Der Weltanschauung (The WorldView) Origin HOUSTON, TEXAS USA

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Der Weltanschauung (The WorldView) Origin: HOUSTON, TEXAS USA %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% % % % Editor: The Desert Fox * FTP: chsun1.spc.uchicago.edu % % Co-Editor: Cyndre The Grey * pub/cud/worldview % % % % T H E W O R L D V I E W M A G A Z I N E % % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% March 6, 1992 Volume 2, Issue 1 Distributed In O'er 90 Countries (*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*) Material Written By Computer And Telecommunications Hobbyists World Wide Promoting the publication of Features, Editorials, and Anything Else.... To submit material, or to subscribe to the magazine contact one of the following net addresses... "Let us arise, let us arise against the oppressors of humanity; all kings, emperors, presidents of republics, priests of all religions are the true enemies of the people; let us destroy along with them all juridical, political, civil and religious institutions." -Manifesto of anarchists in the Romagna, 1878 @-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@ The World View Staff: InterNet Address: The Desert Fox [Editor] dfox@taronga.com Cyndre The Grey [CoEditor] cyndre@taronga.com Rev. Scott Free scotfree@taronga.com Bryan O' Blivion blivion@taronga.com Modok Tarleton rperkins@taronga.com The Sorcerer (REV) sorcerer@taronga.com Brain On A Stick brain@taronga.com WORLD VIEW NEWSGROUP: wv@taronga.com FTP Site: chsun1.spc.uchicago.edu @-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@ TABLE OF CONTENTS 1) Notices/Updates/News/Etc.............................Editors 2) Teen Curfews [Part 2 of 3]...........................Harvard Law Review 3) PSI - Global Dialup Services.........................John Eldredge 4) Who Pays For FTP (Reprint From EFF110)...............Dan Kenny 5) Michelangelo Virus...................................NasaMail 6) Special Internet Connections.........................Scott Yanoff 7) Eniac................................................Unknown 8) The Challenger Transcript............................Freelance Journalist 9) Dutch Police Arrest Hackers..........................Hac-Tic Magazine @-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@ Notices/Updates/News/Etc... Thanks to all the people who are requesting all back issues of our publication! Due to the numerous requests, we are no longer fulfilling back issue requests...except in certain cases. From now on, all issues will be available via ANON. FTP from: CHSUN1.SPC.UCHICAGO.EDU The directory that the Worldview is in will be: PUB/CUD/WORLDVIEW If you do not have access to FTP, let us know. We will try to help. I've had some complaints about the linefeeds in our mag. I am sorry. It is not us! The ones who are having the problem are a select few. I hope the problem ceases soon. We have no control. Ed... @-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@ [Part 2 of 3] This is the second part of a three part series on teen curfews. By: The Harvard Law Review B. The Proper Level of Scrutiny for Children's Rights Under traditional constitutional analysis, a statute that infringes fundamental rights can survive judicial scrutiny only if the government can show that the statute is both necessary and narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest (33). Given that children are persons under the Constitution, logic would seem to demand such strict scrutiny for infringements not only of adults' rights, but of children's rights as well. Yet courts, pointing to the unique developmental traits of children, have afforded minors' rights a level of protection lower than that secured by traditional strict scrutiny (34). Thus, in one relatively recent case, the Supreme Court suggested that an infringement of minors' fundamental rights need only serve a "significant state interest... not present in the case of an adult" (35). Although the Court has declined to apply consistently either this standard or any other, the Court's decisions reflect both a persistent unwillingness to engage in traditional strict scrutiny analysis and a continuing recognition that children's rights deserve considerably more protection than that offered by the rational relation test applied in Bykofsky. The lack of any developed framework for analyzing children's rights was highlighted in the recent case of H.L. v. Matheson (36), in which the Court, addressing the constitutionality of a statute requiring that parents be notified of a minor's decision to undergo an abortion, divided on the issue of the proper level of scrutiny in challenges to differential state treatment of children and adults. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, upheld the statute on the ground that it served "important state interests" and was "narrowly drawn to protect only those interests" (37). Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment on the basis of his characterization of the state interests as "fundamental and substantial" (38). Although dissenting from the Court's judgment, Justice Marshall implicitly expressed support for some variant of a significant-state-interest test and noted that validating a statute under such a test indicated not that minors' rights are less fundamental than adults' but only that special state interests justify infringement of those rights (39). The Court's confusion over the proper formulation of the standard of review results from the tension caused by the recognition that, while children are persons for constitutional purposes, they are simultaneously the subject of special state concern. Yet in many cases this tension may be illusory: a careful analysis of the state's alleged special interests in infringing minors' rights may reveal that such interests are not at stake in a particular situation or will not be furthered by a specific restriction. In such cases, there is no justification for affording less protection to the rights of minor citizens than to the rights of adults. This conclusion is implicit in the wording of the "significant state interest not present in the case of an adult" standard. Because the state must present an interest that pertains uniquely to children before treating them differently from adults, it follows that, absent a significant difference between children and adults, the state must treat the two groups identically (40). But a lower standard of review, if applied in all cases involving infringement of children's fundamental rights, would lead courts automatically to afford less protection to those rights even in cases in which there was no justification for doing so. Thus, children's fundamental rights should be presumptively equal to those of adults, and violations of such rights should merit strict scrutiny (41). Only if courts respect this initial presumption can they properly protect the fundamental rights of children when there is no basis for treating those rights differently (42). Statements that children possess fundamental rights but may be more restricted than adults in the exercise of those rights represent a belief that, although children's abstract rights are identical to those of adults, their concrete rights are not. Because a person's status as a child is not always relevant to her competence to exercise her rights, however, children's concrete rights should also be presumed equal to those of adults. The state should be able to rebut this presumption by demonstrating the relevance of childhood in a particular case. Under the proposed approach, however, courts would not merely apply strict scrutiny to infringements of the rights of children while recognizing special state interests regarding children, for such a procedure, according to traditional strict scrutiny analysis, would be self-contradictory. The principle of strict scrutiny for infringements of fundamental rights presupposes a universe of citizens equal under the Constitution; what qualifies as a compelling state interest does not ordinarily vary depending on which citizens are affected (43). Singling out a group of adult citizens and affording less protection to their fundamental rights solely because of their membership in the group would cut at the very heart of the equal protection principle. Thus, to recognize special interests surrounding one unique class of citizens -- children -- is to recognize the need for a unique form of strict scrutiny. Such a form of review would acknowledge compelling state interests that pertain only to children. Interests that the courts deem compelling under traditional strict scrutiny analysis would, of course, also suffice to justify infringements of children's fundamental rights; such interests would constitute a subset of the acceptable state interests recognized by this new analysis. The only additional compelling interests that the proposed form of strict scrutiny would recognize would be those based on the unique developmental traits of children -- interests that might be called "compelling for children" (44). Under such a test, the rights of children would not be coextensive with those of adults, for the universe of state interests sufficient to justify the infringement of children's rights would be broader. When a law affecting children -- for example, a curfew ordinance -- would not, if applied to adults, survive traditional strict scrutiny, the only possible justification would be a "compelling for children" interest. Courts should therefore require the state to demonstrate that, because of the unique developmental traits of minors, unrestricted exercise of a particular right in the situation in question would create significant (to merely possible or imaginable) dangers of physical or emotional harm to the minors or to others. Thus, the state's power to act in furtherance of its special interests regarding children would not be plenary; rather, the state would have to show not simply that a restriction affected only children, but also that concerns unique to children and relevant to the specific situation in question legitimated the restriction. If such a "compelling for children" interest were present, the statute would be upheld, provided that it was narrowly drawn to protect that interest. If it did not serve an interest "compelling for children," a statute that differentially affected the fundamental rights of children and those of adults would be struck down. C. What Constitutes a "Compelling for Children" Interest As noted above, the assumption that children are particularly vulnerable to certain forms of emotional trauma and are unable to exercise their rights in an informed, rational, and safe manner forms the basis for finding a "compelling for children" interest in legislation restricting children's rights (45). The Supreme Court seemed to be operating under such an assumption in Bellotti v. Baird (46), which struck down a statute that placed various restrictions on the ability of minors to obtain abortions. In Bellotti, a four-Justice plurality set forth three factors that are generally found to justify differential treatment of the constitutional rights of minors. These factors, each of which reflects a different aspect of the assumption that children are not fully competent to exercise their rights, are (1) the peculiar vulnerability of children, (2) the inability of children to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner, and (3) the need to ensure that parents are able to play a central role in their children's upbringing (47). Although Justice Powell's opinion for the Court was joined by only a plurality of the Justices, those who wrote separately did not dispute the preliminary section of the opinion, which articulated the factors relevant to an inquiry into differential treatment of children's rights. The three factors thus provide a framework within which the unique traits of children may be analyzed in accordance with Supreme Court precedent. These three factors form a useful framework for assessing government interests served by a given restriction on the rights of minors (48). Under the proposed analysis, a restriction serves an interest "compelling for children" only if the restriction is narrowly drawn and only if one of the three factors justifies it. In the following Part, each factor is examined more fully in connection with its application to the question of the validity of juvenile curfew ordinances. @-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@ PSI - Global Dialup Services By: John Eldredge CONTACT: John T. Eldredge Performance Systems International, Inc. 11800 Sunrise Valley Drive Suite 1100 Reston, VA 22091 Phone: 1 800.82PSI82 +1 703.620.6651 Fax: +1 703.620.4586 Email: info@psi.com PSI introduces Global Dialup Service (GDS) to provide individuals inexpensive telnet/rlogin access to Internet host computers around the clock through local dialups available on a national basis. Reston, Virginia - September 4, 1991 - John T. Eldredge, Director of Sales and Marketing, Performance Systems International, Inc. (PSI) today announced a new, simple means to access tens of thousands of Internet host computers called Global Dialup Service (GDS). GDS provides a commonly-available way for individuals to access their accounts on Internet host computers, at any hour of the day or night, through the popular telnet or rlogin protocols. This service only requires a personal computer or terminal, basic communications software and a modem set at 300, 1200, or 2400 baud. Dialup points are available locally in major cities throughout the continental US, as well as internationally, through locally available X.25 PADS. Eldredge commented, "The demand for simple access to the thousands of Internet hosts for traveling professionals and remote organizational offices, independent of local times, continues to grow. GDS inexpensively meets this basic need for thousands of individuals." The PSI Global Dialup Service is currently served in over 20 cities across the country, with additional cities being added each month. GDS is available seven days per week, 24 hours per day, and costs just $39 per month. There is a one-time registration fee of $39. PSI, headquartered in Reston, Virginia, is a value-added internetworking services provider with a wide spectrum of services for the individual and corporate user of electronic information. Services range from electronic mail products to turnkey integration of local area networks into the PSINet wide area network system and the Internet. Through the Commercial Internet Exchange (CIX), which PSI co-founded, all commercial US internetworking service providers are interconnected, providing commercial companies on PSINet with no government restrictions on usage to other commercial companies participating in CIX-connected network service providers. Personal internetworking made simple for individuals with PSI's newest turnkey software and service: PSILink(SM) Reston, Virginia - September 24, 1991 - Performance Systems International, Inc. (PSI) today unveiled PSILink(SM) to make personal Internet access and electronic correspondence simple and inexpensive. PSILink(SM) is a turnkey service package which enables the individual in business, academia, government, and even home enterprise to communicate with the world through electronic mail and other services. Its ease of use makes it attractive to thousands of professionals, teachers and students previously reluctant to harness the complexities of valuable Internet access. "It has never been easier to communicate electronically," said William L. Schrader, PSI's President and Chief Executive Officer. "The Internet community is estimated at over 30 million users. PSILink(SM) uses software developed by PSI for the common PC that is easy to install, easy to set up and easy to use." Local dialup points are available in major cities throughout the continental United States for the PSILink(SM) service. PSILink(SM) will be demonstrated at Interop '91, in San Jose, October 9-11. PSI, along with additional companies, will be announcing service and software enhancements of the technology at a press conference during Interop at 8:00 A.M. PST on Tuesday, October 8. Additional on-line information about PSILink(SM) is available by sending e-mail to psilink-info@psi.com; an automatic computer generated information response will be returned to your mailbox. PSI, headquartered in Reston, Virginia, is a value-added internetworking services provider with a wide spectrum of services for the individual and corporate user of electronic information. Services range from electronic mail products to turnkey integration of local area networks into the PSINet(R) wide area network system and the Internet. PSILink - Personal Networking for Internet Access Internet access is an important facet of all higher education institutions, and most corporations throughout the US, Western Europe and the Pacific Basin. It is also important for small organizations and individuals, yet both the cost and usability have been barriers. The PSILink service is designed to remove these barriers. PSI provides local dialups throughout the US to provide PSILink service and provide access to the 25+ million people available through the Internet and electronic mail networks. The PSILink service today provides unlimited electronic messaging at a flat monthly cost: $35 one time $19/month billed on a monthly basis to your MasterCard/Visa, or quarterly by check. Soon to be released under PSILink will be USENET/NEWS and anonymous FTP access. PSI provides the necessary software for MSDOS based PC's to use this service at no additional cost. Even the smallest PC with a Hayes compatible modem can use PSILink. This software is available via anonymous ftp on ftp.psi.com in the "psilink" directory and is available when you register on a 3.5" 1.44Mbyte floppy. Additional information can be had from our on-line brochure and user's guide which is available by sending email to psilink-guide@psi.com A PostScript document will be automatically mailed to you. This document should be printable on any PostScript printer; however, it must be printed on legal size paper. If you want to register for this service send email to psilink-registration@psi.com A PostScript registration information will be automatically mailed to you. If you can't print these PostScript documents sene complete contact information including postal address, name, and phone number to: psilink-order@psi.com You will receive materials via the Postal system. Copyright 1991 Performance Systems International Inc. All rights reserved. @-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@ Who Pays for FTP? From: netspec@zeus.unomaha.edu (Dan Kenny, Network Specialist/ U of N-Omaha) In a previous article, tld@cosmos.bae.bellcore.com (Terry Davidson) writes: "One question: I've asked this before, and have received no response. Who pays for ftp? Some uploads/downloads can take a *VERY* large amount of time; and this has to cost someone some hard cash - but who? Is the login used to send bills to the company from where the call originated (some ftp may be anonymous, but modern UNIX systems darned well get the info anyway, including the actual line/port/phone of the originating machine). I'd like answers to these questions, simply because (1) I have approximately 5 MB of shareware (DOS) utilities to upload to an ftp site for propagation, and (2) there are some GIF files out on the ftp sites I would like to ftp in. Whether or not I actually do this depends on how ftp is billed. Terry, FTP (the file transfer protocol), NNTP (the protocol for the news service you are reading), TELNET (the remote login protocol), SMTP (the mail protocol you receive Internet mail through), and other protocol services in the TCP/IP specification are made available to you courtesy of the educational system in America. Individual colleges, military sites, organizations and commercial sites wire up their machines as a campus network. These networks join a consortium of regional networks (like MIDnet for the Midwest colleges, MILnet for the military, etc) for a fee and if they are an educational institution, also receive subsidization on the cost of connecting their campus networks to the regional network through the National Science Foundation. Additionally, the NSF foots the bill for the long-haul national network connecting the regional networks in one giant internetwork. This long-haul network is built upon the work of the military's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPAnet) in the 1970's and 1980's. These resources are provided to the average Internet user virtually for free, and are done so in the spirit of research and cooperation. Not everyone in the world ascribes to the philosophy of the "bottom-line" business mentality, and they recognize the value of open access to educational resources in the quest for enhancing communication between educators, researchers, students, businesses, organizations, and the community. So to answer your question, we all pay - just like we all pay for open and public access to the nation's highways, the open and public access to community libraries, the open and public access to secondary schools, and the open and public access to the state universities. Individual sites on the Internet make services and resources available (like disk space for anonymous FTP or the ARCHIE database service) out of the spirit of this cooperation and belief that the greater benefit of increased communication outweighs the per-unit-cost of a megabyte of disk storage or a packet of network bandwidth. Usenet news feeds are traditionally provided as a courtesy between educational institutions in this spirit also. If you believe your 5 megs of utilities have educational value, by all means upload them to an appropriate FTP site. If you believe that files you find on an anonymous FTP will enhance your education, download them. Realize that the mere act of communicating with someone on the Internet and exploring available services has educational value. Speaking as a student majoring in one of those science/technical and engineering fields (Computer Science) that people keep worrying about due to growing lack of interest from our youth, I can assure you that the educational benefit I have received through the cooperation of the Internet community has been tremendous. Innovation is not dead in America, at least not yet. We just need to properly recognize the value of long-term investment and commitment to cooperation (whether that be in basic research & development, educating ourselves, or in laying fiber to every household like Japan is doing), regardless of short-term cost (or lack of profit). Remember the technological fallout from the Apollo Moon program? We -all- foot the bill for it, and we -all- (consumers, industry, education, military, and our general competitiveness in the world) benefited from the cooperation and technology-sharing of that national project. Think of the Internet in the same fashion. I do. Just my opinions, Dan Kenny, Network Specialist : University of Nebraska-Omaha netspec@zeus.unomaha.edu @-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@ The following messages were received from NASA Mail From: ADMIN/NASA To: NASA Subj: Virus Early Warning This is a Product Assurance and Security Office (PASO) Virus Early Warning. The PC (not MAC) virus "Michelangelo" has started spreading in the U.S. very fast. This virus has a "trigger" date of March 6 where it will attempt to overwrite vital areas on the PC hard disk. Please make sure that you have a current copy of Virusafe 4.5 installed in your computer. Virusafe is able to detect and remove the mentioned virus. Some other antiviral programs may detect "Michelangelo" but not be able to remove it. If you don't have Virusafe installed, contact your Code AIS representative or call the PASO Virus Prevention Team at XXX-XXXX. Attached is the Virus-L (Internet) message received from A. Padgett Peterson. Subject: WARNING - Michelangelo Virus (PC) THIS VIRUS IS SCHEDULED TO EXECUTE ON MARCH 6, 1992 From all reports this destructive virus is spreading world-wide very rapidly. Unlike the DataCrime "fizzle" in 1989 which contained similar destructive capability but never spread, the Michelangelo appears to have become "common" in just ten months following detection. I have encountered three cases locally in just the last few weeks. Three factors make this virus particularly dangerous: 1) The virus uses similar techniques as the "STONED" virus which while first identifies in early 1988 remains the most common virus currently reported. Since the virus infects only the Master Boot Record on hard disks and the boot record of floppy disks, viral detection techniques that rely on alteration of DOS executable files will not detect the virus. Similarly, techniques that monitor the status of the MBR may only provide users with a single warning that, if execution is permitted to continue, may not be repeated. 2) Michelangelo was first discovered in Europe in mid-1991 consequently many virus scanners in use today will not pick up the virus unless more recent updates have been obtained. 3) Unlike the Stoned and Jerusalem (the most common viruses in the past) which are more annoying than dangerous, the Michelangelo virus will, on its trigger date of March 6th, attempt to overwrite vital areas of the hard disk rendering it unreadable by DOS. Further, since the FATs (file allocation tables) may be damaged, unless backups are available recovery will be very difficult and require someone who is able to rebuild a corrupt FAT (also a very time-consuming process). Fortunately, the Michelangelo virus is also very easy to detect: when resident in a PC, the CHKDSK (included with MS-DOS (Microsoft), PC-DOS (IBM), and DR-DOS (Digital Research) {all names are registered by their owners}) program will return a "total bytes memory" value 2048 bytes lower than normal. This means that a 640k PC which normally returns 655,360 "total bytes memory" will report 653,312. While a low value will not necessarily mean that Michelangelo or any other virus is present, the PC should be examined by someone familiar with viral activity to determine the reason. If the Michelangelo virus is found, the PC should be turned off until disinfected properly. All floppy disks and other machines in the area should then also be examined since the Michelangelo virus is spread i2n the boot record (executable area found on all floppy disks including data-only disks). Padgett Peterson Internet: padgett%tccslr.dnet@mmc.com Note: the opinions expressed are my own and not necessarily those of my employer. Comments refer only to the specific example of the virus that I have examined. Other strains may exist. @-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@ Special Internet Connections By: Scott Yanoff * SPECIAL INTERNET CONNECTIONS: Last Update: 10/13/91 * * Compiled By: Scott Yanoff - yanoff@csd4.csd.uwm.edu * * A + by an entry designates new entries to the list (since last update). * +Archie telnet quiche.cs.mcgill.ca or 132.206.2.3 (Can./USA) telnet nic.funet.fi or 128.214.6.100 (Finland) telnet rana.cc.deakin.oz.au or 128.184.1.4 (Aussie/NZ) offers: Internet anonymous FTP database. (Login: archie) -CARL telnet pac.carl.org or 192.54.81.128 offers: Online database, book reviews, magazine fax delivery service. -Cleveland Freenet telnet freenet-in-a.cwru.edu or 129.22.8.82 offers: USA Today Headline News, Sports, etc... +C64 Archive Server mail twtick@corral.uwyo.edu Subject: Mail-Archive-Request Body-of-letter: help (hit return) end -Dante Project telnet eleazar.dartmouth.edu or 129.170.16.2 offers: Divine Comedy and reviews. (Login: ddpfrnet password: freenet) -Distance Educat. Data telnet sun.nsf.ac.uk or telnet 128.86.8.7 (Login: janet Hostname: uk.ac.open.acs.vax Username: icdl) +FTP Mail ftpmail@decwrl.dec.com Subject: (hit return) Body-of-letter: help (return) quit Offers: ftp via email -Geographic Name Server telnet martini.eecs.umich.edu 3000 or 141.212.100.9 offers: Info by city or area code (Population, Lat./Long., Elevation, etc). -Gopher telnet consultant.micro.umn.edu or 128.101.95.23 Access to: UPI News, weather forecasts, interet games, library (Login:gohper) -Ham Radio Callbook telnet marvin.cs.buffalo.edu 2000 or 128.205.32.4 offers: National ham radio call-sign callbook. -Internet Resrce Guide ftp nnsc.nsf.net offers: compressed/tar'd list of net resources in /resource-guide.txt.tar.Z -IRC Telnet Client telnet bradenville.andrew.cmu.edu or 128.2.54.2 offers: Internet Relay Chat access. -Library of Congress telnet dra.com or 192.65.218.43 offers: COPY of Library of Congress (Assumes terminal is emulating a vt100). -List of Lists ftp ftp.nisc.sri.com or ftp 192.33.33.22 offers: List of interest groups/email lists in /netinfo/interest-groups. -Lyric Server ftp vacs.uwp.edu offers: Lyrics in text file format for anonymous ftp downloading. -Mail Server/Usr Lookup mail mail-server@pit-manager.mit.edu usage: in body of mail message: send usenet-addresses/[name searching for] -NASA SpaceLink telnet spacelink.msfc.nasa.gov or 128.158.13.250 offers: Latest NASA news, including shuttle launches and satellite updates. -NED telnet ipac.caltech.edu or telnet 131.215.139.35 offers: NASA Extragalactic Database. (Login: ned) -Oceanic Info. Center telnet delocn.udel.edu or telnet 128.175.24.1 (Login: info) -Oracle mail oracle@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu offers: The Usenet Oracle! Mail with subject as "help" for more info. -PENpages telnet psupen.psu.edu or telnet 128.118.36.5 offers: Agricultural info (livestock reports, etc.) (Login: PNOTPA) -SDDAS telnet espsun.space.swri.edu 540 offers: SW Research Data Display & Analysis Center. Or telnet 129.162.150.99 -STIS telnet stis.nsf.gov or 128.150.195.40 offers: Science & Technology Information System. (Login: public) -Usenet News MailServer mail [newsgroup]@ucbvax.berkeley.edu Allows you to post to a Usenet newsgroup via email. Useful if you have read- only access to Usenet news. Note: .'s become -'s Ex. alt.test -> alt-test -UNC BBS telnet samba.acs.unc.edu or 128.109.157.30 offers: Access to Library of Congress and nationwide libraries (Login: bbs) -WAIStation telnet hub.nnsc.nsf.net SWAIS telnet quake.think.com (different than hub... above) offers: Wide Area Info. Service. (Login: wais) FTP think.com for more info. -Weather Service telnet madlab.sprl.umich.edu 3000 or 141.212.196.79 offers: Forecast for any city, current weather for any state, etc. -Webster (Temp. down?) telnet decoy.cc.uoregon.edu 2627 offers: Dictionary, Thesaurus, Spelling checker. Type 'HELP' when online! (May not support non-UNIX machines?) * NOTE: NO LOGIN NAMES OR PASSWORDS ARE REQUIRED UNLESS STATED OTHERWISE! * If it prompts you for a login name, you did something wrong, or are not running on a machine that the system you telnetted to supports! * PLEASE email me if you have any additional info/corrections/comments! * @-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@ ENIAC By: Unknown In the beginning there was ENIAC. And the ENIAC was without language or form. And so was created Machine Code. And it was Good. On the second day, Hex was created. And it was good. On the third day, Assembly Language was created. And it was good. On the fourth day, Fortran was created and it was good. On the fifth day, man programmed in Fortran. And it was very good. And it was spoken: "Though may program in any of these, but the tree of COBOL thou shall not partake for thou shalt surely pay for thine transgresssions." But, there was a hacker in the woods who took the form of a mini and spake to the man and said "Thou shalt not pay for thine transgressions, for he knoweth that if thou partakest, thou shall have power to program large and wonderful things that shall be readable by others!" So, the man partook of COBOL. And it was spoken: "Thou hast partaken of the tree of COBOL: Thou art doomed to write hundred thousand line programs, be enslaved by IBM, and not have other good programming options for years." And it was so. Many years passed. IBM dominated. Programs grew larger and larger. BASIC, Pascal, SNOBOL, PLI, Ada and many others came and went. IBM dominated. And COBOL programs grew. Then, as implied, a program came out of the telephone. It spread to the universities who took it on and made it grow. IBM tried to kill it many times, but after the PC was introduced, it was inevitable. First, A. Written in Assembly, not COBOL. Then B which was better that A. Then finally C took full form and shape. With UNIX, it launched into the market seemingly impervious to COBOL's domination. IBM tried again to kill it. Through security holes, and portability, and unreadability IBM tried. But C could not be quashed. The implied savior of programming everywhere had come! And the great COBOL could finally start to be removed. Open systems and high capacity graphic's aided and spurred C on until there was C for DOS, C++, and finally, C for the IBM series 3090. And it was very good. (to be continued ... maybe) @-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@ For Those Who Haven't Heard: The Challenger Transcript DISCLAIMER: This info was submitted by an unknown freelance journalist. The World View Magazine And It's Editors Claim No Responsibility For The Creation Of This Document. We Have No Ties To NASA, Or Any Other Government Organization. The Transcript Follows The Audio Tape Which Was Released To The Public By NASA. As Journalists, We Chose To Publish The Document, Because We Feel The American People Have A Right To Hear All Opinions Regarding This Issue. The World View Does Not Condone Nor Do We Necessarily Agree With The "Cover-Up" Theory Related To This Incident. As Far As We Know, This Information Is Public Domain. --==(*)==-- A secret NASA tape reveals that the crew of the shuttle Challenger not only survived the explosion that ripped the vessel apart; they screamed, cried, cursed and prayed for three hellish minutes before they slammed into the Atlantic and perished on January 28, 1986. The tape is said to begin with a startled crewman screaming,"What happened? What happened? Oh God - No!" Screams and curses are heard- several crewmen begin to weep- and then others bid their families farewell. Two minutes forty-five seconds later the tape ends. That's when the shuttles crew compartment, which remained intact after the vessel exploded over the Atlantic, hit the ocean at over 2,000 miles per hour, instantly killing the crew. " Cover up? Of course there was a coverup, " declared Robert Hotz, a member of the Presidential commission that investigated the disaster. " NASA can't face the fact that they put these astronauts in a situation where they didn't have adequate equipment to survive. NASA doesn't give a damn about anything but covering it's ass, " he said. The official account released by NASA ends with shuttle pilot Michael Smith saying, " Uh-oh! " Some NASA employees have evidently heard more-much more. And they provided the rest of the account based on what they've discussed within NASA in the last five years. The astronauts had time and realized something was happening after the shuttle broke up. " All shuttle astronauts carry personal recorders and the tape in question apparently came from Christa's (McAuliffe), which was recovered after the shuttle disaster, " said Hotz. Jarvis was sitting beside her, and when he figured out what was happening he said, " Give me your hand. " " NASA insists there's nothing like that on tape but they're talking about the mission tape, not Christa's. So they're not lying, but they're not telling the truth, either. " A journalist with close ties to NASA was even more emphatic, " There are persistent rumors, dating back to the disaster, that this tape is absolutely bone-chilling. " The following transcript begins two seconds after NASA's official version ends, with pilot Michael Smith saying, " Uh-oh! " Times from the moment of takeoff are shown in minutes and seconds and are approximate. The sex of the speaker is indicated by M or F. T+1:15 (M) What happened? What happened? Oh God, no - no! T+1:17 (F) Oh dear God. T+1:18 (M) Turn on your air pack! Turn on your air... T+1:20 (M) Can't breathe... choking... T+1:21 (M) Lift up your visor! T+1:22 (M/F) (Screams.) It's hot. (Sobs.) I can't. Don't tell me... God! Do it...now... T+1:24 (M) I told them... I told them... Dammit! Resnik don't... T+1:27 (M) Take it easy! Move (unintelligible)... T+1:28 (F) Don't let me die like this. Not now. Not here... T+1:31 (M) Your arm... no... I (extended garble, static) T+1:36 (F) I'm... passing... out... T+1:37 (M) We're not dead yet. T+1:40 (M) If you ever wanted (unintelligible) me a miracle... (unintelligible)... (screams) T+1:41 (M) She's... she's... (garble) ... damn! T+1:50 (M) Can't breathe... T+1:51 (M/F) (screams) Jesus Christ! No! T+1:54 (M) She's out. T+1:55 (M) Lucky... (unintelligible). T+1:56 (M) God. The water... we're dead! (screams) T+2:00 (F) Goodbye (sobs)... I love you, I love you... T+2:03 (M) Loosen up... loosen up... T+2:07 (M) It'll just be like a ditch landing... T+2:09 (M) That's right, think positive. T+2:11 (M) Ditch procedure... T+2:14 (M) No way! T+2:17 (M) Give me your hand... T+2:19 (M) You awake in there? I... I... T+2:29 (M) Our Father... (unintelligible)... T+2:42 (M) ...hallowed be Thy name... (unintelligible). T+2:57 (M) You...over there? T+2:58 (M) The Lord is my shepherd, I shall...not want. He maketh me to lie down in green pastures... though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil... I will dwell in the house... T+3:15 to end. None. Static, silence. Serpentine Light Chicago Helvetica r det slut @-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@ DUTCH POLICE ARRESTS HACKERS The facts: At 10.30 Monday morning, 27 January 1992, Dutch police searched the homes of two hackers. In the city of Roermond, the parental home of the 21-year old student H.W. was searched and in Nuenen the same happened to the parental home of R.N., a Computer Science engineer, age 25. Both were arrested and taken into custody. At both sites, members of the Amsterdam Police Pilot Team for computer crime were present, alongside local police officers and representatives of the national organization CRI (Criminal Investigations Agency). Both suspects were transported to Amsterdam. The brother of one of the suspects was told the suspects could receive no visits or mail. All of this has happened more than one week ago and the two are still in jail as we write this. The charges: A break-in supposedly occurred at the bronto.geo.vu.nl site at the VU University in Amsterdam. This UNIX system running on a SUN station (IP 130.37.64.3) has been taken off the net at least for the duration of the investigation. What happened to the actual hardware is unknown at this time. The formal charges are: forgery, racketeering and vandalism. The police justify the forgery part by claiming that files on the system have been changed. The vandalism charge is valid because the system had to be taken off the net for a period of time to investigate the extent of the damage. By pretending to be regular users or even system management the hackers committed racketeering, the police says. Both suspects, according to the Dutch police, have made a full statement. According to a police spokesman the motive was "fanatical hobbyism". Spokesperson Slort for the CRI speaks of the "kick of seeing how far you can get". Damages: According to J. Renkema, head of the geo-physics faculty at the VU, the university is considering filing a civil lawsuit against the suspects. "The system was contaminated because of their doing and had to be cleaned out. This cost months of labour and 50.000 guilders (about US$ 30,000). Registered users pay for access to the system and these hackers did not. Result: tens of thousands of guilders in damages." Renkema also speaks of a 'moral disadvantage': The university lost trust from other sites on the network. Renkema claims the university runs the risk of being expelled from some networks. Renkema also claims the hackers were discovered almost immediately after the break-in and were monitored at all times. This means all the damages had occurred under the watchful eyes of the supervisors. All this time, no action was taken to kick the hackers off the system. According to Renkema all systems at the VU were protected according to guidelines as laid down by CERT and SurfNet BV (SurfNet is the company that runs most of the inter-university data-traffic in The Netherlands). What really happened? The charge of 'adapting system-software' could mean that the hackers installed back-doors to secure access to the system or to the root level, even if passwords were changed. New versions of telnet, ftp, rlogin and other programs could have been compiled to log access to the networks. What really happened is anybody's guess. One point is that even the CRI acknowledges that there were no 'bad' intentions on the part of the hackers. They were there to look around and play with the networks. About hacking in general: In the past we have warned that new laws against computer crime can only be used against hackers which are harmless. Against the real computer criminals a law is useless because they will probably remain untraceable. The CRI regularly goes on the record to say that hackers are not the top priority in computer crime investigation. It seems that hackers are an easy target when 'something has to be done'. And 'something had to be done': The pressure from especially the U.S. to do something about the 'hacking problem' was so huge that it would have been almost humiliating for the Dutch not to respond. It seems as if the arrests are mainly meant to ease the American fear of the overseas hacker-paradise. A closer look at the charges and damages: The VU has launched the idea that system security on their system was only needed because of these two hackers. All costs made in relation to system security are billed to the two people that just happened to get in. For people that like to see hacking in terms of analogies: It is like walking into a building full of students, fooling around and then getting the bill for the new alarm-system that they had to install just for you. Systems security is a normal part of the daily task of every system- adminstrator. Not just because the system has to be protected from break-ins from the outside, but also because the users themselves need to be protected from each other. The 'bronto' management has neglected some of their duties, and now they still have to secure their system. This is not damages done, it's work long overdue. If restoring back-ups costs tens of thousands of guilders, something is terribly wrong at the VU. Every system manager that uses a legal copy of the operating system has a distribution version within easy reach. 'Month of tedious labour following the hackers around in the system'. It would have been much easier and cheaper to deny the hackers access to the system directly after they had been discovered. 'Moral damages' by break-ins in other systems would have been small. The VU chose to call the police and trace the hackers. The costs of such an operation cannot be billed to the hackers. Using forgery and racketeering makes one wonder if the OvJ (the District Attorney here) can come up with a better motive than 'they did it for kicks'. If there is no monetary or material gain involved, it is questionable at best if these allegations will stand up in court. As far as the vandalism goes: there have been numerous cases of system management overreacting in a case like this. A well trained system-manager can protect a system without making it inaccessible to normal users. Again: the hackers have to pay for the apparent incompetence of system management. This does not mean that having hackers on your system can not be a pain. The Internet is a public network and if you cannot protect a system, you should not be on it. This is not just our statement, it is the written policy of many networking organizations. One more metaphor: It's like installing a new phone-switch that allows direct dial to all employees. If you get such a system, you will need to tell your employees not to be overly loose-lipped to strangers. It is not the callers fault if some people can be 'hacked'. If you tie a cord to the lock and hang it out the mail-slot, people will pull it. If these people do damages, you should prosecute them, but not for the costs of walking after them and doing your security right. Consequences of a conviction: If these suspects are convicted, the VU makes a good chance of winning the civil case. Furthermore, this case is of interest to all other hackers in Holland. Their hobby is suddenly a crime and many hackers will cease to hack. Others will go 'underground', which is not beneficial to the positive interaction between hackers and system management or the relative openness in the Dutch computer security world. Public systems: If you are not a student at some big university or work for a large corporation, there is no real way for you to get on the Internet. As long as there is no way for some people to connect to the net, there will be people that hack their way in. Whether this is good or bad is besides the point. If there is no freedom to explore, some hackers will become the criminals that government wants them to be. "Our system is perfectly secure !" (and if you prove it's not, we'll have you put in jail) Felipe Rodriquez (felipe@hacktic.nl) & Rop Gonggrijp (rop@hacktic.nl) Rop Gonggrijp (rop@hacktic.nl), editor of | fax: +31 20 6900968 Hack-Tic Magazine (only on paper, only in Dutch) | VMB: +31 20 6001480 the best magazine for staying in touch with the | snail: Postbus 22953, the Techno-Underground. Mail to info@hacktic.nl | 1100 DL Amsterdam @-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@-==-@

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