Computer underground Digest Wed Sep 28, 1994 Volume 6 : Issue 85 ISSN 1004-042X Editors: J

Master Index Current Directory Index Go to SkepticTank Go to Human Rights activist Keith Henson Go to Scientology cult

Skeptic Tank!

Computer underground Digest Wed Sep 28, 1994 Volume 6 : Issue 85 ISSN 1004-042X Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET) Archivist: Brendan Kehoe Retiring Shadow Archivist: Stanton McCandlish Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala Ian Dickinson Urban Legend Editor: E. Greg Shrdlugold CONTENTS, #6.85 (Wed, Sep 28, 1994) File 1--"Green Card Lawyers" Threaten T-Shirt Maker File 2--ACLU letter and release on FBI Wiretap bill File 3--Internet Security Seminar (Nov 12 '94) File 4--Police, Press, and Porn in Toronto File 5--Canadian BBS Sysops Plead Guilty to "Piracy" File 6--PHRACK hardcopies available from SotMESC / GCMS File 7--ACLU Gopher File 8--Telecommunication Reform Bill (S. 1822) DEAD! File 9--Cu Digest Header Information (unchanged) CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION APPEARS IN THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 20 Sep 1994 16:42:43 -0400 From: eye@IO.ORG(eye WEEKLY) Subject: File 1--"Green Card Lawyers" Threaten T-Shirt Maker Toronto's arts newspaper every Thursday =================== EYE NET EYE NET ALL HAIL THE CHIC GEEK! Scum-sucking weasel lawyers as fashion statements by K.K. CAMPBELL Coupla weeks ago, eye Net reported how North Carolina university student Joel Furr ( designed a popular collectible -- T-shirts about net.poltergeist "Serdar Argic." Furr promised to follow-up with a T-shirt featuring Arizona lawyers Laurence Canter and Martha Siegel. On June 18, eye Net reported how this wife-and-hubby law team sent an ad for the American "Green Card lottery" to thousands of newsgroups (win a work permit raffle run by the U.S. government; C&S offered to fill in a few forms for merely hundreds of dollars). This posting tactic is called "spamming." C&S did it twice. Spammers are loathed. Commercial spammers are loathed more. Snotty lawyer commercial spammers attain monumental loathing. So 'twas no surprise C&S were mailbombed into oblivion after each spam attack against Usenet. Both times, the lawyer's Internet providers terminated their account after a global deluge of complaints. The legal weasels squealed in anger and threatened to sue their Internet providers. But nothing came of it. Now they've threatened to sue Furr over his little non-profit T-shirt featuring the net.vermin. Shirt design features a four-color logo of a hand clutching a green card bursting forth from a globe. Around it: "The Green Card Lawyers -- Spamming the Globe." On Aug. 8, Furr publicly announced C&S had sent him private email, a standard nasty-lawyer letter. C&S asserted the "use of their names, likenesses or nickname is prohibited" -- meaning he couldn't even call them, "The Green Card Lawyers." Furthermore, Furr was informed "several large companies" had contacted the lawyers about a line of C&S T-shirts and Furr's plan to sell maybe 10 dozen shirts "would hurt their marketability." A clarification: Furr's shirt mocks C&S -- who the hell would wear it, let alone buy it, otherwise? The claim that "several large companies" are considering issuing a friendly C&S shirt is a source of much mirth and merriment about Planet Earth. Furr knew C&S was fullashit -- indeed, most of Usenet-reading Planet Earth is sure they're fullashit -- but, being a student, he knew he'd neither the time nor resources to fight a nuisance suit. Thus he concluded his Aug. 8 public post: "I think I have lots and lots of legal legs to stand on, but I can't afford to fight a lawsuit." The term "Green Card Lawyers" would be removed from the shirt. But Furr's mailbox soon brimmed with offers of legal assistance, even monetary help -- anything to thwart the most hated husband- wife team in Usenet history. (And Canter has said several times he's going to write a book about how to advertise on the net!) Electronic Frontier Foundation's chief legal counsel Mike Godwin ( advised Furr C&S "threats" were impotent bluster, Furr told eye in a telephone interview, because 1) C&S are not members of the Arizona bar; 2) they are under investigation by the Tennessee bar; 3) they can sue only in the state in which Furr does business; and 4) they have no trademark over the term "Green Card Lawyers." This last means that just because Usenetters call C&S the "Green Card Lawyers" doesn't grant them a trademark on the term. For instance, eye calls them the "Two-Bit, Suck-My-Left-Nut Lawyers" -- Martha and Larry don't own that name either. Bottomline: Furr's going ahead with the original design. "Green Card Lawyers" T-shirts are $11 U.S. -- XXL $1 more, XXXL $2 more. Canadians add $1. Write Furr for more details. To join the net.collectibles mailing list, send email with the message "subscribe netstuff" (without the quotes) to . For the latest on the net.vermin, read alt.flame.canter-and-siegel . =========== Retransmit freely in cyberspace Author holds standard copyright Full issue of eye available in archive ==> or Mailing list available ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 26 Sep 1994 17:57:50 -0400 From: ACLU Information Subject: File 2--ACLU letter and release on FBI Wiretap bill ACLU * ACLU * ACLU * ACLU * ACLU * ACLU * ACLU * ACLU * ACLU NEWS RELEASE * NEWS RELEASE * NEWS RELEASE * NEWS RELEASE ACLU Opposes FBI Wiretap Access Bill; Legislation Would Create Dangerous Precedent For IMMEDIATE RELEASE September 26, 1994 Contact: Barry Steinhardt BarryS @ or Kathy Parrent, 212-944-9800, ext. 424 The American Civil Liberties Union today called on the House Judiciary Committee to reject the FBI Wiretap Access Bill, H.R. 4922, which would require private electronics manufacturers to insure that the FBI can wiretap using developing telecommunications technologies. In a letter sent to Congressman Jack Brooks, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, the ACLU stated that the bill "... creates a dangerous and unprecedented presumption that government not only has the power, subject to warrant to intercept private communications, but that it can require private parties to create special access. It is as if the government had required all builders to construct new housing with an internal surveillance camera for government use." "Moreover, the FBI has not borne the burden of proving why such an extraordinary requirement is necessary..." the letter said. A copy of the full letter with the ACLU's detailed objections follows. ___________________________________________________________________________ September 22, 1994 Honorable Jack Brooks Congressman, State of Texas 2449 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515-4309 Dear Congressman Brooks: We are writing to you to express the ACLU's opposition to the FBI-Wiretap Access Bill, H.R. 4922. While we were not actively involved in Subcommittee deliberations, we have reviewed the legislation and we have several major concerns. The principal problem remains that any digital telephone bill which mandates that communications providers make technological changes for the sole purpose of making their systems wiretap-ready creates a dangerous and unprecedented presumption that government not only has the power, subject to warrant, to intercept private communications, but that it can require private parties to create special access. It is as if the government had required all builders to construct new housing with an internal surveillance camera for government use. Even if such use were triggered only by a judicial warrant, such a requirement would be strongly resisted by the American people. H.R. 4922 establishes a similar requirement, and is without precedent. Moreover, the FBI has not borne the burden of proving why such an extraordinary requirement is necessary. In 1993, there were fewer than 1,000 wiretaps authorized and many of them failed to yield any substantive evidence while intercepting many innocent conversations. It is far from clear that digital telephones will substantially obstruct legitimate law enforcement efforts. Without further public discussion and debate, the public will not have a sufficient opportunity to weigh the loss of privacy against the FBI's claims. There has been no opportunity to learn the full extent of the types of investigations that the FBI claims were precluded because of a restriction on their public dissemination. Yet, based on these secret assertions, 91 such incidents were cited by the FBI. On those slim assertions, the public's loss of privacy in digital communications is all but assured and taxpayers will be asked to pay an extraordinary price. H.R. 4922 authorizes $500 million over the next four years to reimburse telecommunications carriers for the costs that would be imposed by the bill. Even if you accept these cost estimates -- the industry puts the real cost in the billions -- we will spending $125 million or $125,000 per wiretap, for the fewer than 1,000 taps that will be conducted each year. As you know, the ACLU has the greatest respect for Congressman Edwards and Senator Leahy. Both have been tireless champions for civil liberties. The Edwards/Leahy proposal is an improvement over earlier versions offered by the FBI and we applaud their efforts to add new privacy protections. The proposed expansion of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act to cordless phones and the requirement that a court order be obtained for transactional data from electronic communication providers both are steps forward and merit separate consideration by the Congress. But they cannot and should not be traded for the unprecedented intrusion represented by H.R. 4922. In several respects, H.R. 4922 is still too broad in its application. For example, earlier versions of the bill would have applied directly to on-line communication and information services such as internet providers, America On Line, Compuserve, Prodigy etc. H.R. 4922 would apply directly only to "telecommunications carriers" such as the Regional Bell Operating Companies. But this provision does not narrow the scope of the bill as much as it might seem. First, with the new presumption that the government is entitled to require private manufacturers to insure its ability to wiretap, law enforcement will undoubtedly be back in future years insisting that this limitation thwarts its efforts and will seek to broaden the coverage to other information providers. Once the basic principle of H.R. 4922 is accepted, what arguments remain to resist its expansion. The limited application of H.R. 4922 is surely temporary; what matters is the basic requirement, not its immediate application. More importantly, law enforcement will still have the opportunity to intercept on-line communications over the internet or commercial on-line networks, by tapping into the facilities of the telecommunications companies. As critics of the earlier versions had noted the coverage of the on-line providers was largely redundant. All these communications still pass over telephone lines. Law enforcement does not need access at every point in a telecommunication in order to intercept it. Access at any one point is sufficient and that would be readily available since ultimately on-line communications must travel over the public switched telephone network which the bill requires be wiretap ready. Moreover, given the commingled nature of digital communication lines, it is inevitable that more private information from third parties will be intercepted than would be the case with analog phones, and the minimization requirements in the bill will not prevent this. In the end, this proposal will make our telecommunications structure more, not less vulnerable. In its original form the FBI Digital Telephony proposal would have given the power to the Attorney General to impose standards on communication providers which would guarantee that their systems were wiretap-ready. Essentially, this would have created a centralized wiretapping system that threatened the privacy of the entire nation and was dependent for its security on a few select people. This raised the real concern that if electronic communications service providers must design their systems to allow and ensure FBI access, then the resulting mandatory "back doors" may become known to and be exploited by "criminals." The new proposal contains the same risks. It would have the technical standards developed by the industry, through trade associations or standard-setting bodies, in consultation with the Attorney General. But it contains a "safe harbor" provision, which protects a carrier from sanction if it is in compliance with standards created by this approach. The safe harbor provision virtually guarantees that the standards developed through the industry-based process will be adopted by all. Whether the standards are directly imposed by government or created by concerted industry action, in consultation with the government, makes little difference. The result is the same. A centralized wiretapping capacity with all of its vulnerabilities will still be created. Finally, we have grave concerns about the encryption provisions. The Edwards/Leahy version has been described as "neutral" on encryption. The bill provides that telecommunications providers do not need to decrypt data, unless they hold the key. In the short term, this is an improvement over the earlier versions of the bill which would have created obligations to decrypt, but there are at least two longer term problems. First, is the new presumption that industry has the affirmative responsibility to create special technical capacity for the government to snoop. Can there be any real doubt that the FBI will be back in the years to come asserting that its ability to intercept communications has been thwarted by easily available encryption and that an industry obligation, analogous to the new obligation to provide wiretap capacity, must be created. Secondly, in some cases the telecommunications providers may well hold the key -- particularly as they expand the services they provide to their customers. H.R. 4922 proposes a radical and expensive change in our telecommunications structure. The threats it poses, now and prospectively, are real, but the need for it far less than evident or proven. We urge that your Committee not rush into consideration of this far reaching measure with so little time left in the session. We thank you for your consideration of our views and we would be happy to sit down with you to discuss these issues. Sincerely, Ira Glasser Laura Murphy Lee ===================== The ACLU urges interested persons to contact the following members of Congress immediately: Rep. Jack BrooksSen. Howard Metzenbaum (202) 225-6565 (voice)(202) 224-7494 (voice) (202) 225-1584 (fax)(202) 224-5474 (fax) ============================================================= ACLU Free Reading Room | American Civil Liberties Union gopher:// | 132 W. 43rd Street, NY, NY 10036| "Eternal vigilance is the | price of liberty" ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 22 Sep 1994 08:35:44 GMT From: voidstar@NETCOM.COM(Scott Corcoran) Subject: File 3--Internet Security Seminar (Nov 12 '94) INTERNET SECURITY SECURE COMMUNICATIONS OVER UNTRUSTED NETWORKS A one-day seminar on November 12, 1994 Embarcadero Hyatt Regency Hotel in San Francisco. Methods of achieving authentication, authorization, confidentiality, integrity, and nonrepudiation are key to the successful realization of the National Information Infrastructure (NII). Today's Internet is a proving ground for what will become the NII. The San Francisco Chapter of the IEEE Computer Society has put together an outstanding program on encryption, intrusion detection, firewalls, architectures, and protocols for Internet Security. Speakers in this seminar will describe several of the main techniques that exist today and the directions in which they are evolving. The seminar will be helpful to engineers, engineering managers and product planners seeking current knowledge of Internet Security. PROGRAM 8:30 a.m. Registration opens 9:00 a.m. Introduction 9:05 a.m. Keynote Address James Bidzos, President of RSA 9:45 a.m. Steven Bellovin, Ph.D., Bell Labs "Firewalls for Computer Security" 11:00 a.m. Teresa Lunt, SRI "Intrusion Detection" 11:45 a.m. Round Table Lunch (incl. with registration) 1:00 p.m. Professor Martin E. Hellman, Ph.D., Stanford "Cryptography: The Foundation of Secure Networks" 2:00 p.m. Dan Nessett, Ph.D., SunSoft and PSRG "Future Internet Security Architecture" 3:00 p.m. Matt Blaze, Ph.D., Bell Labs "Protocols: Security Without Firewalls" 4:00 p.m. "Public Safety vs. Private Liberty" A Panel Discussion on the Social Implications of Internet Security Rex Buddenberg NPS Alan McDonald FBI Stewart Baker formerly of the NSA James Bidzos President of RSA Matt Blaze Bell Labs Martin Hellman Stanford A one day seminar in San Francisco, on Saturday, November 12th, covering private and public-key encryption, key-escrow, fire-walls, architecture and protocols for security, intrustion detection, and a spirited panel discussion on "Public Safety vs. Private Liberty" ! SEATING IS LIMITED. PRE-REGISTER BY OCTOBER 15TH. 9:05 Keynote Address James Bidzos, President of RSA James Bidzos, President of RSA Data Security, will present the keynote address. Mr. Bidzos heads a company whose encryption technologies are licensed for products ranging from computer operating systems, to software copy protection, to electronic mail, to secure telephones. RSA has licensed several million copies of its encryption software, and has become a focal point for debate on appropriate application of cryptography. Mr. Bidzos has gained a unique perspective on the requirements of effective cryptographic systems. He will highlight the problem of providing strong encryption for users of computer networks while meeting the legitimate needs of law enforcement 9:45 Steven Bellovin, Ph.D., Bell Labs "Firewalls for Computer Security" When you connect your computer to the Internet, you also create a channel into your computer. Clever vandals, thieves and industrial spies have found ways to abuse most of the Internet protocols from FTP and Telnet to the World Wide Web and Network Time Protocols. Short of pulling the plug, firewalls provide the surest defense. The firewall administrator must keep abreast of new methods of attack and understand how firewalls can mitigate the threat. Steven M. Bellovin, Ph.D., is a senior researcher at AT&T's Bell Laboratories and co-author of the well known guide "Firewalls and Internet Security: Repelling the Wily Hacker." As one responsible for protecting "the phone company" from Internet hackers, Dr. Bellovin can describe from firsthand experience how firewalls can be constructed to screen them out. Dr. Bellovin will join us in a live video teleconference from Bell Laboratories. 11:00 Teresa Lunt, SRI "Intrusion Detection" Inevitably, someone will try to breach your firewall and might succeed. The time it takes you to discover the intrusion and catch the culprit depends on the event logging you have established. However, logging the many different transactions that might expose trespassing produces mountains of data. Automatic digestion of the logs is the only hope of monitoring them all. Teresa F. Lunt, Director of Secure Systems Research at SRI's Computer Systems Laboratory, directs work in multilevel database systems and intrusion detection. Ms. Lunt will describe intrusion detection and demonstrate automated tools developed at SRI to analyze audit data for suspicious behavior. 1:00 Professor Martin E. Hellman, Ph.D., Stanford "Cryptography: The Foundation of Secure Networks" Data in transit across unsecured networks like the Internet are subject to wiretapping attacks and impersonation. Moreover, privacy of communication and authentication of the sender's message are essential to Internet commerce, with exchange of contracts, receipts, credit card drafts and the like increasingly commonplace. Encryption can solve some of these problems, but what kind of encryption? Authentication only or encrypted messages? Secret key or public key, or both? Will you need a giant key ring for mes sage keys, session keys, file keys, and passwords? Martin E. Hellman, Ph.D., Professor of Electrical Engineering at Stanford University, is co-inventor of public key cryptography with Whitfield Diffie and Ralph Merkle. He was elected a Fellow of the IEEE for contributions to cryptography. Dr. Hellman will explore threats to communication and costs of electronic countermeasures. He will explain the importance and means of authenticating electronic messages, and he will survey public key cryptography. Dr. Hellman will describe public key techniques including Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), Diffie-Hellman, ElGamal and Digital Signature Standard (DSS). He will also describe the current status of export control and encryption standards such as the Data Encryption Standard (DES), Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) and its encryption algorithm, Skipjack, which is implemented in Clipper and Capstone chips. 2:00 Dan Nessett, Ph.D., SunSoft and PSRG "Future Internet Security Architecture" Dan Nessett, Ph.D., of the SunSoft Division of Sun Microsystems, and until recently with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, has worked extensively in local area networks, distributed operating systems and distributed systems security. He is a member of the Privacy and Security Research Group (PSRG), which is convened under the auspices of the Internet Society. Dr. Nessett will explain the emerging Internet security architecture work undertaken by the PSRG. The architecture will guide the development of security mechanisms used in Internet standards. 3:00 Matt Blaze, Ph.D., Bell Labs "Protocols: Security Without Firewalls" We use firewalls because Internet protocols are not inherently secure. Can we rehabilitate the Internet protocols to produce protocols which are secure, not computationally prohibitive, and compatible with existing protocols? Matt Blaze, Ph.D., of Bell Laboratories will talk about the problems of integrating cryptographic protection into large-scale network infrastructure. Dr. Blaze is the author of "A Cryptographic File System for Unix," presented at the 1993 ACM Conference on Communications and Computer Security, and co-author with John Ioann idis of "The Architecture and Implementation of Network-Layer Security Under UNIX," which describes "swIPe," a network-layer security protocol for the IP protocol suite. Dr. Blaze will address issues concerning network security protoc ols, key management and distribution, and threats and models for cryptographic engineering. 4:00 A Panel Discussion on the Social Implications of Internet Security "Public Safety vs. Private Liberty" At one end of an imagined security spectrum lies the information police-state. Through traffic analysis, mandatory personal ID numbers and escrowed encryption, and the ability to record all messages and commerce carried out on the Information Superhighway, governments could maintain dossiers on every aspect of the personal life and business of its citizens. Privacy advocates fear that a corrupt government could use such information against its political enemies and to subvert personal freedoms. At the other extreme lies information anarchy. Through the use of digital cash, anonymous remailers, and strong non-escrowed encryption, the Information Superhighway could become a hide-out for criminals and national security threats. The potential for black-market activity and the associated tax-evasion is so enormous that some have speculated that governments could eventually collapse. Law-enforcem ent advocates fear that they will be unable to keep up with criminals and terrorists who ply their trade electronically. Our distinguished panel will provide insight into the interplay between the rights of individuals to privacy and freedom, the rights of companies to conduct unrestrained trade, and the ability of law enforcement and security agencies to perform their functions efficiently. This conclusion to the seminar will put into perspective the social changes that might be wrought by the technical advances discussed earlier in the day. Panelists include: Rex Buddenberg NPS Alan McDonald FBI Stewart Baker formerly of the NSA James Bidzos President of RSA Matt Blaze Bell Labs Martin Hellman Stanford Rex Buddenberg, Instructor of information systems architecture and applied networking at the Naval Postgraduate School, will moderate the panel. Mr. Buddenberg is a maritime command, communication, control and intelligence (C3I) consultant and a computer networking author. As a C3I architect for the U.S. Coast Guard, he developed plans and specifications for extending Internet connectivity to oceanographic ships. Mr. Buddenberg contemplates the means and effects of net warfare as both the good guys and bad guys share the same network. Alan McDonald, Special Counsel for Electronic Surveillance Matters, Information Resources Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, is a specialist in the law and policy concerning electronic surveillance, Digital Telephony, and encryption issues. He frequently represents the FBI's view of law enforcement equities in light of advanced telecommunications and encryption. Stewart Baker is a former General Counsel to the NSA and a partner in Steptoe & Johnson, a Washington, DC law firm. His expertise is in telecommunications, computer export policy, security of national information infrastructure and encryption. Mr. Baker brings direct experience with the problem that strong encryption creates for the NSA in protecting our national security. QUESTIONS? CALL (415)-327-6622. Cut-off and complete this form, enclose your check payable to the IEEE SFCS, and mail to: IEEE Council Office 701 Welch Rd. #2205 Palo Alto, CA. 94304 To qualify for the reduced Pre-registration fees, your application with check must be postmarked no later than Oct. 15, 1994. Registration fee includes lunch, refreshments, and parking. Seating is limited. To make sure the seminar is not sold out, call (415) 327-6622. please check the appropriate box Fees on or before Oct. 15th: ___ IEEE Member $ 110 ___ Non-member $ 120 ___ Student $ 85 Fees after Oct. 15th: ___ IEEE Member $ 125 ___ Non-member $ 145 ___ Student $ 100 (students must present ID) The seminar location is the Hyatt Regency Embarcadero Hotel, near the Ferry Building, in San Francisco. Your registration fee includes the all day seminar, lunch, and convenient parking in the garages underneath adjacent Embarcadero Centers 1, 2, or 3. (Keep your ticket for validation). Please print clearly: Name : __________________________________________ Title : __________________________________________ Company: __________________________________________ Address: __________________________________________ __________________________________________ _______________________________ ___ ______ Day phone #:(___)_____-_______ IEEE member (or affiliate) #:_______ ____ (for discount) College/University (if student):___________________ ___ Vegetarian lunch option Refunds will be honored through October 22nd, substitutions any time. Additional information can be obtained by telephoning the IEEE Bay Area Council Office: (415)327-6622. IEEE SFCS RESERVES THE RIGHT TO MAKE CHANGES TO THE SEMINAR Sponsored by the San Francisco Chapter of the IEEE Computer Society. The IEEE is a non-profit organization. ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 25 Sep 1994 20:28:58 -0400 From: eye@IO.ORG(eye WEEKLY) Subject: File 4--Police, Press, and Porn in Toronto ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ eye WEEKLY September 22 1994 Toronto's arts newspaper every Thursday ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ EYE NET EYE NET PRESS, POLICE AND PORN REVISITED by K.K. CAMPBELL Once again, the news media finds itself being used to misrepresent the nature of the net for the Big Story about the 3Ps -- Pedophilia, Pornography or Piracy. On Sept. 13, CITY-TV's CityPulse News did a story about "Mr. Concerned Citizen," who is worried children can access hardcore porn on the net through a system called called Interlog. Mr. Concerned Citizen is Bruce Lloyd of Agincourt, who filed a complaint with Metro Police Chief William McCormack against Interlog. We also met Interlog owner Matt Harrop (, a 19-year-old with dyed-purple hair. It's the sort of juxtaposition of images that the camera loves: Mr. Concerned-Citizen-Who-Loves- Children versus Freaky-Haired Porn-Peddler. But that's not quite the whole story. It turns out Lloyd is himself a writer of copious vile material. Lloyd had not counted on some elements of the news media discovering his net.history. (Joe Baptista, a friend of Lloyd's, similarly suckered CITY news in January with the fake story that the Ontario government computers held banned Karla Homolka newstories in them.) In fact, as this column will demonstrate, Lloyd's complaint issues from a personal vendetta against Harrop. Sysadmins, take note. LLOYD IN ACTION Let's review some of Lloyd's posting habits. It all seems to have started around Aug. 21, when Lloyd entered into a flamewar with rabid homophobe Chuck Whealton ( * Lloyd began mailbombing Whealton's site, a definite no-no. * Lloyd soon claimed he'd found out where Whealton lives and that he and friends would drive down to Delaware and gang rape Whealton: "I can't wait to have sex with him ... maybe we could do it at the same time! I bet he's never had two guys up his ass at once before!" * Lloyd has the curious distinction of being even more hated by most online gays than brain-dead homophobes like Whealton. Quotes from his public posts afford a glimpse into why. Lloyd wrote some interesting posts to lesbian netters: "You just can't leave me alone ... Enjoy being a failure, Cuntlicker." "Perchance a rigorous butt-fuck is what you need to loosen up, Cuntrag?" In a phone interview, Lloyd admitted to eye he wrote these remarks -- in fact, he giggled when admitting to them. "Well, you know, I was trying to be insulting." * His interest in protecting children from porn is also clear from this Usenet post: "I love straight fuckers like this. What they really need is to have their dicks tied up in leather straps and then have needles pierced right through them." * On the "pornography" front, Lloyd sent a very detailed post called "How To Suck A Penis" to newsgroups accessible by children. (He did not write it, just distributed it.) "If Mr. Lloyd is so concerned about children being allowed on this network, why was he contributing his own obscene material?" asks Ken Weaverling (, manager of computer services at Stanton/Wilmington Campuses of Delaware Technical & Community College -- the site that has Whealton as a user. For a fuller archive of Lloyd's public Usenet posts, use anonymous FTP to in directory ~ftp/interlog. To experienced netters, these quotes from Lloyd's net.writings aren't that shocking and are dismissed as immature attempts to shock. They are really just his way of "turning up the heat" in this medium. But they become important to prove Lloyd's motives when he lays a complaint with the chief of police. HARROP IN ACTION Other netters had long been complaining about Lloyd to sysadmin Harrop. After the rape threat, Harrop asked Lloyd to tone it down. "I informed him his account would be terminated if he kept it up," Harrop said. "At this point, he attempted to blackmail me. He said he'd go to the police with obscenity charges against Interlog if he was removed." Reading that, Harrop said enough was enough and wrote Lloyd email that his account was history. Lloyd was permitted a farewell letter, which Harrop would use as proof Lloyd had read the termination notice. It begins: "Matt, I'll let you know that you've pissed me off. You've wasted a lot of your time and energy on nothing. I encouraged a lot of people to use your system. Now, they will not. I am very sorry, Matt, it sounds like you are going to lose a lot more than just me as a user. You are also going to lose Apple as a customer." (When eye called Apple, a spokesperson emphatically denied that Lloyd is an actual Apple employee. He is a subcontracted phone-tech support staffer -- he answers questions from Mac users who forget where the "on" switch is.) Lloyd again made the police threat: "I might mention that I am thinking of going to the police anyway. You are carrying highly illegal material on your system. Pornographic and obscene material. You are directly responsible for this." The next day (Sept. 13), Lloyd faxed media a release entitled "Metro Police To Investigate Obscenity Charges Against Toronto Internet Service Provider" -- before the police had even read the complaint. Lloyd told eye it's strictly coincidence his complaint came the day after he was kicked off Interlog. Most netters don't buy Lloyd's story for a second. But they worry that unless press and/or police get savvy to how the Internet works, anyone with a grudge will be able to do what Lloyd did. Meanwhile, the real victim in all this is business owner Matt Harrop and Interlog, portrayed by a gullible mainstream media outlet as purveyors of porn to children. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Press Release For More Information, Call: Bruce Lloyd Telephone: (416) 297-1742 METRO POLICE TO INVESTIGATE OBSCENITY CHARGES AGAINST TORONTO INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER Metropolitan Toronto Police have been asked to investigate obscenity charges against INTERLOG INTERNET SERVICES, and Internet service provider operating from 1235 Bay Street, Suite 400, Toronto. (A copy of the complaint to Metro Police is attached). The complain stems from my discovery of obscene materials on the computer system of Interlog. The materials include: sexually graphic texts, pictures involving bestiality, and other pictures showing both women and men in degrading and obscene activity. Such material would clearly be in contravention of Canadian law. The obscene material in question is distributed via the Internet: A world-wide computer network, often referred to as "The Information Superhighway". The material is received by Interlog, from computer users around the world, and held on a hard disk drive at the Bay Street address. Anyone willing to pay Interlog9s membership fee of $22.50/month can access the information. Of particular concern is the fact that children have full access to this information -- As Interlog requires no proof of age or identification when registering. This will be an interesting case in law: The decision of Metro Police and the Crown Attorney to pursue or not to pursue charges in this matter, will have repercussions for Ontarian's with regard to what information they will be able to access, in the future, on the Information Superhighway. Further, the actions of the authorities in this matter may help establish the status of Internet Service Providers as "common carriers" (like Canada Post or Bell Canada), or not. * * * * * September 13, 1994 FAX Chief William McCormack Metropolitan Toronto Police 40 College Street Toronto, ON Dear Chief McCormack: Please accept this correspondence as my official request for you to commence an investigation into the operations and practices of Interlog Internet Services (Interlog). Interlog is an Internet service provider, operated from 1235 Bay Street, Suite 400, Toronto, (416) 975.2655 (voice), (416) 532.5015 (fax), (416) 515.1414 (data) my Mr. Matt Harrop. As you may be aware, the Internet is a world-wide computer network. At present, approximately 20 million people have some form of access to the Internet; and approximately 300,000 information databases are available to users. Part of the Internet consists of Usenet. Usenet is a forum of "newsgroups", which provide for the exchange of information on a variety of topic specific areas. Of particular concern to me, in relation to this complain, are the "" hierarchy of newsgroups. One of these newsgroups is "". In this newsgroups, I have found pictures which I consider to be pornographic and obscene, and in contravention of Canadian Law. Interlog Internet Services provides access to these newsgroups to anyone who is willing to pay their fee of $22.50/month. The procedure for obtaining an account with Interlog consists of mailing a cheque along with a completed and signed registration form. I have attached copy of the registration form, for your information. You will notice that it is not necessary to submit identification with this form: This, I am further concerned by the fact that children could easily register and access the obscene material contained in The information contained in, and other newsgroups (including ones dealing with the Homolka publication ban, and many sexually explicit groups), is downloaded by Mr. Harrop of Interlog. It is then held on his computer system, and accessed by his registered users. Chief McCormack, at this time I ask that you undertake to investigate the information which is contained on the computer systems of Interlog Internet Services. Further I would expect that you would seek judicial authorization to seize any equipment found to contain obscene materials, and shut the service down. Lastly, I would ask that you pursue criminal charges in this matter, should your investigations determine that in fact Mr. Harrop is storing and transmitting obscene materials. Thank you for your time and attention to this matter. I will look forward to speaking with your investigators at the earliest opportunity, in order to provide any further information that may be required. Sincerely, Bruce M. Lloyd 30 Thunder Grove, Suite 1612, Agincourt, Ontario, M1V 4A3 (416) 297-1742 ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 22 Sep 1994 15:15: 06 EDT From: Subject: File 5--Canadian BBS Sysops Plead Guilty to "Piracy" * Copied (from: CAN_SYSLAW) by Steven Horn using timEd 1.01.g2+. Hello All! The following story appeared in Wednesday's The Globe and Mail Report on Business (Sept. 21, 1994, National edition, p. 5): "Two bulletin board operators in Montreal and Toronto recently pleaded guilty to the illegal distribution of software and were fined a total of $22,500. 'This sends an important message that software piracy in Canada will not be tolerated -- at any level,' said Frank Clegg, president of the Canadian Alliance Against Software Theft, which announced the convictions yesterday. In August, the RCMP raided a Montreal bulletin board system (BBS) known as 90 North, revealing the distribution of unlicenced software by Lotus, Microsoft, Novell and Novell/WordPerfect Applications Group. Its operator, Michael Solomon, was fined $20,000. In September, Sergio Arana, operator of Toronto-based Legion of Death, was fined $2,500 after investigators infiltrated his BBS and downloaded sufficient software to confirm illegal activity." There's nothing I can add. ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 22 Sep 94 14:25 CDT From: rejones@MHGJRS.MHG.COM Subject: File 6--PHRACK hardcopies available from SotMESC / GCMS Press Release The SotMESC is presenting three volumes of the collected works from Phrack in a bounded treasury. These collectors items can be obtained from the non-profit SotMESC organization. Phrack 1-42 (c) SotMESC are being offered to the public to fund our organization in protecting network liberties, freedom and privacy. The Phrack volumes and other assorted fundings we are publishing can be found in our current catalog available for $1 via Smail at: SotMESC, Box 573, Long Beach, Ms 39560. More information on the SotMESC can be obtained by pointed to with Mosaic. ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 24 Sep 1994 12:47:15 -0500 From: "William B. Collins" Subject: File 7--ACLU Gopher Point your gophers to for access to the ACLU Free Reading Room. The following document is from the ACLU Gopher. It is also available through the World Wide Web. ======================= THE ACLU FREE READING ROOM Welcome to the American Civil Liberties Union Free Reading Room, a publications, software, and information resource of the nation's oldest and largest defender of the principles set forth in the Bill of Rights. The ACLU Free Reading Room makes available to users of the internet a growing collection of our publications and information resources. Currently, the collection includes our basic line of publications on issues of high public interest; the current issue of our membership newsletter, Civil Liberties; a growing collection of recent public policy reports and action guides; Congressional voting records for the 103rd Congress; and an archive of news releases from the National Office. The collection will grow to include calls to action on legislative issues, testimony delivered to Congress, and a collection of ACLU legal briefs submitted in important Supreme Court cases. In the future, we plan to develop a variety of electronic publications, including an adaptation of our newsletter and other special interest mailing lists. Please watch this space for further information. ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION The ACLU Free Reading Room is a project of the Public Education Department of the National Office of the American Civil Liberties Union. Programming services are provided by The Pipeline Network, an Internet access provider based in New York. The ACLU Free Reading Room contains publications and other materials from the ACLU in a gopher and ftp accessible resource, and is a read-only site. At this time, we recommend that follow-ups and public discussion of the materials at this site take place in the USENET news group alt.society.civil-liberties, alt.censorship or other newsgroups or bulletin boards where appropriate. Comments and questions about this resource may be directed to Unless otherwise indicated, documents in this resource may be circulated in whole with acknowledgement, and may of course be quoted under fair use guidelines. Print reproduction other than for personal use should be requested from, or by mail at this address: American Civil Liberties Union, Department of Public Education, 132 West 43rd Street, New York, New York 10036 Consulting this resource is not a means of obtaining legal advice or representation from the ACLU. For information about seeking assistance from the ACLU, consult section 10 of this gopher. At this time, we do not have the capacity to forward electronic mail to our state offices, who are responsible for reviewing legal complaints arising in their areas and offering legal assistance. Therefore, requests for legal assistance sent to cannot be accepted. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 26 Sep 1994 12:17:02 CDT From: Vigdor Schreibman - FINS Subject: File 8--Telecommunication Reform Bill (S. 1822) DEAD! FINS SPECIAL REPORT September 23, 1994 S. 1822 DEAD! Hollings Throws In The Towel Washington, DC, Sept 23, 1994--Sen. Ernest F. Hollings (D-SC), announced today that "we will be unable to pass comprehensive telecommunications reform legislation this Congress." Hollings noted that "only one sector of the industry continues to oppose the bill . . . the telephone companies, and especially, the RBOCs." Moreover, Hollings listed a serious of reasons that would make passage of the bill "impossible this Congress." This included (among others reasons), the fact that "the RBOCs have violated the terms of the agreement they have reached with me and the other members of the committee on long distance" as well as an ultimatum delivered by Sen. Dole. Dole informed the Committee yesterday that a serious of revisions of the bill, were required, which were "non-negotiable." The provisions would have "substantially deregulated the industry" according to Hollings. ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 13 Aug 1994 22:51:01 CDT From: CuD Moderators Subject: File 9--Cu Digest Header Information (unchanged since 10 Sept 1994) Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are available at no cost electronically. CuD is available as a Usenet newsgroup: Or, to subscribe, send a one-line message: SUB CUDIGEST your name Send it to LISTSERV@UIUCVMD.BITNET or LISTSERV@VMD.CSO.UIUC.EDU The editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-0303), fax (815-753-6302) or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL 60115, USA. Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of LAWSIG, and DL1 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT libraries and in the VIRUS/SECURITY library; from America Online in the PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters;" On Delphi in the General Discussion database of the Internet SIG; on RIPCO BBS (312) 528-5020 (and via Ripco on internet); and on Rune Stone BBS (IIRGWHQ) (203) 832-8441. CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from 1:11/70; unlisted nodes and points welcome. EUROPE: from the ComNet in LUXEMBOURG BBS (++352) 466893; In ITALY: Bits against the Empire BBS: +39-461-980493 In BELGIUM: Virtual Access BBS: + (ringdown) UNITED STATES: ( in /pub/CuD/ ( in /pub/Publications/CuD/ ( in /pub/eff/cud/ in /src/wuarchive/doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/ in /pub/wuarchive/doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/ in /doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/ EUROPE: in pub/doc/cud/ (Finland) in pub/cud/ (United Kingdom) JAPAN: /mirror/ COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long as the source is cited. Authors hold a presumptive copyright, and they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts unless absolutely necessary. DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not violate copyright protections. ------------------------------ End of Computer Underground Digest #6.85 ************************************


E-Mail Fredric L. Rice / The Skeptic Tank