth -- and ends when the Community's decision has been announced. The Commentary, in discussing this point, says that, in the case of an accusation, the point when the matter has been brought up is when both sides have stated their initial positions, and a bhikkhu has been authorized to cross-examine them. Effort. The Vibhanga divides the effort here into three parts and allots the penalties as follows: One gets up to go: a dukkata. One reaches the distance of one //hatthapasa// from the meeting: another dukkata. One passes beyond the distance of one //hatthapasa//: a pacittiya. The K/Commentary adds that one must also remain within the boundary (//sima//) for this factor to be fulfilled, but the Vibhanga makes no mention of this, and there seems no reason to adopt it. If we did adopt it, it would mean that if a formal act were being carried out against a bhikkhu, and he left the meeting and the boundary to avoid it, he would be committing no offense. Thus it seems better to stick with the Vibhanga and say that this factor is fulfilled when one goes beyond one hatthapasa away from the meeting, regardless of whether one then stays within the boundary or not. Intention. There is no offense if, without giving one's consent, one leaves the meeting for purposes other than to invalidate the act. Examples in the Vibhanga include: One is ill. One has to do something (e.g., prepare or give medicine) for one who is ill. One is overcome with the need to urinate or defecate. One leaves, without desiring to invalidate the act, with the thought, "I'll come right back." In all of these cases, though, if possible, it is best to give one's consent before going. Non-offenses. In addition to the above cases, there is also no offense if one leaves a meeting without giving one's consent with the purpose of invalidating the act if one perceives that: the act will lead to quarreling, a crack, or a split in the Community; or the act is being carried out not in accordance with the rule, by an incomplete assembly, or against/for a person who doesn't warrant it. Summary: Getting up and leaving a meeting of the Community in the midst of a valid formal act -- without having first given one's consent to the act and with the intention of invalidating it -- is a pacittiya offense. * * * 81. Should any bhikkhu, (acting as part of) a Community in concord, give robe-cloth (to an individual bhikkhu) and later complain, "The bhikkhus apportion the Community's gains according to friendship," it is to be confessed. Apportioning the Community's gains. The Cullavagga (VI.15.2) contains a passage saying that no one -- not even the Community itself -- can take any of the following items belonging to the Community and turn them over to individual ownership: monasteries or monastery land; dwellings or land on which dwellings are built; furnishings, such as couches, chairs, or mattresses; metal vessels or tools; building materials or articles made of pottery or wood. The collective term for these goods is //garubhanda//, or heavy articles. The penalty for handing any of the Community's garubhanda over to individual ownership is a thullaccaya. In the origin story to Parajika 4, the Buddha states that a bhikkhu who gives the Community's garubhanda to a lay person is one of the five great thieves in the world. Light articles (//lahubhanda//) belonging to the Community, though, may be turned over to individual ownership -- of a bhikkhu or novice -- but only when the proper procedures are followed. The usual pattern is to appoint a Community official, through a formal act, to be responsible for making sure that such items be distributed fairly to the members of the Community eligible to receive them. Such officials include distributors of robe-cloth, of food, of fruit, of non-staple foods, and of small accessories, such as scissors, sandals, water strainers, etc. (Cv.VI.21). In addition, this training rule shows that a Community acting as a whole may take light articles belonging to it and turn them over to individual bhikkhus or novices. (According to the K/Commentary to Pacittiya 79, this can be done with a simple declaration (//apalokana//), although the kathina ceremony, which would fall under this general category, follows the pattern of a motion with one announcement.) A typical example, apart from the kathina, would be if the Community receives a particularly fine piece of cloth and, instead of cutting it up to share the pieces out among the members, decides to present the entire piece to one of its members who has been especially helpful to the group. This is one way in which the Community may reward a Community official for his services. Any member of the Community who disagrees with such a decision may prevent it from happening by protesting during the declaration. The purpose of this rule is to prevent members of the Community from complaining, after the they have taken part in such a decision, that the Community was acting out of favoritism. The factors for the full offense are two. 1) //Object//: One has acted as part of a Community that has given robe-cloth to a bhikkhu who has been chosen, through a prior formal act, to be a Community official. 2) //Effort//: One complains afterwards that the Community acted out of favoritism. Object. //Acting as part of a Community// means that one is in communion with the Community that handed over the cloth, and that one was in the same boundary with them: i.e., one was either in the meeting or had given one's consent to it. //Robe-cloth// means a piece of any of the six kinds of allowable cloth, measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths. The various permutations of articles and recipients are as follows: Complaining when the Community has given robe-cloth to a Community official: a pacittiya. Complaining when the Community has given any other light article to a Community official: a dukkata. Complaining when the Community has given any light article -- cloth or otherwise -- to a bhikkhu who is not a Community official or to a novice: a dukkata. Perception is not a mitigating factor here. For example, if the recipient was made a Community official through a valid formal act, then regardless of how one perceives that act, it has no effect on the penalty under this rule. (The Vibhanga is somewhat confusing on this point, not saying explicitly whether the factor of "perception with regard to the formal act" refers to the act by which the official was appointed or to the act by which the cloth was handed over to him. The first interpretation, though, is the only one that makes sense in light of the no-offense clauses, and the K/Commentary confirms that it is the correct one.) Effort. This factor is fulfilled by any expression of personal displeasure with the Community. If, however, one accuses the Community of having carried out the act improperly -- not in accordance with the rule, or with an incomplete assembly -- the case would come not here, but under Pacittiya 63. Non-offenses. The Vibhanga says that if the article //was// given out of habitual favoritism, anger, delusion, or fear, there is no offense in complaining, "What is the use of giving it to him? After receiving it he'll ruin it; he won't take proper care of it." Notice, however, that even in cases of this sort one is allowed to criticize only the recipient, and not the Community -- for, after all, one had one's chance to protest during the meeting, but remained silent. Summary: After participating in a formal act of the Community giving robe-cloth to a Community official: Complaining that the Community acted out of favoritism is a pacittiya offense. * * * 82. Should any bhikkhu knowingly divert to an individual gains that had been allocated for the Community, it is to be confessed. This rule has already been explained under NP 30. Summary: Persuading a donor to give to another individual a gift that he or she had planned to give to a Community -- when one knows that it was intended for the Community -- is a pacittiya offense * * * * * * * *

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