CHAPTER FIVE Sanghadisesa This term means +quot;involving the Community in the initial (//

                                           
                                           
                                           
                                           
                              CHAPTER FIVE
                                           
                              Sanghadisesa
                              ~~~~~~~~~~~~
   
   
   This term means "involving the Community in the initial (//adi//) 
   and subsequent (//sesa//) acts." It refers to the fact that the 
   Community is the agent that initially calls on the bhikkhu who 
   breaks any of the rules in this category to undergo the penalty (of 
   //manatta//, penance, and //parivasa//, probation), subsequently 
   reimposes the penalty if he does not properly carry it out, and 
   finally lifts the penalty when he does. There are thirteen training 
   rules here, the first nine entailing a sanghadisesa immediately on 
   transgression, the last four only after the offender has been 
   rebuked three times as a formal act of the Community.
   
   
   
       1.Intentional discharge of semen, except while dreaming, 
       entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.
   
     The origin story to this rule is as follows: 
   
       "Now at that time Ven. Seyyasaka was leading the celibate 
       life dissatisfied. Because of this, he was thin, wretched, 
       unattractive, and jaundiced, his body covered with veins. 
       Ven. Udayin saw that Ven. Seyyasaka was thin...his body 
       covered with veins; and seeing him, said to him, 'Seyyasaka, 
       my friend, why are you thin...your body covered with veins? 
       Could it be that you're leading the celibate life 
       dissatisfied?'
       
       "'Yes, friend.'
       
       "'In that case, eat as you like and sleep as you like and 
       bathe as you like; and having eaten, slept, and bathed as 
       you like, when dissatisfaction arises and lust assails the 
       mind, emit semen making do with your hand.'
       
       "'But is it okay to do that?'
       
       "'Of course. I do it myself.'
       
       "So then Ven. Seyyasaka ate as he liked and slept as he 
       liked...and when dissatisfaction arose and lust assailed his 
       mind, he would emit semen making do with his hand. Then it 
       wasn't long before he became attractive, with rounded 
       features, a clear complexion, and very bright skin. So the 
       bhikkhus who were his friends said to him, 'Before, friend 
       Seyyasaka, you were thin...your body covered with veins. But 
       now you are attractive, with rounded features, a clear 
       complexion, and very bright skin. Could it be that you're 
       taking medicine?'
       
       "'No, I'm not taking medicine, my friends. I just eat as 
       like and sleep as I like...and when dissatisfaction arises 
       and lust assails my mind, I emit semen making do with my 
       hand.'
       
       "'But do you emit semen making do with the same hand you use 
       to eat the gifts of the faithful?'
       
       "'Yes, my friends.'
       
       "So the bhikkhus...were offended and annoyed and spread it 
       about, 'How can this Ven. Seyyasaka emit semen making do 
       with the same hand he uses to eat the gifts of the 
       faithful?'"
       
     This rule, in its outline form, is one of the simplest to explain. 
   In its details, though, it is one of the most complex, not only 
   because the subject is a sensitive matter, but also because the 
   Commentary deviates somewhat from the Vibhanga in its explanations 
   of two of the three factors that constitute the full offense.
     
     The three factors are result, intention, and effort: Emission of 
   semen caused by an intentional effort. When all three factors are 
   present, the offense is a sanghadisesa. If the last two -- intention 
   and effort -- are present, the offense is a thullaccaya. Any single 
   factor or any other combination of two factors -- i.e., intention 
   and result without making a physical effort, or effort and result 
   without intention -- is not grounds for an offense. 
     
     It may seem strange to list the factor of result first, but I want 
   to explain it first partly because, in understanding the types of 
   intention and effort covered by this rule, it is necessary to know 
   what they are aimed at, and also because result is the one factor 
   where the Vibhanga and Commentary are in basic agreement.
     
     Result. The Commentary discusses the physiology of semen as it was 
   understood at the time, and in passing touches on the question of 
   whether the word //semen// refers to the clear liquid produced in 
   small quantities by the prostrate and Cooper's glands prior to 
   ejaculation, or to the seminal fluid released at orgasm (in its 
   words, "having made the whole body shake, it is released and 
   descends into the urinary tract.") It concludes that the latter is 
   what is meant here.
     
     As for the Vibhanga, it devotes long passages to the various 
   colors and qualities that semen can come in, only to conclude that 
   the color and quality are irrelevant to the offense. This suggests 
   that a bhikkhu who has had a vasectomy can still commit an offense 
   under this rule, since he can still discharge the various components 
   that go into seminal fluid -- minus only the sperm -- at orgasm. 
     
     //Discharge//, according to the Vibhanga, refers to the point in 
   time when the semen "falls from its base." The Commentary explains 
   this as the point when the semen enters the urinary tract, because 
   from that point on the process is irreversible. Thus if the process 
   of sexual stimulation has reached this point, the factor of result 
   has been fulfilled, even if one tries to prevent the semen from 
   leaving the body by pinching the end of one's penis.
     
     Intention. The Vibhanga defines //intentionally// as "having made 
   the decision knowingly, consciously, and purposefully." According to 
   the Commentary, "having made the decision" refers to the moment when 
   one "crushes" one's indecisiveness by taking an act. (These are the 
   same terms it uses to explain the same phrase under Parajika 3 and 
   several other rules. The meaning is that one has definitely made up 
   one's mind to start with the act and is not simply toying with the 
   idea.) //Knowingly// means that one knows that, "I am making an 
   exertion." //Consciously// means that one is aware that one's 
   efforts are bringing about an emission of semen. //Purposefully// 
   means that one's purpose is to enjoy the bringing about of an 
   emission.
     
     This last point is where the Commentary deviates from the 
   Vibhanga's discussion of the factor of intention. The Vibhanga, 
   throughout its analysis, expresses the factor of purpose simply as 
   "aiming at causing an emission," and it lists ten possible reasons 
   for wanting to bring the emission about:
       
     for the sake of health,
     for the sake of pleasure,
     for the sake of a medicine,
     for the sake of a gift (to insects, says the Commentary),
     for the sake of merit,
     for the sake of sacrifice,
     for the sake of heaven,
     for the sake of seed (to produce a child -- a bhikkhu who gave 
       semen to be used in artificial insemination would fit in this 
       category), 
     for the sake of investigating (to see what color it will be -- 
       ancient medicine sometimes used this as a way of diagnosing 
       disease), or
     for the sake of fun. 
   
     Each of these reasons, the Vibhanga says, fulfills the factor of 
   intention here. Thus for the Commentary to limit the question of 
   "purpose" strictly to the enjoyment of the act of bringing about an 
   emission (numbers 2 and 10 in the Vibhanga's list) has no basis in 
   the Canon. And so the factor of intention under this rule is 
   fulfilled when one wants to cause an emission of semen, for no 
   matter what reason.
     
     Given the way //intention// is defined, there is no offense for a 
   bhikkhu who brings on an emission of semen -- 
     
     //accidentally// -- e.g., toying with his penis simply for the 
       pleasure of the contact, when it suddenly and unexpectedly goes 
       off;
     
     //not knowing that he is making an effort// -- e.g., when he is 
       dreaming or in a semi-conscious state before fully waking up from 
       sleep;
     
     //not conscious that his efforts are bringing about an emission of 
       semen// -- e.g., when he is so engrossed in applying medicine to 
       a sore on his penis that he doesn't realize that he is bringing 
       on an ejaculation; 
     
     or when his efforts are //motivated by a purpose other than that 
       of causing an emission// -- e.g., when he wakes up, finds that he 
       is about to have a spontaneous ejaculation, and grabs hold of his 
       penis to keep the semen from soiling his robes or bedding. 
   
   
     Effort. The Vibhanga defines four types of effort that fulfill 
   this factor: A bhikkhu causes an emission making an effort (1) at an 
   internal object, (2) at an external object, (3) at both an internal 
   and an external object, or (4) by shaking his pelvis in the air. It 
   then goes on to explain these terms: The internal object is one's 
   own living body. External objects can either be animate or inanimate 
   objects. The third type of effort involves a combination of the 
   first two, and the fourth covers cases when one makes one's penis 
   erect ("workable") by making an effort in the air. 
     
     The extremely general nature of these definitions gives the 
   impression that the compilers of the Vibhanga wanted them to cover 
   every imaginable type of bodily effort aimed at arousing oneself 
   sexually, and this impression is borne out by the wide variety of 
   cases covered in the Vinita Vatthu. They include, among others, a 
   bhikkhu who squeezes his penis with his fist, one who rubs his penis 
   with his thumb, one who rubs his penis against his bed, one who 
   inserts his penis into sand, one who bathes against the current in a 
   stream, one who rubs his preceptor's back in the bathing room, one 
   who gets an erection from the friction of his thighs and robes while 
   walking along, one who has his belly heated in the bathing room, and 
   one who stretches his body. In each of these cases, if the bhikkhu 
   aims at and succeeds in causing an emission, he incurs a 
   sanghadisesa.
     
     The Vinita Vatthu also includes a case in which a bhikkhu, 
   desiring to cause an emission, orders a novice to take hold of his 
   (the bhikkhu's) penis. He gets his emission and a sanghadisesa to 
   boot, which shows that getting someone else to make the effort for 
   one fulfills the factor of effort here.
     
     In discussing the factor of effort, though, the Commentary makes a 
   slight change in the Vibhanga's definition -- that one makes an 
   effort //with// or //upon// one's own body, etc., rather than //at// 
   one's own body, etc. -- and adds an additional factor: that the 
   effort must be directed at one's own penis. If this is so, then a 
   bhikkhu who succeeds in causing an emission by stimulating any of 
   the erogenous zones of his body aside from his penis would incur no 
   penalty. The Commentary itself actually makes this point, and the 
   Sub-commentary seconds it, although the V/Sub-commentary says that 
   such a bhikkhu would incur a dukkata -- what it bases this opinion 
   on, it doesn't say: perhaps a misreading of the Case of the Sleeping 
   Novice, which we will discuss below. 
     
     At any rate, the Commentary in adding this last factor runs up 
   against a number of cases in the Vinita Vatthu in which the effort 
   does not involve the penis: the bhikkhu warming his belly, the 
   bhikkhu rubbing his preceptor's back, a bhikkhu having his thighs 
   massaged, and others. The Commentary deals with these cases by 
   rewriting them, stating in most cases that the effort somehow had to 
   involve the penis. This in itself is questionable, but when the 
   Commentary actually contradicts the Vinita Vatthu in the case of the 
   bhikkhu who warms his belly, saying that this sort of effort could 
   not involve an offense at all, even if one aims at and succeeds in 
   causing an emission, the commentators have moved beyond the realm of 
   commenting into the realm of rewriting the rule.
     
     As stated in the Introduction, we have to go on the assumption 
   that the compilers of the Vibhanga knew the crucial factors well 
   enough to know what is and is not an offense, and were careful 
   enough to include all the relevant facts when describing the 
   precedents in the Vinita Vatthu in order to show how the Buddha 
   arrived at his judgments. Since the Commentary's position -- adding 
   the extra factor that the physical effort has to involve one's own 
   penis -- directly contradicts the Vibhanga on this point, the extra 
   factor cannot stand.
     
     The question then is why the commentators added the extra factor 
   in the first place. An answer may be found in one of the cases in 
   the Vinita Vatthu: the Case of the Sleeping Novice.
   
       "On that occasion a certain bhikkhu grabbed hold of the 
       penis of a sleeping novice. His semen was emitted. He felt 
       remorseful....'Bhikkhu, there is no sanghadisesa offense. 
       There is a dukkata offense.'"
   
     The issue here is whose semen was emitted. Pali syntax, unlike 
   English, doesn't give us a clue, for there is no rule that the 
   pronoun in one sentence should refer to the subject of the preceding 
   sentence. There are many cases under Parajika 3 that follow the 
   form, "A stone badly held by the bhikkhu standing above hit the 
   bhikkhu standing below on the head. The bhikkhu died. He felt 
   remorseful." In these cases it is obvious from the context within 
   the story which bhikkhu died and which one felt remorseful, while 
   with the sleeping novice we have to look for the context in terms of 
   the other parts of the Vibhanga. 
     
     If the bhikkhu was the one who emitted semen, then perhaps there 
   is a contradiction in the Vibhanga, and the Commentary is justified 
   in saying that the effort must involve one's penis, for otherwise 
   the case would seem to fulfill the Vibhanga's general definition for 
   the factor of effort: The bhikkhu is making an effort at an outside 
   body and has an emission. Following the general pattern of the rule, 
   he would incur a sanghadisesa if he intended emission, and no 
   penalty at all if he didn't. Yet the question of intention is not 
   mentioned at all, and the bhikkhu is given a dukkata, which suggests 
   an inconsistency.
     
     If, however, the novice was the one who emitted, there is no 
   inconsistency at all: The bhikkhu gets his dukkata for making 
   lustful bodily contact with another man (see the discussion under 
   Sanghadisesa 2, below), and the case is included here to show that 
   the full offense under this rule concerns instances where one makes 
   //oneself// emit semen, and not where one makes others emit. (Other 
   than this case, there is nothing in the rule or the Vibhanga that 
   expressly makes this point. The rule simply mentions bringing about 
   the emission of semen, without explicitly mentioning whose. This 
   would explain the bhikkhu's uncertainty as to whether or not he had 
   committed a sanghadisesa.) And the reason there is no mention of 
   whether or not the bhikkhu intended to emit semen is because -- as 
   it comes under another rule -- it is irrelevant to the case.
     
     Thus, since the second reading -- the novice was the one who had 
   an emission -- does no violence to the rest of the Vibhanga, it 
   seems to be the preferable one. So if this was the case that led the 
   commentators to add their extra factor, we can see that they misread 
   it, and that the Vibhanga's original definition for the factor of 
   effort still stands: Any bodily effort made at one's own body, at 
   another body or physical object, at both, or any effort made in the 
   air -- like shaking one's pelvis or stretching one's body -- 
   fulfills the factor of effort here.
     
     One case that does //not// fulfill the factor of effort is when 
   one is filled with lust and stares at the private parts of a woman 
   or girl. In the case dealing with this contingency, the bhikkhu 
   emits semen, but again no mention is made of whether he intended to. 
   In any event, the Buddha lays down a separate rule, imposing a 
   dukkata for staring lustfully at a women's private parts. This 
   suggests that efforts with one's eyes do not count as bodily efforts 
   under this sanghadisesa, for otherwise the penalty would have been a 
   sanghadisesa if the bhikkhu had intended emission, and no offense if 
   he hadn't. And this also suggests that the dukkata under this 
   separate rule holds regardless of intention or result. The 
   Commentary adds that this dukkata applies also to staring lustfully 
   at the genitals of a female animal or at the area of a fully-clothed 
   woman's body where her sexual organ is, thinking, "Her sexual organ 
   is there." At present we would impose the penalty on a bhikkhu who 
   stares lustfully at a woman's private parts in a pornographic 
   photograph. 
     
     Consent. A special contingency covered by this rule is mentioned 
   twice in the Vinita Vatthu for Parajika 1: A woman approaches a 
   bhikkhu and offers to make him emit semen by making do with her hand 
   (%). The bhikkhu lets her go ahead, and the Buddha says that he 
   incurs a sanghadisesa in doing so. The commentaries treat the case 
   as self-evident and offer no extra details. Thus, given the facts as 
   we have them, it would seem that consent under this rule can be 
   expressed physically simply by letting the act happen. A bhikkhu who 
   acquiesces mentally when someone tries and succeeds in making him 
   emit semen is not absolved from the full offense here even if he 
   otherwise lies perfectly still throughout the event. 
     
     Derived offenses. As stated above, a bhikkhu who fulfills all 
   three factors -- result, intention, and effort -- incurs a 
   sanghadisesa. One who fulfills only the last two -- intention and 
   effort -- incurs a thullaccaya.
     
     People have sometimes asked how much of an effort is necessary to 
   incur a thullaccaya and, in particular, whether the thullaccaya is 
   only for cases where a bhikkhu tries to go all the way to an 
   emission but cannot have one for physical reasons beyond his control 
   -- e.g., he is unable to have an erection or to produce semen -- or 
   whether it also covers cases where a bhikkhu starts out trying to 
   cause an emission but stops short and changes his mind before the 
   emission can come.
     
     The Vibhanga suggests indirectly that the penalty covers both 
   cases when it says simply that the thullaccaya is for one who 
   intends, makes the effort, but does not emit. If it had meant to 
   limit the penalty to those who //cannot// emit, it would have said 
   so and would have set some kind of standard for determining when the 
   bhikkhu passed the threshold from //does not// to //cannot// so that 
   there would be no doubt as to where the realm of non-offense ends 
   and thullaccaya begins. But it doesn't.
     
     The Commentary is even clearer on this topic when it discusses the 
   case of a bhikkhu who, filled with his lust, grabs his penis with 
   the purpose of causing an emission but drifts off to sleep before an 
   emission occurs. The emission does occur while he is asleep, though, 
   and he incurs a sanghadisesa. Since efforts made during sleep do not 
   count (see below), this shows that the factor of effort does not 
   need to go all the way to ejaculation in order to count. 
     
     In discussing the case of a bhikkhu with fat thighs who develops 
   an erection simply by walking along, the Commentary mentions that if 
   one finds sensual "fever" arising in such a case, one must 
   immediately stop walking and start contemplating the foulness of the 
   body so as to purify the mind before continuing on one's way. 
   Otherwise, one would incur a thullaccaya simply for moving one's 
   legs. //Sensual fever//, here, probably refers to the desire to 
   cause an emission, for there are several spots where the Commentary 
   discusses bhikkhus who stimulate an erection simply for the 
   enjoyment of the contact rather than to cause an emission, and the 
   judgment is that they incur no penalty, even if an emission does 
   inadvertently result. 
     
     Aside from the thullaccaya, there are no other derived offenses 
   under this rule. A bhikkhu who has an ejaculation while thinking 
   sensual thoughts but without making any physical effort to cause it, 
   incurs no penalty regardless of whether or not the idea crosses his 
   mind that he would like to have an emission, and whether or not he 
   enjoys it when it occurs. However, the Commentary notes here that 
   even though there is no offense involved, one should not let oneself 
   be overcome by sensual thoughts in this way. This point is borne out 
   by the famous simile that occurred to Prince Siddhattha before his 
   Awakening and that later, as Buddha, he related to a number of 
   listeners:
   
       "'Suppose there were a wet sappy piece of timber lying on 
       dry ground far from water, and a man were to come along with 
       an upper fire-stick, thinking, "I'll light a fire. I'll 
       produce heat." Now what do you think? Would he be able to 
       light a fire and produce heat by rubbing the upper 
       fire-stick in the wet sappy timber...?'
       
       "'No, Master Gotama. And why not? Because the wood is wet 
       and sappy, even though it is lying on dry ground far from 
       water. The man would reap nothing but weariness and 
       disappointment.'
       
       "'So it is with any priest or contemplative who lives 
       withdrawn from sensuality only in body, but whose desire, 
       infatuation, urge, thirst, and fever for sensuality is not 
       relinquished and stilled within him: Whether or not he feels 
       painful, racking, piercing feelings due to his striving (for 
       Awakening), he is incapable of knowledge, vision, and 
       unexcelled self-awakening.'" (M.36) 
   
     Non-offenses. In addition to the cases already mentioned -- the 
   bhikkhus who bring about emissions accidentally, not knowing that 
   they are making an effort, not conscious that their efforts are 
   bringing about an emission, whose efforts are motivated by a purpose 
   other than that of causing an emission, or who without making any 
   physical effort have an ejaculation while overcome by sensual 
   thoughts -- there is no offense for a bhikkhu who has an ejaculation 
   during a dream. 
     
     In the wording of the rule, the phrase "except while dreaming" is 
   expressed by an idiom that could also mean "at the end of a dream." 
   This second possibility, though, is ruled out by the Commentary, 
   which states that what happens in the mind while one is sleeping 
   falls in the bounds of the Abhidhamma, but what happens after one 
   awakens falls within the bounds of the Vinaya; and that there is no 
   such thing as a misdeed performed when one is in a "non-negligible" 
   state of mind that does not count as an offense. ("Non-negligible," 
   according to the Sub-commentary, means "normal.")
     
     In making the exception for what happens while asleep, the Buddha 
   states that even though there may be the intention to cause an 
   emission, it doesn't count. The Commentary goes on to say, however, 
   that if a bhikkhu fully awakens in the course of a wet dream, he 
   should lie still and be extremely careful not to make a move that 
   would fulfill the factor of effort under this rule. If the process 
   has reached the point where it is irreversible, and the ejaculation 
   occurs spontaneously, he incurs no penalty regardless of whether or 
   not he enjoys it. And as the Commentary quotes from the Kurundi, one 
   of the ancient Sinhalese commentaries on which it is based, if he 
   wakes up in the course of a wet dream and grabs hold of his penis so 
   that the ejaculation will not soil his robes or bedding, there is no 
   offense.
     
     However, the case from the Commentary mentioned above -- the 
   bhikkhu who had the desire and made the effort towards an emission 
   before falling off to sleep -- suggests that the exemption for 
   emissions during a dream does not extend to cases where both the 
   intention and the effort occur while one is fully conscious, for all 
   three factors under this rule are fully present: One makes the 
   conscious decision to cause an emission, makes a conscious effort 
   aimed at causing the emission, and the emission occurs. Whether or 
   not one is conscious that it is occurring is of no account.
   
       Summary: Intentionally causing oneself to emit semen, or 
       getting someone else to cause one to emit semen -- except 
       during a dream -- is a sanghadisesa offense. 
                                           
                                           
                                 * * *
   
   
       2.Should any bhikkhu, overcome by lust, with altered mind, 
       engage in bodily contact with a woman, or in holding her 
       hand, holding a lock of her hair, or caressing any of her 
       limbs, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the 
       Community.
   
   This rule has sometimes been viewed as a sign of prejudice against 
   women. But, as the origin story makes clear, the Buddha formulated 
   the rule not because women are bad, but because bhikkhus sometimes 
   can be. 
   
       "Now at that time, Ven. Udayin was living in the forest. His 
       dwelling was beautiful, attractive, and appealing. The inner 
       chamber was in the middle, entirely surrounded by the outer 
       rooms. The bed and chair, the pillows and bolsters were well 
       arranged, the water for washing and drinking well placed, 
       the surrounding area well swept. Many people came to admire 
       it. Even a certain Brahmin together with his wife went to 
       where Ven. Udayin was staying and on arrival said, 'We would 
       like to admire your dwelling.'
       
       "'Very well then, Brahmin, have a look.' Taking the key, 
       unfastening the lock, and opening the door, he entered the 
       dwelling. The Brahmin entered after Ven. Udayin; the Brahmin 
       lady after the Brahmin. Then Ven. Udayin, opening some of 
       the windows and closing others, walking around the inner 
       room and coming up from behind, rubbed up against the 
       Brahmin lady limb by limb.
       
       "After a while the Brahmin exchanged pleasantries with Ven. 
       Udayin and left. Delighted, he burst out with an exclamation 
       of joy: 'How splendid are are these Sakyan contemplatives 
       who live in the forest like this! And how splendid is Ven. 
       Udayin who lives in the forest like this!'
       
       "When he had said this, his wife said to him, 'What's so 
       splendid about him? He rubbed up against me limb by limb 
       just the way you do!'
       
       "So the Brahmin was offended and annoyed and spread it 
       about: 'How shameless these bhikkhus are, how immoral and 
       hypocritical!...How can this contemplative Udayin rub up 
       against my wife limb by limb? It isn't possible to go with 
       your women-folk to a monastery or dwelling. If you go to a 
       monastery or dwelling with your womenfolk, the Sakyan 
       contemplatives will molest them!'"
   
     There are two ways in which a bhikkhu can come into contact with a 
   woman: either actively (the bhikkhu makes the contact) or passively 
   (the woman does). Since the Vibhanga uses different terms to analyse 
   these two possibilities, we will discuss them separately.
   
   //Active contact//. The full offense for active contact here is 
   composed of four factors:
   
     1) //Object//: a living woman -- "even one born on that very day, 
       all the more an older one." Whether or not she is awake to 
       realize what is going on is irrelevant to the offense.
     
     2) //Perception//: The bhikkhu correctly perceives her to be a 
       woman.
     
     3) //Intention//: He is acting under the influence of lust. 
     
     4) //Effort//: He comes into physical contact with her.
   
     Since the system of derived offenses based on the various 
   permutations of these factors is one of the most complex in the 
   Vibhanga, we will limit our discussion first to the full offense 
   before going into the permutations.
     
     Of the four factors listed above, only two -- intention and effort 
   -- require detailed explanation.
     
     Intention. The Vibhanga explains the term //overcome with lust// 
   as meaning "impassioned, desiring, a mind bound by attraction." 
   //Altered//, it says, can refer in general to one of three states of 
   mind -- passion, aversion, or delusion -- but here it refers 
   specifically to passion. 
     
     The Commentary adds a piece of Abhidhamma analysis at this point, 
   saying that //altered// refers to the moment when the mind leaves 
   its state of pure neutrality in the //bhavanga// under the influence 
   of desire. Thus the factor of intention here can be fulfilled not 
   only by a prolonged or intense feeling of desire, but also by a 
   momentary infatuation.
     
     The Commentary also tries to limit the range of passion to which 
   this rule applies, saying that it covers only desire for the 
   enjoyment of contact. As we noted under Parajika 1, the ancient 
   commentators formulated a list of eleven types of lust, each 
   mutually exclusive, and the question of which rule applies to a 
   particular case depends on which type of lust provokes the bhikkhu's 
   actions. Thus if a bhikkhu lusting for intercourse touches a woman, 
   it says, he incurs only a dukkata as a preliminary to sexual 
   intercourse under Parajika 1. If he touches her from his lust for an 
   ejaculation, he incurs a thullaccaya as a preliminary to causing an 
   emission under Sanghadisesa 1. Only if he touches her with the 
   simple desire to enjoy the sensation of contact does he incur a 
   sanghadisesa under this rule.
     
     This system, though very neat and orderly, flies in the face of 
   common sense and, as we noted under Parajika 1, contradicts the 
   Vibhanga as well, so there is no need to adopt it. We can stick with 
   the Vibhanga to this rule and say that //any// state of passion 
   fulfills the factor of intention here. The Commentary's discussion, 
   though, is useful in showing that the passion needn't be full-scale 
   sexual lust. Even a momentary desire to enjoy the sensation of 
   physical contact -- overwhelming enough that one acts on it -- is 
   enough to fulfill this factor.
     
     Effort. The Vibhanga illustrates the effort of making physical 
   contact with a list of activities: rubbing, rubbing up against, 
   rubbing downwards, rubbing upwards, bending down, pulling up, 
   drawing to, pushing away, seizing hold (or pinning down -- 
   //abhinigganhana//), squeezing, grasping, or touching. The Vinita 
   Vatthu includes a case of a bhikkhu giving a woman a blow with his 
   shoulder: He too incurs a sanghadisesa, which shows that the 
   Vibhanga's list is meant to cover all similar actions as well. If a 
   bhikkhu with lustful mind does anything of this sort to a living 
   woman's body, perceiving that she is a woman, he incurs the full 
   penalty under this rule. 
     
     Derived offenses. Each of the factors of an offense allows a 
   number of permutations that admit for different classes of offenses. 
   Taken together, they form a complex system. Here we will consider 
   each factor in turn.
   
     //Object//. Assuming that the bhikkhu is acting with lustful 
   intentions and is perceiving his object correctly, he incurs a 
   thullaccaya for making bodily contact with a //pandaka//, a female 
   yakkha, or a dead woman; and a dukkata for bodily contact with a man 
   (or boy), a wooden doll, or a female animal.
     
     //Pandaka //is usually translated as eunuch, but eunuchs are only 
   one of five types of pandakas recognized by the Commentary:
   
     (1) An //asitta// (literally, a "sprinkled one") -- a man who 
       finds sexual fulfillment in performing fellatio on another man 
       and bringing him to climax. (For some reason, other homosexual 
       acts, even though they were known in ancient India, are not 
       included under this type nor under any of the types in this 
       list.)
     
     (2) A voyeur -- a man who finds sexual fulfillment in watching 
       other people have sex.
     
     (3) A eunuch -- one who has been castrated.
     
     (4) A half-time pandaka -- one who is a pandaka only during the 
       waning moon. (!  --  The Sub-commentary's discussion of this 
       point shows that its author and his contemporaries were as 
       unfamiliar with this type as we are today. Perhaps this was how 
       bisexuals were understood in ancient times.)
     
     (5) A neuter -- a person born without sexual organs.
     
     According to the Commentary, the Mahavagga's statement (I.61) that 
   pandakas cannot receive ordination refers only to the last three 
   types, and to the half-time pandaka only during the waning moon.
   
     As for female yakkhas, the Commentary says that this also includes 
   female deities. There is an ancient story in Chieng Mai of a bhikkhu 
   who was visited by a dazzling heavenly maiden late one night while 
   he was meditating alone in a cave at Wat Umong. He couldn't resist 
   touching her and, as soon as he did, went immediately out of his 
   mind. The moral: This is one thullaccaya not to be taken lightly.
   
     Also from the Commentary:
   
     (1) The thullaccaya for lustfully touching female corpses applies 
       only to those that would be grounds for a full offense under 
       Parajika 1, i.e., those with an anal, oral, or genital orifice 
       intact enough for one to perform the sexual act. Female corpses 
       decomposed beyond that point are grounds for a dukkata here.
     
     (2) The dukkata for lustfully touching wooden dolls (mannikins) 
       applies also to any female form made out of other materials, and 
       even to any picture of a woman.
     
     (3) Female animals include female nagas and other half-animal, 
       half-woman species as well.
     
     According to the Sub-commentary, the dukkata for lustfully 
   touching female animals also applies to male animals.
     
     For some reason, male yakkhas and deities slipped out of the list. 
   Perhaps they should come under "men."
     
     //Perception//. Misperception affects the severity of the offense 
   only in the cases of women and pandakas. A bhikkhu who makes lustful 
   bodily contact with a woman while under the impression that she is 
   something else -- a pandaka, a man, or an animal -- incurs a 
   thullaccaya. If he makes lustful bodily contact with a pandaka while 
   under the impression that the pandaka is a woman, a man, or an 
   animal, the penalty is a dukkata. In the cases of men and animals, 
   misperception has no effect on the severity of the case: Lustful 
   bodily contact -- e.g., with a male transvestite whom one thinks to 
   be a woman -- still results in a dukkata. 
     
     //Intention//. The Vinita Vatthu contains cases of a bhikkhu who 
   caresses his mother out of filial affection, one who caresses his 
   daughter out of fatherly affection, and one who caresses his sister 
   out of brotherly affection. In each case the penalty is a dukkata. 
     
     The Vibhanga does not discuss the issue of bhikkhus who 
   intentionally make active contact with women for purposes other than 
   lust or affection -- e.g., helping a woman who has fallen into a 
   raging river -- but the Commentary does. It introduces the concept 
   of //anamasa//, things carrying a dukkata penalty when touched; 
   women and clothing belonging to a woman top the list. It then goes 
   into great detail to tell how one should behave when one's mother 
   falls into a raging river. Under no circumstances, it says, should 
   one grab hold of her, although one may extend a rope, a board, etc., 
   in her direction. If she happens to grab hold of her son the 
   bhikkhu, he should not shake her off, but should simply let her hold 
   on as he swims back to shore.
     
     Where the Commentary gets the concepts of //anamasa// is hard to 
   say. Perhaps it came from the practices of the Brahmin caste, who 
   are very careful not to touch certain things and people of certain 
   lower castes. At any rate, there is no direct basis for it in the 
   Canon. Although the concept has received universal acceptance in 
   Theravadin Communities, many highly-respected Vinaya experts have 
   made an exception right here, saying that there is nothing wrong in 
   touching a woman when one's action is based not on lust but on a 
   desire to save her from danger. Even if there is an offense in doing 
   so, there are other places where Buddhaghosa recommends that one be 
   willing to incur a minor penalty for the sake of compassion (e.g., 
   digging a person out of a hole into which he has fallen), and the 
   same principle surely holds here.
     
     There is no offense in touching a being other than a woman if 
   one's intentions are not lustful, although tickling is an offense 
   under Pacittiya 52.
   
   
     //Effort//. Acts of lustful but indirect bodily contact with a 
   woman one perceives to be a woman and a pandaka one perceives to be 
   a woman carry the following penalties:
   
     For the woman: Using one's body to make contact with an article 
       connected to her body -- e.g., using one's hand to touch the hem 
       of her dress, a rope, or stick she is holding: a thullaccaya.
     
     Using an item connected with one's body to make contact with her 
       body -- e.g., using the edge of one's robe or a flower one is 
       holding to brush along her arm: a thullaccaya. 
     
     Using an item connected with one's body to make contact with an 
       item connected with her body: a dukkata.
     
     Taking an object -- such as a flower -- and tossing it against her 
       body, an object connected with her body, or an object she has 
       tossed: a dukkata.
     
     Taking hold of something she is standing or sitting on -- a 
       bridge, a tree, a boat, etc. -- and giving it a shake: a dukkata. 
     
     For the pandaka one assumes to be a woman, the penalty in all the 
       above cases is a dukkata.
     
     These penalties for indirect contact have inspired the Commentary 
   to say that if a bhikkhu makes contact with a clothed portion of a 
   woman's body or uses a clothed portion of his body to make contact 
   with hers, and the cloth is so thick that neither his body hairs nor 
   hers can penetrate it, the penalty is only a thullaccaya, since he 
   is not making direct contact. Only if the contact is skin-to-skin, 
   skin-to-hair, or hair-to-hair (as might be possible through thin 
   cloth) does he commit the full offense. Thus a bhikkhu who fondles 
   the breasts or buttocks of a fully-clothed woman would incur only a 
   thullaccaya since the contact was indirect. 
     
     While this contention might be true in a technical sense, two 
   points from the Vibhanga indicate that its compilers did not have 
   this sort of thing in mind when they mentioned indirect contact. 
     
     (1) In its discussion of passive contact, the Vibhanga divides the 
   factor of effort into two parts: effort and result. The result 
   necessary for a full offense is that the bhikkhu detects contact. 
   The important word here is "detect" (//pativijanati//): The Canon 
   uses it to refer to cases where one perceives something that may not 
   be readily apparent, and here it seems specifically designed to 
   cover instances where the contact may not be skin-to-skin, but still 
   can be felt as bodily contact. Thus if the contact is such that the 
   bhikkhu could feel the presence of the woman's body through his or 
   under her clothing, direct contact has been made. If this much 
   contact is enough for a full offense under passive contact, there is 
   good reason to assume that it should also be enough under active 
   contact as well. 
     
     (2) The Vinita Vatthu contains the following case:
     
       "Now at that time, a certain bhikkhu, seeing a woman he 
       encountered coming in the opposite direction, was infatuated 
       and gave her a blow with his shoulder. He was 
       remorseful....'Bhikkhu, you have committed a sanghadisesa 
       offense.'"
     
     As mentioned in the Introduction, we have to go on the assumption 
   that the Vibhanga compilers were careful enough to include all of 
   the relevant facts in describing the cases in the Vinita Vatthu. Now 
   if the Commentary's assertion were true -- that the amount of cloth 
   between the bodies of the bhikkhu and the woman is important in 
   determining an offense -- the compilers would have mentioned this 
   factor at least indirectly, saying, for instance, that the encounter 
   took place in the monastery, where he might have had his shoulder 
   uncovered, rather than outside of the monastery, where he should 
   have had it covered; or that he had neglected to cover his shoulders 
   when leaving the monastery; or that he was wearing a very fine robe 
   that allowed his hair to pass through. But they say nothing of the 
   sort, and their silence here suggests that such questions are 
   irrelevant. 
     
     The only cases of indirect contact mentioned in the Vinita Vatthu 
   refer to contact of a much more remote sort: a bhikkhu pulls a cord 
   of which a woman is holding another end, pulls a stick of which she 
   is holding the other end, or gives her a playful push with his bowl.
     
     Thus in the context of this rule the Vibhanga defines "object 
   connected to the body," through which indirect contact is made, with 
   examples: things that the person is //holding//. The Vinaya Mukha 
   adds things that are //hanging// from the person, like the hem of a 
   robe or a dress. In this context, contact made through cloth that 
   the person is wearing, if the contact can be detected, would be 
   classed as direct. This would parallel Parajika 1, in which the 
   question of whether there is anything covering either of the organs 
   involved in intercourse is completely irrelevant to the offense. 
   Thus the concept of direct and indirect contact here would seem to 
   follow general linguistic usage: If a woman is wearing a 
   long-sleeved shirt, for instance, grabbing her by the arm and 
   grabbing her by the shirt-sleeve are two different things, and would 
   receive different penalties under this rule. 
     
     According to the Vibhanga, if a bhikkhu feels desire for contact 
   with a woman and makes an effort but does not achieve even indirect 
   contact, the penalty is a dukkata.
   
     //Passive contact//. The Vibhanga's analysis of passive contact -- 
   when the bhikkhu is the object rather than the agent making the 
   contact -- deals with only a limited number of variables.
     
     Agent: either a woman the bhikkhu perceives to be a woman, or a 
   pandaka he perceives to be a woman.
     
     The agent's effort: any of the actions that fulfill the factor of 
   act for the full offense under active contact -- rubbing, pulling, 
   pushing, squeezing, etc.
     
     The bhikkhu's aim. The Vibhanga lists only two here: the desire to 
   come together and the desire to escape (%). The Sub-commentary 
   explains the first as desiring the pleasurable feeling of contact. 
     
     Effort. The bhikkhu either makes a physical effort or he doesn't. 
   The Commentary includes under this factor even the slightest 
   physical movements, such as winking, raising one's eyebrows, or 
   rolling one's eyes. At present we would include such things as 
   inviting a woman to caress one, or deliberately placing oneself in a 
   crowded entrance to a store so that women would have to make contact 
   with one as they walked past.
     
     Result. The bhikkhu either detects the contact or he doesn't.
     
     The most important factor here is the bhikkhu's aim: If he desires 
   to escape from the contact, then no matter who the person making the 
   contact is, whether or not the bhikkhu makes an effort, or whether 
   or not he detects the contact, there is no offense. The Vinita 
   Vatthu gives an example: 
   
       "Now at that time, many women, pressing up to a certain 
       bhikkhu, led him about arm-in-arm. He felt 
       conscience-stricken.... 'Did you consent, bhikkhu?' (the 
       Buddha) asked. 
       
       'No, Lord, I did not.' 
       
       'Then there was no offense, bhikkhu, as you did not 
       consent.'" 
   
     The Commentary mentions another example, in which a bhikkhu, not 
   desiring the contact, is molested by a lustful woman. He remains 
   perfectly still, with the thought, "When she realizes I am not 
   interested, she will go away." He too commits no offense.
     
     However, if the bhikkhu desires the contact, then the offenses are 
   as follows:
     
     The agent is a woman, the bhikkhu makes an effort and detects 
   contact: a sanghadisesa. He makes an effort but detects no contact: 
   a dukkata. He makes no effort (e.g., he remains perfectly still as 
   she grasps, squeezes, and rubs his body): no offense regardless of 
   whether or not he detects contact. One exception here, though, would 
   be the special case mentioned under "Consent" in the preceding rule, 
   in which a bhikkhu lets a woman -- or anyone at all, for that matter 
   -- make him have an emission and he incurs a sanghadisesa under that 
   rule as a result. 
     
     The agent is a pandaka whom the bhikkhu perceives to be a woman, 
   the bhikkhu makes an effort and detects contact: a dukkata. All 
   other possibilities -- effort but no detected contact, detected 
   contact but no effort, no effort and no detected contact: no 
   offense. 
     
     Counting offenses. According to the Vibhanga, if a bhikkhu has 
   lustful bodily contact with //x// number of people in any of the 
   ways that constitute an offense here, he commits //x// number of 
   offenses. For example, if he lustfully rubs up against two women in 
   a bus, he incurs two sanghadisesas. If, out of fatherly affection, 
   he hugs his two daughters and three sons, he incurs two dukkatas for 
   hugging his daughters and no penalty for hugging his sons. 
     
     The Commentary adds that if he makes lustful contact with a person 
   //x// number of times, he commits //x// number of offenses. For 
   instance, he hugs a woman from behind, she fights him off, and he 
   strikes her out of lust: two sanghadisesas.
     
     The question of counting sanghadisesas, though, is somewhat 
   academic, since the penalty for multiple offenses is almost 
   identical with the penalty for one. The only difference is in the 
   formal announcements that accompany the penalty -- e.g., when the 
   Sangha places the offender under probation, when he informs others 
   bhikkhus of why he is under probation, etc. For more on this point, 
   see the concluding section of this chapter.
     
     Non-offenses. There is no offense for a bhikkhu who makes contact 
   with a woman -- 
   
     //unintentionally// --  as when inadvertently running into a woman 
       in a crowded place;
     //unthinkingly// --  as when a woman runs into him and, startled, 
       he pushes her away; 
     //unknowingly// -- as when, without lustful intent, he touches a 
       young tomboy he thinks to be a boy; or
     //when he doesn't give his consent// -- as in the case of the 
       bhikkhu led around arm-in-arm by a crowd of women.
   
       
       Summary: Lustful bodily contact with a woman whom one 
       perceives to be a woman is a sanghadisesa offense.
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
       3.Should any bhikkhu, overcome by lust, with altered mind, 
       address lewd words to a woman in the manner of young men to 
       a young woman alluding to sexual intercourse, it entails 
       initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.
   
   
       "Now at that time Ven. Udayin was living in the forest. One 
       day many women came to the monastery to admire his dwelling. 
       They went to where he was staying and on arrival said to 
       him, 'Ven. Sir, we would like to admire your dwelling.' Then 
       Ven. Udayin, showing the dwelling to the women and referring 
       to their genital and anal orifices, praised and criticized 
       and begged and implored and asked and quizzed and advised 
       and instructed and ridiculed them. Those of the women who 
       were brazen, shameless, and sly giggled at Ven. Udayin, 
       exclaimed to him, laughed aloud, and teased him; while those 
       of the women who had a sense of decency complained to the 
       bhikkhus as they left: 'It is improper, Ven. sirs, and 
       unbecoming! Even from our husbands we wouldn't like to hear 
       this sort of thing, much less from Master Udayin.'"
   
   The K/Commentary lists five factors for a full breach of this rule:
   
     1) //Object//: a woman, i.e., any female human being experienced 
       enough to know what words are and are not lewd.
     2) //Perception//: The bhikkhu perceives her to be such a woman.
     3) //Intention//: He is lustful. As in the preceding rule, we can 
       take the Commentary's definition of lust here as the //minimum// 
       amount of lust to fulfill this factor: He wants to enjoy saying 
       something lewd or improper.
     4) //Effort//: He makes remarks referring to her genitals, anus, 
       or to her performing sexual intercourse.
     5) //Result//: The woman immediately understands.
   
     The only factors requiring detailed explanation here are intention 
   and effort. 
     
     Intention. The minimum level of desire required to fulfill this 
   factor means that this rule covers cases where a bhikkhu simply gets 
   a charge out of referring to a woman's genitals, etc., in her 
   presence, without necessarily having any desire actually to have sex 
   with her.
     
     The Vibhanga makes clear that this rule does not cover statements 
   made in anger. Thus any insults a bhikkhu may direct at a woman out 
   of anger rather than playfully in desire -- even if they refer to 
   her genitals, etc. -- would come under Pacittiya 2, rather than 
   here.
     
     Effort. The Vibhanga states that to incur a sanghadisesa under 
   this rule when one is speaking to a woman, one must refer to //her// 
   genitals, anus, or performing sexual intercourse (%). 
     
     The Commentary goes further and says that to incur the full 
   penalty one must make direct mention of one of these three things, 
   or accuse her of being sexually deformed in a way that refers 
   directly to her genitals. Otherwise, if one refers lustfully to 
   these matters without directly mentioning them, there is no 
   sanghadisesa, although the Sub-commentary quotes ancient texts 
   called the Ganthipadas as assigning a dukkata for such an act.
     
     All of this contradicts the Vibhanga, which lists the ways of 
   referring to the woman's anus, genitals, and sexual intercourse that 
   would entail the full penalty under this rule -- one speaks praise, 
   speaks criticism, begs, implores, asks, quizzes, advises, exhorts, 
   or ridicules -- and many of the examples it gives, although 
   referring to the woman's private parts or to her performing sexual 
   intercourse, do not actually mention those words: "How do you give 
   to your husband?" "How do you give to your lover?" "When will your 
   mother be reconciled?" "When will you have a good opportunity?" 
   Although all of these statements refer to sexual intercourse, and 
   people in those days would have understood them in that light, none 
   of them actually mentions it. 
     
     Thus the Vibhanga's examples seem to indicate that if a bhikkhu is 
   referring lustfully to the woman's private parts or to her 
   performing sexual intercourse, then whether or not he directly names 
   those things, he fulfills this factor. 
     
     None of the texts mention the case in which a bhikkhu talks to one 
   person about another person's private parts, etc.
     
     Derived offenses. The factors of effort, object, perception, and 
   result permit a number of permutations that result in lesser 
   offenses. As for the permutations of intention, see the section on 
   non-offenses, below.
     
     //Effort//. A bhikkhu speaks to a woman he perceives to be a woman 
   and refers lustfully to parts of her body -- aside from her private 
   parts -- below her collarbone and above her knees, such as her 
   breasts or her thighs: a thullaccaya. If he refers to parts of her 
   body outside of that area, such as her face or hair, or to clothing 
   or jewelry she is wearing: a dukkata.
     
     //Object//. A bhikkhu speaks to a pandaka (in this and the 
   following cases we are assuming that he perceives his object 
   correctly) and refers lustfully to his private parts or to his 
   performing sexual intercourse: a thullaccaya. He refers lustfully to 
   other parts of the pandaka's body, his clothing, etc.: a dukkata.
     
     A bhikkhu speaks to a man (or boy) and refers lustfully to any 
   part of his listener's body, clothing, etc.: a dukkata. The same 
   penalty holds for speaking lustfully to a common animal about its 
   body, ornaments, etc. (%). (This is a point with interesting 
   implications, but unfortunately the Commentary is silent. Perhaps 
   nagas would be included here, or perhaps the Vibhanga compilers had 
   in mind cases where one mentions such things to an animal within 
   earshot of a human or celestial being.)
     
     The texts make no mention of speaking lustfully to a woman/girl 
   too young to understand what is and is not lewd. We might argue from 
   the cases included in the Vinita Vatthu, though -- where bhikkhus 
   make punning references to women's private parts, and the women do 
   not understand -- that a bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya for referring 
   directly to her genitals, anus, or performing sexual intercourse in 
   her presence, and a dukkata for referring indirectly in her presence 
   to such things.
     
     //Perception//. A bhikkhu speaking to a woman whom he perceives to 
   be something else -- a pandaka, a man, an animal -- incurs a 
   thullaccaya if he refers lustfully to her genitals, anus, or 
   performing sexual intercourse. If he is speaking to a pandaka, a 
   man, or an animal he misperceives -- e.g., he thinks the pandaka is 
   a woman, the man is a pandaka, the animal is a man -- he incurs a 
   dukkata if he refers lustfully to those topics.
     
     //Result//. As mentioned above, the Vinita Vatthu contains a 
   number cases of bhikkhus speaking to women and making punning 
   references to the women's genitals that the women do not understand. 
   In one case the penalty is a thullaccaya, in the others a dukkata. 
   The thullaccaya case is the only one in which the bhikkhu uses a 
   word synonymous with genitals (//magga//, which also means road, the 
   meaning the woman understood). Thus we might argue that if a bhikkhu 
   makes direct reference to the genitals, anus, or sexual intercourse 
   -- and this includes slang expressions and euphemisms -- and the 
   woman doesn't immediately understand that he is referring to those 
   things, he incurs a thullaccaya. If he makes indirect mention of 
   those things, and she doesn't immediately understand what he is 
   referring to, he incurs a dukkata. If it so happens that she 
   understands later, the penalty remains the same.
     
     Counting offenses. A bhikkhu making remarks of the sort covered by 
   this rule to //x// number of people commits //x// number of 
   offenses, the type of offense being determined by the factors 
   discussed above. Thus for lustful remarks to two women referring to 
   their breasts, he would incur two thullaccayas; for lustful remarks 
   to three men concerning their bodies, three dukkatas; for teasing a 
   group of twenty old ladies about how their time for sexual 
   performance is past, twenty sanghadisesas. 
     
     Non-offenses. The Vibhanga states that there is no offense for a 
   bhikkhu who speaks aiming at (spiritual) welfare (//attha//), aiming 
   at Dhamma, or aiming at teaching. Thus, for example, if one is 
   talking in front of women and has no lustful intent, one may recite 
   or explain the training rules that deal with these matters or go 
   into detail on the topic of the loathsomeness of the body as a topic 
   of meditation, all without incurring a penalty. The Commentary here 
   adds an example of a bhikkhu addressing a sexually deformed woman, 
   telling her to be heedful in her practice so as not to be born that 
   way again. If, however, one were to broach any of these topics out 
   of a desire to enjoy saying something lewd to one's listeners, one 
   would not be immune from an offense.
     
     A bhikkhu who, without intending to be lewd, makes innocent 
   remarks that his listener takes to be lewd, commits no offense. 
   
       Summary: Making a lustful remark to a woman about her 
       genitals, anus, or about performing sexual intercourse is a 
       sanghadisesa offense. 
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
       4. Should any bhikkhu, overcome by lust, with altered mind, 
       speak in the presence of a woman in praise of ministering to 
       his own sensuality thus: "This, sister, is the highest 
       ministration, that of ministering to a virtuous, 
       fine-natured follower of the celibate life such as myself 
       with this act" -- alluding to sexual intercourse -- it 
       entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community. 
   
   
       "Now at that time a certain woman, a widow, was beautiful, 
       attractive, and appealing. So Ven. Udayin, arising early in 
       the morning, taking his robe and bowl, went to her 
       residence. On arrival, he sat on an appointed seat. Then the 
       woman, approaching him, paying him homage, sat down to one 
       side. As she sat there, Ven. Udayin instructed, urged, 
       roused, and encouraged her with a talk on Dhamma. Then the 
       woman, instructed, urged, roused, and encouraged with a talk 
       on Dhamma...said to him, 'Tell me, Ven. sir, what would be 
       in my power to give you for your welfare: Robe-cloth? 
       Alms-food? Lodgings? Medicines for the sick?'
       
       "'Those things aren't hard for us to come by sister....Give 
       just what is hard for us to come by.'
       
       "'What, Ven. sir?'
       
       "'Sexual intercourse.'
       
       "'For your welfare, Ven. sir?'
       
       "'For my welfare, sister.'
       
       "'Then come, Ven. sir.' Entering into an inner room, taking 
       off her cloak, she lay back on a couch. Then Ven. Udayin 
       approached the woman and, on approaching, said, 'Who would 
       touch this foul-smelling wretch?' And he departed, spitting.
       
       "Then the woman was offended and annoyed and spread it 
       about...'How can this contemplative Udayin, when he himself 
       begged me for sexual intercourse, say, "Who would touch this 
       foul-smelling wretch?" and depart spitting? What's wretched 
       about me? What's foul-smelling about me? In what am I 
       inferior to whom?'"
       
   At first glance this rule might seem redundant with the preceding 
   one, for what we have here is another case of a bhikkhu advising, 
   begging, or imploring a woman to perform sexual intercourse. 
   However, some facts about language and belief in the Buddha's time 
   might have led some people to feel that this was a special case not 
   covered by the previous rule; so -- to prevent this misunderstanding 
   -- it gets separate treatment here.
     
     "Giving," in the Buddha's time, was a common term for having sex. 
   If a woman gave to a man, that meant that she was willing to have 
   sexual intercourse with him. Now, Buddhism was not the only religion 
   of the time to teach that gifts -- of a more innocent sort -- given 
   to contemplatives produced great reward to those who gave them, and 
   ultimately somebody somewhere came up with the bright idea that 
   since sex was the highest gift, giving it to a contemplative would 
   produce the highest reward. Whether this idea was first formulated 
   by faithful women or by clever contemplatives is hard to say. There 
   are several cases in the Vinita Vatthu to Parajika 1 telling of 
   bhikkhus approached or attacked by women professing this belief, 
   which shows that it had some currency: that sex was somehow seen as 
   a way to higher benefits through the law of kamma.
     
     Since the preceding rule gives exemptions for bhikkhus speaking 
   "aiming at (spiritual) welfare (//attha//), aiming at Dhamma," some 
   misguided souls who did not comprehend the Buddha's teachings on 
   sensuality might believe that welfare of this sort might fit under 
   the exemption. Even today, although the rationale might be 
   different, there are people who believe that having sex with 
   spiritual teachers is beneficial for one's spiritual well-being. 
   Thus we have this separate rule to show that the Buddha would have 
   no part in such a notion, and that a bhikkhu who tries to suggest 
   that his listener would benefit from having sex with him is not 
   exempt from an offense.
     
     The K/Commentary lists five factors for the full offense here.
     
     Object: a woman experienced enough to know what words are and are 
   not lewd.
     
     Perception. The bhikkhu perceives her to be such a woman.
     
     Intention. He is lustful. According to the Sub-commentary, this 
   means that he wants to enjoy saying something lewd or improper. This 
   point is borne out by the origin story, where Ven. Udayin addressed 
   his remarks to the young widow apparently just to test her reaction. 
   As in the preceding rules, we can take the Sub-commentary's 
   definition to stand for the //minimum// amount of lust needed to 
   fulfill this factor.
     
     Effort. The bhikkhu speaks to the woman in praise of her 
   ministering to his sensual needs, making reference to sexual 
   intercourse. The Commentary maintains that his remarks must directly 
   mention sexual intercourse for this factor to be fulfilled, but the 
   example in the rule itself would seem to contradict its assertion.
     
     Result. The woman immediately understands.
     
     Derived offenses. The only factors having permutations leading to 
   lesser offenses are object and perception.
     
     //Object//. A bhikkhu, motivated by lust, makes such remarks to a 
   pandaka: a thullaccaya. To a man or animal: a dukkata.
     
     //Perception//. A bhikkhu, motivated by lust, makes such remarks 
   to a woman he perceives to be something else -- a pandaka, man, or 
   animal: a thullaccaya. To a pandaka he perceives to be something 
   else: a dukkata.
     
     Counting offenses. Offenses are counted by the number of people 
   one makes such remarks to.
     
     Non-offenses. The no-offense clauses in the Vibhanga, in addition 
   to the blanket exemptions mentioned under Parajika 1, read simply: 
   "There is no offense if he speaks saying, 'Support us with the 
   requisites of robe-cloth, alms-food, lodgings, or medicines for the 
   sick.'" Thus there is apparently no way that a bhikkhu in his right 
   mind may speak in the presence of another person in praise of that 
   person's ministering to his (the bhikkhu's) own sexual desires, 
   without committing an offense.
     
       Summary: Telling a woman that she would benefit from having 
       sexual intercourse with oneself is a sanghadisesa offense.
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
       5. Should any bhikkhu engage in conveying a man's intentions 
       to a woman or a woman's intentions to a man, proposing 
       marriage or paramourage -- even if only for a momentary 
       liaison -- it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the 
       Community.
       
   There are essentially two factors for a full offense under this 
   rule: effort and object.
     
     Effort. The Commentary says that to "engage in conveying" means to 
   take on the role of a go-between. This includes helping to arrange 
   not only marriages and affairs, but also "momentary associations" 
   that, from the way it describes them, could include anything from 
   appointments with a prostitute to arrangements for X to be Y's date.
     
     The Vibhanga sets the component factors of a go-between's role at 
   three: 
     
     1) //accepting// the request of one party to convey a proposal; 
     2) //inquiring//, i.e., informing the second party and learning 
       his/her/their reaction; and 
     3) //reporting// what one has learned to the first party. 
     
     The penalties for these actions are: a dukkata for performing any 
   one of them, a thullaccaya for any two, and a sanghadisesa for the 
   full set of three. Thus a bhikkhu acting on his own initiative to 
   sound out the possibility of a date between a man and a woman would 
   incur a thullaccaya for inquiring and reporting. A bhikkhu planning 
   to disrobe who asks a woman if she would be interested in marrying 
   him after his return to lay life would incur a dukkata for 
   inquiring.
     
     The penalties are the same if the bhikkhu, instead of acting as a 
   go-between himself, gets someone else to act for him. Thus a bhikkhu 
   who agrees to convey such a proposal but then gets a lay follower or 
   another bhikkhu to do the inquiring and reporting, would incur a 
   sanghadisesa all the same.
     
     If a group of bhikkhus are asked to act as go-betweens and they 
   all accept, then even if only one of them takes the message, all 
   incur the penalty for his actions. 
     
     "Result" is not a factor here, and so the Commentary mentions that 
   whether or not the arrangements succeed has no bearing on the 
   offense.
     
     "Intention" is also not a factor, which leads the Sub-commentary 
   to raise the issue of a man who writes his proposal in a letter and 
   then, without disclosing the contents, gets a bhikkhu to deliver it. 
   Its conclusion, though, is that this case would not qualify as an 
   offense under this rule, in that both the Vibhanga and the 
   Commentary define the action of conveying as "telling": Only if the 
   bhikkhu himself tells the proposal -- whether repeating it orally, 
   making a gesture or writing a letter -- does he commit an offense 
   here. 
     
     Object. The full offense is for acting as a go-between between a 
   man and a woman who are not married to each other. If, instead of 
   dealing directly with the man and woman, one deals with people 
   speaking on their behalf (their parents, a pimp), one incurs the 
   full penalty all the same.
     
     There is no offense for a bhikkhu who tries to effect a 
   reconciliation between an estranged couple who are not divorced; but 
   a full offense for one who tries to effect a reconciliation between 
   a couple who are. "Perception" is also not a factor here, which 
   inspires the Commentary to note that even an arahant could commit an 
   offense under this rule if he tried to effect a reconciliation 
   between his parents whom he assumed to be separated when they 
   actually were divorced. 
     
     A bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya for acting as a go-between for a 
   pandaka; and, according to the Commentary, the same penalty for 
   acting as a go-between for a female yakkha or peta. (!)
     
     Non-offenses. The Vibhanga states that, in addition to the usual 
   exemptions, there is no offense if a bhikkhu conveys a message from 
   a man to a woman or vice versa dealing with "business of the 
   Community, of a shrine, or of a sick person." The Commentary 
   illustrates the first two instances with cases of a bhikkhu 
   conveying a message dealing with construction work for the Community 
   or a shrine; and the third with a case where a bhikkhu, acting on 
   behalf of a fellow bhikkhu who is sick, is sent by a male lay 
   follower to a female lay follower for medicine.
     
     The Sub-commentary adds that any similar errand is also exempt 
   from penalty as long as it is not a form of subservience to lay 
   people (see Sanghadisesa 13, below).
     
       Summary: Acting as a go-between to arrange a marriage, an 
       affair, or a date between a man and a woman not married to 
       each other is a sanghadisesa offense. 
   
   
                                 * * *
                                           
   
       6.When a bhikkhu is building a hut from (gains acquired by) 
       his own begging -- having no sponsor, destined for himself 
       -- he is to build it to the standard measurement. Here the 
       standard is this: twelve spans, using the sugata span, in 
       length (measuring outside); seven in width, (measuring) 
       inside. Bhikkhus are to be assembled to designate the site. 
       The site the bhikkhus designate should be without 
       disturbances and with adequate space. If the bhikkhu should 
       build a hut from his own begging on a site with disturbances 
       and without adequate space, or if he should not assemble the 
       bhikkhus to designate the site, or if he should exceed the 
       standard, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the 
       Community.
   
   
       "At that time the bhikkhus of Alavi were having huts built 
       from their own begging -- having no sponsors, destined for 
       themselves, not to any standard measurement -- that did not 
       come to completion. They were continually begging, 
       continually hinting: 'Give a man, give labor, give an ox, 
       give a wagon, give a knife, give an ax, give an adze, give a 
       spade, give a chisel, give rushes, give reeds, give grass, 
       give clay.' People, harassed with the begging, harassed with 
       the hinting, on seeing bhikkhus would feel apprehensive, 
       alarmed, would run away; would take another route, face 
       another direction, close the door. Even on seeing cows, they 
       would run away, imagining them to be bhikkhus."
   
   
   This rule and the following one concern the procedures a bhikkhu 
   should follow when he wants to build a dwelling for his own use. The 
   following rule deals with cases where he has a sponsor to provide 
   him with funds and materials. This rule deals with cases where he 
   doesn't. The Vibhanga and Commentary define the words //hut// and 
   //dwelling// in these rules in such a way that they apply only to a 
   limited range of structures, but the Commentary's discussion of what 
   a bhikkhu may and may not beg for when building anything at all, 
   guarantees that even in cases not covered by these rules he is not 
   allowed to be burdensome to the people he asks for help. In 
   discussing this rule, we will first cover what kinds of begging are 
   proper and improper in connection with //any// kind of construction 
   work, and then go on to treat the particular case coming under this 
   rule.
     
     Begging. A bhikkhu may ask for people to give labor in any 
   situation. Thus he may ask stone masons to carry stone posts to his 
   construction, or carpenters to carry boards there. If, after he has 
   asked them to help with the labor, they volunteer to donate the 
   materials as well, he may accept them without penalty. Otherwise, he 
   has to reimburse them for the materials. 
     
     As for tools, vehicles, and other things he will use in the 
   process of construction, he may ask only to borrow them from other 
   people and may not ask for them outright. If the tools get damaged, 
   he is responsible for getting them repaired before returning them to 
   the owner. The only things he needn't return to the owner are light 
   articles (//lahubhanda//), which the Sub-commentary identifies as 
   things like reeds, rushes, grass, and clay -- i.e., things having 
   little or no monetary value at all. 
     
     In effect, this means that unless a bhikkhu is going to build his 
   dwelling out of reeds, etc., or out of thrown-away scraps, he may 
   not ask for any of the materials that will actually go into the 
   dwelling. Keep in mind that these rules were made during a period 
   when wilderness was still plentiful, and solid building materials 
   such as timber and stones were free for the taking. At present, 
   unless a bhikkhu has access to unclaimed wilderness of this sort, to 
   unclaimed garbage, or has enough funds on deposit with his steward 
   (see NP 10) to cover the cost of materials, his only recourse if he 
   wants a solid structure is either to rammed earth or to hinting.
     
     The Commentary notes that while hinting is not allowed with regard 
   to food or cloth, it is allowed with regard to construction 
   materials. One example it gives is asking, "Do you think this is a 
   good place to build a hut? An ordination hall?" Another example is 
   staking out a construction site in hope that someone will ask, "What 
   are you planning to do here?" If people get the hint and offer the 
   materials, the bhikkhu may accept them. If they don't, he may not 
   ask directly for any materials except the "light articles" mentioned 
   above. 
     
     From this it should be obvious that even in cases not covered by 
   this rule -- i.e., the dwelling he is building doesn't qualify as a 
   "hut," or he is building something for other people to use -- a 
   bhikkhu engaged in construction work is not allowed to be burdensome 
   to the laity. This is an important point, as the Buddha illustrated 
   in a story he told to the bhikkhus at Alavi. A certain bhikkhu had 
   once come to him with a complaint, and he reports the conversation 
   as follows:
   
       "'Lord, there is a large forest on the slopes of the 
       Himalayas, and not far from it is a broad, low-lying marsh. 
       A great flock of birds, after feeding all day in the marsh, 
       goes to roost in the forest at nightfall. That is why I have 
       come to see the Blessed One -- because I am annoyed by the 
       noise of that flock of birds.'
       
       "'Bhikkhu, you want those birds to go away for good?'
       
       "'Yes, Lord, I want them to go away for good.'
       
       "'Then go back there, enter the forest, and in the first 
       watch of the night make this announcement three times: 
       "Listen to me, good birds. I want a feather from everyone 
       roosting in this forest. Each of you give me one feather." 
       In the second watch...In the third watch of the night make 
       this announcement three times: "Listen to me, good birds. I 
       want a feather from everyone roosting in this forest. Each 
       of you give me one feather"....(The bhikkhu did as he was 
       told.) Then the flock of birds, thinking, 'The bhikkhu asks 
       for a feather, the bhikkhu wants a feather,' left the 
       forest. And after they were gone, they never again returned. 
       Bhikkhus, begging is unpleasant, hinting is unpleasant even 
       to these common animals -- how much more so to human 
       beings?"
   
     The hut. Now we turn to the particular case covered by this rule. 
   The Vibhanga defines a hut as "plastered inside, outside, or both." 
   It also states that this rule does not apply to a //lena//, a 
   //guha//, or to a grass hut. A lena, according to the Commentary, is 
   a cave. A guha it doesn't define, except to say that guhas may be 
   built out of wood, stone, or earth. And as for a grass hut, it says 
   that this refers to any building with a grass //roof//, which means 
   that even a dwelling with plastered walls but a grass roof would not 
   count as a hut under this rule (although a hut whose roof has been 
   plastered and then covered with grass //would// count as a hut 
   here).
     
     The Commentary goes on to stipulate that the plastering mentioned 
   in the Vibhanga refers to a plastered //roof//, that the plaster 
   must be either clay or white lime (plastering with cow dung or mud 
   doesn't count, although cement would probably come under "white 
   lime" here), and that the plastering on the inside or outside of the 
   roof must be contiguous with the plastering on the inside or outside 
   of the walls. Thus if the builder leaves a gap in the plastering 
   around the top of the wall so that the plastering of the roof and 
   the plastering of the walls don't touch at any point, the building 
   doesn't qualify as a hut and so doesn't come under the rule. 
     
     The Commentary's stipulations on these point may seem like 
   attempts to create gaping loopholes in the rule, but there is 
   nothing in the Vibhanga to prove them wrong. Perhaps in those days 
   only fully plastered buildings were considered to be finished, 
   permanent structures, while everything else was considered makeshift 
   and temporary and thus not worth the fuss and bother of the 
   procedures we will discuss below.
     
     At another point in its discussions, the Commentary adds that any 
   building three sugata spans wide or less is not big enough to move a 
   bed around in and so does not count as a hut under this rule. The 
   Commentary itself defines a sugata span as three times the span of a 
   normal person, which would put it at approximately 75 cm. More 
   recent calculations, based on the fact that the Buddha was not 
   abnormally tall, set the sugata span at 25 cm. 
     
     The procedures. If, for his own use, a bhikkhu is planning to 
   build a hut as defined in this rule, he must chose a site, clear it, 
   and ask for the local Community to inspect and approve it before he 
   can go ahead with the actual construction.
     
     //The site//. The site must be free of disturbances and have 
   adequate space. 
     
     "Free of disturbances" means that the site is not the abode of 
   such creatures as termites, ants, or rats who might do harm to the 
   building, or of those such as snakes, scorpions, tigers, lions, 
   elephants, or bears who might do harm to its inhabitant. The 
   Commentary states that the Vibhanga's purpose in forbidding a 
   bhikkhu from building on a site where termites and other small 
   animals have their home is to show compassion to these and other 
   small creatures like them by not destroying their nests. As for the 
   stipulation against building where snakes and other dangerous 
   animals live, this also extends, it says, to the areas where they 
   regularly forage for food.
     
     In addition, the Vibhanga says that a site without disturbances is 
   one that is not near any places that will disturb the bhikkhu's 
   peace and quiet. Examples it gives are: fields, orchards, places of 
   execution, cemeteries, pleasure groves, royal property, elephant 
   stables, horse stables, prisons, taverns, slaughterhouses, highways, 
   crossroads, public rest-houses, and meeting places.
     
     "Adequate space" means that there is enough room on the site for a 
   yoked wagon to go around, or for a man to carry a ladder around, the 
   proposed hut. The question arises as to whether this means that all 
   trees within that radius of the hut must be cut down, or whether it 
   simply means that there must be enough land around the hut so that 
   if the trees were not there, it would be possible to go around the 
   hut in the ways mentioned. The Sub-commentary states that the 
   stipulation for adequate space is so that the hut will not be built 
   on the edge of a precipice or next to a cliff wall, and the Vinaya 
   Mukha notes that the Vibhanga here is following the Laws of Manu (an 
   ancient Indian legal text) in ensuring that the dwelling not be 
   built right against someone else's property. Both of these 
   statements suggest that there is no need to cut the trees down.
     
     The Vinaya Mukha maintains further that the procedures for getting 
   the site approved are concerned basically with laying claim to 
   unclaimed land, and this has led many Communities in Thailand to say 
   that the need to have the Community approve the site does not apply 
   to places where the Community already owns the land, such as in a 
   monastery. If a bhikkhu in such Communities wishes to build a hut 
   for his own use on monastery land, he need only get the approval of 
   the abbot. The ancient texts say nothing on this point, so it is an 
   area where the wise policy is to follow the views of the Community 
   to which one belongs. 
     
     //Clearing the site//. Before notifying the local Community, the 
   bhikkhu must get the site cleared -- so says the Vibhanga, and the 
   Commentary adds that he should get it leveled as well. In both 
   cases, he should arrange to have this done in such a way that does 
   not violate Pacittiyas 10 & 11. Again, the question arises as to 
   whether clearing the site means cutting down the trees on the spot 
   where one proposes building the hut. In the origin story to the 
   following rule, Ven. Channa caused an uproar by cutting down a 
   venerated tree on a site where he planned to build, which led the 
   Buddha to formulate the rule that the Community must inspect and 
   approve the site to prevent uproars of this sort. This suggests that 
   clearing the site here means clearing the underbrush. Only after the 
   Community has approved the site should the necessary trees be cut 
   down.
     
     //Getting the site inspected//. The bhikkhu then goes to the local 
   Community and formally asks them to inspect the site. (The Pali 
   passages for this and the remaining formal requests and 
   announcements are in the Vibhanga.) Either the entire Community will 
   go to inspect the site or it will select two or three of its members 
   to go and inspect the site in its stead. The Vibhanga says that 
   these inspectors should know what does and does not constitute a 
   disturbance and adequate space, and requires that they be chosen by 
   a formal motion with one announcement. The Commentary, for some 
   reason, says that they may also be chosen by a simple declaration 
   (//apalokana//).
     
     The inspectors then visit the site. If they find any disturbances 
   or see that the site has inadequate space, they should tell the 
   bhikkhu not to build there. If the site passes inspection, though, 
   the bhikkhu may go on to the next step.
     
     //Getting the site approved//. The bhikkhu returns to the 
   Community and formally asks them to approve the site. The formal act 
   involves a motion and one announcement. Once this has passed, the 
   bhikkhu may start construction.
     
     The size of the hut. As the rule states, the hut may be no more 
   than twelve spans long and seven spans wide, or approximately 3 x 
   1.75 meters. For some reason the Vibhanga states that the length of 
   the hut is measured from the outside (excluding the plastering, says 
   the Commentary), while the width is measured from the inside. The 
   Commentary adds that neither of these measurements may be exceeded. 
   Thus a hut ten by eight spans wide, even though it has less floor 
   area than a twelve by seven span hut, would exceed the standard 
   width and so would be a violation of this rule.
     
     Offenses. The Vibhanga allots the penalties for building a hut 
   without a sponsor, for one's own use, without regard for the 
   stipulations in this rule, as follows:
   
     an oversized hut -- a sanghadisesa;
     a hut on an unapproved site -- a sanghadisesa;
     a hut on a site without adequate space -- a dukkata;
     a hut on a site with disturbances -- a dukkata.
   
     These penalties are additive. Thus, for example, an oversized hut 
   on an unapproved site would entail a double sanghadisesa.
     
     The wording of the training rule, though, suggests that building a 
   hut without a sponsor, for one's own use, on a site with 
   disturbances and without adequate space would entail a sanghadisesa; 
   but the Sub-commentary says -- without offering explanation -- that 
   to read the rule in this way is to misinterpret it. Since the 
   penalty for a multiple sanghadisesa is the same as that for a single 
   one, there is only one case where this would make an appreciable 
   difference: a hut of the proper size, built on a designated site 
   that has disturbances or does not have adequate space. This is a 
   case of a formal act of the Community improperly performed: Either 
   the bhikkhus inspecting the site were incompetent, or the 
   disturbances were not immediately apparent. Since the usual penalty 
   for improperly performing an act of the Community is a dukkata 
   (Mv.II.16.4), this may be why the Vibhanga allots penalties as it 
   does. 
     
     As we noted in the Introduction, in cases where the Vibhanga is 
   explaining the training rules that deal with formal acts of the 
   Community, it sometimes has to deviate from the wording of the rules 
   so as to bring them in line in with the general pattern for such 
   acts, a pattern that was probably formulated after the rules and 
   came to take precedence over them.
     
     Getting others to build the hut. If, instead of building the hut 
   himself, a bhikkhu gets others to build it for him, he must inform 
   them of the four stipulations mentioned in this rule. If he neglects 
   to inform them, and they build the hut in such a way that it does 
   not meet any or all of the stipulations, he must either have it torn 
   down (to the ground, says the Commentary) and have it rebuilt in 
   line with the stipulations, give it to another, or face the full 
   penalty for each of the stipulations they violated that he neglected 
   to mention to them. 
     
     For example: He tells them to build a hut of the right size, but 
   neglects to tell them to have the site approved. They build it to 
   the right size, the site is without disturbances and has adequate 
   space but is not approved. Unless he has it torn down or gives it to 
   another, he incurs a sanghadisesa.
     
     If the bhikkhu mentions the proper stipulations, but learns that 
   the builders are ignoring them, he must go himself or send a 
   messenger to reiterate the stipulations. Not to do so incurs a 
   dukkata. If, having been reminded of the stipulations, the builders 
   still ignore them, the bhikkhu incurs no penalty; but they -- if 
   they are bhikkhus -- incur a dukkata for each of the three criteria 
   regarding the site that they disobey. As for the standard 
   measurement, they are not bound by it as they are building the hut 
   for another's use.
     
     If a bhikkhu, intending it for his own use, completes a hut that 
   others have started, or gets others to complete a hut he has 
   started, he is still bound by the stipulations given in this rule.
     
     Preliminary offenses. The penalties in the preliminary steps are 
   as follows: If the hut is such that when finished it will entail a 
   sanghadisesa or two, each act in its construction entails a dukkata, 
   until the next to the last act, which entails a thullaccaya. Once 
   the hut is completed, and the bhikkhu incurs the sanghadisesa(s), 
   the dukkatas and thullaccaya are nullified.
     
     Non-offenses. The no-offense clauses mention, in addition to the 
   usual exemptions, that there is no offense "in a lena, in a guha, in 
   a grass hut, in (a dwelling) for another's use, or in anything other 
   than a dwelling." The Commentary explains that no offense here means 
   that these cases are not subject to any of the four stipulations 
   given in this rule. As for the last case, if a bhikkhu is building, 
   e.g., a meeting hall for the Community, he is not bound by this 
   rule, but if he plans to live there as well, he is. This last case 
   suggests that if a bhikkhu is building a dwelling, planning to 
   donate it formally to the Community but also planning to live there 
   himself, he is not exempt from this rule.
   
       Summary: Building a plastered hut -- or having it built -- 
       without a sponsor, destined for one's own use, without 
       having obtained the Community's approval, is a sanghadisesa 
       offense. Building a plastered hut -- or having it built -- 
       without a sponsor, destined for one's own use, exceeding the 
       standard measurements, is also a sanghadisesa offense.
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
       7. When a bhikkhu is building a large dwelling -- having a 
       sponsor and destined for himself -- he is to assemble 
       bhikkhus to designate the site. The site the bhikkhus 
       designate should be without disturbances and with adequate 
       space. If the bhikkhu should build a large dwelling on a 
       site with disturbances and without adequate space, or if he 
       should not assemble the bhikkhus to designate the site, it 
       entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.
   
   
   The Vibhanga defines //dwelling// here with the same terms it uses 
   for //hut// in the preceding rule. All explanations for this rule 
   may be inferred from those above, the only difference being that, as 
   the dwelling here has a sponsor, no begging is involved in its 
   construction, and so there is no need to limit its size. 
     
     If a sponsor is building a dwelling for a bhikkhu, and the bhikkhu 
   is not involved in any way in building it or getting it built, this 
   rule does not apply.
   
       Summary: Building a hut with a sponsor -- or having it built 
       -- destined for one's own use, without having obtained the 
       Community's approval, is a sanghadisesa offense.
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
       8.Should any bhikkhu, malicious, angered, displeased, charge 
       a (fellow) bhikkhu with an unfounded case involving defeat, 
       (thinking), "Surely with this I may bring about his fall 
       from the celibate life," then regardless of whether or not 
       he is cross-examined on a later occasion, if the issue is 
       unfounded and the bhikkhu confesses his anger, it entails 
       initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.
   
   
       "Now at that time a householder who served fine food gave 
       food to the Community on a regular basis, four bhikkhus 
       every day. (One day) he happened to go on some business to 
       the monastery. He went to where Ven. Dabba Mallaputta was 
       staying and on arrival bowed to him and sat down to one 
       side....Ven. Dabba Mallaputta roused... him with a Dhamma 
       talk. Then the householder with fine food...said to Dabba 
       Mallaputta, 'To whom, sir, is tomorrow's meal in our house 
       assigned?'
       
       "'To (the) followers of Mettiya and Bhummajaka, 
       householder.' [Mettiya and Bhummajaka were among the leaders 
       of the group-of-six, a faction notorious for its shameless 
       behavior, and instigators of many of the situations that 
       compelled the Buddha to formulate training rules.]
       
       "This upset the householder with fine food. Thinking, 'How 
       can these evil bhikkhus eat in our house?' he returned home 
       and ordered his female slave: 'Hey. Those who are coming for 
       a meal tomorrow: Prepare a seat for them in the storeroom 
       and serve them unhusked rice porridge with pickle brine.'
       
       "'As you say, master,' the female slave answered....
       
       "Then the followers of Mettiya and Bhummajaka said to one 
       another, 'Yesterday we were assigned a meal at the house of 
       the householder with fine food. Tomorrow, attending with his 
       wife and children, he will serve us. Some will offer rice, 
       some will offer curry, some oil, and some dainties.' Because 
       of their joy, they didn't sleep as much that night as they 
       had hoped.
       
       "Early the next morning...they went to the home of the 
       householder with fine food. The female slave saw them coming 
       from afar. Preparing them a seat in the storeroom, she said 
       to them, 'Have a seat, honored sirs.'
       
       "The thought occurred to the followers of Mettiya and 
       Bhummajaka, 'No doubt the food isn't ready yet, which is why 
       we are being made to sit in the storeroom.'
       
       "Then the female slave brought them unhusked rice porridge 
       with pickle brine and said, 'Eat, honored sirs.'
       
       "'Sister, we've come for the regular meal.'
       
       "'I know you've come for the regular meal. But yesterday the 
       householder ordered me, "Hey. Those who are coming for a 
       meal tomorrow: Prepare a seat for them in the storeroom and 
       serve them unhusked rice porridge with pickle brine." So 
       eat, honored sirs.'
       
       "Then the followers of Mettiya and Bhummajaka said to one 
       another, 'Yesterday the householder with fine food went to 
       the monastery and met with Dabba Mallaputta. No doubt Dabba 
       Mallaputta turned him against us.' Because of their 
       disappointment, they didn't eat as much as they had hoped.
       
       "Then they returned to the monastery and, putting away their 
       robes and bowls, went to the storeroom outside the gate and 
       sat on their outer cloaks, their arms around their knees, 
       silent, abashed, their shoulders drooping, their heads down, 
       brooding, at a loss for words.
       
       "Then Mettiya Bhikkhuni came along and said to them, 'I 
       salute you, masters.' But when she had said this, they 
       didn't respond. A second time...A third time she said, 'I 
       salute you, masters.' And a third time they didn't respond.
       
       "'Have I offended you, masters? Why don't you respond to 
       me?'
       
       "'Because you stand by doing nothing, sister, when Dabba 
       Mallaputta treats us like dirt.'
       
       "'What can I do?'
       
       "'If you like, you could get the Blessed One to expel Dabba 
       Mallaputta right this very day.'
       
       "'What can I do? How could I do that?'
       
       "'Come, sister. Go to where the Blessed One is and say this: 
       "It is unfitting, Lord, and improper. The quarter without 
       dread, without harm, without danger, is (now) the quarter 
       with dread, with harm, with danger. Where there is calm, 
       there is a windstorm. The water, as it were, is ablaze. I 
       have been raped by Master Dabba Mallaputta."'
       
       "'As you say, masters.' (And she went to carry out their 
       bidding.)"
   
   This is just the heart of the origin story to this rule, which is 
   one of the longest and most controversial accounts in the Vinaya. 
   After Mettiya Bhikkhuni made her charge, the Buddha convened a 
   meeting of the Sangha to question Ven. Dabba Mallaputta. The latter, 
   who had attained arahantship at the age of seven, responded 
   truthfully that he could not call to mind ever having indulged in 
   sexual intercourse even in a dream, much less when awake. The Buddha 
   then told the Sangha to expel Mettiya Bhikkhuni and returned to his 
   quarters.
     
     According to the Commentary, the expulsion of Mettiya Bhikkhuni 
   was one of the controversial points in the split between the 
   Mahayanist bhikkhus in the Abhayagiri Vihara and the Theravadin 
   bhikkhus of the Mahavihara in the old Sri Lankan capital of 
   Anuradhapura. Even modern scholars have objected to the Buddha's 
   treatment of Mettiya Bhikkhuni and interpret this passage as a 
   "monkish gloss," as if the Buddha himself were not a monk, and the 
   entire Canon were not the work of monks and nuns. The Commentary 
   maintains that the Buddha acted as he did because he knew if he 
   treated her less harshly, the followers of Mettiya and Bhummajaka 
   would never have volunteered the information that they had put her 
   up to making the charge in the first place, and the truth would 
   never have come out. This would have led some people to remain 
   secretly convinced of Ven. Dabba Mallaputta's guilt and -- because 
   he was an arahant -- would have been for their long-term detriment.
     
     At any rate, what concerns us here is that at some point after 
   this rule was formulated, the Buddha put the Sangha in charge of 
   judging accusations of this sort and gave them a definite pattern to 
   follow in order to ensure that their judgments would be accurate and 
   fair. Because the Vibhanga and Commentary to this rule are based on 
   this pattern, we will discuss the pattern first before dealing with 
   the special case -- unfounded charges -- covered by this rule.
     
     Admonition. As the Buddha states in Sanghadisesa 12, one of the 
   ways bhikkhus may hope for growth in his teachings is through mutual 
   admonition and mutual rehabilitation. If a bhikkhu commits an 
   offense, the responsibility is his to inform his fellow bhikkhus so 
   that they may help him through whatever procedures the offense may 
   entail. Now of course, human nature being what it is, there are 
   bound to be bhikkhus who neglect this responsibility, in which case 
   the responsibility falls to the offender's fellow bhikkhus who know 
   of the matter to admonish him in private, if possible, or -- if he 
   is stubborn -- to make a formal charge in a meeting of the 
   Community.
     
     The pattern here is this: Before speaking to the bhikkhu, one must 
   first make sure that one is qualified to admonish him. According to 
   Cv.IX.1-2, this means one knows:
   
     1) One is pure in bodily conduct.
     2) One is pure in verbal conduct.
     3) One is motivated by kindness, not vengeance.
     4) One is learned in the Dhamma.
     5) One knows both Patimokkhas (the one for the bhikkhus and the 
       one for the bhikkhunis) in detail.
     
     Furthermore, one determines that:
   
     1) I will speak at the right time and not at the wrong time.
     2) I will speak the truth and not untruths.
     3) I will speak gently and not harshly.
     4) I will speak what is connected with the goal and not what is 
       unconnected with the goal.
     5) I will speak out of kindness and not out of inner anger.
   
     The Parivara (XV.5.3) adds that one should keep five qualities in 
   mind: compassion, solicitude for the other's welfare, sympathy, 
   desire to see him rehabilitated, and a desire to keep the Vinaya 
   foremost.
     
     If one feels that one is unqualified, yet believes that another 
   bhikkhu has committed an offense for which he has not made amends, 
   one should find another bhikkhu who is qualified to handle the 
   charge and inform him. Not to inform anyone in cases like this -- if 
   the case involves a parajika or sanghadisesa offense -- is to 
   violate Pacittiya 64, except in the extenuating circumstances 
   discussed under that rule.
     
     The next step, if one is qualified to make the charge, is to look 
   for a proper time and place to talk with the other party -- e.g., 
   when he is not likely to get embarrassed or upset -- and then to ask 
   his leave, i.e., to ask permission to speak with him: "Let the Ven. 
   One give me leave. I want to speak with you." To accuse him of an 
   offense without asking leave is to incur a dukkata (Mv.II.16.1).
     
     As for the other party, the Buddha recommends that he should give 
   leave only after assessing the person asking for leave, for it is 
   possible that someone might ask for leave without any real grounds, 
   simply to be abusive. (A bhikkhu who asks for leave with no grounds 
   -- i.e., he has not seen the other party commit the offense, has 
   heard no reliable report to that effect, and has no reason to 
   suspect anything to that effect -- incurs a dukkata (Mv.II.16.3).) 
   The Parivara (XV.4.7) suggests that one should not give leave to a 
   bhikkhu who:
   
     1) is unconscientious,
     2) is ignorant,
     3) is not a bhikkhu in regular standing,
     4) speaks intent on creating a disturbance, or
     5) is not intent on rehabilitating the bhikkhu he is accusing.
     
     In another passage (XV.5.4), it suggests further that one should 
   not give leave to a bhikkhu who:
   
     1) is not pure in bodily conduct,
     2) is not pure in verbal conduct,
     3) is not pure in his livelihood,
     4) is foolish, childish, and unintelligent, or
     5) is unable to give a consistent line of reasoning when 
       questioned.
     
     If the bhikkhu, is not unqualified in any of these ways, though, 
   one should willingly give him leave to speak. The Cullavagga 
   (IX.5.7) says that, when being admonished or accused, one should 
   keep two qualities in mind: truth, and lack of anger. The Patimokkha 
   also contains a number of rules imposing penalties on behaving 
   improperly when one is being admonished formally or informally: 
   Sanghadisesa 12 for being difficult to admonish in general, 
   Pacittiya 12 for being evasive or refusing to answer when being 
   formally questioned, Pacittiya 54 for being disrespectful to one's 
   accuser or to the rule one is being accused of breaking, and 
   Pacittiya 71 for finding excuses for not listening to a particular 
   training rule.
     
     If both sides act in good faith and without prejudice, accusations 
   of this sort are easy to settle on an informal basis. If they can't 
   be settled informally, they should be taken to a meeting of the 
   Community so that the group as a whole may pass judgment. The 
   procedures for this sort of formal meeting will be discussed under 
   the Aniyata and Adhikarana-Samatha rules, below. 
     
     Abuse of the system. As the origin story to this rule shows, it 
   can easily be the case that a bhikkhu making a charge against 
   another bhikkhu is acting out of a grudge and has simply made up the 
   charge. This rule and the following one cover cases where the 
   made-up charge is that the other bhikkhu has committed a parajika. 
   Pacittiya 76 covers cases where the made-up charge is that the other 
   bhikkhu has broken a less serious rule.
     
     The full offense under this rule involves four factors:
     
     1) //Object//: The other bhikkhu is regarded as ordained.
     
     2) //Perception//: One perceives him to be innocent of the offense 
       one is charging him with.
     
     3) //Intention//: One wants to see him expelled from the Sangha.
     
     4) //Effort//: One makes an unfounded charge in his presence that 
       he is guilty of a parajika offense.
   
     Object. The definition of this factor -- the other bhikkhu is 
   regarded as ordained -- may sound strange, but it comes from the 
   K/Commentary and is phrased that way with a reason: In normal cases 
   the object of this rule will be an innocent bhikkhu, but there may 
   be cases where a bhikkhu has actually committed a parajika offense 
   that no one knows about; yet instead of disrobing, he acts as if he 
   were still a bhikkhu, and everyone else assumes that he still is. 
   Yet even a "bhikkhu" of this sort would fulfill this factor as far 
   as this rule is concerned. 
     
     For example, Bhikkhu X steals some of the monastery funds, but no 
   one knows about it, and he continues to act as if he were a bhikkhu. 
   Bhikkhu Y later develops a grudge against him and makes an unfounded 
   charge that he has had sexual intercourse with one of the monastery 
   supporters. Even though X is not really a bhikkhu, the fact that 
   people in general assume him to be one means that he fulfills this 
   factor.
     
     Perception. If one perceives the bhikkhu one is charging with a 
   parajika offense to be innocent of the offense, that is enough to 
   fulfill this factor regardless of whether the accused is actually 
   innocent or not. To make an accusation based on the assumption or 
   suspicion that the accused is //not// innocent entails no offense.
     
     Intention. If, in making an unfounded charge of a parajika offense 
   against another bhikkhu, one's purpose is to see him expelled from 
   the Sangha, that fulfills this factor. If one's purpose is simply to 
   insult him, one's actions would come under Pacittiya 2. If one's 
   purpose is both to see him expelled and to insult him, one incurs 
   both a sanghadisesa and a pacittiya. If one has a strange sense of 
   humor and is making the charge as some sort of joke, the penalty is 
   either a pacittiya under Pacittiya 1 or a dubbhasita under Pacittiya 
   2: The texts are not clear on this point, but in either case this 
   sort of thing is no joking matter.
     
     According to the Vibhanga, "confessing one's anger" can simply 
   mean admitting that one made the charge idly. Thus the amount of 
   malice motivating one's desire to see the other bhikkhu expelled can 
   be minimal indeed: If one wants to see him expelled just for the fun 
   of it, that would fulfill the factor of intention here.
     
     Effort. The act covered by this rule is that of making an 
   unfounded charge of a parajika in the accused's presence. Whether 
   one makes the charge oneself or gets someone else to make it, the 
   penalty is the same. If that "someone else" is a bhikkhu and knows 
   the charge is unfounded, he too incurs the full penalty. 
     
     The Vibhanga defines an unfounded charge as one having no basis in 
   what has been seen, heard, or suspected. In other words, the accuser 
   has not seen the accused committing the offense in question, nor has 
   he heard anything reliable to that effect, nor is there anything in 
   the accused's behavior to give rise to any honest suspicion. 
     
     "Seeing" and "hearing," according to the Commentary, also include 
   the powers of clairvoyance and clairaudience one may have developed 
   through meditation. Thus if one charges X with having committed a 
   parajika offense on the basis of what one has seen clairvoyantly, 
   this would not be an unfounded charge, although one should be 
   careful to make clear from the very beginning what kind of seeing 
   the charge is based on. 
     
     If there is some basis in fact, but one changes the status of the 
   evidence, the penalty is the same. Changing the status means, e.g., 
   saying that one saw something when in actuality one simply heard 
   about it or suspected it, or that one saw it clearly when in 
   actuality one saw it indistinctly. 
     
     An example from the Commentary: Bhikkhu X goes into a grove to 
   relieve himself. Ms. Y goes into the same grove to get something 
   there. One sees them leaving the grove at approximately the same 
   time -- which could count as grounds for suspicion -- but one then 
   accuses Bhikkhu X, saying that one actually saw him having sex with 
   Ms. Y. This would count as an unfounded charge. Another example: In 
   the dark of the night, one sees a man stealing something from the 
   monastery storehouse. He looks vaguely like Bhikkhu Z, but one can't 
   be sure. Still, one firms up one's accusation by saying that one 
   definitely saw Z steal the item. Again, this would count as an 
   unfounded charge.
     
     The Commentary states that for an unfounded charge to count under 
   this rule, it must state explicitly (a) the precise act the accused 
   supposedly committed (e.g., having sexual intercourse, getting a 
   woman to have an abortion) or (b) that the accused is guilty of a 
   parajika, or (c) that the accused is no longer a true bhikkhu. If 
   one simply says or does something that might imply that the accused 
   is no longer a bhikkhu -- e.g., refusing to show him respect in line 
   with his seniority -- that does not yet count as a charge.
     
     The Commentary adds that charging a bhikkhu with having committed 
   a virtual parajika, as discussed in the conclusion to the preceding 
   chapter, would fulfill this factor as well. For instance, if one 
   makes an unfounded charge accusing Bhikkhu A of having killed his 
   father before his ordination, that would constitute a full offense 
   here.
     
     All of the charges given as examples in the Vibhanga are expressed 
   directly to the accused -- "I saw you have sexual intercourse," "I 
   heard you lay false claims to a superior human state" -- and the 
   Commentary concludes from this that the full offense occurs only 
   when one makes the charge in the accused's presence, in line with 
   the pattern for admonition discussed above. To make an unfounded 
   charge behind the accused's back, it states, incurs a dukkata. 
     
     Some people have objected to this point, saying that this gives a 
   very light penalty for backhanded character assassination, but there 
   is nothing in the Vibhanga to indicate that the Commentary is wrong 
   here. Remember that the correct procedures for making an accusation 
   require that an earnest charge be made in the presence of the 
   accused. If a bhikkhu spreads gossip about another bhikkhu, accusing 
   him of having committed a parajika, he should be asked whether he 
   has taken up the matter with the accused. If he hasn't, he should be 
   told to speak to the accused before he speaks to anyone else. If he 
   says that he doesn't feel qualified or that he fears the accused 
   will retaliate, he should be told to take the matter up with the 
   bhikkhus who will be responsible for calling a meeting of the 
   Community. If he refuses to do that, he shouldn't be listened to.
     
     For some reason, the Commentary maintains that a charge made in 
   writing does not count, although a charge made by gesture -- e.g., 
   pointing at the accused when one is asked who committed the parajika 
   -- does. Perhaps in those days written charges were regarded as too 
   cowardly to take seriously.
     
     The rule seems to require that the accused confess that he was 
   acting out of anger, although the Vibhanga states that this means 
   simply that he admits the charge was a lie. The Commentary states 
   further that here the rule is showing the point where the rest of 
   the Community knows that the bhikkhu making the charge is guilty of 
   a sanghadisesa: He actually committed the offense when he made the 
   charge.
     
     The Commentary adds "result" as a further factor to the offense 
   under this rule, saying that the accused must understand the charge 
   in a reasonable amount of time -- but nothing in the Vibhanga 
   supports this added factor.
     
     Whether or not anyone actually believes the charge is not a factor 
   here.
     
     Non-offenses. If one understands the accused to be guilty of a 
   parajika and accuses him accurately on the basis of what one has 
   seen, heard, or suspected, then -- regardless of whether he is 
   guilty or not -- one has not committed an offense. Even in a case 
   such as this, though, one incurs a dukkata if one makes the charge 
   without asking leave of the accused, and a pacittiya if one makes 
   the charge so as to insult him.
   
       Summary: Making an unfounded charge to a bhikkhu that he has 
       committed a parajika offense, in hopes of having him 
       disrobed, is a sanghadisesa offense. 
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
       9.Should any bhikkhu, malicious, angered, displeased, using 
       as a mere ploy an aspect of an issue that pertains 
       otherwise, charge a bhikkhu with a case involving defeat, 
       (thinking), "Surely with this I may bring about his fall 
       from the celibate life," then regardless of whether or not 
       he is cross-examined on a later occasion, if the issue 
       pertains otherwise, an aspect used as a mere ploy, and the 
       bhikkhu confesses his anger, it entails initial and 
       subsequent meetings of the Community.
   
   
       "At that time the followers of Mettiya and Bhummajaka, 
       descending from Vulture Peak Mountain, saw a billy-goat 
       copulating with a nanny-goat. Seeing them, they said, 'Look 
       here, friends, let's name this billy-goat Dabba Mallaputta, 
       and this nanny-goat Mettiya Bhikkhuni. Then we'll phrase it 
       like this: "Before, my friends, we accused Dabba Mallaputta 
       on the basis of what we had heard, but now we have seen him 
       with our very own eyes fornicating with Mettiya 
       Bhikkhuni!"'"
   
   
   Some grudges die hard. This rule is almost identical with the 
   preceding one and involves the same factors except for one of the 
   sub-factors under "Effort": "Unfounded charge" here becomes "a 
   charge based on an issue that pertains otherwise." The phrase sounds 
   strange, but the origin story gives a perfect example of what it 
   means.
     
     The precise difference between the two rules is this: With an 
   unfounded charge, one has neither seen, heard, nor suspected that an 
   offense has been committed; or if one has, one changes the status of 
   the evidence -- e.g., one states something one has suspected as if 
   one has heard it, or something one has heard as if one has seen it. 
   In a charge based on an issue that pertains otherwise, one has seen 
   an offense being committed and one does not change the status of the 
   evidence, but one distorts the facts of the case. 
     
     To summarize the Vibhanga, there are two basic ways in which this 
   can be done: 
     
     1) X, who may or may not be a bhikkhu, has something in common 
       with Bhikkhu Y -- they are both tall, short, dark, fair, have the 
       same name, or whatever. One sees X committing an action that 
       would amount to an offense and then, on the basis of the 
       similarity between the two, claims that one has seen Bhikkhu Y 
       committing a parajika. For instance, X and Y are both very tall. 
       Late at night one sees X -- knowing that it is X -- stealing 
       tools from the monastery storeroom. One has a grudge against Y 
       and so accuses him of being the thief, saying, "I saw this big 
       tall guy stealing the tools, and he looked just like you. It must 
       have been you."
     
     2) One sees Bhikkhu Y actually committing an offense. Although one 
       perceives that it is a lesser offense, one magnifies the charge 
       to a parajika. For instance, one sees him get into an argument 
       with Bhikkhu Z and in a fit of anger give Z a blow to the head. Z 
       goes unconscious, falls to the floor and suffers a severe 
       concussion resulting in death. Since Y's intention was simply to 
       hurt him, not to kill him, he incurs only a pacittiya. If one 
       realizes the nature of Y's intention and the fact that the 
       penalty is a pacittiya, and yet accuses him of having committed a 
       parajika, one would incur a sanghadisesa under this rule. 
   
     If one sees Y committing an action that one knows does not violate 
   the rules, but that bears some resemblance to an offense, and then 
   accuses him of having committed a parajika, it would not fit under 
   this category. For instance, Y is teaching Vinaya to some new 
   bhikkhus and quotes a few of the statements that would count as 
   claims of superior human states. One overhears him and, although 
   realizing the context, later accuses him of having violated Parajika 
   4. Since one knows that Y committed no offense, this would count as 
   an unfounded charge and so would come under the preceding rule. 
     
     The other explanations here are exactly the same as those for the 
   preceding rule, except that in the no-offense clauses the Vibhanga 
   states that if one makes a charge against the accused based on what 
   one actually perceives, there is no offense even if the issue turns 
   out to pertain otherwise. For instance, from the examples already 
   given: One sees X stealing tools in the dark and, because of his 
   resemblance to Y, actually thinks Y is the thief. One sees Y give a 
   fatal blow to Z and actually thinks that Y's intention was to kill 
   Z. In either of these cases, if one then accuses Y of a parajika 
   offense, one incurs no penalty regardless of how the case comes out, 
   although -- as in the preceding rule -- one should be careful to ask 
   Y's leave before making the charge and to have no intention of 
   insulting him. 
   
       Summary: Distorting the evidence while accusing a bhikkhu of 
       having committed a parajika offense, in hopes of having him 
       disrobed, is a sanghadisesa offense. 
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
       10.Should any bhikkhu agitate for a schism in a Community in 
       concord, or should he persist in taking up an issue 
       conducive to schism, the bhikkhus should admonish him thus: 
       "Do not, Ven. sir, agitate for a schism in a Community in 
       concord or persist in taking up an issue conducive to 
       schism. Let the venerable one be reconciled with the 
       Community, for a Community in concord, on complimentary 
       terms, free from dispute, having a common recitation, dwells 
       in peace." 
   
       And should that bhikkhu, admonished thus by the bhikkhus, 
       persist as before, the bhikkhus are to rebuke him up to 
       three times so as to desist. If while being rebuked up to 
       three times he desists, that is good. If he does not desist, 
       it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.
   
   
   This rule dates from Devadatta's attempt to create a schism in the 
   Sangha during the Buddha's life and is designed to help prevent such 
   an attempt from ever happening again.
     
     Disputes. Schisms arise from disputes over what the Buddha did and 
   did not teach or, in the words of the Cullavagga, "when bhikkhus 
   dispute, saying: 
   
     'It is Dhamma,' or 'It is not Dhamma;' 
     'It is Vinaya,' or 'It is not Vinaya;' 
     'It was spoken by the Tathagata,' or 'It was not spoken by the 
       Tathagata;' 
     'It was regularly practiced by the Tathagata,' or 'It was not 
       regularly practiced by the Tathagata;'
     'It was formulated by the Tathagata,' or 'It was not formulated by 
       the Tathagata;' 
     'It is an offense,' or 'It is not an offense;' 
     'It is a light offense,' or 'It is a heavy offense;' 
     'It is a curable offense,' or 'It is an incurable offense;' 
     'It is a serious offense,' or 'It is not a serious offense.'
       
     Whatever strife, quarreling, contention, dispute, differing 
   opinions, opposing opinions, heated words, abusiveness based on 
   this, is an issue arising from disputes." (Cv.IV.14.2)
     
     Thus not all disagreements on these matters are classed as issues. 
   Friendly disagreements or differences of interpretation aren't; 
   heated and abusive disagreements are. 
     
     The Buddha advises that a bhikkhu who wants to bring up such 
   questions for discussion should first consider five points: 1) 
   whether it is the right time for such a discussion; 2) whether it 
   concerns something true; 3) whether it is connected with the goal; 
   4) whether he will be able to get on his side bhikkhus who value the 
   Dhamma and Vinaya; and 5) whether the question will give rise to 
   strife, quarreling, disputes, cracks, and splits in the Community. 
   If the answer to the first four questions is yes, and to the fifth 
   question no (i.e., it is the right time for the discussion, it 
   concerns something true, it is connected with the goal, bhikkhus who 
   value the Dhamma and Vinaya will be willing to join his side, and 
   the discussion is not likely to lead to strife), he may go ahead and 
   start the discussion. Otherwise, he should let the matter rest for 
   the time being (Cv.IX.4).
     
     The Cullavagga quotes the Buddha as saying that two sorts of 
   mental states -- skillful and unskillful -- can turn disputes into 
   issues. The unskillful states he lists are covetous, corrupt, or 
   confused states of mind; the skillful ones are states of mind that 
   are not covetous, corrupt, or confused. He adds, however, that six 
   character traits can lead to issues arising from disputes that will 
   tend toward the detriment of many people. They are when a bhikkhu -- 
   
     is easily angered and bears ill will,
     is mean and spiteful,
     is jealous and possessive,
     is scheming and deceitful,
     has evil desires and wrong views,
     is attached to his own views, obstinate, unable to let them go.
   
     Such a bhikkhu, he says, lives without deference or respect for 
   the Buddha, the Dhamma, or the Sangha, and does not complete the 
   training. If one should see any of these traits within oneself or 
   others, one should strive for their abandonment. If there are no 
   such traits present, one should make sure that they don't arise in 
   the future (Cv.IV.14.3). 
     
     Not all disputes, even when prolonged, will lead to schism. An 
   example is the dispute that led to the Second Council. Even though 
   it was bitterly fought, there was never a point when either faction 
   thought of splitting off and conducting communal business 
   separately. In fact, even after the early Buddhists had formed into 
   18 separate schools, and the Mahayana movement added //its// schools 
   of interpretation, Chinese visitors to India reported that bhikkhus 
   belonging to the different schools of thought could be found living 
   together harmoniously in the same monastery, performing communal 
   business together in peace. (Many scholars have misunderstood this 
   point, thinking that the various schools were schismatic, but in 
   fact they weren't.)
     
     Thus there are two sets of procedures to follow when a dispute 
   becomes an issue: For a dispute in which none of the partisans is 
   aiming at a schism, there are the procedures listed in 
   Cv.IV.14.16-26. For one that is heading towards a schism (and 
   //only// for one in which at least one side is aiming at schism, the 
   Commentary implies and the Sub-commentary states explicitly), we 
   have this rule and the following one.
     
     Schism. The Cullavagga (VII.5.1), states that schism occurs when 
   the leader of a schism puts the matter to a vote in a Community of 
   at least nine bhikkhus with at least four on either side of the 
   split. It further adds that all the bhikkhus involved must be 
   bhikkhus of regular standing in communion with the group as a whole 
   (i.e., they haven't been suspended from the Community), living in 
   the same boundary.
     
     If one or the other of these qualifications is lacking -- the 
   issue goes to a vote in a Community of less than nine bhikkhus, one 
   side or the other gets less than four adherents, or the bhikkhus 
   involved are not on regular standing or do not belong to the same 
   boundary -- the efforts at schism count as a crack (//raji//) in the 
   Community, but not as a full split (//bheda//).
     
     However, the Parivara (XV.10.9), drawing on material in A.X.35 & 
   37, lists five ways in which a schism can take place: discussion, 
   announcement, vote, act, and recitation. The Commentary, trying to 
   reconcile the Cullavagga and Parivara on this point, interprets the 
   five ways as four steps in a single process (the last two ways 
   counting as alternative forms of a single step): 
   
     1) //Discussion//. A bhikkhu aiming at schism begins a dispute 
       over the Buddha's teachings, explaining Dhamma as not-Dhamma; 
       not-Dhamma as Dhamma; Vinaya as not-Vinaya; not-Vinaya as Vinaya; 
       what was not spoken by the Buddha as having been spoken by him; 
       what was spoken by the Buddha as not; what was not regularly 
       practiced by him as having been regularly practiced by him; what 
       was regularly practiced by him as not; what was not formulated by 
       him as having been formulated by him; what was formulated by him 
       as not; an offense as a non-offense; a non-offense as an offense; 
       a heavy offense as a light offense; a light offense as heavy; a 
       curable offense as incurable; an incurable offense as curable; a 
       serious offense as not serious; or a not-serious offense as 
       serious.
     
     2) //Announcement//. He announces that he is splitting off from 
       the Community and asks other bhikkhus to take sides. 
     
     3) //Vote//. The issue goes to a vote in a Community of at least 
       nine bhikkhus, with at least four on either side.
     
     4) //Act or recitation//. The bhikkhus who side with the 
       schismatic split from the others and recite the Patimokkha or 
       perform other communal business separately.
   
     According to the Commentary, the actual schism has not taken place 
   until step 4, when the schismatic group conducts communal business 
   or recites the Patimokkha separately. This is in accordance with 
   A.X.35 but seems to conflict with the Cullavagga, so the Commentary 
   explains that if the vote is taken in a split-off meeting of the 
   Community, steps 3 and 4 happen simultaneously, and the schism has 
   been accomplished. Otherwise, if the vote is taken outside of the 
   boundary, the schism is not finalized until the split-off faction 
   conducts communal business separately within the same boundary as 
   the Community (Pv.VI.2 & XV.10.10).
     
     We can notice from the way the Vibhanga and Commentary analyze the 
   steps leading up to schism, that if a group of bhikkhus is living in 
   a Community that does not adhere to the Buddha's teachings and they 
   wish to leave the group so that they may more easily follow those 
   teachings, they do not count as schismatics. However, they should be 
   careful first to make sure that their views //are// genuinely in 
   line with the Buddha's teachings and then conduct their departure in 
   as amenable and unprovocative a manner as possible. In other words, 
   instead of announcing a split, they should simply say that they want 
   to go to a more congenial place to practice. 
     
     Schism is serious business -- one of the five most heinous crimes 
   a person can commit. The other four are killing one's mother, 
   killing one's father, killing an arahant, and maliciously causing a 
   Buddha to shed blood. A bhikkhu who creates a schism is expelled and 
   can never be readmitted into the Community during this lifetime 
   (Mv.I.67). If he knows that his schism is against the Dhamma, then 
   after death he will go immediately to Hell and be boiled there for 
   an aeon. The same fate awaits those who join his schismatic group 
   knowing that what he teaches is not the true Dhamma or Vinaya. 
   Those, however, who follow him not knowing that his teaching is not 
   the true Dhamma or Vinaya will not necessarily suffer that fate. If 
   they realize their mistake and ask to be allowed back into the 
   Community, they need only confess a thullaccaya and they are members 
   of the Community in full standing as before (Cv.VII.4.4; 
   Cv.VII.5.1-6).
     
     Preventing a schism. The Vibhanga states that if a bhikkhu sees or 
   hears of an attempt at a schism, it is his duty to reprimand the 
   instigator three times, for the instigator, if he goes 
   unreprimanded, may continue with his efforts as he likes without 
   incurring a penalty. A bhikkhu who neglects this duty incurs a 
   dukkata. The Commentary adds that this dukkata applies to every 
   bhikkhu within a half-yojana (five-mile) radius who learns of the 
   attempt at a schism; any bhikkhu outside that radius, even though he 
   may not be subject to the penalty, should still regard it as his 
   duty, if he is able, to go reprimand the instigator as well. 
   (According to the Sub-commentary, any bhikkhu within the five-mile 
   radius who is ill or otherwise unable to go reprimand the instigator 
   is not subject to this penalty.) If the attempt takes place during 
   the Rains Retreat, other bhikkhus are allowed to cut short their 
   stay at other monasteries to help end the attempt (Mv.III.6-9). 
     
     If, after being reprimanded three times, the instigator abandons 
   his efforts, he incurs no penalty and nothing further need be done. 
     
     If he is still recalcitrant, though, he incurs a dukkata; and the 
   next step is to take him into the midst of a formal meeting of the 
   Community (by force, if necessary, says the Commentary) and admonish 
   him formally three more times. If he abandons his efforts before the 
   end of the third admonition, well and good. If not, he incurs 
   another dukkata. The next step is to recite a formal rebuke, by 
   mandate of the Community, using the formula of one motion and three 
   announcements given in the Vibhanga. If the instigator remains 
   obstinate, he incurs an additional dukkata at the end of the motion, 
   a thullaccaya at the end of each of the first two announcements, and 
   the full sanghadisesa at the end of the third. Once he commits the 
   full offense, the penalties he incurred in the preliminary stages 
   are nullified.
     
     Perception. The Vibhanga states that if the acts of admonition and 
   rebuke are carried out properly -- i.e. the bhikkhu really is 
   misstating the Buddha's teachings, is really aiming at a schism, and 
   the various other formal requirements for a formal act are fulfilled 
   -- then if he does not abandon his intention to agitate for a 
   schism, he incurs the full sanghadisesa regardless of whether he 
   perceives the act to be proper, improper, or doubtful. If the act is 
   improperly carried out, then regardless of how he perceives its 
   validity, he incurs a dukkata for not abandoning his intention (%). 
     
     The fact that the bhikkhu is not free from an offense in the 
   latter case is important: There are several other, similar points in 
   the Vinaya -- such as the Buddha's advice to the Dhamma-expert in 
   the controversy at Kosambi (Mv.X.1.8) -- where for the sake of the 
   harmony of the Community in cases that threaten to be divisive, the 
   Buddha advises bhikkhus to abandon controversial behavior and to 
   yield to the mandate of the Community even if it seems unjust. 
     
     Non-offenses. The no-offense clauses, in addition to the usual 
   exemptions, state simply that there is no offense if the bhikkhu is 
   not reprimanded or if he gives up his attempt at a schism.
     
     Further steps. If the bhikkhu is truly stubborn, it is possible 
   that he may continue in his efforts at a schism even after this 
   sanghadisesa is imposed on him. However, the fact that the Community 
   met to deal with his case should be enough to alert well-meaning 
   bhikkhus that the schismatic is following a wrong course of action, 
   and this should help unite the Community against his efforts. If 
   they deem it necessary -- to keep the laity from being taken in by 
   his arguments -- they may authorize one or more of their members to 
   inform the lay community that the schismatic has committed this 
   offense (see Pacittiya 9) and explain why. If the schismatic refuses 
   to undergo the penalty or remains divisive, they may suspend him 
   from the entire Sangha. If, unrepentant, he leaves to go elsewhere, 
   they may send word to whatever Community he tries to join. 
     
     All of this shows one of the reasons why schism is regarded so 
   seriously: As the Buddha states in the Discourse on Future Dangers 
   (A.V.78), it is difficult to find time to practice when the 
   Community is embroiled in controversy this way.
       
       Summary: To persist in one's attempts at a schism, after the 
       third announcement of a formal rebuke in a meeting of the 
       Community, is a sanghadisesa offense. 
       
   
                                 * * *
   
   
       11.Should bhikkhus -- one, two, or three -- who are 
       followers and partisans of that bhikkhu, say, "Do not, Ven. 
       sirs, admonish that bhikkhu in any way. He is an exponent of 
       the Dhamma, an exponent of the Vinaya. He acts with our 
       consent and approval. He knows, he speaks for us, and that 
       is pleasing to us," other bhikkhus are to admonish them 
       thus: "Do not say that, Ven. sirs. That bhikkhu is not an 
       exponent of the Dhamma and he is not an exponent of the 
       Vinaya. Do not, Ven. sirs, approve of a schism in the 
       Community. Let the venerable ones' (minds) be reconciled 
       with the Community, for a Community in concord, on 
       complimentary terms, without dispute, with a common 
       recitation, dwells in peace." 
       
       And should those bhikkhus, thus admonished, persist as 
       before, the bhikkhus are to rebuke them up to three times so 
       as to desist. If while being rebuked up to three times by 
       the bhikkhus they desist, that is good. If they do not 
       desist, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the 
       Community.
   
   
   If the schismatic mentioned in the preceding rule begins to attract 
   adherents, they are to be treated under this rule -- and quickly, 
   before the schismatic gains a fourth adherent. The reasons are 
   these:
   
     1) One Community cannot impose a penalty on another Community 
       (four or more bhikkhus) in any one formal act. (Mv.IX.2)
     
     2) Penalties of this sort may be imposed only with the unanimous 
       agreement of all the bhikkhus present in the meeting. If there is 
       a fourth adherent present in the meeting, he can prevent the 
       rebuke from being completed.
     
     3) As the Sub-commentary points out, once a potential schismatic 
       has gained four adherents, he has enough of a following to go 
       through with his split.
   
     The procedures for dealing with these partisans -- reprimanding 
   them in private, admonishing and rebuking them in the midst of the 
   Community -- are the same as in the preceding rule.
   
       Summary: To persist in supporting a potential schismatic, 
       after the third announcement of a formal rebuke in a meeting 
       of the Community, is a sanghadisesa offense. 
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
       12.In case a bhikkhu is by nature difficult to admonish -- 
       who, when being legitimately admonished by the bhikkhus with 
       reference to the training rules included in the (Patimokkha) 
       recitation, makes himself unadmonishable (saying), "Do not, 
       venerable ones, say anything to me, good or bad; and I will 
       not say anything to the venerable ones, good or bad. 
       Refrain, venerable ones, from admonishing me" -- the 
       bhikkhus should admonish him thus: "Let the venerable one 
       not make himself unadmonishable. Let the venerable one make 
       himself admonishable. Let the venerable one admonish the 
       bhikkhus in accordance with what is right, and the bhikkhus 
       will admonish the venerable one in accordance with what is 
       right; for it is thus that the Blessed One's following is 
       nurtured: through mutual admonition, through mutual 
       rehabilitation." 
   
       And should that bhikkhu, thus admonished by the bhikkhus, 
       persist as before, the bhikkhus are to be rebuke him up to 
       three times so as to desist. If while being rebuked up to 
       three times he desists, that is good. If he does not desist, 
       it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community. 
   
   
   If a bhikkhu breaks any of the rules of the Vinaya without 
   undergoing the penalties they entail, or if he breaks them 
   habitually even when undergoing the penalties, the other bhikkhus 
   have the duty to admonish him, as explained under Sanghadisesa 8. If 
   he shows disrespect while being admonished or refuses to mend his 
   ways, he incurs a further penalty under Pacittiya 54. If his lack of 
   respect while being admonished becomes habitual, he is to be treated 
   under this rule.
     
     The Commentary defines //difficult to admonish// as "impossible to 
   speak to," and then further clarifies by saying that a bhikkhu 
   difficult to admonish is one who cannot stand being criticized or 
   who does not mend his ways after his faults are pointed out to him. 
   It quotes from the Anumana Sutta (M.15) a list of traits, any one of 
   which makes a bhikkhu difficult to admonish: He has evil desires; 
   exalts himself and degrades others; is easily angered; because of 
   this he harbors ill will, holds a grudge, utters angry words; 
   accused, he throws a tantrum (literally, "explodes"); accused, he is 
   insulting; accused, he returns the accusation; he evades back and 
   forth; he does not respond; he is mean and spiteful; jealous and 
   possessive; scheming and deceitful; stubborn and proud; attached to 
   his own views, obstinate, unable to let them go.
     
     A good number of these traits are exemplified by Ven. Channa -- 
   according to tradition, the Buddha's horseman on the night of the 
   great Going Forth -- in the origin story to this rule.
     
       "Who do you think you are to admonish me? It is I who should 
       admonish you! The Buddha is mine, the Dhamma is mine, it was 
       by my young master that the Dhamma was realized. Just as a 
       great blowing wind would gather up grass, sticks, leaves, 
       and rubbish, or a mountain-born river would gather up water 
       weeds and scum, so you, in going forth, have been gathered 
       up from various names, various clans, various ancestries, 
       various families. Who do you think you are to admonish me? 
       It is I who should admonish you!"
     
     The procedures to follow when a bhikkhu is difficult to admonish 
   -- reprimanding him in private, admonishing and rebuking him in a 
   formal meeting of the Community -- are the same as under 
   Sanghadisesa 10, beginning with the fact that a bhikkhu who, hearing 
   that Bhikkhu X is being difficult to admonish, incurs a dukkata if 
   he does not reprimand him. The question of perception and the 
   non-offenses are also the same as under that rule. 
     
     If the bhikkhu difficult to admonish carries on as before, even 
   after incurring the full penalty under this rule, the Community may 
   perform an act of banishment (//pabbajaniya-kamma//) against him for 
   speaking in dispraise of the Community (Cv.I.13) or -- if he admits 
   to performing acts that are offenses but refuses to see that they 
   are offenses or to undergo the penalty -- the Community may exclude 
   him from participating in the Patimokkha and Pavarana ceremonies 
   (Mv.IV.16.2; Cv.IX.2) or suspend him from the entire Sangha. 
   (Cv.I.26; Cv.I.31)
   
       Summary: To persist in being difficult to admonish, after 
       the third announcement of a formal rebuke in the Community, 
       is a sanghadisesa offense.
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
       13.In case a bhikkhu living in dependence on a certain 
       village or town is a corrupter of families, a man of 
       depraved conduct -- whose depraved conduct is both seen and 
       heard about, and the families he has corrupted are both seen 
       and heard about -- the bhikkhus are to admonish him thus: 
       "You, Ven. sir, are a corrupter of families, a man of 
       depraved conduct. Your depraved conduct is both seen and 
       heard about; the families you have corrupted are both seen 
       and heard about. Leave this monastery, Ven. sir. Enough of 
       your staying here."
       
       And should that bhikkhu, thus admonished by the bhikkhus, 
       say about the bhikkhus, "The bhikkhus are prejudiced by 
       favoritism, prejudiced by aversion, prejudiced by delusion, 
       prejudiced by fear, in that for this sort of offense they 
       banish some and do not banish others," the bhikkhus are to 
       admonish him thus: "Do not say that, Ven. sir. The bhikkhus 
       are not prejudiced by favoritism, are not prejudiced by 
       aversion, are not prejudiced by delusion, are not prejudiced 
       by fear. You, Ven. sir, are a corrupter of families, a man 
       of depraved conduct. Your depraved conduct is both seen and 
       heard about, and the families you have corrupted are both 
       seen and heard about. Leave this monastery, Ven. sir. Enough 
       of your staying here."
       
       And should that bhikkhu, thus admonished by the bhikkhus, 
       persist as before, the bhikkhus are to rebuke him up to 
       three times so as to desist. If while being rebuked up to 
       three times he desists, that is good. If he does not desist, 
       it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.
   
   
   A //corrupter of families// is a bhikkhu who -- behaving in a 
   demeaning, frivolous, or subservient way -- succeeds in ingratiating 
   himself to lay people to the point where they withdraw their support 
   from bhikkhus who are earnest in the practice and give it to those 
   who are more ingratiating instead. This is illustrated in the origin 
   story of this rule, in which the followers of Assaji and Punabbasu 
   (leaders of one faction of the group of six) had thoroughly 
   corrupted the lay people at Kitagiri.
     
       "Now at that time a certain bhikkhu, having finished his 
       rains-residence among the people of Kasi and on his way to 
       Savatthi to see the Blessed One, arrived at Kitagiri. 
       Arising early in the morning, taking his robe and bowl, he 
       entered Kitagiri for alms: gracious in the way he approached 
       and departed, looked forward and behind, drew in and 
       stretched out his arm; his eyes downcast, his every movement 
       consummate. People seeing him said, 'Who is this weakest of 
       weaklings, this dullest of dullards, this most snobbish of 
       snobs? Who would go up and give him alms? Our masters, the 
       followers of Assaji and Punabbasu, are compliant, genial, 
       pleasing in conversation. They are the first to smile, 
       saying, "Come, you are welcome." //They// are not snobbish. 
       They are approachable. They are the first to speak. It is to 
       them that alms should be given.'"
   
     The Vibhanga lists the ways of corrupting a family as giving gifts 
   of flowers, fruit, etc., practicing medicine, and delivering 
   messages -- although the Commentary qualifies this by saying there 
   is no harm in delivering messages that have to do with religious 
   activities, such as inviting bhikkhus to a meal or to deliver a 
   sermon, or in conveying a lay person's respects to a senior bhikkhu.
     
     //Depraved conduct// the Vibhanga defines merely as growing 
   flowers and making them into garlands, but this, the Commentary 
   says, is a shorthand reference to the long list of bad habits 
   mentioned in the origin story, which includes such things as 
   presenting garlands to women, eating from the same dish with them, 
   sharing a blanket with them, eating at the wrong time, drinking 
   intoxicants, wearing garlands, using perfumes and cosmetics, 
   dancing, singing, playing musical instruments, playing games, 
   performing stunts, learning archery, swordsmanship, and 
   horsemanship; boxing and wrestling. Any one of these actions taken 
   in isolation carries only a minor penalty -- a dukkata or a 
   pacittiya -- but if indulged in habitually to the point where its 
   bad influence becomes "seen and heard about," i.e., common 
   knowledge, it can become grounds for his fellow bhikkhus to banish 
   him from their particular Community until he mends his ways.
     
     The Cullavagga, in a section that begins with the same origin 
   story as the one for this rule (Cv.I.13-16), treats the act of 
   banishment in full detail, saying that a Community of bhikkhus, if 
   it sees fit, has the authority to perform an act of banishment 
   against a bhikkhu with any of the following qualities:
   
     1) He is a maker of strife, disputes, quarrels, and issues in the 
       Community.
     2) He is ignorant, inexperienced, and has many offenses for which 
       he has not made amends.
     3) He lives in unbecoming association with householders.
     4) He is corrupt in his precepts, corrupt in his conduct, or 
       corrupt in his views.
     5) He speaks in dispraise of the Buddha, Dhamma, or Sangha.
     6) He is frivolous in word, deed, or both.
     7) He misbehaves in word, deed, or both.
     8) He is vindictive in word, deed, or both.
     9) He practices wrong modes of livelihood.
   
     This last category includes such practices as:
   
     a) running messages and errands for kings, ministers of state, 
       householders, etc. A modern example would be participating in 
       political campaigns.
     b) scheming, talking, hinting, belittling others for the sake of 
       material gain; pursuing gain with gain (giving items of small 
       value in hopes of receiving items of larger value in return, 
       making investments in hopes of profit, offering material 
       incentives to those who make donations). (For a full discussion 
       of these practices, see Ven. Nanamoli's translation of the 
       Visuddhi Magga, //The Path of Purification//, pp. 24-30.)
     c) Practicing worldly arts, e.g., medicine, fortune telling, 
       astrology, exorcism, reciting charms, casting spells, performing 
       ceremonies to counteract the influence of the stars, determining 
       propitious sites, setting auspicious dates (for weddings, etc.), 
       interpreting oracles, auguries, or dreams, or -- in the words of 
       the Vibhanga to the Bhikkhunis' Pacittiya 49 & 50 -- engaging in 
       any art that is "external and unconnected with the goal." The 
       Cullavagga (V.33.2) gives a dukkata for studying and teaching 
       worldly arts or hedonist doctrines (//lokayata//). For extensive 
       lists of worldly arts, see the Brahmajala and Samannaphala Suttas 
       -- pp. 62-65 and pp. 35-38 in Ven. Bodhi's translations. For the 
       connection between lokayata and hedonism (e.g., the Kama Sutra), 
       see Warder, //Outline of Indian Philosophy//, pp. 38-39.
   
     A bhikkhu banished for indulging in any of these activities is 
   duty-bound to undergo the 18 observances listed in Cv.I.15 and to 
   mend his ways so that the Community will revoke the act of 
   banishment. The Commentary adds that a bhikkhu banished for 
   corrupting families may not live in the monastery where he was 
   misbehaving, nor enter the city or town where he was corrupting 
   families, until after the banishment is revoked (this point is based 
   on Cv.I.16.1). Also, even after the revoking of the banishment, he 
   may never again accept gifts from the families he had corrupted. If 
   they ask him why, he may tell them. If they then explain that they 
   are giving the gifts not because of his former behavior but because 
   he has now mended his ways, he may then accept it.
     
     If a bhikkhu, instead of mending his ways after being banished, 
   criticizes the act of banishment or those who performed it, he is 
   subject to this rule. The procedure to follow in dealing with him -- 
   reprimanding him in private, admonishing and rebuking him in a 
   formal meeting of the Community -- is the same as under Sanghadisesa 
   10, beginning with the fact that a bhikkhu who, hearing that Bhikkhu 
   X is criticizing his act of banishment, incurs a dukkata if he does 
   not reprimand him. The question of perception and the non-offenses 
   are also the same as under that rule.
   
       Summary: To persist -- after the third announcement of a 
       formal rebuke in the Community -- in criticizing an act of 
       banishment performed against oneself is a sanghadisesa 
       offense. 
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
   A bhikkhu who commits an offense against any of these thirteen 
   sanghadisesa offenses is duty-bound to inform a fellow bhikkhu and 
   to ask a Community of at least four bhikkhus to impose a six-day 
   period of penance (//manatta//) on him. (The Canon says, literally, 
   a six-night period: At the time of the Buddha, the lunar calendar 
   was in use and, just as we using the solar calendar count the 
   passage of days, they counted the passage of nights; a 24-hour 
   period, which is a day for us, would be a night for them, as in the 
   Bhaddekaratta Sutta (M.131), where the Buddha explicitly says that a 
   person who spends a day and night in earnest practice has had an 
   "auspicious night.")
     
     Penance. Penance does not begin immediately, but only at the 
   convenience of the Community giving it. During his period of 
   penance, the offender is partially stripped of seniority and must 
   observe a number of restrictions -- 94 in all (Cv.II.5-6). The four 
   most important are:
     
     1) He must not live under the same roof as a full-fledged bhikkhu.
     
     2) He must live in a monastery with at least four full-fledged 
       bhikkhus.
     
     3) He may not go anywhere outside the monastery unless accompanied 
       by four full-fledged bhikkhus.
     
     4) Every day he must inform all the bhikkhus in the monastery of 
       the fact that he is observing penance and the precise offense for 
       which the penance was imposed. If visiting bhikkhus come to the 
       monastery, he must inform them as well; if he goes to another 
       monastery, he must inform all the bhikkhus there, too. 
   
     If, on any day of his penance, the bhikkhu neglects to observe any 
   of these four restrictions, that day does not count toward the total 
   of six. In addition, he incurs a dukkata each time he fails to 
   observe any of the 94 restrictions.
     
     Once the bhikkhu has completed his penance, he may ask a Community 
   of at least 20 bhikkhus to give him rehabilitation. Once 
   rehabilitated, he returns to his previous state as a full-fledged 
   bhikkhu in good standing.
     
     Probation. If a bhikkhu who commits a sanghadisesa offense 
   conceals it from his fellow bhikkhus past dawn of the day following 
   the offense, he must observe an additional period of probation 
   (//parivasa//) for the same number of days as he concealed the 
   offense. Only after he has completed his probation may he then ask 
   for the six-day period of penance.
     
     The Commentary sets the factors of concealment at ten, which may 
   be arranged in five pairs as follows:
   
     1) He has committed a sanghadisesa offense and perceives it as a 
       sanghadisesa offense.
     
     2) He has not been suspended and perceives that he has not been 
       suspended. (If a bhikkhu has been suspended, no other bhikkhus 
       will speak with him, and thus he cannot tell them until after his 
       suspension has been lifted.)
     
     3) There are no obstacles (e.g., a flood, a forest fire, dangerous 
       animals) and he perceives that there are none.
     
     4) He is able to inform another bhikkhu (i.e., a fellow bhikkhu 
       suitable to be informed lives in a place that may be reached in 
       that day, one is not too weak or ill to go, etc.) and he 
       perceives that he is able. //A bhikkhu suitable to be informed// 
       means a one who is -- 
   
        a) in good standing (e.g., not undergoing penance or probation 
          himself) and
        b) not on unfriendly terms with the offender. 
   
     5) He (the offender) desires to conceal the offense and so 
       conceals it. 
   
     If any of these factors are lacking, there is no penalty for not 
   informing another bhikkhu that day. For instance, the following 
   cases do //not// count as concealment:
     
     A bhikkhu is not sure whether or not the action he has done 
       qualifies as a sanghadisesa and so waits until he can consult 
       with a knowledgeable bhikkhu before informing anyone else.
     
     A bhikkhu lives alone in a forest and commits a sanghadisesa in 
       the middle of the night. Afraid of the snakes or other wild 
       animals he might encounter in the dark, he waits until daylight 
       before going to inform a fellow bhikkhu.
     
     A bhikkhu lives alone in a forest, but the only other bhikkhu 
       within one day's traveling time is a personal enemy who, if he is 
       informed, will use this as an opportunity to smear the offender's 
       name, so the offender travels another day or two before reaching 
       a friendly bhikkhu whom he informs.
     
     Once all of the first eight factors are complete, though, one must 
   inform another bhikkhu before dawn of the next day or else incur a 
   dukkata and undergo the penalty for concealment.
     
     A bhikkhu who commits a slighter offense that he thinks is a 
   sanghadisesa and then conceals it, incurs a dukkata (Cv.III.34.1).
     
     The restrictions for a bhikkhu undergoing probation are similar to 
   those for one undergoing penance and are discussed in detail at 
   Cv.II.1.
     
     Sanghadisesas are classified as heavy offenses (//garukapatti//), 
   both because of the seriousness of the offenses themselves and 
   because the procedures of penance, probation, and rehabilitation are 
   burdensome by design, not only for the offender but also for the 
   Community of bhikkhus in which he lives -- a fact intended to act as 
   added deterrent to anyone who feels tempted to transgress.
     
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