Computer underground Digest Sun Oct 10, 1994 Volume 6 : Issue 88 ISSN 1004-042X Editors: J

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Computer underground Digest Sun Oct 10, 1994 Volume 6 : Issue 88 ISSN 1004-042X Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET) Archivist: Brendan Kehoe Retiring Shadow Archivist: Stanton McCandlish Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala Ian Dickinson Urban Legend Editor: E. Greg Shrdlugold CONTENTS, #6.88 (Sun, Oct 10, 1994) File 1--EFF Statement on Passage of Digital Telephony Act File 2--The DT bill just passed in the Senate. File 3--EPIC on Wiretap Bill Passag File 4--Computer Freedom and Privacy-95 Conf info (corrected ver.) File 5--Cu Digest Header Information (unchanged since 10 Sept 1994) CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION APPEARS IN THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 8 Oct 1994 15:23:26 -0400 (EDT) From: Stanton McCandlish Subject: File 1--EFF Statement on Passage of Digital Telephony Act EFF Statement on and Analysis of Digital Telephony Act ------------------------------------------------------ October 8, 1994 Washington, DC - Congress late Friday (10/7) passed and sent to the President the Edwards/Leahy Digital Telephony Legislation (HR 4922/S 2375). The bill places functional design requirements on telecommunications carriers in order to enable law enforcement to continue to conduct electronic surveillance pursuant to a court order, though the bill does not expand law enforcement authority to conduct wiretaps. Moreover, the design requirements do not apply to providers or operators of online services such as the Internet, BBS's, Compuserve, and others. The bill also contains significant new privacy protections, including increased protection for online personal information, and requirements prohibiting the use of pen registers to track the physical location of individuals. Jerry Berman, EFF's Policy Director, said: "Although we remain unconvinced that this legislation is necessary, the bill draws a hard line around the Internet and other online networks. We have carved cyberspace out of this legislation". Berman added, "The fact that the Internet, BBS's, Prodigy, and other online networks are not required to meet the surveillance capability requirements is a significant victory for all users of this important communications medium." Privacy Protections for Online Personal Information Increased ------------------------------------------------------------- The bill adds a higher standard for law enforcement access to online transactional information. For maintenance and billing purposes, most online communications and information systems create detailed records of users' communication activities as well as lists of the information, services, or people that they have accessed or contacted. Under current law, the government can gain access to such transactional records with a mere subpoena, which can be obtained without the intervention of a court. To address this issue, EFF pushed for the addition of stronger protections against indiscriminate access to online transactional records. Under the new protections, law enforcement must convince a court to issue an order based on a showing of "specific and articulable facts" which prove that the information sought would be relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. Berman said: "The new legal protections for transactional information are critical in that they recognize that these records are extremely sensitive and deserve a high degree of protection from casual law enforcement access. With these provisions, we have achieved for all online systems a significantly greater level of protection than exists today for any other form of electronic communication, including the telephone." EFF to Continue to Monitor Implementation ----------------------------------------- Berman added: "There are numerous opportunities under this bill for public oversight and intervention to ensure that privacy is not short-changed. EFF will closely monitor the bill's implementation, and we stand ready to intervene if privacy is threatened." In the first four years, the government is required to reimburse carriers for all costs associated with meeting the design requirements of the bill. After four years, the government is required to reimburse carriers for all costs for enhancements that are not "reasonably achievable", as determined in a proceeding before the FCC. The FCC will determine who bears the costs in terms of the impact on privacy, costs to consumers, national security and public safety, the development of technology, and other factors. If the FCC determines that compliance is not reasonably achievable, the government will either be required to reimburse the carrier or consider it to be in compliance without modification. Berman said: "EFF is committed to making a case before the FCC, at the first possible opportunity, that government reimbursement is an essential back-stop against unnecessary or unwanted surveillance capabilities. If the government pays, it will have an incentive to prioritize, which will further enhance public accountability and protect privacy." EFF Decision to Work on Legislation ----------------------------------- Since 1992 EFF, in conjunction with the Digital Privacy and Security Working Group (a coalition of over 50 computer, communications, and public interest organizations and associations working on communications privacy issues, coordinated by EFF) has been successful at stopping a series of FBI Digital Telephony proposals, which would have forced communications companies to install wiretap capability into every communications medium. However, earlier this year, Senator Leahy and Rep. Edwards, who have helped to quash previous FBI proposals, concluded that passage of such a bill this year was inevitable. Leahy and Edwards stepped in to draft a narrow bill with strong privacy protections, and asked for EFF's help in the process. "By engaging in this process for the last several months," Berman noted, "we have been successful in helping to craft a proposal that is significantly improved over the FBI's original bill in terms of privacy, technology policy, and civil liberties, and have, in the process, added significant new privacy protections for users of communications networks. We commend Representative Edwards, Senator Leahy, and Representatives Boucher and Markey for standing up for civil liberties and pushing for strong privacy protections." The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is a non-profit public interest organization dedicated to achieving the democratic potential of new communications technology and works to protect civil liberties in new digital environments. Other Privacy Protections Added by the Bill ------------------------------------------- The bill also adds the following new privacy protections * The standard for law enforcement access to online transactional records is raised to require a court order instead of a mere subpoena. * No expansion of law enforcement authority to conduct electronic surveillance. * The bill recognizes a citizen's right to use encryption. * All authorized surveillance must be conducted with the affirmative intervention of the telecommunications carrier. Monitoring triggered remotely by law enforcement is prohibited. * Privacy advocates will be able to track law enforcement requests for surveillance capability, and expenditures for all surveillance capability and capacity added under this bill will be open to public scrutiny. * Privacy protections must be maintained in making new technologies conform to the requirements of the bill, and privacy advocates may intervene in the administrative standard setting process. * Information gleaned from pen register devices is limited to dialed number information only. Law enforcement may not receive location information. Analysis of and comments on major provisions of the bill -------------------------------------------------------- A. Key new privacy protections 1. Expanded protection for transactional records sought by law enforcement Senator Leahy and Rep. Edwards have agreed that law enforcement access to transactional records in online communication systems (everything from the Internet to AOL to hobbyist BBSs) threatens privacy rights because the records are personally identifiable, because they reveal the content of people's communications, and because the compilation of such records makes it easy for law enforcement to create a detailed picture of people's lives online. Based on this recognition, the draft bill contains the following provisions: i. Court order required for access to transactional records instead of mere subpoena In order to gain access to transactional records, such as a list of to whom a subject sent email, which online discussion group one subscribes to, or which movies you request on a pay-per view channel, law enforcement will have to prove to a court, by the showing of "specific and articulable facts" that the records requested are relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. This means that the government may not request volumes of transactional records merely to see what it can find through traffic analysis. Rather, law enforcement will have to prove to a court that it has reason to believe that it will find some specific information that is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation in the records that it requests. With these provisions, we have achieved for all online systems, a significantly greater level of protection than currently exists for telephone toll records. The lists of telephone calls that are kept by local and long distance phone companies are available to law enforcement without any judicial intervention at all. Law enforcement gains access to hundreds of thousands of such telephone records each year, without a warrant and without even notice to the citizens involved. Court order protection will make it much more difficult for law enforcement to go on "fishing expeditions" through online transactional records, hoping to find evidence of a crime by accident. ii. Standard of proof much greater than for telephone toll records, but below that for content The most important change that these new provisions offer, is that law enforcement will (a) have to convince a judge that there is reason to look at a particular set of records, and (b) have to expend the time and energy necessary to have a US Attorney or DA actually present a case before a court. However, the burden or proof to be met by the government in such a proceeding is lower than required for access to the content of a communication. 2. New protection for location-specific information available in cellular, PCS and other advanced networks Much of the electronic surveillance conducted by law enforcement today involves gathering telephone dialing information through a device known as a pen register. Authority to attach pen registers is obtained merely by asserting that the information would be relevant to a criminal investigation. Courts have no authority to deny pen register requests. This legislation offers significant new limits on the use of pen register data. Under this bill, when law enforcement seeks pen register information from a carrier, the carrier is forbidden to deliver to law enforcement any information which would disclose the location or movement of the calling or called party. Cellular phone networks, PCS systems, and so-called "follow-me" services all store location information in their networks. This new limitation is a major safeguard which will prevent law enforcement from casually using mobile and intelligent communications services as nation-wide tracking systems. i. New limitations on "pen register" authority Law enforcement must use "technology reasonably available" to limit pen registers to the collection of calling number information only. Currently, law enforcement is able to capture not only the telephone number dialed, but also any other touch-tone digits dialed which reflect the user's interaction with an automated information service on the other end of the line, such as an automatic banking system or a voice-mail password. 3. Bill does not preclude use of encryption Unlike previous Digital Telephony proposals, this bill places no obligation on telecommunication carriers to decipher encrypted messages, unless the carrier actually holds the key. The bill in no way prohibits citizens from using encryption. 4. Automated remote monitoring precluded Law enforcement is specifically precluded from having automated, remote surveillance capability. Any electronic surveillance must be initiated by an employee of the telecommunications carrier. 5. Privacy considerations essential to development of new technology One of the requirements that telecommunications carriers must meet to be in compliance with the Act is that the wiretap access methods adopted must protect the privacy and security of each user's communication. If this requirement is not met, anyone may petition the FCC to have the wiretap access service be modified so that network security is maintained. So, the technology used to conduct wiretaps cannot also jeopardize the security of the network as a whole. If network-wide security problems arise because of wiretapping standards, then the standards can be overturned. 6. Increased Public Accountability All law enforcement requests for surveillance capability and capacity, as well as all expenditures paid by law enforcement to telecommunications carriers and all modifications made by carriers to comply with this bill, will be accountable to the public. The government is also required to pay for all upgrades, in both capability and capacity, in the first four years, and all costs after four years for incorporating the capability requirements in the costs for meeting those requirements are not 'reasonably achievable'. A determination of whether compliance after four years is reasonably achievable will be made by the FCC in an open and public proceeding. Government reimbursement for compliance costs will permit the public the opportunity to decide whether additional surveillance capability is necessary. In all, the reimbursement requirements combined with the reporting requirements and the open processes built in to this bill, law enforcement surveillance capability, capacity, and expenditures will be more accountable to the public than ever before. B. Draconian provisions softened In addition, the surveillance requirements imposed by the bill are not as far-reaching as the original FBI version. A number of procedural safeguards are added which seek to minimize the threatens to privacy, security, and innovation. Though the underlying premise of the Act is still cause for concern, these new limitations deserve attention: 1. Narrow Scope The bill explicitly excludes Internet providers, email systems, BBSs, and other online services. Unlike the bills previously proposed by the FBI, this bill is limited to local and long distance telephone companies, cellular and PCS providers, and other common carriers. 2. Open process with public right of intervention The public will have access to information about the implementation of the Act, including open access to all standards adopted in compliance with the Act, the details of how much wiretap capacity the government demands, and a detailed accounting of all federal money paid to carriers for modifications to their networks. Privacy groups, industry interests, and anyone else has a statutory right under this bill to challenge implementation steps taken by law enforcement if they threaten privacy or impede technology advancement. 3. Technical requirements standards developed by industry instead of the Attorney General All surveillance requirements are to be implemented according to standards developed by industry groups. The government is specifically precluded from forcing any particular technical standard, and all requirements are qualified by notions of economic and technical reasonableness. 4. Right to deploy untappable services Unlike the original FBI proposal, this bill recognizes that there may be services which are untappable, even with Herculean effort to accommodate surveillance needs. In provisions that still require some strengthening, the bill allows untappable services to be deployed if redesign is not economically or technically feasible. Background Information ---------------------- * The Bill:, /pub/EFF/Policy/Digital_Telephony/digtel94.bill, 1/EFF/Policy/Digital_Telephony, digtel94.bill All other files available from, /pub/EFF/Policy/Digital_Telephony/Old/, 1/EFF/Policy/Digital_Telephony/Old * EFF Analysis of Bill as Introduced: digtel94_analysis.eff * EFF Statement on Earlier 1994 Draft of Bill: digtel94_old_statement.eff * EFF Analysis of Earlier 1994 Draft: digtel94_draft_analysis.eff * EFF Statement on Announcement of 1994 Draft: digtel94.announce * EFF Statement on Announcement of 1993 Draft: digtel93.announce * Late 1993/Early 1994 Draft: digtel94_bill.draft * EFF Statement on 1992 Draft: digtel92_analysis.eff * EFF Statement on 1992 Draft: digtel92_opposition.announce * Late 1992 Draft: digtel92_bill.draft * Original 1992 Draft: digtel92_old_bill.draft For more information Contact ---------------------------- Jerry Berman Policy Director Jonah Seiger Project Coordinator +1 202 347 5400 (voice) +1 202 393 5509 (fax) ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 8 Oct 1994 00:55:41 -0400 (EDT) From: "Shabbir J. Safdar" Subject: File 2--The DT bill just passed in the Senate. The Wiretap Watch Final Issue October 7, 1994 Distribute Widely Recent Quotes: (It's been a busy week, we've answered over 2,000 emails) "I think we should adjourn now [..] the country is safer when we're not in session." -Sen. Charles Grassley (R-IA) on C-SPAN "Senator Wallop's office, may I help you?" "Yes, I called to register my support for the Senator's concerned position on the bill." "Ok, got it. Thanks" "Have there been a lot of calls today? Dozens? Fifty?" "Hundreds so far today." -A conversation I had earlier today with Sen. Wallop's office "I called Feinstein again and the offical breakfast food is still a waffle." -Another California caller on Feinstein's FBI Wiretap position ------------------------------------------------------------------- Contents A look back at the bill What you should do right now Positions of legislators pro and con Status of the bills Brief explanation of the bill ------------------------------------------------------------------- A LOOK BACK AT THE BILL As you may have already discovered the Senate passed the bill tonight on "unanimous consent". Although I will leave the soothsaying to more eloquent folks, there are a number of things that need to be said and people that need to be thanked. 1. A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITH THIS LEGISLATIVE FIGHT During this campaign, we asked people to contact several legislators about the bill. This was a very effective means ofat mobilizing people. When we put out the word that Senator Wallop needed support, hundreds of calls were received the very next day -- their office was stunned. This is the first time many of the sitting legislators learned that constituents were concerned about privacy. We have begun to teach them that this is an important issue. Educating a legislator is an ongoing process that we'll continue to assist with in preparation for the elections. It would be great if legislators begin to consider what effects their actions will have on "the privacy vote." Sincere thanks go out to the literally thousands of people who took the time to call their legislators. The response we received to our alerts was amazing. The mail itself was overwhelming; the letters really kept us going on those late nights. When people wrote to us, saying that they had faxed our press release to a dozen papers and called the same number of legislators, it seemed inconceivable that we should let something as minor as sleep slow us down. Thanks to everyone who contributed by calling and faxing (and sending in corrections). It appears that our technique of providing excellent information with the research done for the reader is a technique people appreciate. We'll continue to refine it in preparation for the next legislative session. 2. THIS COULD HAVE BEEN MUCH WORSE Much worse versions of the DT bill have been introduced. They were all killed before really getting anywhere. When this version was brought up, the EFF had a difficult decision in front of them: assume the soothsayers were right about it passing this year and try to hack in some privacy provisions, or try and mount a fight against it. Other factors such as organizational direction played a part in this decision I'm sure, but I'm not qualified to talk about that. (I'm about as far from an EFF insider as you can get.) There are several privacy provisions that have been added to the bill. Had the EFF not intervened, they would not be there. PERIOD. I think we owe them a thank you for that. Did they really know what they were doing or was it a lucky guess? Who's to say; we all have 20/20 hindsight. When EFF made this decision, it was months ago. They were like an ace-in-the-hole should the bill pass. 3. THIS IS STILL A PROCESS THE PUBLIC NEEDS TO MONITOR There are several ways in which the powers in the bill could be abused by law enforcement. The bill provides law enforcement with unprecedented assurance that a wiretap will always be available. This will subtly change the way law enforcement does its work. ("When your most ubiqitous tool in a hammer, the world starts to look a lot like nails..") Furthermore the process for creating the wiretap functionality standards truly rests in the hands of the FCC. We have seen from past experience with the CallerID blocking fiasco that the FCC is not the bastion of privacy that we wish it was. In that instance, there was significant public outcry against the proposal, and yet privacy still lost. What's the good news? There are organizations who we can count on to watchdog this process. The EFF wrote most (if not all) of the privacy provisions of the bill. They will be in a great position to monitor the progress of this process and ensure that not just the LETTER of the privacy provisions are followed, but the SPIRIT as well. Furthermore, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) is aggressive in their FOIA efforts, which keep our government honest. I sleep better at nights knowing they're keeping an eye out. I would have given my left foot to be in the courtroom this week with EPIC when the FBI's counsel asked for a five year delay on releasing twenty pages of wiretap data, and the judge told the attorney to " Director Freeh and tell him I said this matter can be taken care of in an hour and [a] half." Finally, I want to take a moment to thank David Sobel, Marc Rotenberg, & David Banisar of EPIC for all the help they gave us. Not being in DC, its difficult for us to simply "drop by" the office of a swing vote legislator and present our arguments. We're very grateful to them for this. ------------------------------------------------------------------- WHAT YOU SHOULD DO RIGHT NOW Nothing for the moment. The Senate passed the Digital Telephony bill (S. 2375) a few minutes before adjournment tonight. The various holds put on it by Republican Senators were removed and the bill passed on "unanimous consent". This means that there was no opposition to it. President Clinton is almost certain to sign it. --------------------------------------------------------------------- STATUS STATUS SB 2375 It passed on the evening of Oct. 7 on unanimous consent literally minutes before the Congress adjourned. STATUS HR 4922 It passed on the evening of Oct. 5 on a voice vote. Oct 7, 94 The Senate passed S. 2375 on unanimous consent minutes before adjournment. Oct 6, 94 Nothing happened, though a Senate vote was expected. Several Senators have placed holds on the bill. Oct 5, 94 House passes HR 4922 on a voice vote. Oct 4, 94 House is scheduled to vote on HR 4922, along with more than 50 other items on the "suspension calendar". The debate took place tonight; the House vote was put off until Oct 5, '94. Oct 3, 94 Judge Richey instructs the FBI to comply with a FOIA request to make available their wiretap surveys (which they claim justify their bill) by Nov. 1. Sep 29, 94 HR 4922 marked up and reported out of the Hse. Jud. Comm and nearly to the full House Sep 28, 94 SB 2375 amended, marked up, and reported out of the Sen. Jud. Comm. to the full Senate Sep 15, 94 HR 4922 hearing held in the Telecommunications Comm. Aug 18, 94 HR 4922 reported back to committee (write to Rep. Jack Brooks!) Aug 11, 94 Sen. Leahy & Rep. Edwards hold a joint hearing on the bills in Wash. DC at 1pm in Rayburn 2237. Aug 10, 94 HR 4922 referred to Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights Aug 10, 94 SB 2375 referred to Subcomm. on Technology and the Law Aug 9, 94 Rep. Hyde officially cosponsors HR 4922 Aug 9, 94 HR 4922 referred to House Judiciary Committee Aug 9, 94 SB 2375 referred to Senate Judiciary Committee Aug 9, 94 Identical House and Senate bills are announced by their respective sponsors, Rep. Don Edwards (D-CA) and Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT) EFF states the legislation is "not necessary" and predicts it will pass regardless. For more information about the Digital Telephony bills, check the Voters Telecomm Watch gopher site ( or contact Steven Cherry, VTW Press Contact at (718) 596-2851 or --------------------------------------------------------------------- FINAL POSITIONS OF LEGISLATORS Because the Senate version passed with "unanimous consent", all of the sitting Senators supported it. This means that if someone is a Senator, they supported it. No fancy ASCII tables required. Three representatives we know of opposed the bill in the House: Dist ST Name, Address, and Party Phone Fax ==== == ======================== ============== ============== 4 CA Doolittle, John T. (R) 1-202-225-2511 1-202-225-5444 1 OR Furse, Elizabeth (D) 1-202-225-0855 na 12 NC Watt, Melvin* (D) 1-202-225-1510 1-202-225-1512 Please call them and thank them for their privacy stances. --------------------------------------------------------------------- BRIEF EXPLANATION OF THE BILLS The FBI's Wiretap bills (also known as the DT - Digital Telephony bills) mandate that *all* communications carriers must provide wiretap-ready equipment so that the FBI can more easily implement their court-ordered wiretaps. The costs of re-engineering all communications equipment will be borne by the government, industry and consumers. It does not cover information service providers. The bill is vague and the standards defining "wiretap ready" do not exist. Furthermore, the FBI has yet to make a case which demonstrates that they have been unable to implement a single wiretap. Although we as a society have accepted law enforcement's need to perform wiretaps, it is not reasonable to mandate this functionality as a part of the design. In itself, that would be an important debate. However without any proof that this is indeed a realistic and present problem, it is unacceptable and premature to pass this legislation today. The Voters Telecomm Watch (VTW) does not believe the FBI has made a compelling case to justify that all Americans give up their privacy. Furthermore, the VTW does not believe the case has been made to justify spending 500 million Federal dollars over the next several years to re-engineer equipment to compromise privacy, interfere with telecommunications privacy, and fulfill an unproven government need. There are some privacy protections built into the bill. Their benefit does not outweigh the damage that building wiretaps into all communication does, however. ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 8 Oct 1994 16:06:52 -0700 From: email list server Subject: File 3--EPIC on Wiretap Bill Passag EPIC on Wiretap Bill Passage The passage of the FBI Wiretap Bill in the closing hours of the 103d Congress demonstrates the need for continued and aggressive advocacy in support of communications privacy. The legislation, which mandates the re-design of the nation's telecommunications infrastructure to facilitate government interception, was enacted with no floor debate and no resolution of the lingering questions concerning the need for such an unprecedented and far-reaching change in the law. The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) opposed passage of the bill and believes that its enactment could establish a dangerous precedent for the design and development of the National Information Infrastructure. The grassroots campaign that emerged to oppose the wiretap legislation shows the potential of the Internet as a means of educating the public and promoting democratic participation in the policymaking process. In the two-month period between the introduction of the legislation and its enactment, grassroots efforts demonstrated that a measure initially touted as a "compromise" bill was, in fact, a highly controversial proposal. Numerous Congressional offices admitted to being astounded by the number of calls and faxes they received in opposition to the legislation as it moved to consideration in both houses. EPIC believes that the on-line campaign to defeat the wiretap bill can serve as a model for the Internet community to build upon in the future. We congratulate the thousands of individuals who participated in the process and wish to express our appreciation and admiration for the work of the Voters Telecomm Watch (VTW) in bridging the gap between Washington and activists around the country. EPIC looks forward to continuing to work VTW, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Internet Business Association and the many other organizations that joined us in opposing the FBI Wiretap Bill. Implementation of the newly enacted legislation must be closely monitored. EPIC is committed to continuing its efforts to obtain relevant government data under the Freedom of Information Act, including the aggressive pursuit of our pending litigation against the FBI for the release of information cited in support of the wiretap legislation. EPIC also intends to monitor proceedings in the Federal Communications Commission pursuant to the new law and to participate in such proceedings to protect the privacy interests of network users. EPIC will also continue its research and advocacy activities in the areas of encryption policy, medical records privacy, transactional data privacy, proposed national identification systems, and other issues now emerging with the advent of the information superhighway. Electronic Privacy Information Center 666 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E. Suite 301 Washington, DC 20003 (202) 544-9240 (voice) (202) 547-5482 (fax) (e-mail) ------------------------------ From: Judi Clark Subject: File 4--Computer Freedom and Privacy-95 Conf info (corrected ver.) Date: Fri, 7 Oct 1994 14:27:22 -0700 (PDT) Call for Participation - CFP'95 The Fifth Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy Sponsored by the ACM SIGCOMM, SIGCAS, SIGSAC and Stanford Law School 28 - 31 March 1995 San Francisco Airport Marriott Hotel, Burlingame, California INVITATION This is an invitation to submit session and topic proposals for inclusion in the program of the Fifth Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy. Proposals may be for individual talks, panel discussions, debates, or other presentations in appropriate formats. Proposed topics should be within the general scope of the conference, as outlined below. SCOPE The advance of computer and telecommunications technologies holds great promise for individuals and society. From convenience for consumers and efficiency in commerce to improved public health and safety and increased participation in democratic institutions, these technologies can fundamentally transform our lives. New computer and telecommunications technologies are bringing new meanings to our freedoms to speak, associate, be left alone, learn, and exercise political power. At the same time these technologies pose threats to the ideals of a just, free, and open society. Personal privacy is increasingly at risk from invasion by high-tech surveillance and eavesdropping. The myriad databases containing personal information maintained in the public and private sectors expose private life to constant scrutiny. Political, social, and economic fairness may hinge on ensuring equal access to these technologies, but how, at what cost, and who will pay? Technological advances also enable new forms of illegal activity, posing new problems for legal and law enforcement officials and challenging the very definitions of crime and civil liberties. But technologies used to combat these crimes can threaten the traditional barriers between the individual and the state. Even such fundamental notions as speech, assembly and property are being transformed by these technologies, throwing into question the basic Constitutional protections that have guarded them. Similarly, information knows no borders; as the scope of economies becomes global and as networked communities transcend international boundaries, ways must be found to reconcile competing political, social, and economic interests in the digital domain. The Fifth Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy will assemble experts, advocates and interested people from a broad spectrum of disciplines and backgrounds in a balanced public forum to explore and better understand how computer and telecommunications technologies are affecting freedom and privacy in society. Participants will include people from the fields of computer science, law, business, research, information, library science, health, public policy, government, law enforcement, public advocacy, and many others. Topics covered in previous CFP conferences include: Personal Information and Privacy Access to Government Information Computers in the Workplace Electronic Speech, Press and Assembly Governance of Cyberspace Role of Libraries on the Information Superhighway Law Enforcement and Civil Liberties Privacy and Cryptography Free Speech and the Public Communications Network We are also actively seeking proposals with respect to other possible topics on the general subject of computers, freedom and privacy. Some new topics we are considering include: Telecommuting: Liberation or Exploitation? Courtesy, and the Freedom to be Obnoxious Commercial Life on the Net How Does the Net Threaten Government Power? Universal Access to Network Services The Meaning of Freedom in the Computer Age Online Interaction and Communities Government-Mandated Databases PROPOSAL SUBMISSION All proposals should be accompanied by a position statement of at least one page, describing the proposed topic. Proposals for panel discussions, debates and other multi-person presentations should include a list of proposed participants and session chair. Proposals should be sent to: CFP'95 Proposals Stanford Law and Technology Policy Center Stanford Law School Stanford, California 94305-8610 or by email to: with the word "Proposal" in the subject line. Proposals should be submitted as soon as possible to allow thorough consideration for inclusion in the formal program. The deadline for submissions is 1 November 1994. STUDENT PAPER COMPETITION Full time students are invited to enter the student paper competition. Winners will receive a scholarship to attend the conference and present their papers. Papers should not exceed 2,500 words and should examine how computer and telecommunications technologies are affecting freedom and privacy in society. All papers should be submitted to Professor Gary T. Marx by 20 November 1994. Authors may submit their papers either by sending them as straight text via email to: or by sending six printed copies to: Professor Gary T. Marx University of Colorado Campus Box 327 Boulder, Colorado 80309-0327 (303) 492-1697 Submitters should include the name of their institution, degree program, and a signed statement affirming that they are a full-time student at their institution and that the paper is an original, unpublished work of their own. INFORMATION For more information on the CFP'95 program and advance registration, as it becomes available, write to: CFP'95 Information Stanford Law and Technology Policy Center Stanford Law School Stanford, California 94305-8610 or send email to: with the word "Information" in the subject line. THE ORGANIZERS General Chair -------------- Carey Heckman Stanford Law School Stanford Law & Technology Policy Center Stanford, CA 94305-8610 415-725-7788 (voice) 415-725-1861 (fax) To discuss potential CFP'95 speakers, topics, and formats, and to receive additional CFP'95 information, subscribe to the CFP95 list. Send to a plain text message consisting of subscribe cfp95. Program Committee --------------------- Sheri Alpert Internal Revenue Service Judi Clark ManyMedia Kaye Caldwell Software Industry Coalition Esther Dyson EDventure Holdings Mike Godwin Electronic Frontier Foundation Peter Harter National Public Telecomputing Network Lance J. Hoffman George Washington University Ellen Kirsh America OnLine Bruce R. Koball Motion West Gary T. Marx University of Colorado Mitch Ratcliffe Digital Media Marc Rotenberg Electronic Privacy Information Center Deborah Runkle American Association for the Advancement of Science Barbara Simons USACM Ross Stapleton-Gray Georgetown University Glenn Tenney Fantasia Systems Jeff Ubois Author and Consultant J. Kent Walker, Jr. U.S. Department of Justice Affiliations are listed for identification. ---- Please distribute and post this notice! ------------------------------ ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 13 Aug 1994 22:51:01 CDT From: CuD Moderators Subject: File 5--Cu Digest Header Information (unchanged since 10 Sept 1994) Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are available at no cost electronically. 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