From @vm42.cso.uiuc.edu:owner-cudigest@VMD.CSO.UIUC.EDU Mon Jul 4 00:02:35 1994 Date: Sun,

---
Master Index Current Directory Index Go to SkepticTank Go to Human Rights activist Keith Henson Go to Scientology cult

Skeptic Tank!

From <@vm42.cso.uiuc.edu:owner-cudigest@VMD.CSO.UIUC.EDU> Mon Jul 4 00:02:35 1994 Date: Sun, 3 Jul 1994 22:36:00 CDT Reply-To: TK0JUT2@MVS.CSO.NIU.EDU Sender: CU-DIGEST list Subject: Cu Digest, #6.60 To: Multiple recipients of list CUDIGEST Computer underground Digest Sun June 30, 1994 Volume 6 : Issue 60 ISSN 1004-042X Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET) Archivist: Brendan Kehoe Retiring Shadow Archivist: Stanton McCandlish Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala Ian Dickinson Coptic Idolator: Ephram Shrewdlieu CONTENTS, #6.60 (Sun, June 30, 1994) File 1--Open Letter to Veep Al Gore in re New Computer Standard File 2--PDC'94 CFP-Artifacts session (revised) File 3--ACM Releases Crypto Study Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are available at no cost electronically. 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Digest contributors assume all responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not violate copyright protections. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 23 Jun 1994 17:12:16 -0500 (CDT) From: Wade Riddick Subject: File 1--Open Letter to Veep Al Gore in re New Computer Standard An Open Letter To Al Gore, Vice President of the United States of America A New Computer Standard: Fixing the Flats on the Information Highway The U.S. must manage the early adoption of industrywide standards that render emerging technologies compatible with each other and speed commercial acceptance. Such standards make it easier for purchasers to experiment with equipment embodying new technology and reduce the risk of committing to a technology that quickly becomes obsolete . . . In the U.S., technological standards are set with little regard to such issues. Large companies or government agencies set de facto standards... Unfortunately, none of these sources of standards has explicit responsibility for managing the standards process to best promote a new technology. - Robert Reich1 One important roadblock often missed by policymakers as they work to lay the foundations of the information super-highway is the incompatibility that exists among the operating systems and microchips that will form the highway's roadbed. When the Clinton Administration opened the telecommunications industry to competition, its goal was not to limit consumer choice, but rather to broaden choice by weakening narrow, monopolistic controls over technology and allowing small private companies to move technology in many different directions. None of this will be possible without a common standard to allow these diverse innovations to interact. Just as the national economy needs a common currency and a common language in which to conduct business, so too does the information superhighway need a standard through which its components can interact. Since the development of the U.S. Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) in the 1960s, the federal government has done an admirable job establishing network protocols, which are rules needed for seamless long-distance data transmission between computers. Without such standards, today's international computer network, known as the Internet, would not exist. The U.S. government, however, has not done a good job of standardizing the basic commands needed to operate computers-the languages, compilers, operating systems and other instructions governing the microprocessor (the central processing unit, or CPU, that is a computer's "brain"). These forms of programming instructions are the most valuable types of electronic data because they tell computers how to handle information. If an application (program) can be transmitted between two different computers but cannot run on both machines-the current norm in the industry-the application's value is limited. Companies like Apple, IBM, Microsoft, Intel and Novell have little incentive to create truly open or common standards for operating systems or microchip instructions because each company in one way or another competes successfully on the basis of differences in its products. Proprietary standards (where all rights to the standard are retained by one firm) are one way these companies can protect their research and development (R&D) costs from reengineering by competing firms.2 The Problem Just as the mercantilist nations of the last century forced their currency on their colonies and used tariff barriers to discourage trade with other powers, computer makers in the twentieth century have set standards governing the internal commerce of their products to the detriment of the competition.3 In the same way that 19th-century Britain bucked the mercantilist trend, maintained a free trading regime, and lost ground to "freeloading" traders as a result, IBM defined an open PC standard and bore the costs of maintaining it while clone makers got a free ride. With no need for heavy R&D expenses, these companies could undercut IBM prices by a significant margin. In the past, proprietary standards have acted as unfair exchange standards, making it unnecessarily expensive for consumers to move their investments in data-and particularly software-around from one platform (operating system) to another. This deters investment, just as the asset-trapping nature of a command economy or non-convertible currency was for many years a substantial deterrent to foreign investment in Eastern Europe. Consumers have started demanding more compatibility between systems, but companies have been slow to react. As _The Economist_ put it, "every firm wants a monopoly-and every firm wants to call it an open standard."4 Recently, corporations have begun establishing interfirm alliances to allow their systems to support "multiple personalities" (multiple operating systems). Future IBM computers will be able to run Mac software, while Apple's new Power PC will run Windows and OS/2, thanks to the use of translation and emulation software.5 John Sculley-the ex-CEO of Apple-points out in _Defying Gravity_ that computer designs can no longer be based just on the engineers' experience of using the system. No one company has the business expertise to design an entire system in a world where more diverse products have to be brought to market faster than ever. That speed requires higher levels of coordination, cooperation and standardization between companies. The current proliferation of cross-licensing agreements falls short of a universal standard. The incentive to sell incompatible platforms is still there; companies have just decided to rely on translation software that they make, called microkernels, instead of full-blown operating systems for their profits. They have failed to break up the operating system into individual components that can be built by different companies according to comparative (instead of historical) advantage. Someday, as happened with railroads and automobiles, a standard for interchangeable software parts will emerge, either through government intervention or the natural evolution of a monopoly out of the market.6 This monopoly will, however, require government regulation at some point to prevent abuse, as was necessary with the railroad and telephone empires. It is often forgotten why, how, and at what cost the national railroads were unified. According to John Browning, "like railroads, new information networks are increasingly being built in large, monolithic chunks, starting from the long distance links and working down to the local one."7 Long distance links were the last part of the national rail system to be built, because it took an immense effort to integrate incompatible regional networks- particularly in the South where there were only spur lines.8 In fact, railroads, highways and even computers9 to a certain extent have been built up regionally with government stimulus and later coordinated through national structures. Regional and local monopolies had to be granted so that proposed standards would be self-enforcing, since where there is incentive to compete, there is incentive to deviate from the standard and affect the distribution of market share. Railroads were easy to standardize because the tracks were originally built with iron rails that wore out quickly. Tracks had to be rebuilt often, so it was not difficult-given adequate financial incentive-to rebuild the gauges to a particular width.10 The advent of steel, because of its durability, might actually have threatened this standardization. Fortunately, just as steel was replacing iron in the 1870s and '80s, local railroad companies came together in regional alliances to standardize gauges and policies for transcontinental shipping, ending decades of chaos in the industry. These alliances greatly reduced costs to the consumer and spurred investment in new railroad technology. Some railroad companies concerned with standardization feared the emergence of a monopoly and tried to preserve their independence by confederating. They borrowed from the American federalist model of government to create their own tripartite government with a legislative assembly, executive branch, and judiciary for settling disputes. This structure balanced competing regional interests against one another and produced an efficient, egalitarian, state-of- the-art continental transportation system.11 Since the governing convention created by these small cartels did not include all rail companies, nor address all of the public interest, it collapsed when Jay Gould and others began forming large conglomerates. New, antidemocratic giants emerged, which Congress then stepped in to regulate. Either through market evolution or government intervention, such a standardization of CPUs and operating systems is inevitable. According to _The Economist_, the computer industry is rapidly becoming "a commodity business"12 with all the accompanying industry- wide conventions. This is occurring in an industry producing goods with the highest intellectual property content in history (hardly characteristic of most commodities). It is possible for government to move in now, avoid further costs of incompatibility and establish a forward-looking, flexible standard that will preclude the development of a monopoly and will reshape the way value is created in the software industry. In the process, the hyper-competitive aspects of the computer industry that have served society so well could be preserved. As the National Performance Review prescribes, government can set clear goals and act as a catalyst while allowing private actors to move the ball down the field. Because of the peculiar nature of information, such a standard need not be autocratic, nor would setting one be risky. The Japanese and European efforts to set High-Definition Television (HDTV) standards flopped because they locked industry into analog hardware before superior digital technology was ready. Immature technologies have never been successfully pushed on society. The software industry has almost the opposite problem-not so much inventing the wheel or prematurely setting it in stone as constantly having to reinvent it (in order to operate applications under different systems).13 A computer's instructions are vastly different than the regular objects that come to mind when standards are discussed. The instructions CPUs use are virtual; they are not materially dependent on any particular piece of hardware. As symbols, they can always grow and be reinterpreted, unlike manufactured products such as metal pipe, whose dimensions cannot be changed once cast. Corporate planners, long resistant to the adoption of a standardizing framework, are beginning to see the adaptability of computer code as an advantage upon which a new standard could be based. As the senior technical editor of *BYTE* put it, "the battle is no longer about whether to layer object-oriented services and emulation systems . . . on a small kernel . . . nor whether to build an operating system in this style but how to do the job right."14 The remaining problem is one of coordination between corporations in getting these new systems to work together. The Solution The essential features of such a system are easily described. The system could be called DNA, after its biological counterpart which binds all organic matter into the same competitive framework. While object orientation15-the way in which commonly used types of data are paired with the instructions needed to manipulate that data-makes data transportable and software highly extensible *within* a platform, DNA would make that operating system and processor object oriented so that both data *and* software would be transportable across platforms. In other words, when a processor receives a standard DNA message telling it to do something like add two numbers or draw a line, it will have a library available to translate the instruction into the host language of that particular processor. Under this system, it would be up to the CPU's manufacturer to supply the most basic translation libraries, but other firms could supply add-ons or extensions for functions too complex for the CPU to execute. This way, market competition could be used to set standards for new forms of data, instead of having the government mandate standards for immature technologies. A company marketing a product which uses a completely novel form of data-say a device for producing certain odors16-would have an opportunity to create its own standard for data by marketing a new extension for the DNA system. A competitor might also market a similar plug-in, and both companies could compete to gain supporters for their mini-standard. In the end, the best solution would likely win out. Companies would not have to worry about maintaining compatibility with an existing base because no previous software could produce odors. The uniform interface of DNA would allow individual firms to use their expertise to replace inefficient system components easily, thereby broadening the market for their products. If DNA contained a standard driver for reading keyboard input, for example, and someone wanted to market a new voice recognition device that would be compatible with past software, that company could make a substitute for the keyboard interface that instead uses the firm's voice recognition hardware. DNA would increase the marketability of the voice recognition device, because customers could buy the physical device without having to upgrade their entire software library. According to *The Economist*, "today all firms need a niche"17 in the computer market-and universal standards can provide the necessary framework. DNA would not pick winners, but would instead make it easier for winners to emerge. Systems would be built component by component on the basis of efficiency, rather than through political or alliance considerations. Much DNA code may have to be interpreted on each platform, but with a common object code standard each platform would be able to do this in the most efficient manner. If this standard's basic design is flawed or technology passes it by (since technology moves faster than anyone's capacity to plan ahead), certain instructions could be reserved in advance to switch to a completely new, but as yet unspecified standard. In the past, companies have objected to the slight performance degradation caused by interpretation. The Macintosh has been successful precisely because of the huge "toolbox"18 of standard commands it makes available to applications. Because programs "call" these functions in the system, instead of in the application itself, Apple has managed to reduce program size and smoothly maintain the system's evolutionary growth path. Apple's new PowerPC is the first example of a "multiple personality" PC capable of running under more than one operating system. The PowerPC uses a new platform and microprocessor, the 601. To run the old software, which is written for a 68000 microprocessor, the PowerPC interprets and translates that code to the 601. Reinterpreting the old 68000 instructions slows things down, but by rewriting the toolbox to run on the faster new 601, Apple makes up for that loss. Users see no performance degradation with old software and see tremendous gains with new software. Most of Apple's competitors are planning similar interpretation schemes for their new systems. Since an open standard requires some sort of monopolistic power, it is clear that if DNA is implemented, companies will no longer profit from the creation of monolithic operating systems. The way value is created in the software and hardware industries would be radically altered under DNA, as shown in Figure 1, but who wants to make money reinventing the wheel? Real money is made on the cutting edges of technology, and this technological advancement should continue to be driven by the free market. U.S. policymakers must think seriously now about how to keep American industries globally competitive for the next fifty years. By 2040, no software power will make money reinventing the wheel. In a world where microprocessor architectures are proliferating instead of unifying and where technical progress is speeding up in all areas of science, a DNA-type standard is needed, if for no other reason than to coordinate the diffusion of technical expertise. Only by making new technology generic, so that a user can plug it in and go, will the learning curve needed to use new technologies efficiently be conquered. Technology transfer needs to become more automatic. Many writers, James Dearing among them, have thought of technology transfer as a "difference-reduction"19 problem-one of trying to get users and inventors to share the same knowledge about an invention so that the person in the field knows how to apply it as well as the inventor. In fact, really useful technology gets put to uses never dreamed of by its inventors. The problem is how to insulate the information needed to use new technology from the knowledge of how it works-which confuses most consumers. The historical trend in U.S. technological development is clear; either government or industry will eventually take steps to stop this continual rebuilding of operating systems from the ground up. The real issue to be decided in the telecommunications debate is not over who owns the virtual asphalt or builds the on-ramps. The question is who will own the resulting computer standard governing the packaging of information. Any firm which wins control will have a power not unlike the government's ability to print money: the firm will control the currency of day-to-day electronic transactions. This fact is becoming increasingly apparent and important to policymakers. According to Admiral Bobby Inman and Daniel Burton, "arcane topics like technical standards . . . that once were viewed as the responsibility of obscure bureaucrats will increasingly engage public officials at the highest levels."20 There is already a consensus in the industry as to what features computers will incorporate in the next decade. It is also clear that some sort of standard for object code will emerge as well. Government, though, has several options for the role it can play in this process: (1) the Commerce Department, perhaps with some authorizing legislation, could call industry heads together and order them to set a common object code standard; (2) Commerce could accept bids from various companies and groups for such a standard; or (3) finally, the federal government could itself craft a standard with the help of qualified but disinterested engineers, and then try to force it upon the industry through the use of government procurement rules, control over the flow of research and development money or other economic levers. The recent victory of Microsoft in its case against Stac Electronics over protecting its operating system indicates that some reform of the intellectual property laws may be needed as well. Given the acrimony in the current debate over the definition of a much-needed encryption (data security) standard, it is difficult to identify the most politically feasible path for policymakers to follow in developing common object code standards. There is enough of a consensus in the industry and among users now to begin the search for a solution. A serious effort should also be made to reach a consensus with other industrialized nations, for computers are globally interconnected to a degree that no other mass consumer product has been. Government can prevent a monopoly if it moves now. The unique nature of information technology would allow a common standard to develop without locking the industry into risky, immature technologies and would accelerate rather than hinder innovation. According to Nicholas Negroponte, director of MIT's Media Lab, "an open systems approach is likely to foster the most creative energies for new services and be a vehicle for the most rapid change and evolution."21 Such an approach would simply provide a stable framework within which businesses could compete on the basis of their expertise and not on their historical advantage. This is what America's founding fathers designed federalism to do from the start: balance competing sectoral and regional interests against one another to spur competition and development for the benefit of all. By Wade Riddick Author Biography Wade Riddick is a graduate student and National Science Foundation Fellow in the Department of Government at the University of Texas. He received his B.A. in English from Louisiana State University. He can be reached at RIDDICK@JEEVES.LA.UTEXAS.EDU. Figure 1 Traditional Microsoft Windows -> Disk / Screen / Memory / Audio / ... -> User IBM OS/2 -> Disk / Screen / Memory / Audio / ... -> User Apple Macintosh -> Disk / Screen / Memory / Audio / ... -> User Currently users have to pick one complete operating system to run. __________________________________________________________________ New Systems - Microsoft Windows / Microsoft Windows NT -> kernel -- IBM OS/2 - User \ - Apple Macintosh - Microsoft Windows / Apple/IBM PowerPC -> kernel -- IBM OS/2 -> User \ - Apple Macintosh In systems being introduced this year, users have to pick one company's kernel and then another company's operating system(s). ___________________________________________________________________ DNA Common Standard Microsoft Apple IBM ( ( ) ) ) ( Disk + Screen + Memory + ..... -> User Under DNA, no one company will make *the* operating system. ___________________________________________________________________ Notes 1 Robert Reich, "The Quiet Path to Technological Preeminence," *Scientific American*, vol. 261, no. 4, (October, 1989), p. 45. 2 There are many different ways to accomplish the same task. Reengineering allows one firm to copy the functionality of another firm's design without exactly copying the design itself and infringing on the patent. If a plumber could not find 1" aluminum pipes at the hardware store, but had the proper connectors, he might instead use 2" pipes; this is essentially what computer engineers do. Most successful companies do not mind that others clone their products, because the technological frontier expands so quickly. One generation of chips may have a heyday of only two years. After that, a better chip appears that can do what the old one does and much more. Intel, for example, makes its money on the cutting edge of technology by selling new chips like the Pentium (i.e., P5) and does not mind that Advanced Micro Devices sells a clone of the older (P4) chip. Since it is Intel's chip family, users trust only Intel to release the next generation standard. If AMD tried to release a P6 first, no one would buy it because it might not be compatible with the P6 Intel releases. 3 Computer instructions can be thought of as forms of money because they control specific system resources. Just as societies accept the convention that a piece of paper with symbols has monetary value and can be exchanged for something tangible like a candy bar, computer makers decide that certain numbered instructions mean certain things and perform certain physical tasks on the computer. Operating systems are like political regimes because they set the rules for using resources and determine what types of money are permissible. Just as businesses in America will not take British pound notes because different symbols are printed on the bill, incompatible computers do not recognize each other's basic commands because different numbers code for different instructions-even though all computers can perform the same logical tasks. Unlike nations, though, assets cannot be moved across computer families because no convention for exchanging currencies exists. 4 "The Computer Industry: Do It My Way," *The Economist*, vol. 326, no. 7800, (February 27th, 1993), p. 11. 5 For a detailed description of this technology, see *BYTE*'s January 1994 issue. 6 The most likely stimulus for a desktop PC standard will come from interactive TV manufacturers whose profits are not made selling operating systems but rather set-top boxes. 7 "Get on Track: There Will Be No Info Highway," *Wired Magazine*, vol. 2, no. 2, (February, 1994), p. 65. 8 *The Economist* compared the development of the information superhighway to the "the railway free-for-all of the 19th century." See "America's Information Highway," *The Economist*, vol. 329, no. 7843, (December 25, 1993), p. 35. 9 If one thinks of the fragmentation as sectoral instead of regional (e.g., IBM mainframes in banking, Macintoshes in publishing and so on). 10 Companies used non-standard widths to force customers to use their railcars and prevent them from riding through their network without paying. The cost to efficiency was high, because transcontinental cargo had to be loaded and unloaded several times. 11 For an account of this standardization process see Alfred Chandler's *The Visible Hand* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1977), esp. pp. 130-142. Because these small firms had monopolies in their local markets, they had an interest in adhering to and maintaining rail gauge and coupler standards. In essence, they created one big monopoly, but one whose ownership and profits were evenly distributed across the countryside. 12 "The Computer Industry: Reboot System and Start Again," *The Economist*, vol. 326, no. 7800, (February 27th, 1993), p. 4. 13 Object-oriented programming seeks to solve part of this problem by permitting code reuse on particular platforms, but it has no standard and does not address the problem of microprocessor Babel, so objects cannot easily work across platforms. 14 John Udell, "The Great OS Debate," *BYTE*, vol. 19, no. 1, (January, 1994), p. 117. 15 Objects are ways of pairing commonly used types ("classes") of data with the instructions needed to manipulate them ("methods"). Programs then perform their tasks by creating or using existing objects and sending "messages" to the objects to tell them what to do. For instance, a line object might hold two values and a program could send it messages creating a new line, changing its location, or deleting it. This approach cuts down on redundant code. The programs that draw lines can share the same line object. Small objects can be easily combined into more complex systems. A square could be a combination of four lines. When a program sends a "create" message to the square, the square sends four "create" messages to the line object. 16 Presumably for virtual reality or pharmaceutical research. 17 "The Computer Industry: Harsh New World," *The Economist*, vol. 326, no. 7800, (February 27th, 1993), p. 7. 18 Toolboxes are large sets of functions provided by the operating system to applications. On the Mac, for instance, the toolbox draws windows and plays sounds. Programmers do not need to write their own code to do these things because they are provided by the system. Since all programs use these standard services, applications can be written faster and appear the same to users, so the learning curve for using Mac programs is much shorter. Other companies have adopted this approach and now provide extensive services through what they call an API (Application Program Interface). 19 James Dearing, "Rethinking Technology Transfer," *International Journal of Technology Management*, vol. 8, pp. 1-8. 20 Bobby Inman and Ray Burton, "Technology and Competitiveness," *Scientific American*, vol. 269, no. 1 (January 1991), p. 126. 21 Nicholas Negroponte, "Set-Top Box As Electronic Toll Booth: Why We Need Open-Architecture TV," *Wired*, vol. 1, no. 4 (Sept/Oct, 1993), p. 120. 1 Robert Reich, The Quiet Path to Technological Preeminence, Scientific American, vol. 261, no. 4, (October, 1989), p. 45. 2 There are many different ways to accomplish the same task. Reengineering allows one firm to copy the functionality of another firm's design without exactly copying the design itself and infringing on the patent. If a plumber could not find 1" aluminum pipes at the hardware store, but had the proper connectors, he might instead use 2" pipes; this is essentially what computer engineers do. Most successful companies do not mind that others clone their products, because the technological frontier expands so quickly. One generation of chips may have a heyday of only two years. After that, a better chip appears that can do what the old one does and much more. Intel, for example, makes its money on the cutting edge of technology by selling new chips like the Pentium (i.e., P5) and does not mind that Advanced Micro Devices sells a clone of the older (P4) chip. Since it is Intel's chip family, users trust only Intel to release the next generation standard. If AMD tried to release a P6 first, no one would buy it because it might not be compatible with the P6 Intel releases. 3 Computer instructions can be thought of as forms of money because they control specific system resources. Just as societies accept the convention that a piece of paper with symbols has monetary value and can be exchanged for something tangible like a candy bar, computer makers decide that certain numbered instructions mean certain things and perform certain physical tasks on the computer. Operating systems are like political regimes because they set the rules for using resources and determine what types of money are permissible. Just as businesses in America will not take British pound notes because different symbols are printed on the bill, incompatible computers do not recognize each other's basic commands because different numbers code for different instructions even though all computers can perform the same logical tasks. Unlike nations, though, assets cannot be moved across computer families because no convention for exchanging currencies exists. 4 The Computer Industry: Do It My Way, The Economist, vol. 326, no. 7800, (February 27th, 1993), p. 11. 5 For a detailed description of this technology, see BYTE's January 1994 issue. 6 The most likely stimulus for a desktop PC standard will come from interactive TV manufacturers whose profits are not made selling operating systems but rather set-top boxes. 7 Get on Track: There Will Be No Info Highway, Wired, vol. 2, no. 2, (February, 1994), p. 65. 8 The Economist compared the development of the information superhighway to the the railway free-for-all of the 19th century. See America's Information Highway, The Economist, vol. 329, no. 7843, (December 25, 1993), p. 35. 9 If one thinks of the fragmentation as sectoral instead of regional (e.g., IBM mainframes in banking, Macintoshes in publishing and so on). 10 Companies used non-standard widths to force customers to use their railcars and prevent them from riding through their network without paying. The cost to efficiency was high, because transcontinental cargo had to be loaded and unloaded several times. 11 For an account of this standardization process see Alfred Chandler's The Visible Hand (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1977), esp. pp. 130-142. Because these small firms had monopolies in their local markets, they had an interest in adhering to and maintaining rail gauge and coupler standards. In essence, they created one big monopoly, but one whose ownership and profits were evenly distributed across the countryside. 12 The Computer Industry: Reboot System and Start Again, The Economist, vol. 326, no. 7800, (February 27th, 1993), p. 4. 13 Object-oriented programming seeks to solve part of this problem by permitting code reuse on particular platforms, but it has no standard and does not address the problem of microprocessor Babel, so objects cannot easily work across platforms. 14 John Udell, The Great OS Debate, BYTE, vol. 19, no. 1, (January, 1994), p. 117. 15 Objects are ways of pairing commonly used types (classes) of data with the instructions needed to manipulate them (methods). Programs then perform their tasks by creating or using existing objects and sending messages to the objects to tell them what to do. For instance, a line object might hold two values and a program could send it messages creating a new line, changing its location, or deleting it. This approach cuts down on redundant code. The programs that draw lines can share the same line object. Small objects can be easily combined into more complex systems. A square could be a combination of four lines. When a program sends a create message to the square, the square sends four create messages to the line object. 16 Presumably for virtual reality or pharmaceutical research. 17 The Computer Industry: Harsh New World, The Economist, vol. 326, no. 7800, (February 27th, 1993), p. 7. 18 Toolboxes are large sets of functions provided by the operating system to applications. On the Mac, for instance, the toolbox draws windows and plays sounds. Programmers do not need to write their own code to do these things because they are provided by the system. Since all programs use these standard services, applications can be written faster and appear the same to users, so the learning curve for using Mac programs is much shorter. Other companies have adopted this approach and now provide extensive services through what they call an API (Application Program Interface). 19 James Dearing, Rethinking Technology Transfer, International Journal of Technology Management, vol. 8, pp. 1-8. 20 Bobby Inman and Ray Burton, Technology and Competitiveness, Scientific American, vol. 269, no. 1 (January 1991), p. 126. 21 Nicholas Negroponte, Set-Top Box As Electronic Toll Booth: Why We Need Open-Architecture TV, Wired, vol. 1, no. 4 (Sept/Oct, 1993), p. 120. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 10 Jun 1994 15:41:54 -0700 From: email list server Subject: File 2--PDC'94 CFP-Artifacts session (revised) ================================================================== CALL FOR PARTICIPATION-Artifacts session PDC'94 Third Biennial Conference on Participatory Design Chapel Hill, North Carolina October 27-28, 1994 Sponsored by Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility ================================================================== In the last few years, participatory approaches to design have gained adherents around the world. Participatory design approaches have at their core the involvement of workers in the design and development of new technologies and work practices that have the potential of improving their work lives. Collaborative design projects combine the skills and knowledge of workers who will use or are using the technology, with the technological and organizational expertise of those involved in its development. The first Participatory Design conference explored the historical roots of this way of working, by bringing European practitioners together with American researchers and industry developers. By the second conference, PDC'92, participatory approaches to design had taken root in the US, not only in research environments, but also at several commercial firms. The goal at that time was to take a further step towards defining and nurturing participatory design. In PDC `94, we would like both to consider our ways of working and to foster a substantial dialog among practitioners. The conference is an international forum where this emerging community can meet, exchange ideas and experiences, and investigate the incorporation of participatory design approaches in new areas such as: product development, long-term system maintenance and redesign, and settings in the developing world. We encourage the participation of all those interested in learning about participatory design and in trying it in their own settings, as well as those currently employing participatory approaches to design (possibly under other names). ================================================================== Artifacts submissions (including posters and demonstrations) The Artifacts program brings together representations, techniques, methodologies and technologies developed for or through participatory design. (A representation may take the form of documents and other objects that reflect work practices, designs, and associated materials, and should include both the artifact itself and how it is used in the work situation.) A contribution to the Artifacts program should be intended to be shown or demonstrated informally at a booth. The Artifacts program will take place in conjunction with the conference dinner and thus will not overlap with the papers/panels/workshops tracks. Submission Requirements: Description and motivation of the artifact and how it is used in practice (5 copies, maximum 3 pages). Include non-textual materials like photographs, videotapes, sketches, etc., if appropriate (only one copy of a videotape is required, and photographs may be provided in photocopied form). Be sure to describe any plans to engage conference participants directly in using the artifact. Each accepted artifact will be represented by a one-page, published short paper in the PDC'94 Proceedings. Please contact Michael Muller at the addresses given below to obtain a copy of the author's kit or consult the format/guidelines available through cpsr.org. The one-page short paper MUST be received in camera-ready format as part of the submission, due 15 July 1994. Brief description of artifact presenter's relevant experience and background. Any special equipment or power requirements. Submissions and requests for information to: Michael Muller, PDC'94 Artifacts Co-Chair U S WEST Advanced Technologies 4001 Discovery Drive / Suite 280 Boulder CO 80303 USA tel: +1 303 541 6564 fax: +1 303 541 6003 email: michael@advtech.uswest.com ================================================================== IMPORTANT DATES (in 1994) July 15: Artifacts proposals received August 1: Final versions of papers/panels/workshops received for proceedings August 15: Acceptance notifications to artifact presenters ================================================================== Accepted submissions and proposals from all categories will appear in a proceedings distributed to conference participants. We look forward to seeing you in North Carolina in the Fall of 1994. Sincerely, PDC '94 Conference Committee Bill Anderson Conference Chair Susan Suchman & David Bellin Local Co-chairs Susan Irwin Anderson & Randall Trigg Program Co-chairs Andrew Clement Panels Chair Finn Kensing Workshops Chair Annette Adler & Michael Muller Artifacts Co-chairs Elizabeth Erickson Proceedings Chair Erran Carmel Treasurer Barbara Katzenberg & Peter Piela Publicity Co-chairs ================================================================= PDC '94 Program Committee Annette Adler (Artifacts Co-Chair), Xerox Corporate Architecture Susan Irwin Anderson (Program Co-Chair) Susanne Bodker, Aarhus University Tone Bratteteig, University of Oslo, Norway Andrew Clement (Panels Chair), University of Toronto Yrjo Engestrom, University of California, San Diego Christiane Floyd, University of Hamburg Joan Greenbaum, LaGuardia College, City University of New York Judith Gregory, University of California, San Diego Kaj Gronbaek, Aarhus University, Denmark Jonathan Grudin, University of California, Irvine Mike Hales, University of Brighton, United Kingdom Karen Holtzblatt, InContext Enterprises Finn Kensing (Workshops Chair), Roskilde University Center, Denmark Sarah Kuhn, University of Massachusetts, Lowell Michael Muller (Artifacts Co-Chair), US West Advanced Technologies Charley Richardson, University of Massachusetts, Lowell Patricia Sachs, NYNEX Science and Technology Randall Trigg (Program Co-Chair), Xerox Palo Alto Research Center Eline Vedel, The National Bank of Norway Ina Wagner, Technical University, Vienna Terry Winograd, Stanford University / Interval Research ================================================================== For registration information write c/o Information Foundation, 46 Oakwood Dr., Chapel Hill, NC, 27514 or send electronic mail to suchman@ncsu.edu. For program information write William L. Anderson, Xerox Corp. 817- 02B, 295 Woodcliff Drive Fairport, NY 14450 USA email:band@wc.mc.xerox.com tel: (716)-383-7983 ================================================================== Conference information is also available via the World Wide Web at http://cpsr.org/cpsr/conferences/pdc94 or via anonymous ftp at ftp.cpsr.org in the /cpsr/conferences/pdc94 directory. ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 30 Jun 1994 16:34:47 +0000 From: "US ACM, DC Office" Subject: File 3--ACM Releases Crypto Study Association for Computing Machinery PRESS RELEASE __________________________________________________ Thursday, June 30, 1994 Contact: Joseph DeBlasi, ACM Executive Director (212) 869-7440 Dr. Stephen Kent, Panel Chair (617) 873-3988 Dr. Susan Landau, Panel Staff (413) 545-0263 COMPUTING SOCIETY RELEASES REPORT ON ENCRYPTION POLICY "CLIPPER CHIP" CONTROVERSY EXPLORED BY EXPERT PANEL WASHINGTON, DC - A panel of experts convened by the nation's foremost computing society today released a comprehensive report on U.S. cryptography policy. The report, "Codes, Keys and Conflicts: Issues in U.S Crypto Policy," is the culmination of a ten-month review conducted by the panel of representatives of the computer industry and academia, government officials, and attorneys. The 50-page document explores the complex technical and social issues underlying the current debate over the Clipper Chip and the export control of information security technology. "With the development of the information superhighway, cryptography has become a hotly debated policy issue," according to Joseph DeBlasi, Executive Director of the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), which convened the expert panel. "The ACM believes that this report is a significant contribution to the ongoing debate on the Clipper Chip and encryption policy. It cuts through the rhetoric and lays out the facts." Dr. Stephen Kent, Chief Scientist for Security Technology with the firm of Bolt Beranek and Newman, said that he was pleased with the final report. "It provides a very balanced discussion of many of the issues that surround the debate on crypto policy, and we hope that it will serve as a foundation for further public debate on this topic." The ACM report addresses the competing interests of the various stakeholders in the encryption debate -- law enforcement agencies, the intelligence community, industry and users of communications services. It reviews the recent history of U.S. cryptography policy and identifies key questions that policymakers must resolve as they grapple with this controversial issue. The ACM cryptography panel was chaired by Dr. Stephen Kent. Dr. Susan Landau, Research Associate Professor in Computer Science at the University of Massachusetts, co-ordinated the work of the panel and did most of the writing. Other panel members were Dr. Clinton Brooks, Advisor to the Director, National Security Agency; Scott Charney, Chief of the Computer Crime Unit, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice; Dr. Dorothy Denning, Computer Science Chair, Georgetown University; Dr. Whitfield Diffie, Distinguished Engineer, Sun Microsystems; Dr. Anthony Lauck, Corporate Consulting Engineer, Digital Equipment Corporation; Douglas Miller, Government Affairs Manager, Software Publishers Association; Dr. Peter Neumann, Principal Scientist, SRI International; and David Sobel, Legal Counsel, Electronic Privacy Information Center. Funding for the cryptography study was provided in part by the National Science Foundation. The ACM, founded in 1947, is a 85,000 member non-profit educational and scientific society dedicated to the development and use of information technology, and to addressing the impact of that technology on the world's major social challenges. For general information, contact ACM, 1515 Broadway, New York, NY 10036. (212) 869-7440 (tel), (212) 869-0481 (fax). Information on accessing the report electronically will be posted soon in this newsgroup. ------------------------------ ------------------------------ End of Computer Underground Digest #6.60 ************************************

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