Computer underground Digest Sun July 24, 1994 Volume 6 : Issue 67 ISSN 1004-042X Editors:

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Computer underground Digest Sun July 24, 1994 Volume 6 : Issue 67 ISSN 1004-042X Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET) Archivist: Brendan Kehoe Retiring Shadow Archivist: Stanton McCandlish Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala Ian Dickinson Copper Ionizer: Ephram Shrustleau CONTENTS, #6.67 (Sun, July 24, 1994) File 1--White House retreats on Clipper File 2--EPIC Alert 1.04 (Gore on Clipper) File 3--HR 3937 now a dead end; House Rules Comm results File 4--Sen. Leahy on Clipper File 5--Summary of Amateur Action BBS Trial (Days 1-3) Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are available at no cost electronically. CuD is available as a Usenet newsgroup: comp.society.cu-digest Or, to subscribe, send a one-line message: SUB CUDIGEST your name Send it to LISTSERV@UIUCVMD.BITNET or LISTSERV@VMD.CSO.UIUC.EDU The editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-0303), fax (815-753-6302) or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL 60115, USA. Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of LAWSIG, and DL1 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT libraries and in the VIRUS/SECURITY library; from America Online in the PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters;" On Delphi in the General Discussion database of the Internet SIG; on RIPCO BBS (312) 528-5020 (and via Ripco on internet); and on Rune Stone BBS (IIRGWHQ) (203) 832-8441. CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from 1:11/70; unlisted nodes and points welcome. EUROPE: from the ComNet in LUXEMBOURG BBS (++352) 466893; In ITALY: Bits against the Empire BBS: +39-461-980493 UNITED STATES: etext.archive.umich.edu (141.211.164.18) in /pub/CuD/ ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/Publications/CuD aql.gatech.edu (128.61.10.53) in /pub/eff/cud/ world.std.com in /src/wuarchive/doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/ uceng.uc.edu in /pub/wuarchive/doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/ wuarchive.wustl.edu in /doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/ EUROPE: nic.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud/ (Finland) ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud/ (United Kingdom) JAPAN: ftp.glocom.ac.jp /mirror/ftp.eff.org/ COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long as the source is cited. Authors hold a presumptive copyright, and they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts unless absolutely necessary. DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not violate copyright protections. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 21 Jul 1994 14:03:10 -0400 (EDT) From: Stanton McCandlish Subject: File 1--White House retreats on Clipper Yesterday, the Clinton Administration announced that it is taking several large, quick steps back in its efforts to push EES or Clipper encryption technology. Vice-President Gore stated in a letter to Rep. Maria Cantwell, whose encryption export legislation is today being debated on the House floor, that EES is being limited to voice communications only. The EES (Escrowed Encryption Standard using the Skipjack algorithm, and including the Clipper and Capstone microchips) is a Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) designed by the National Security Agency, and approved, despite a stunningly high percentage anti-EES public comments on the proposal) by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Since the very day of the announcement of Clipper in 1993, public outcry against the key "escrow" system has been strong, unwavering and growing rapidly. What's changed? The most immediate alteration in the White House's previously hardline path is an expressed willingness to abandon the EES for computer applications (the Capstone chip and Tessera card), and push for its deployment only in telephone technology (Clipper). The most immediate effect this will have is a reduction in the threat to the encryption software market that Skipjack/EES plans posed. Additionally, Gore's letter indicates that deployment for even the telephone application of Clipper has been put off for months of studies, perhaps partly in response to a draft bill from Sens. Patrick Leahy and Ernest Hollings that would block appropriation for EES development until many detailed conditions had been met. And according to observers such as Brock Meeks (Cyberwire Dispatch) and Mark Voorhees (Voorhees Reports/Information Law Alert), even Clipper is headed for a fall, due to a variety of factors including failure in attempts to get other countries to adopt the scheme, at least one state bill banning use of EES for medical records, loss of NSA credibility after a flaw in the "escrowed" key system was discovered by Dr. Matt Blaze of Bell Labs, a patent infringement lawsuit threat (dealt with by buying off the claimant), condemnation of the scheme by a former Canadian Defense Minister, world wide opposition to Clipper and the presumptions behind it, skeptical back-to-back House and Senate hearings on the details of the Administration's plan, and pointed questions from lawmakers regarding monopolism and accountability. One of the most signigicant concessions in the letter is that upcoming encryption standards will be "voluntary," unclassified, and exportable, according to Gore, who also says there will be no moves to tighten export controls. Though Gore hints at private, rather than governmental, key "escrow," the Administration does still maintain that key "escrow" is an important part of its future cryptography policy. EFF would like to extend thanks to all who've participated in our online campaigns to sink Clipper. This retreat on the part of the Executive Branch is due not just to discussions with Congresspersons, or letters from industry leaders, but in large measure to the overwhelming response from users of computer-mediated communication - members of virtual communities who stand a lot to gain or lose by the outcome of the interrelated cryptography debates. Your participation and activism has played a key role, if not the key role, in the outcome thus far, and will be vitally important to the end game! Below is the public letter sent from VP Gore to Rep. Cantwell. ****** July 20, 1994 The Honorable Maria Cantwell House of Representatives Washington, D.C., 20515 Dear Representative Cantwell: I write to express my sincere appreciation for your efforts to move the national debate forward on the issue of information security and export controls. I share your strong conviction for the need to develop a comprehensive policy regarding encryption, incorporating an export policy that does not disadvantage American software companies in world markets while preserving our law enforcement and national security goals. As you know, the Administration disagrees with you on the extent to which existing controls are harming U.S. industry in the short run and the extent to which their immediate relaxation would affect national security. For that reason we have supported a five-month Presidential study. In conducting this study, I want to assure you that the Administration will use the best available resources of the federal government. This will include the active participation of the National Economic Council and the Department of Commerce. In addition, consistent with the Senate-passed language, the first study will be completed within 150 days of passage of the Export Administration Act reauthorization bill, with the second study to be completed within one year after the completion of the first. I want to personally assure you that we will reassess our existing export controls based on the results of these studies. Moreover, all programs with encryption that can be exported today will continue to be exportable. On the other hand, we agree that we need to take action this year to assure that over time American companies are able to include information security features in their programs in order to maintain their admirable international competitiveness. We can achieve this by entering into an new phase of cooperation among government, industry representatives and privacy advocates with a goal of trying to develop a key escrow encryption system that will provide strong encryption, be acceptable to computer users worldwide, and address our national needs as well. Key escrow encryption offers a very effective way to accomplish our national goals, That is why the Administration adopted key escrow encryption in the "Clipper Chip" to provide very secure encryption for telephone communications while preserving the ability for law enforcement and national security. But the Clipper Chip is an approved federal standard for telephone communications and not for computer networks and video networks. For that reason, we are working with industry to investigate other technologies for those applications. The Administration understands the concerns that industry has regarding the Clipper Chip. We welcome the opportunity to work with industry to design a more versatile, less expensive system. Such a key escrow system would be implementable in software, firmware, hardware, or any combination thereof, would not rely upon a classified algorithm, would be voluntary, and would be exportable. While there are many severe challenges to developing such a system, we are committed to a diligent effort with industry and academia to create such a system. We welcome your offer to assist us in furthering this effort. We also want to assure users of key escrow encryption products that they will not be subject to unauthorized electronic surveillance. As we have done with the Clipper Chip, future key escrow systems must contain safeguards to provide for key disclosure only under legal authorization and should have audit procedures to ensure the integrity of the system. Escrow holders should be strictly liable for releasing keys without legal authorization. We also recognize that a new key escrow encryption system must permit the use of private-sector key escrow agents as one option. It is also possible that as key escrow encryption technology spreads, companies may established layered escrowing services for their own products. Having a number of escrow agents would give individuals and businesses more choices and flexibility in meeting their needs for secure communications. I assure you the President and I are acutely aware of the need to balance economic an privacy needs with law enforcement and national security. This is not an easy task, but I think that our approach offers the best opportunity to strike an appropriate balance. I am looking forward to working with you and others who share our interest in developing a comprehensive national policy on encryption. I am convinced that our cooperative endeavors will open new creative solutions to this critical problem. Sincerely, Al Gore AG/gcs ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 21 Jul 1994 14:34:24 +0000 From: Dave Banisar Subject: File 2--EPIC Alert 1.04 (Gore on Clipper) A letter from Vice President Al Gore to Representative Maria Cantwell (D-WA) sent this week during Congressional debate on the Export Administration Act has raised important questions about the current state of the Clipper proposal. Some have hailed the statement as a major reversal. Others say the letter seals a bad deal. Below we have included the letter from the Vice President, a statement from EPIC, and recommendations for further action. ======================================================================= [2] EPIC Statement on Gore Letter to Cantwell ======================================================================= News reports that the Clinton Administration has reversed itself on encryption policy are not supported by the letter from Vice President Gore to Maria Cantwell regarding export control policy. In fact, the letter reiterates the White House's commitment to the NSA's key escrow proposal and calls on the private sector to develop products that will facilitate electronic surveillance. The letter from the Vice President calls on the government and the industry to develop jointly systems for key escrow cryptography. Key escrow is the central feature of the Clipper chip and the NSA's recommended method for electronic surveillance of digital communications. The letter also reaffirms the Administration's support for Clipper Chip as the federal standard for voice networks. There is no indication that the White House will withdraw this proposal. Statements that Clipper is "dead" are absurd. The letter offers no changes in export control policy. It recommends instead that the status quo be maintained and that more studies be conducted. (The White House already completed such a study earlier this year. The results were never disclosed to the public, despite EPIC's request for release of the findings under the Freedom of Information Act.) This is a significant setback for groups expecting that export control laws would be revised this year. The White House expresses a willingness to allow unclassified algorithms and to hold key escrow agents liable for misuse. These are the only provisions of the Gore letter favorable to the user community. But neither provision would even be necessary if the White House did not attempt to regulate cryptography in the first place. The Administration's willingness to accept private sector alternatives to Clipper for data networks essentially ratifies an agreement to develop "wiretap ready" technologies for data networks. We believe the letter from the Vice President is essentially a blueprint for electronic surveillance of digital networks. The government will set out the requirements for surveillance systems such as key escrow, and the industry will build complying systems. The plan dovetails neatly with the FBI's Digital Telephony proposal, which will establish legal penalties for companies and users that design systems that cannot be wiretapped. We do not believe this is in the interests of users of the information highway. Key escrow necessarily weakens the security and privacy of electronic communications. It makes networks vulnerable to tampering and confidential messages subject to compromise. It is the approach urged by organizations that specialize in electronic eavesdropping. No group of Internet users has ever called for key escrow encryption. If this proposal goes forward, electronic surveillance will almost certainly increase, network security will be weakened, and people who design strong cryptography without key escrow could become criminals. This is not a victory for freedom or privacy. We support unclassified standards and relaxation of export controls. We cannot support the premise that the government and industry should design key escrow systems. We also do not believe that Clipper is an appropriate standard for federal voice communications. We are asking the Vice President to reconsider his position and urging network users to make known their concerns about the proposal. Electronic Privacy Information Center Washington, DC July 21, 1994 ======================================================================= [3] Letter from Gore to Cantwell ======================================================================= THE VICE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON July 20, 1994 The Honorable Maria Cantwell House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515 "Dear Maria, "I write today to express my sincere appreciation of your efforts to move the national debate forward on the issue of information security and export controls. I share your strong conviction for the need to develop a comprehensive policy regarding encryption, incorporating an export policy that does not disadvantage American software companies in world markets while preserving our law enforcement and national security goals. "As you know, the Administration disagrees with you on the extent to which existing controls are harming U.S. industry in the short run and the extent to which their immediate relaxation would affect national security. For that reason we have supported a five-month Presidential study. In conducting this study, I want to assure you that the Administration will use the best available resources of the federal government. This will include the active participation of the National Economic Council and the Department of Commerce. In addition, consistent with the Senate-passed language, the first study will be completed within 150 days of passage of the Export Administration Act reauthorization bill, with the second study to be completed within one year after the completion of the first. I want to personally assure you that we will reassess our existing export controls based on the results of these studies. Moreover, all programs with encryption that can be exported today will continue to be exportable. "On the other hand, we agree that we need to take action this year to ensure that over time American companies are able to include information security features in their program in order to maintain their international competitiveness. We can achieve this by entering into a new phase of cooperation among government, industry representatives and privacy advocates with a goal of trying to develop a key escrow encryption system that will provide strong encryption, be acceptable to computer users worldwide, and address our national security needs as well. "Key escrow encryption offers a very effective way to accomplish our mutual goals. That is why the Administration adopted the key escrow encryption standard in the "Clipper Chip" to provide very secure encryption for telephone communications while preserving the ability for law enforcement and national security. But the Clipper Chip is an approved federal standard for telephone communication and not for computer networks and video networks. For that reason, we are working with industry to investigate other technologies for these applications. "The administration understands the concerns that industry has regarding the Clipper Chip. We welcome the opportunity to work with industry to design a more versatile, less expensive system Such a key escrow scheme would be implementable in software, firmware or hardware, or any combination thereof, would not rely on a classified algorithm, would be voluntary, and would be exportable. While there are many severe challenges to developing such a system, we are committed to a diligent effort with industry and academics to achieve such a system. We welcome your offer to assist us in furthering this effort. "We also want to assure users of key escrow encryption products that they will not be subject to unauthorized electronic surveillance. As we have done with the Clipper Chip, future key escrow schemes must contain safeguards to provide for key disclosure only under legal authorization and should have audit procedures to ensure the integrity of the system. Escrow holders should be strictly liable for releasing keys without legal authorization. "We also recognize that a new key escrow encryption system must permit the use of private-sector key escrow agents as one option. It is also possible that as key escrow encryption technology spreads, companies may establish layered escrowing services for their own products. Having a number of escrow agents would give individuals and businesses more choice and flexibility in meeting their needs for secure communications. "I assure you the President and I are acutely aware of the need to balance economic and privacy needs with law enforcement and national security. This is not an easy task, I think that our approach offers the best opportunity to strike an appropriate balance. I am looking forward to working with you and others who share our interest in developing a comprehensive national policy on encryption. I am convinced that our cooperative endeavors will open new creative solutions to this critical problems." Sincerely /s/ Al Gore ======================================================================= [4] What You Can Do (Email the VP) ======================================================================= The Clipper debate has reached a critical juncture. The White House and industry are about to seal a deal to make key escrow the standard for encrypted communications. If you believe that individuals should have the right to make full use of new technologies to protect privacy, now is the time for your voice to be heard (and your email to be sent). EMAIL the Vice President at vice.president@whitehouse.gov - Thank him for the Administration's willingness to reconsider its views on Clipper - Express support for the decision to support unclassified algorithms and liability for key escrow agents - But urge him not to require key escrow as a standard for encryption products - Emphasize that key escrow is the soul of Clipper, the method for conducting electronic surveillance of digital communications - Call for extensive testing and studies before any key escrow system is deployed You should also: - Urge him to withdraw Clipper as a standard for voice communications - Urge him to support relaxation of export controls - Ask for the public release of the earlier White House study on cryptography - Ask for the public release of White House documents reviewing the weaknesses of the key escrow proposal The Vice President has clearly shown a willingness to listen to the concerns of the user community on this issue. Your letter could make a difference. ======================================================================= [5] Upcoming Privacy Related Conferences and Events ======================================================================= DEF CON ][ ("underground" computer culture) "Load up your laptop Muffy, we're heading to Vegas!" The Sahara Hotel, Las Vegas, NV. July 22-24. Contact: dtangent@defcon.org. Hackers on Planet Earth: The First US Hacker Congress. Hotel Pennsylvania, New York City, NY. August 13-14. Sponsored by 2600 Magazine. Contact: 2600@well.sf.ca.us. Technologies of Surveillance; Technologies of Privacy. The Hague, The Netherlands. September 5. Sponsored by Privacy International and EPIC. Contact: Simon Davies (davies@privint.demon.co.uk). 16th International Conference on Data Protection. The Hague, Netherlands. September 6-8. Contact: B. Crouwers 31 70 3190190 (tel), 31-70-3940460 (fax). CPSR Annual Meeting. University of California, San Diego. October 8-9. Contact: Phil Agre Symposium: An Arts and Humanities Policy for the National Information Infrastructure. Boston, Mass. October 14-16. Sponsored by the Center for Art Research in Boston. Contact: Jay Jaroslav (jaroslav@artdata.win.net). Third Biannual Conference on Participatory Design, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. October 27-28. Sponsored by CPSR. Contact: trigg@parc.xerox.com. Ethics in the Computer Age Conference. Gatlinburg, Tennessee. November 11-13. Sponsored by ACM. Contact: jkizza@utcvm.utc.edu (Send calendar submissions to Alert@epic.org) ======================================================================= To subscribe to the EPIC Alert, send the message: SUBSCRIBE CPSR-ANNOUNCE Firstname Lastname to listserv@cpsr.org. You may also receive the Alert by reading the USENET newsgroup comp.org.cpsr.announce ======================================================================= The Electronic Privacy Information Center is a public interest research center in Washington, DC. It was established in 1994 to focus public attention on emerging privacy issues relating to the National Information Infrastructure, such as the Clipper Chip, the Digital Telephony proposal, medical record privacy, and the sale of consumer data. EPIC is sponsored by the Fund for Constitutional Government and Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility. EPIC publishes the EPIC Alert and EPIC Reports, pursues Freedom of Information Act litigation, and conducts policy research on emerging privacy issues. For more information email info@epic.org, or write EPIC, 666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE, Suite 301, Washington, DC 20003. +1 202 544 9240 (tel), +1 202 547 5482 (fax). The Fund for Constitutional Government is a non-profit organization established in 1974 to protect civil liberties and constitutional rights. Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility is a national membership organization of people concerned about the impact of technology on society. For information contact: cpsr-info@cpsr.org ------------------------ END EPIC Alert 1.04 ------------------------ ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 22 Jul 1994 00:22:13 -0400 (EDT) From: "Shabbir J. Safdar" Subject: File 3--HR 3937 now a dead end; House Rules Comm results [updated July 21, 1994 shabbir] ********************************************************************* DISTRIBUTE WIDELY ********************************************************************* Table of contents: Introduction Result of House Rules committee vote Status of the bill 1994 Voters Guide ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- INTRODUCTION Voters Telecomm Watch keeps scorecards on legislators' positions on legislation that affects telecommunications and civil liberties. If you have updates to a legislator's positions, from either: -public testimony, -reply letters from the legislator, -stated positions from their office, please contact vtw@vtw.org so they can be added to this list. General questions: vtw@vtw.org Mailing List Requests: vtw-list-request@vtw.org Press Contact: stc@vtw.org Gopher URL: gopher://gopher.panix.com:70/11/vtw WWW URL:We're working on it. :-) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- RESULT OF THE HOUSE RULES COMMITTEE VOTE ON HR 3937 Based on information gathered by volunteers, we've been able to piece together some of the positions of the House Rules Committee as to how they voted for/against opening up HR 3937 to amendments on the House floor. [This is now somewhat moot, as is explained in the next section.] Extensive kudos go to Joe Thomas gaj@portman.com (Gordon Jacobson) who both did extensive work to help find this information. Here are the results we were able to obtain: [The committee voted 5-4 to open the bill] HOUSE RULES COMMITTEE MEMBERS Dist ST Name, Address, and Party Phone ==== == ======================== ============== 9 MA Moakley, John Joseph (D) 1-202-225-8273 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 3 SC Derrick, Butler (D) 1-202-225-5301 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 24 CA Beilenson, Anthony (D) 1-202-225-5911 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 24 TX Frost, Martin (D) 1-202-225-3605 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 10 MI Bonior, David E. (D) 1-202-225-2106 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 3 OH Hall, Tony P. (D) 1-202-225-6465 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 5 MO Wheat, Alan (D) 1-202-225-4535 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 6 TN Gordon, Bart (R) 1-202-225-4231 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 28 NY Slaughter, Louise M. (D) 1-202-225-3615 Voted "open" 22 NY Solomon, Gerald B. (R) 1-202-225-5614 Voted "open" 1 TN Quillen, James H. (R) 1-202-225-6356 Told a constituent he would vote for "open". 28 CA Dreier, David (R) 1-202-225-2305 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 14 FL Goss, Porter J. (R) 1-202-225-2536 UNSPECIFIED POSITION It is probably not worth the trouble to ask the remaining legislators how they voted unless you happen to chat with their staff often. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- STATUS OF THE BILL (updated 7/21/94) If you read the appropriate newsgroups (or any major newspaper) you've seen the news about the Gore/Cantwell compromise. Since everyone has reprinted it already, we'll not reprint it again, though we'll happily send you a copy should you have missed it. The upshot of this is that Rep. Maria Cantwell will not be offering her amendment and therefore HR 3937 is a dead end this year for liberalizing cryptography exports. Since VTW is an organization dedicated to working on legislation, and there is no longer a piece of relevant legislation, we will be concentrating on other projects. The "cantwell" section of our archive will be reworked, and the records of legislators that voted will be kept there for future reference. [NOTE: these voting records will also be rolled into our 1994 Voters Guide] Here is the final schedule/chronology of the bill Jul 21, 94 Rep. Cantwell and Vice Pres. Al Gore compromise on seven principles, retreating on the Clipper chip; Rep. Cantwell chooses not continue to press the legislation or the amendment (see relevant articles in today's NY Times and Washington Post) Jul 20, 94 HR3937 comes to House floor; a "good" amendement will be offered Jul 11, 94 House Rules Committee marks HR3937 "open"; allowing amendments Jun 30, 94 [*** vote postponed, perhaps till the week of 7/11/94] House Rules Comm. decides whether to allow amendments on the bill when it reaches the House floor Jun 14, 94 Gutted by the House Select Committee on Intelligence May 20, 94 Referred to the House Select Committee on Intelligence May 18, 94 Passed out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 18 attached to HR 3937, the General Export Administration Act Dec 6, 93 Referred to the Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade and Nov 22, 93 Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1994 VOTERS GUIDE Voters Telecomm Watch believes that you should be informed about your legislators' positions on key issues. We will be developing a survey to give to current legislators and their challengers that will gauge their positions on key issues involving telecommunications and civil liberties. These results will be made publicly available on the net for you to use in casting your vote in November. We'll be depending on you to help get legislative candidates to fill out and return their surveys. Please watch this space for the announcement of survey availability in the coming weeks. If you wish to participate in the development of the survey, feel free to join the working list by mailing a note to that effect to vtw@vtw.org ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 22 Jul 1994 17:15:55 EST From: David Sobel Subject: File 4--Sen. Leahy on Clipper Sen. Leahy on Clipper U.S. SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY Vermont ________________________________________________________________ STATEMENT OF PATRICK LEAHY ON VICE PRESIDENT GORE'S CLIPPER CHIP LETTER July 21, 1994 I have read the July 20th letter from the Vice President about the Administration's current thinking on Clipper Chip and, to my mind, it represents no change in policy. In fact, when this letter was sent, I would be surprised if the Administration even thought it was news. The letter makes clear to me that the Administration continues to embrace key escrow encryption technology, and stands behind Clipper Chip as a federal standard for telephone communications. The official standard makes clear that this standard applies to any communications over telephone lines. Those communications include not only voice, but also low-speed computer data and facsimile messages. The Administration is working on encryption technologies for higher-speed transmissions, such as for computer networks and video networks. The Vice President says that they want to work with industry to design a key escrow system that could be implemented not just in hardware, but also in software, that would be voluntary, exportable and not rely upon a classified encoding formula. The Administration said all this last February when the federal standard was approved. Yet, when Administration witnesses were questioned about the progress they had made in this effort at my Judiciary subcommittee hearing in early May, I learned they had held only a few meetings. Last week, the Appropriations Committee accepted strong Report language I suggested on Clipper Chip. The Attorney General is directed to report to Congress within four months on ten areas of concern about Clipper Chip. I agree with the Vice President that balancing economic and privacy needs with law enforcement and national security is not always an easy task. But we can do better than Clipper Chip. ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 23 Jul 94 15:31:03 PDT From: hkhenson@cup.portal.com (H Keith Henson) Subject: File 5--Summary of Amateur Action BBS Trial (Days 1-3) ((MODERATORS NOTE: The Amateur Action BBS trial has started, and Keith Henson reports on the proceedings from the first three days)) AA BBS Trial--days 1 and 2. Robert and Carleen along with their attorney had the typical problems of defending yourself a long way from home. The airline made them check their legal files, and then promptly lost them, plus all their luggage. So first day was a mess, showing up before the judge in traveling clothes--who ordered Richard Williams (their attorney) go out and buy a suit over lunchtime. (Robert actually went out and bought a suit for Richard. The luggage and files finally showed up--after enough time for them all to have been run through a copier.) All of day 1 and the first hour today was used up picking a jury. Richard did the best he could-- considering where the trial is being held. There was only one person who had ever been on a bbs, and the prosecution bumped that one. There are only 2 out of 14 who have know anything about computers, however, 9 of the 12 are men . . . . and he did get most of the thumpers out of the mix. I got tossed out after the opening statements because I am to be a witness to Dirmeyer's statements. I might have been of more use inside picking up the prosecutors abysmal ignorance than as a witness. Ah well, perhaps I can stir up folks out here to the injustice. Dan Newsom, small frame, gray hair opened up with a 1950's lecture on obscenity, here a prong there a prong, what a way to spend your life! He tried to explain GIFs, got to talking about faxes, then went off into a really sorry description of chat mode. He made an issue of the contents of AA BBS being wide open to the public (not true, it being membership) and made a big issue out of David Dirmeyer finding menu items which mentioned "teen" (And, so what? 18-19 is legal, and nudist material of any age is legal.) He went into the prosecution's argument that Robert had asked for the government's kiddy porn to be shipped to him, so it could be put on the BBS as GIFs. (Right, as if the AA Sysop would put up GIFs with titles and subject matter like "Little Girls Like to Fuck Too! He won't even let members upload GIFs.) Like Humpty Dumpty, the government's term for child porn is now "action mags," and *you* are expected to know this. Much of the rest of the day was spent on a computer class, with pictures of mainframes, monitors, keyboards and mice, plus diagrams and maps. Massive boredom was setting in . . . I have been peeking through the glass into the court room, and about 3:30 they did get to the first of the "porn" tapes. The poor jury! I am now glad they threw me out. Multiple hours of watching shit and piss closeups--and no popcorn! Out of the hundreds of tapes AA had, you would think David Dirmeyer could have picked out something with a little wider appeal. Each to their own fetish I suppose. Richard was watching Dirmeyer and mentioned to me that Dirmeyer (who must have seen this one a dozen times by now) was staring at the monitor--just transfixed. >From half a dozen peeks at it, I must say the technical quality was pretty good--you could almost smell it. :-) Audio was in German. (Far be it from me to judge other people's harmless (if disgusting) fetishes, but if the jury decided to lynch the prosecutor for subjecting *them* to other people's fetish material I would be happy to knot the rope. The variety in what people get off on out there at 5-6 sigma is amazing, and definitely not for everyone.) 5:20 improvement--the last half hour of the tape is of a woman masturbating--after 10 minutes, it switches to regular hetro sex. Strangely spliced. Jury is not any too happy at the prosecution for running past 5pm. The big unanswered question to me is *what* is the government (or this part of it) trying to accomplish? If they want to keep this kind of material out of the Bible Belt, there has to be more effective approaches than going after AA BBS in California. If they want to keep it off computers, good luck. PS--one dismissed prospective juror was a minister who said his son had been diagnosed as a "pornography addict." Can someone comment if there is such a classification in the diagnostic index? AA BBS Trial--day 3. More videos today. David Dirmeyer is still staring at them and occasionally adjusting his clothes. Dan Newsom sits a good distance away from him with a grim look on his face. The jury overloaded, and some of them dozed off. The case is not turning into a media circus. One of the local TV stations has been there, and one stringer for AP. Courthouse workers wonder by, stare in for a few minutes and wonder on shaking their heads as to why Memphis has to deal with Californians. I spent the day researching--partly looking into the different "community" standards argument. In my view, a person such as Dirmeyer who has bought the kind of hardware you need to download GIFs, has read what AA BBS has to offer, sends them money or a credit card, and goes to the trouble of downloading porn GIFs is no more a member of a "bible belt" community than someone who has moved to San Francisco. In fact, the physic distance one travels in just login on to the Internet is at least that far! It has slowly dawned on me that this trial is just a small wave on top of a major cultural clash which is going on today. It is the community standards of puritanical/ fundamentalist groups (serious Catholics--the few that are left, various Baptist related groups, Mormons, etc.) against the community standards which dominate the net. There is an excellent article in Time this week about the spread of net culture and its values as more people are absorbed into the net. In spite of the net being "everywhere" (I log on through a local telenet number in Memphis) there is a concentration of net people on the coasts and concentration of the others through the center of the United States. Among the major cultural differences--I would estimate well over half the people who read usenet news or get serious amounts of email are aware of "jury nullification." The login cookie for the machine I use is: "If the jury feels the law is unjust, we recognize the undisputed power of the jury to acquit, even if its verdict is contrary to the law as given by a judge, and contrary to the evidence ... and the courts must abide by that decision." - US v Moylan, 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, 1969, 417 F.2d at 1006 Similar quotes are in many .sig lines. Except among libertarians, knowledge of the power of juries outside of the computer field is rare. My other research took me to an adult video store. No question, they are tamer than the wildest you can get in San Francisco. But I did note that among perhaps a thousand they had all the standard ones, _Debby does Dallas_, _Behind the Green Door_ and, within 6 blocks of the courthouse where the famous ruling came down, _Deep Throat_. The case is clearly going to run over the week the judge wanted. The prosecution has more videos to show, I think the animal ones are next. In fact, the judge has to be away Friday. They had Dirmeyer on the stand today and are still on trying to make out that Robert ordered kiddy porn. I believe the argument now is that he did not *respond* to an email message about "action mags." I will get copies of the actual text, and will post the entire transcript. Since there is no chance I will be called this week, I am going back to San Jose to take care of business (Xanadu) till they have a better idea of when I will be needed. I will call Memphis on a daily basis and post trial news as I can. Keith Henson PS. I asked why the NAFTA argument failed. The court ruled on good logic that the entire agreement is a sham on the American public and a fraud on Canada and Mexico--because it has absolutely no authority to be enforced. That surprised the heck out of me, and it seems that the AA BBS postings have had an unexpected effect as far away as the GATT negotiations. Someone there is reported to have noticed the NAFTA postings, and as a result, the US will be admitted to GATT only if the agreement passes as a Treaty! PPS. The judge also ruled on the speedy trial. It seems that the airline losing their luggage and making them a few hours late allowed her to rule against them on speedy trial, even though the trial was 33 days over the limit! Well, my mom always said to be prompt! ------------------------------ End of Computer Underground Digest #6.67 ************************************

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