Computer underground Digest Sun May 14, 1995 Volume 7 : Issue 38 ISSN 1004-042X Editors: J

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Computer underground Digest Sun May 14, 1995 Volume 7 : Issue 38 ISSN 1004-042X Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@MVS.CSO.NIU.EDU Archivist: Brendan Kehoe Shadow Master: Stanton McCandlish Field Agent Extraordinaire: David Smith Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala Ian Dickinson Goddess of Judyism Editor: J. Tenuta CONTENTS, #7.38 (Sun, May 14, 1995) File 1--Jacking in from the "One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest" Port File 2--Jacking in from the Narco-Terrorist Encryption Port File 3--CDT Testifies At Sen. Jud. Comm. Hrg. on Bombs (CDT #13/fwd) File 4--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 19 Apr, 1995) CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION APPEARS IN THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE. --------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 13 May 1995 14:06:13 -0500 From: Brock@well.sf.ca.us(Brock Meeks) Subject: File 1-- Jacking in from the "One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest" Port CyberWire Dispatch // Copyright (c) 1995 // Jacking in from the "One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest" Port: Washington, D.C. -- The Internet had its head placed on the chopping block during a Congressional hearing today (May 11th). Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) put it there. Sen. Herb Kohl (D-Wis.) tied its hands, while Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) welded the axe. Specter, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Government Information, called the hearing to investigate "The Availability of Bomb Making Information on the Internet." The hearing focused on "the use of the Internet by a variety of groups and individuals to propagate 'mayhem manuals,' which as their name suggests, are guides to assist people in committing acts of violence," Specter said. Specter didn't mince words about his intentions. The subtext of the hearing was that the Internet, somehow, now represents a "clear and present danger" to the American way of life, threatening innocent citizens and children. "There are serious questions about whether it is technologically feasible to restrict access to the Internet or to censor certain messages," Specter said. Feinstein rode into the hearing with blinders on. "I have a problem with people teaching others" how to build bombs that kill, she said. The First Amendment doesn't extend to the that kind of information, she said, especially when it resides in electronic format so easily available. Her remarks were directed at a panel of experts who had, for the most part, acknowledged that such information was readily available on the Net, but nonetheless was indeed protected by the First Amendment. The First Amendment argument didn't fly with Feinstein, who railed at the panel's testimony. "You really have my dander up," she said. "This is not what this country is about." That remark drew a sharp response from Jerry Berman, executive director of the Washington-based Center for Democracy and Technology: "Excuse me, Senator, but that *is* what this nation is all about." Feinstein would hear nothing of it. "I believe there is a difference between free speech and teaching someone to kill," she said, "And all we're doing here is protecting [terrorist information] under the mantle of free speech." Feinstein, former mayor of San Francisco, one of America's most liberal cities, carried a lot of baggage into the hearing; she was once the failed target of a letter bomb addressed to her office while mayor, according to a Subcommittee staffer. Sen. Kohl waded into the hearing reading from a tired script, saying that America would "be shocked" if they knew about "dark back alleys" of the "information superhighway." Kohl paid lip-service to the Constitution, saying that government shouldn't "be in the business of telling people what they can and cannot think." However, that didn't stop him from suggesting that government has every right to "prevent people from endangering public safety," which really means restricting access --somehow -- to the "dangerous" (ooohhh....) "dark back alleys" of the Internet. His suggestions: (1) Parents should be notified every time their kids get an online account. (2) Every parent should be able to block a kid's access to whatever areas they want. "If we have the technology to get kids on the Internet, we should have the technology to get them off it," he said. (3) Online companies should rip out a page from the video game industry, where "industry-wide cooperation to restrict access to minors has forestalled government intervention," he said. The vid-game industry, right, those cozy folks that bring Mortal Kombat into your living room and shopping malls, where even 8-year olds know how to punch in the infamous "blood codes" which, when enabled, show defeated characters being gutted while still alive, leaving the screen oozing. And this is the same video industry which drew a sharp rebuke from Sen. Specter himself last December when he found out that the so-called "industry-wide cooperation" to label games with "ratings" wasn't being implemented on anything more than a piecemeal basis. Fueling this hysteria-circus was Robert Litt, deputy assistant attorney general, Criminal Div. of the Department of Justice. Litt mouthed to the Subcommittee what will certainly become the "Scare Monger's Anthem": "Not only do would-be terrorists have access to detailed information on how to construct explosives, but so do children." ... And so do children... "This problem can only grow worse as more families join the Internet 'society,'" Litt warned. . "... And so do children..." But does any of this so-called terrorist information require any kind of congressional Constitutional tweaking? Not according to Litt's own testimony. There are, on the books now, "a number of federal laws" that can be used to "prosecute bomb-related offenses," and those can be directly transferred to any such investigations linked to the Internet, Litt testified, adding that such laws "can be applied even when the offense is accomplished through speech." Read it again: "[A]pplied even... through speech." If that was the sound of a hammer falling -- or an axe -- you're right. Litt outlined how current laws protect even bomb making materials on the Internet as expressions of free speech; however, he noted, with some glee, that the proposals before Congress right now, offered up by the White House, will "permit the government to better track and prosecute those who misuse information available on the Internet...." The hysteria of these doomsayers, however, ran into an unexpected brick wall during the hearing. Sen. Specter asked Litt point-blank if he had *any* kind of statistics or "direct knowledge" of any "criminal act" that had resulted from anyone obtaining information off the Internet. "No Senator, we do not," Litt answered somewhat shyly. Specter reframed the question -- twice -- giving Litt a chance to weasel an answer, but there was no weasel room. The cold, hard facts are and remain: No law enforcement agency has been able to link any criminal act to any information now residing on the Internet. But this wasn't good enough for Specter, who asked Litt to go back and "investigate" the question and report his findings back to the Subcommittee. Another blow to Internet foes was the testimony of Frank Tuerkheimer. Tuerkheimer, a professor of law at the U. of Wisconsin, made his fame in the 1970s as the U.S. Attorney which successfully argued to stop the publication of the "How to Make an H-Bomb" article in the _Progressive_ magazine. He won that case, which he admitted today, he had little enthusiasm for trying because the information in the article was gathered from public domain sources. However, all of that effort was moot point, he noted: Some other publication printed the article anyway. Information will find a way to get out, Tuerkheimer said. "We're not talking about regulating information," he said, "we're talking about regulating 'information-plus." That's when the information is taken and used in the commission of a criminal act, and it's that combination that needs to be addressed, not the information, he said. Putting a fine point on his arguments, Tuerkheimer noted in his testimony that the Encyclopedia Britannica "reveals great detail on explosive manufacture." [It's all right there on on pages 275-282 of Vol. 21 of the 1986 edition.] Adding insult to injury, he pointed out that on page 279 of that section, there is a description of the Ammonium Nitrate/Fuel oil mixture bomb like that used in the Oklahoma City bombing! I wonder, now, if Sen. Feinstein will rush to outlaw the encyclopedia... or maybe she'll introduce a bill that will have librarians issued X-acto knives to cut out just those pages. "...so the children" won't have access.... Perhaps Tuerkheimer's finest blow was when he noted that the Department of Agriculture Forestry Service publishes the "Blaster's Handbook" (written with taxpayer money) that also includes a recipe for the Ammonium Nitrate/Fuel oil bomb like that used to blow little kids into chunks in the Oklahoma City bombing. America's online sweetheart, America Online, was represented ably by William Burrington. He admitted to the Subcommittee that although his company monitored "selected areas" for violations of the company's terms of service, there was no possible to keep an eye on every public message. The point he hammered on -- and rightly so -- is that the "information ocean" that is the Internet is impossible to place restrictions on "because of its international nature," he said, more than once. Any laws the U.S. might try to apply don't mean shit internationally, as Burrington tried to point out, a point that apparently fell on deaf ears. One pair of ears that didn't fail to hear were those of Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont). This old warhorse continued to be what increasingly sounds like the only voice of reason on Capitol Hill. "Before we head down a road that leads to censorship," he said, "we must think long and hard about its consequences." Leahy is bothered about "tragic events" such as the Oklahoma bombing as much as anyone, he said. However, the "same First Amendment that protects each of us and our right to think and speak as we choose, protects others as well," he said. It is "harmful and dangerous *conduct*, not speech, that justify adverse legal consequences," Leahy noted. There is "little to be gained in the way of safety by banning" access to so-called terrorist information "over electronic media," Leahy said, especially when it's so readily available in paper form... even from the Agriculture Department. Hell, there's probably even an government sponsored 800 number you can call to order the "Blaster's Handbook." In one lengthy discussion, Specter cited an Internet posting in which the poster asked for bomb making information that he (or she, gender wasn't noted) could use against "zionist government officials." Specter asked the panel if such a message could be considered a crime. "No," said the Justice Department's Litt. "But what about the response to the message?" Specter asked. Such a response "approaches, if it hasn't already crossed the line, a prosecutorial offense," Litt said. Tuerkheimer disagreed. "Too general," he said. There's "no target" identified, "it's hard to see how the Justice Department could prosecute" the responder to that message, he said. Of course, Specter's query begs the question: Would it be a crime to respond to the "bomb information wanted" message by sending them a copy of the taxpayer funded, government-sponsored "Blaster's Handbook"? You make the call, because if you don't, Congress will. "In other words, the industry acts now or Congress will do it for you," Kohl said. I doubt he was joking. Meeks out... ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 13 May 1995 14:06:13 -0500 From: Brock@well.sf.ca.us(Brock Meeks) Subject: File 2-- Jacking in from the Narco-Terrorist Encryption Port CyberWire Dispatch// Copyright (c) 1995// Jacking in from the Narco-Terrorist Encryption Port: Washington, DC -- The other shoe has dropped. Several times. In the political backlash and emotional fallout of the bombing of of the federal building in Oklahoma City, FBI Director Louis Freeh has begun to wage his own private war on the use of private, encryption schemes. According to Administration sources, several different proposals are now being discussed on how to implement a policy of government mandated, government "certified" encryption. The most hardline of these proposals would outlaw the public's ability to choose an encryption scheme which the government couldn't break, under the authority of a court order. Freeh has left no doubts about his intentions. Not satisfied with a proposal he successfully rammed through Congress last year -- the bill that gives law enforcement agencies "easy wiretap access" to digital conversations, at a cost of $500 million in taxpayer money -- his next target is private encryption. During an appropriations hearing May 11th, Freeh told a congressional panel: "[W]e're in favor of strong encryption, robust encryption. The country needs it, industry needs it. We just want to make sure we have a trap door and key under some judge's authority where we can get there if somebody is planning a crime." That means an end to private, non-government encryption, which don't have keys the government can use. Private encryption schemes allow a person to scramble an electronic message that, if intercepted by an unintended party, renders it unreadable. These scrambling programs are useful from to a wide range of people and interests, including researchers that want to keep their proprietary breakthroughs safe from prying eyes to corporations sending trade secrets to a distant office across the Net to ordinary folks sending a steamy love letter to a lover. But these same encryption programs are being used by "terrorists and international drug traffickers," as well, claims FBI Director Freeh, and that makes private encryption schemes a threat to national security. Freeh's crusade against encryption has been enjoined by members of the Justice Department, with the gleeful back alley goading the nation's top spook group, the National Security Agency. And when it comes right down to it, your privacy rights don't stand a snowball's chance in hell of outweighing pictures of dead babies or pieces of dead babies. During an April 27th Senate Judiciary Committee on terrorism, Freeh boldly told a panel of lawmakers eager to give his agency more latitude to "catch the bad guys" (and civil rights violations be damned... as long as we don't have to watch the guts of little kids being splattered on steel girders and broken concrete...): "The FBI cannot and should not tolerate any individuals or groups... which would kill innocent Americans, which would kill *'America's kids.'*" To meet the "challenges of terrorism," Freeh said, several things must be done, among them, deal with "encryption capabilities available to criminals and terrorists" because such technology endangers "the future usefulness of court-authorized wiretaps. This problem must be resolved." While Freeh used the Oklahoma City bombing as convenient "news hook" to again make a pitch to "resolve" the private encryption "problem," the Director was basically reading from a dog-eared script. Within the last 3 months he repeatedly has testified publicly before Congress about the "evils" of encryption. On March 30 the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime he said: "Even though access is all but assured [by the passage of the Digital Wiretap Act] an even more difficult problem with court-authorized wiretaps looms. Powerful encryption is becoming commonplace. The drug cartels are buying sophisticated communications equipment.... This, as much as any issue, jeopardizes the public safety and national security of this country. Drug cartels, terrorists, and kidnappers will use telephones and other communications media with impunity knowing that their conversations are immune from our most valued investigative technique." Then during a May 3 appearance before the same Committee, Freeh said: "Encryption capabilities available to criminals and terrorists, both now and in days to come, must be dealt with promptly. We will not have an effective counterterrorism counterterrorism strategy if we do not solve the problem of encryption." But there's nothing to be alarmed at here, according to Freeh. Just because he's asking the Congress and the White House to strip you of the right to choose how you scramble your messages, using a program that the government doesn't hold all the keys too, doesn't mean that the Director isn't a sensitive guy or that he has suddenly taken a liking to wearing jackboots. Freeh steadfastly maintains all these new powers he's asking for are simply "tools" and "not new authorities." These new powers are "well within the Constitution," Freeh told Congress. Freeh hasn't publicly outlined just how he proposes to "resolve" the "encryption problem." However, according to an FBI source, several plans are in the works. The source refused to detail any specific plan, but added: "Let's just say everything is on the table." Does that include outlawing private encryption schemes? "I said 'everything,'" the source said. The encryption debate has been raging for years. Two years ago the Clinton Administration unveiled a new policy in which it proposed to flood the market with its own home-grown encryption devices -- a product of the National Security Agency -- called the "Clipper Chip." The Clipper is based on a "key-escrow" system. Two government agencies would hold the keys "in escrow", which are unique to each chip, in a kind of "data vault." Any time the FBI-- or your local sheriff -- wanted to tap your phone conversations, they would have to ask a judge to give the two government agencies to turn over the keys to you Clipper chip. With those keys, the FBI could then unscramble any of your conversations at will. That policy raised a huge firestorm of controversy and the Clipper sunk from sight, down, but not out. The intent of the White House, acting as a front man for the NSA and other intelligence agencies along with the FBI, was to have Americans adopt Clipper voluntarily. The FBI took it on good faith -- and I'm not joking here -- that criminals, too, would buy Clipper equipped phones, allowing the government to easily unscramble their wiretapped conversations. Why would criminals knowingly use a device they knew the government could easily tap? "Because criminals are stupid," was the FBI's party line. No, I'm not making this up. The "voluntary" aspect didn't stop the controversy. Indeed, buried in the Administration's own background briefing papers on the Clipper was the no nonsense statement that the Administration, after reviewing the Constitution, had determined that "American's have no Constitutional right to choose their own method of encryption." Call it a peremptory strike on privacy. The end of freely chosen encryption comes as no surprise to Jim Dempsey, currently the executive director of the Center for National Security Studies. Dempsey, you might remember, walked point for former Congressman Don Edwards during last year's tussle over the FBI's Digital Wiretap access bill. Dempsey, in fact was one of the bill's principal authors. "I always felt [the Administration] had to know they would ultimately go to [some kind of government] mandatory encryption scheme," Dempsey said. "I don't think it's a big leap for the government to think of private encryption like they do kiddie porn." An NSA source, when questioned about his agency's role in the process, was reluctant to speak. He did say that Clipper was merely "Act One" of a "Three part play." Pressed for further details, he said, "do your own homework." During the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism hearing May 11, Robert Litt, deputy assistant attorney general for the Criminal Division of Justice, said the "widespread use of reliable, strong encryption that allows government access, with appropriate restrictions... is designed to achieve" a "delicate balance" between privacy rights and law enforcement needs. When Dispatch asked Litt to elaborate, he said his comments refereed to the use of the Clipper Chip. But what if criminals bypass Clipper, using private encryption schemes, such as those now being decried by Freeh? "If one solution doesn't work, then we have to go to the next step," he said. Is that next step the outlawing of private encryption? Litt smiled and repeated his answer. Dispatch has learned that one proposal being seriously discussed would, indeed, outlaw all private, non-government approved encryption schemes. Here's how the government plan breaks out, according to sources familiar with the proposal: (1) The government would "certify" a few so-called "Commercial Key-Escrow" programs. These are similar in design to the government's Clipper Chip, but industry would hold the keys and some of these systems might not be classified, as is the software underlying Clipper. However, the companies producing such "certified" programs could claim trade secrets, not allowing the public access the underlying programs. (2) The government, tossing a bone to industry, would lift export controls on all "certified" encryption programs. Currently, it's against the law to export encryption programs, as they are controlled by the State Department under the same classification as munitions. (3) The use of government certified encryption would become a federal mandate, making it illegal to use private encryption schemes that had not passed the "certification" test. The plans are "still really liquid," said an Administration source. "We all know what a bitch this going to be trying to sell it to the selling public," he said. "The flashpoint potential of this idea isn't lost on anyone." The Administration is hoping the public will buy off on the fact that: (1) It's private industry holding the keys, not government agencies. (2) The availability of "choice" among several different vendors will squash the imagery of Big Brother. Expect the rise of an off-shore, black market "encryption" trade. It will surely come. And it will have to be a black market; the FBI has already gone around the world preaching the evils of private encryption, trying to get other law enforcement groups to push for outlawing such programs in their own countries. And they already have a convert: Russia. That country recently adopted such a policy... nice to know we're following in Mr. Yeltsin's footsteps. Meeks out... ------------------------------ From: jseiger@cdt.org (Jonah Seiger) Subject: File 3--CDT Testifies At Sen. Jud. Comm. Hrg. on Bombs (CDT #13/fwd) Date: 12 May 1995 16:04:54 -0500 -------------------------------------------------------- ****** ******** ************* ******** ********* ************* ** ** ** *** POLICY POST ** ** ** *** ** ** ** *** May 12, 1995 ** ** ** *** Number 13 ******** ********* *** ****** ******** *** CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY ---------------------------------------------------------- A briefing on public policy issues affecting civil liberties online -------------------------------------------------------- CDT POLICY POST Number 13 May 12, 1995 CONTENTS: (1) CDT Testifies at Senate Judiciary Subcommittee Hearing On the Availability of Bomb-Making Materials on the Internet (2) About the Center for Democracy and Technology This document may be re-distributed freely provided it remains in its entirety. ------------------------------------------------------ SUBJECT: CDT Testifies at Senate Judiciary Subcommittee Hearing On the Availability of Bomb-Making Materials on the Internet The availability of bomb-making information and 'mayhem manuals' on the Internet was the subject of a hearing yesterday (5/11/95) before the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Government Information. CDT Executive Director Jerry Berman testified before the panel. Berman's testimony is available on CDT's online archives (URL's below). The bombing in Oklahoma City has brought the Internet under new scrutiny by Congress and the Clinton Administration. In his opening statement, Subcommittee Chair Arlen Spector (R-PA) made clear the First Amendment issues raised by government efforts to censor certain material in cyberspace. However, Spector acknowledged that the availability of so called "mayhem manuals" (one of which he displayed before the hearing) raises concerns about public safety and national security. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), in his opening statement, urged caution and careful consideration of the benefits new communications technologies can bring before Congress rushes to restrict and limit its use. "Before we head down a road that leads to censorship, we must think long and hard about its consequences. The same First Amendment that protects each of us and our right to think and speak as we choose, protects these others as well. The rule of this free society has long been that it is harmful and dangerous conduct, not speech, that justify adverse legal consequences", Leahy said. Senator Leahy, an opponent of Senator Exon's Communications Decency Act (S. 314), and strong advocate of freedom of speech and the free flow of information in cyberspace, recently introduced S. 714, an alternative to Senator Exon's bill (the text of Leahy's bill is available from CDT, URL below). Witnesses on the panel included: * Jerry Berman, Executive Director, Center For Democracy and Technology * Rabbi Marvin Hier, Dean of the Simon Wiesenthal Center * Robert Litt, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, US Detp. of Justice * William Burrington, Assistant General Counsel. America Online * Prof. Frank Tuerkheimer, U. of Wisconsin Law School What Does It Mean To "Shout Fire In Cyberspace?" ----------------------- CDT's Jerry Berman acknowledged the availability of bomb-making instructions and terrorist manuals on the Internet, but argued that such materials deserve the same degree of protection as identical materials available in bookstores or libraries. "As an open society, governed by the democratic principles of the First and Fourth Amendments, we tolerate and even encourage robust debate, advocacy and exchange of information on all subjects and in all media of expression, without exception. Prior restraint or any government action which might chill speech have long been labeled intolerable, expect in the few circumstances in which that speech advocates imminent violence and is likely to produce such violence. Even in these cases, Constitutional law and long-standing law enforcement policy have dictated great restraint in order to avoid chilling legitimate speech activity." "Justice Holmes taught that the First Amendment does not protect a person from punishment for "falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic," Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), but what does it mean to "shout fire" in cyberspace? We believe that shouting fire in cyberspace is actually far less threatening, and thus less deserving of censure, than the equivalent act in the physical world. Though one can shout fire in an email message or on an Internet newsgroup, the likelihood that it will incite readers to imminent, criminal action is much reduced because the readers are dispersed around the country, and even around the world." Berman added, "The Center for Democracy and Technology believes that any prosecutorial or investigative activity must be predicated on speech **plus** a reasonable indication that the speech will lead to imminent violence. Speech alone is not enough to prosecute or investigate in other media, and it should not be sufficient in interactive media. Moreover, we assert that current law and the FBI's strict interpretation of the existing Attorney General investigative guidelines are adequate to serve both law enforcement purposes and First Amendment interests. In the sharpest exchange of the hearing, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), expressed strong concern about the ability of children to access bomb-making material on the Internet. Visibly outraged by the testimony, Feinstein said, "I have a problem with people who use the First Amendment to teach others how to kill [other people]" Protecting such speech, "... is not what this country is about." CDT's Jerry Berman responded, "Excuse me, Senator, but that *is* what this nation is all about." Feinstein countered that she believes that there is a " difference between free speech and teaching someone how to kill others", and suggested that the government should take a greater role in preventing the availability of such materials. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Robert Litt, agreeing with CDT's assertion that the First Amendment protects bomb-making manuals and other such material regardless of the medium of distribution, added that the Justice Department has the authority under current law to prosecute individuals who use the Internet to commit crimes relating to "extortion, threats, conspiracy, and aiding and abetting the violation of other federal laws". But Litt emphasized that such prosecutions must be predicated by **conduct**. Litt said: "We can, therefore, clearly act to punish conduct that falls within the scope of existing laws. But when we address not conduct by possibly protected speech, the power of law enforcement is restricted by the First Amendment. As the Committee well knows, we must guard the public's right to free speech even while protecting the public from criminal activity. The Constitution imposes stringent limits on our ability to punish the mere advocacy of principals or the mere dissemination of information, without more, even if the communications in question are utterly repugnant". However, the Justice Department staked out a more aggressive line on the issues of encryption and anonymity. On anonymity, Litt acknowledged the necessity of confidentiality for whistle-blowers and informants, but argued that the availability of complete anonymity on the Internet is of serious concern to law enforcement. In his prepared testimony, Litt echoed FBI Director Louis Freeh's recent comments that "... unless the encryption issue is adequately addressed, criminal communications over the telephone and the Internet will be will be encrypted and inaccessible to law enforcement even if a court has approved electronic surveillance," and pledged to continue to work to find solutions to this issue. In a statement which appears to dredge up previous arguments from the Department in support of the Clipper Chip government key escrow proposal, Litt said: "We believe that it is possible to deal with both of these issues -- encryption and anonymity. Privacy rights should generally be protected, but society should continue to have, under appropriate safeguards and when necessary for law enforcement, the ability to identify people and hold them accountable for their conduct. In the case of encryption, the appropriate balance can be achieved by the widespread use of reliable, strong cryptography that allows for government access, with appropriate restrictions, in criminal investigations and for national security purposes. The federal escrowed encryption standard issued last year is designed to achieve this delicate balance for voice telephony." Rabbi Marvin Hier of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, argued that the nature of the Internet, including its broad reach and the veil of anonymity, provides a fertile ground for hate-groups and other potentially dangerous organizations. While stressing the importance of the First Amendment, Hier recommended that: * Law enforcement should have the ability to monitor hate groups and other organizations that clearly advocate an intention to commit violence that use the Internet to distribute information; * Online service providers (particularly the commercial services such as AOL and Compuserve) should take steps to prevent their networks from being used to distribute material from these organizations; and * To look at the uses of these communications technologies and to examine what legal limits can be placed on it. William Burrington, Assistant General Counsel and Director of Government Affairs for America Online, stressed that AOL does take steps to address violations of its terms of service agreement, and has removed users who use the network to post inappropriate material to public forums. However, Burrington cautioned that it is impossible and illegal under ECPA for a service provider to monitor every communication that travels across their network. Burrington further noted that, while it is possible for America Online to exercise limited control inside its own networks, monitoring and controlling content on the Internet is beyond the reach of any one because of the decentralized nature and global reach of the network. Speaking from direct experience, University of Wisconsin Law Professor Frank Tuerkheimer stressed that the government should not attempt too prevent or censor the publication of bomb-making manuals or other such materials -- not only because such action is clearly contrary to the First Amendment, but also because the material would inevitably be published in another forum, rendering the government's argument moot. This is precisely what occurred in 1979 in United States v. Progressive, Inc (476 F. Supp 990 (W.D. Wisc. 1979). In this case, the government, sought to prevent the publication of instructions on how to make a hydrogen bomb. Professor Tuerkheimer was the federal prosecutor in the Progressive Case. The article was ultimately published and the case became moot because the information was found to be available in a number of public libraries. Tuerkheimer noted that it would be futile for the government to attempt to prosecute someone for distributing bomb making material on the Internet, since information on how to build an ammonium nitrate bomb similar to the device used in the Oklahoma City tragedy can be found in encyclopedias and in publications available from the US Department of Agriculture. NEXT STEPS: Although the issue of the availability of bomb-making manuals and the use of the Internet by malitia and hate-groups has received considerable attention in the press and on Capitol hill in recent weeks, as of this writing there has been no legislation introduced, and so far none of the counter-terrorism proposals specifically address this issue. CDT will closely track this issue, and will alert you to any developments as soon as they become available. Paths to Relevant Documents -------------------------- CDT Executive Director Jerry Berman's testimony is available at the following URL's: http://www.cdt.org/policy/terrorism/internet_bomb.test.html ftp://ftp.cdt.org/pub/cdt/policy/terrorism/internet_bomb.test Additional hearing documents, including the Department of Justice testimony can be found at the following URL's http://www.cdt.org/terrorism/May11_hearing.html ftp://ftp.cdt.org/pub/cdt/policy/terrorism/00-INDEX.terrorism The Text of S. 714, Senator Leahy's Alternative to the Communications Decency Act, can be found at: http://www.cdt.org/policy/legislation/s714.html ftp://ftp.cdt.org/policy/legislation/s714.bill ---------------------------------------------------- (2) ABOUT THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY The Center for Democracy and Technology is a non-profit public interest organization. The Center's mission is to develop and advocate public policies that advance constitutional civil liberties and democratic values in new computer and communications technologies. Contacting us: General information on CDT can be obtained by sending mail to CDT has set up the following auto-reply aliases to keep you informed on the Communications Decency Act issue. For information on the bill, including CDT's analysis and the text of Senator Leahy's alternative proposal and information on what you can do to help -- cda-info@cdt.org For the current status of the bill, including scheduled House and Senate action (updated as events warrant) -- cda-stat@cdt.org World-Wide-Web: http://www.cdt.org/ ftp: ftp://ftp.cdt.org/pub/cdt/ gopher: CDT's gopher site is still under construction and should be operational soon. snail mail: Center For Democracy and Technology 1001 G Street, NW Suite 700 East Washington, DC 20001 voice: +1.202.637.9800 fax: +1.202.637.9800 ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 19 Apr 1995 22:51:01 CDT From: CuD Moderators Subject: File 4--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 19 Apr, 1995) Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are available at no cost electronically. CuD is available as a Usenet newsgroup: comp.society.cu-digest Or, to subscribe, send a one-line message: SUB CUDIGEST your name Send it to LISTSERV@VMD.CSO.UIUC.EDU The editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-0303), fax (815-753-6302) or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL 60115, USA. To UNSUB, send a one-line message: UNSUB CUDIGEST Send it to LISTSERV@VMD.CSO.UIUC.EDU (NOTE: The address you unsub must correspond to your From: line) Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of LAWSIG, and DL1 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT libraries and in the VIRUS/SECURITY library; from America Online in the PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters;" On Delphi in the General Discussion database of the Internet SIG; on RIPCO BBS (312) 528-5020 (and via Ripco on internet); and on Rune Stone BBS (IIRGWHQ) (203) 832-8441. CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from 1:11/70; unlisted nodes and points welcome. EUROPE: In BELGIUM: Virtual Access BBS: +32-69-844-019 (ringdown) Brussels: STRATOMIC BBS +32-2-5383119 2:291/759@fidonet.org In ITALY: Bits against the Empire BBS: +39-464-435189 In LUXEMBOURG: ComNet BBS: +352-466893 UNITED STATES: etext.archive.umich.edu (192.131.22.8) in /pub/CuD/ ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/Publications/CuD/ aql.gatech.edu (128.61.10.53) in /pub/eff/cud/ world.std.com in /src/wuarchive/doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/ uceng.uc.edu in /pub/wuarchive/doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/ wuarchive.wustl.edu in /doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/ EUROPE: nic.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud/ (Finland) ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud/ (United Kingdom) JAPAN: ftp.glocom.ac.jp /mirror/ftp.eff.org/Publications/CuD ftp://www.rcac.tdi.co.jp/pub/mirror/CuD The most recent issues of CuD can be obtained from the Cu Digest WWW site at: URL: http://www.soci.niu.edu:80/~cudigest/ COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long as the source is cited. Authors hold a presumptive copyright, and they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts unless absolutely necessary. DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not violate copyright protections. ------------------------------ End of Computer Underground Digest #7.38 ************************************

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