Computer underground Digest Tue Aug 17 1993 Volume 5 : Issue 62
Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
Copie Editor: Etaoin Shrdlu, Senior
CONTENTS, #5.62 (Aug 17 1993)
File 1--CU News ("Software felons," "Valuing Info," et. al.)
File 2--CuNews ("Technofogies" and more)
File 3--Another BBS Seizure in Hartford
File 4--Call for Clipper Comments
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Date: Sat, 31 Jul 93 02:01:00 BST
Subject: File 1--CU News ("Software felons," "Valuing Info," et. al.)
A federal grand jury in California handed down felony indictments for
software piracy near the first week of July. These are the first
indictments under the law that makes copyright infringement a fel ony.
The indictments follow coast-to-coast raids over the past four months
where US Marshals seized over 9.5 millions dollars worth of MS-DOS
and Windows operating systems.
(Information Week. July 12, 1993. pg 8)
How much are your computer files really worth? The Information
Systems Security Association has put together a panel to create a
methodology for determining the value of information. Representatives
from Chase Manhattan Bank, Bank America, and Motorola are among the
panel members. The ISSA suggests that valuation can be determined in
three ways: Cost to acquire/develop/maintain the info, value to
owners/others, and commercial value.
(Information Week. July 12, 1993. pg 62)
Virus "fax vote" results
Information Week magazine recently conducted a self-selected survey
of IS managers and virus security. Some of the more interesting
Measures implemented to deal with virus threat:
86% purchased anti-viral software
Company practices altered as a result of virus threat:
49% use of shareware
47% downloading from BBSs
State of the virus threat during the past 12 months:
34% stayed the same
Number of machines infected during past year:
46% less than 25%
For the complete results in each category, and for other questions
and comments, refer to Information Week. July 19, 1993. Pgs 25 and
Holy Data Islands!
The Wall Street Journal (July 12, 1993 p B-2) reports that a company
founded by Ed Leonard has been farming out data for storage at
monasteries. Customers like the prices, and the dedication and
discretion of the monks is apparently unmatched.
(Information Week. July 19, 1993. pg 62)
Lotus and Novell have filed criminal charges against a man and wife
in Singapore after they were found guilty in a civil suit for
copyright and trademark violations. The companies obtained a court or
der to freeze nearly one million dollars in assets belonging to the
pair, who had sold thousands of illegal software copies in Southeast
(Information Week. May 10, 1993. pg. 8)
Computer Ethics Institute Conference
Information Week reports that Congressman Edward Markey (D - Mass.)
made the following remarks at the conference.
"Just because personal information can be collected electronically,
can be gleaned off the network as people call 800 number or click
channels on the television, or can be cross-referenced into
sophisticated lists and put on line for sale to others, does not
mean that it has been technologically predetermined that privacy
and social mores should be bent to that capability. (...) The
Constitution is a 200-year-old parchment, simply because we digitize
the words should not suggest their meanings change." Later, Markey
commented that "Real harm can be done in the virtual world."
Refer to "Ethics and Cyberculture" , Information Week, May 10, 1993
pg. 60 for more information on the conference and Markey's speech.
Follow-up on Epson America Email Case
Alana Shoars, plaintiff in a case against Epson America, reports that
she's "slogging forward" with the case. Shoars was dismissed from her
Email administrator job in January 1990 after she complained that by
monitoring employees' Email the company was invading their privacy.
Her wrongful termination lawsuit, as well as a class-action lawsuit
brought on behalf of 170 Epson employees, is in appellate court.
(Information Week. July 26, 1993. pg 62)
Political Censorship at Microsoft?
Gregory Steshenko was allowed to emigrate from the Soviet Union to
the US in 1987. Last September he landed a job with Microsoft as a
support engineer. Last month he was fired, he says, for sending
political messages over the Internet. Microsoft contends it was solely
for performance reasons. Steshenko's messages typically centered on
the political situation in his native Ukraine, and his view that the
Ukrainian government is more corrupt than the previous Communist
government. ( In fact, Steshenko was once imprisoned in the Soviet
Union for spreading "anti-Soviet propaganda"). He comments: ". ..it
looks to me like I've found another kind of Big Brother. In the Soviet
Union it was the party and the state. In the US, it is the
(Information Week. July 26, 1993. pg 62)
Fraud Free with AT&T
AT&T has announced a service that will help protect corporate calling
card users from fraudulent use of their card number:
AT&T Card Protect (sm) Service gives you real control over card
usage. To help prevent unauthorized use, we offer you a range of
measures such as geographic restrictions, purchase limits and
account passwords to meet your specific calling needs.
24 hours a day, 7 days a week, our Fraud Analysis and Surveillance
Center provides state-of-the-art security coverage for every one of
your employee's cards. It helps to identify unauthorized card use
in real time, allowing prompt action to be taken.
Dr. Dobb's Editor Speaks Out Against Clipper Chip
Jonathan Erickson, editor-in-chief of Dr. Dobb's Journal, writes
about the government's "clipper" chip in his July 1993 editorial. Mr.
Erickson begins by describing some of the antics and crimes of Ke vin
Poulsen, a hacker whose story is familiar to regular CuD readers.
After discussing Paulsen, the gist of the FBI's proposal, and the
clipper Erickson concludes with this statement:
Money and export concerns aside, the real issues remain those of
privacy and the government's attitude towards its citizens. What
we're witnessing is a fundamental shift from what we've considered
to be our Constitutional right to privacy to a view that the
government is privy to our most private conversations. This alone
is enough to make Kevin Poulsen look like nothing more than an
angel with a dirty face.
(Dr. Dobb's Journal. July 1993. pg 8)
Based on a survey in Macworld, an estimated 20 million US employees
may be victims of electronic monitoring on the job. Of the 21% of
employers admitting to checking up on employees, 74% had searched
electronic work files, 42% had searched workers' email and 15% had
searched voice mail. When the survey asked why, the nosy respondents
replied that their snooping was to monitor work flow or to invest
igate espionage and theft.
(Communications of the ACM. Aug 1993. pg 9 reprinted with permission)
Lax on Tapes
The Clinton administration has been blasted by a federal judge on its
promise to make good on preserving nearly 6,000 computerized White
House records that hold millions of National Security Council e mail
messages. In January the judge ordered the tapes copied for
preservation. As of late June, the judge threatened to fine the White
House and National Archives $50K a day for not complying with prior
orders each day the tapes aren't copied. Justice Department lawyers
have tried in vain to appeal the order, citing the timetable of the
task as causing "irreparable disruption of White House operations".
(Communications of the ACM. Aug 1993. pg 10 reprinted with permission)
Timothy Leary, the Harvard prof known for his hallucinogenic
escapades in the '60s and Virtual Reality experimentation of more
recent times, has designed the VR programs for Light, Wisdom, and
Sound, a new night club in New York. VR could be on the brink of
rivaling dance floors as nightlife entertainment. However, club
owners are worried that happy clubbers may never leave the private
VR sex room once they get in - it's one of the main attractions of
(Communications of the ACM. Aug 1993. pg 10 reprinted with permission)
Date: Sat, 7 Aug 93 21:38:00 BST
Subject: File 2--CuNews ("Technofogies" and more)
A survey by Dell Computer Corp found that technophobia is alive and
well in the United States. In a survey of 500 adults and 1000
teenagers found that about 25% of the adults has never used a
computer, programmed a VCR, or set-up the stations on their car radio.
About a third said they feared they might damage a computer during
normal use, and a quarter of them said they wouldn't use a computer un
less they were forced to do so. About the same percentage said they
still miss their typewriters. As you might expect, the results were
drastically different for the teens in the sample. Only 8% of them had
never used a computer. About the same percentage said they felt
uncomfortable using one without assistance. Roughly two-thirds of
both groups said they wished computer terminology was easier to
understand. Contact Dell Computer Corp for more information about the
(Information Week. August 2, 1993 pg. 46)
More on "Tiger Teams"
Harlan Crouse, a security specialist with the US Army, has a guest
editorial in the August 2, 1993 issue of Information Week (pg. 52).
Crouse responds to IW's earlier story about firms that use so-called
'tiger teams' of ex-hackers to test security. The following are some
excerpts from the editorial.
...using convicted computer criminals to do information security work
is the height of folly. We don't use former armed robbers as bank
guards and we don't use child molesters as sex therapists; why should
we trust our precious information to convicted felons?
Common sense dictates that if you something to valuable, you work to
protect it. That means all the time - not just when it's convenient
or when a security deficiency has become nearly disastrous. What would
you think of people who lock the door to their houses only sometimes, or
only after their houses have already been burglarized?
Lapses in security are almost always traceable, directly or indirectly,
to management's inattention to the need to protect organizational
assets. Yet managers are seldom held accountable for their negligence.
Unfortunately, it's the taxpayers, customers, stockholders, and
employees who pay.
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 11:58:26 GMT
From: Wes Morgan
Subject: File 3--Another BBS Seizure in Hartford
This was posted to Usenet's alt.censorship newsgroup.
> * Forwarded by MATT GIWER from the Main Board conference.
> * Original from DON KIMBERLIN to ALL on 08-09-93.
>Date: 08-03-93 (22:35) Number: 1089
>From: KENNETH PAVLAK Refer#: NONE
> To: ALL Recvd: NO
>Subj: Sysop held on $500,000 Bail Conf: (24) F-Law&Dis
>The Hartford Courant on August 5, 1993 (page b-4) stated that a 21 year
>old computer BBS operator was arrested for maintaining a computer
>bulletin board that had a bomb making recipe.
>Michael Elansky was charged by the West Hartford police with inciting
>injury to persons or property - a felony charge - and risk of injury
>to a minor.
>He was held in lieu of $500,000 bond (in CT the bond for a person accused
>of murder is normally $100,000)
>Det. Capt. James Gustafson said the case was "sealed" and no information
>could be released.
>Michal Elansky's father said information from the Anarchists Cook Book
>(Available from Paladin Press, P.O. Box 1307, Boulder, CO 80306,
>phone 303-443-7250) was on the bbs placed there by person or persons
>unknown; it was impossible for his son to keep track of due to the
>number of calls to his bbs.
>And so, Big Brother now says that passing along information will get
>a person 21 years old locked up on a half a million dollars bail, while
>accused murderers get out on 100,000 dollars. The newspaper did not
>say if the computer or the files from it were taken.
>Can the people who were on that bbs look forward to a "Visit" from
>the servants of Big Brother?
>Will they be arrested if they downloaded VERBOTEN information? Will
>there be MASS ARRESTS of people who have knowledge that is no longer
>Time will tell
>=== GEcho 1.00
> * SPEED 1.30 >01< * Remember, god works in meaningless ways.
>Internet: Matt Giwer@mechanic.fidonet.org
>Note: mechanic is a Fidonet<>USENET gate for TAMPA BAY,FL.
> The opinions stated in this post are only my own!
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 1993 14:23:16 EST
From: Dave Banisar
Subject: File 4--Call for Clipper Comments
Call for Clipper Comments
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has issued a
request for public comments on its proposal to establish the
"Skipjack" key-escrow system as a Federal Information Processing
Standard (FIPS). The deadline for the submission of comments is
September 28, 1993. The full text of the NIST notice follows.
CPSR is urging all interested individuals and organizations to express
their views on the proposal and to submit comments directly to NIST.
Comments need not be lengthy or very detailed; all thoughtful
statements addressing a particular concern will likely contribute to
NIST's evaluation of the key-escrow proposal.
The following points could be raised about the NIST proposal
(additional materials on Clipper and the key escrow proposal may be
found at the CPSR ftp site, cpsr.org):
* The potential risks of the proposal have not been assessed and many
questions about the implementation remain unanswered. The NIST notice
states that the current proposal "does not include identification of
key escrow agents who will hold the keys for the key escrow
microcircuits or the procedures for access to the keys." The key
escrow configuration may also create a dangerous vulnerability in a
communications network. The risks of misuse of this feature should be
weighed against any perceived benefit.
* The classification of the Skipjack algorithm as a "national
security" matter is inappropriate for technology that will be used
primarily in civilian and commercial applications. Classification of
technical information also limits the computing community's ability to
evaluate fully the proposal and the general public's right to know
about the activities of government.
* The proposal was not developed in response to a public concern or a
business request. It was put forward by the National Security Agency
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation so that these two agencies
could continue surveillance of electronic communications. It has not
been established that is necessary for crime prevention. The number
of arrests resulting from wiretaps has remained essentially unchanged
since the federal wiretap law was enacted in 1968.
* The NIST proposal states that the escrow agents will provide the key
components to a government agency that "properly demonstrates legal
authorization to conduct electronic surveillance of communications
which are encrypted." The crucial term "legal authorization" has not
been defined. The vagueness of the term "legal authorization" leaves
open the possibility that court-issued warrants may not be required in
some circumstances. This issue must be squarely addressed and
* Adoption of the proposed key escrow standard may have an adverse
impact upon the ability of U.S. manufacturers to market cryptographic
products abroad. It is unlikely that non-U.S. users would purchase
communication security products to which the U.S. government holds
Comments on the NIST proposal should be sent to:
Director, Computer Systems Laboratory
ATTN: Proposed FIPS for Escrowed Encryption Standard
Technology Building, Room B-154
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
Submissions must be received by September 28, 1993. CPSR has
asked NIST that provisions be made to allow for electronic
submission of comments.
Please also send copies of your comments on the key escrow
proposal to CPSR for inclusion in the CPSR Internet Library, our
ftp site. Copies should be sent to .
VOL. 58, No. 145
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (DOC)
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
Docket No. 930659-3159
A Proposed Federal Information Processing Standard for an Escrowed
Encryption Standard (EES)
58 FR 40791
Friday, July 30, 1993
Notice; request for comments.
SUMMARY: A Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) for an
Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) is being proposed. This proposed
standard specifies use of a symmetric-key encryption/decryption
algorithm and a key escrowing method which are to be implemented in
electronic devices and used for protecting certain unclassified
government communications when such protection is required. The
algorithm and the key escrowing method are classified and are
referenced, but not specified, in the standard.
This proposed standard adopts encryption technology developed by
the Federal government to provide strong protection for unclassified
information and to enable the keys used in the encryption and
decryption processes to be escrowed. This latter feature will assist
law enforcement and other government agencies, under the proper legal
authority, in the collection and decryption of electronically
transmitted information. This proposed standard does not include
identification of key escrow agents who will hold the keys for the
key escrow microcircuits or the procedures for access to the keys.
These issues will be addressed by the Department of Justice.
The purpose of this notice is to solicit views from the public,
manufacturers, and Federal, state, and local government users so that
their needs can be considered prior to submission of this proposed
standard to the Secretary of Commerce for review and approval.
The proposed standard contains two sections: (1) An announcement
section, which provides information concerning the applicability,
implementation, and maintenance of the standard; and (2) a
specifications section which deals with the technical aspects of the
standard. Both sections are provided in this notice.
DATES: Comments on this proposed standard must be received on or
before September 28, 1993.
ADDRESSES: Written comments concerning the proposed standard should be
sent to: Director, Computer Systems Laboratory, ATTN: Proposed FIPS
for Escrowed Encryption Standard, Technology Building, room B-154,
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD
Written comments received in response to this notice will be
made part of the public record and will be made available for
inspection and copying in the Central Reference and Records
Inspection Facility, room 6020, Herbert C. Hoover Building, 14th
Street between Pennsylvania and Constitution Avenues, NW.,
Washington, DC 20230.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Dennis Branstad, National
Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD 20899,
telephone (301) 975-2913.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This proposed FIPS implements the
initiative announced by the White House Office of the Press
Secretary on April 16, 1993. The President of the U.S. approved a
Public Encryption Management directive, which among other actions,
called for standards to facilitate the procurement and use of
encryption devices fitted with key-escrow microcircuits in
Federal communication systems that process sensitive, but
Dated: July 26, 1993.
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication XX
Announcing the Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES)
Federal Information Processing Standards Publications (FIPS PUBS)
are issued by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) after approval by the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to section
111(d) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949
as amended by the Computer Security Act of 1987, Public Law 100-235.
Name of Standard: Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES).
Category of Standard: Telecommunications Security.
Explanation: This Standard specifies use of a symmetric-key
encryption (and decryption) algorithm and a Law Enforcement Access
Field (LEAF) creation method (one part of a key escrow system) which
provide for decryption of encrypted telecommunications when
interception of the telecommunications is lawfully authorized. Both
the algorithm and the LEAF creation method are to be implemented in
electronic devices (e.g., very large scale integration chips). The
devices may be incorporated in security equipment used to encrypt (and
decrypt) sensitive unclassified telecommunications data. Decryption of
lawfully intercepted telecommunications may be achieved through the
acquisition and use of the LEAF, the decryption algorithm and escrowed
To escrow something (e.g., a document, an encryption key) means
that it is "delivered to a third person to be given to the grantee
only upon the fulfillment of a condition" (Webster's Seventh New
Collegiate Dictionary). A key escrow system is one that entrusts
components of a key used to encrypt telecommunications to third
persons, called key component escrow agents. In accordance with the
common definition of "escrow", the key component escrow agents provide
the key components to a "grantee" (i.e., a government agency) only
upon fulfillment of the condition that the grantee properly
demonstrates legal authorization to conduct electronic surveillance of
communications which are encrypted using the specific device whose key
component is requested. The key components obtained through this
process are then used by the grantee to reconstruct the device unique
key and obtain the session key (contained in the LEAF) which is used
to decrypt the telecommunications that are encrypted with that device.
The term, "escrow", for purposes of this standard, is restricted to
the dictionary definition.
The encryption/decryption algorithm has been approved for
government applications requiring encryption of sensitive unclassified
telecommunications of data as defined herein. The specific operations
of the algorithm and the LEAF creation method are classified and hence
are referenced, but not specified, in this standard.
Data, for purposes of this standard, includes voice, facsimile and
computer information communicated in a telephone system. Telephone
system, for purposes of this standard, is limited to systems
circuit-switched up to no more than 14.4 kbs or which use basic-rate
ISDN, or to a similar grade wireless service.
Data that is considered sensitive by a responsible authority should
be encrypted if it is vulnerable to unauthorized disclosure during
telecommunications. A risk analysis should be performed under the
direction of a responsible authority to determine potential threats
and risks. The costs of providing encryption using this standard as
well as alternative methods and their respective costs should be
projected. A responsible authority should then make a decision, based
on the risk and cost analyses, whether or not to use encryption and
then whether or not to use this standard.
Approving Authority: Secretary of Commerce.
Maintenance Agency: Department of Commerce, National Institute of
Standards and Technology.
Applicability: This standard is applicable to all Federal departments
and agencies and their contractors under the conditions specified
below. This standard may be used in designing and implementing
security products and systems which Federal departments and agencies
use or operate or which are operated for them under contract. These
products may be used when replacing Type II and Type III (DES)
encryption devices and products owned by the government and government
This standard may be used when the following conditions apply:
1. An authorized official or manager responsible for data security
or the security of a computer system decides that encryption is
required and cost justified as per OMB Circular A-130; and
2. The data is not classified according to the National Security
Act of 1947, as amended, or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
However, Federal departments or agencies which use encryption
devices for protecting data that is classified according to either of
these acts may use those devices also for protecting unclassified data
in lieu of this standard.
In addition, this standard may be adopted and used by non-Federal
Government organizations. Such use is encouraged when it provides the
Applications: Devices conforming to this standard may be used for
protecting unclassified communications.
Implementations: The encryption/decryption algorithm and the LEAF
creation method shall be implemented in electronic devices (e.g.,
electronic chip packages) that can be physically protected against
unauthorized entry, modification and reverse engineering.
Implementations which are tested and validated by NIST will be
considered as complying with this standard. An electronic device shall
be incorporated into a cyptographic module in accordance with FIPS
140-1. NIST will test for conformance with FIPS 140-1. Cryptographic
modules can then be integrated into security equipment for sale and
use in an application. Information about devices that have been
validated, procedures for testing equipment for conformance with NIST
standards, and information about obtaining approval of security
equipment are available from the Computer Systems Laboratory, NIST,
Gaithersburg, MD 20899.
Export Control: Implementations of this standard are subject to
Federal Government export controls as specified in title 22, Code of
Federal Regulations, parts 120 through 131 (International Traffic of
Arms Regulations -ITAR). Exporters of encryption devices, equipment
and technical data are advised to contact the U.S. Department of
State, Office of Defense Trade Controls for more information.
Patents: Implementations of this standard may be covered by U.S. and
Implementation Schedule: This standard becomes effective thirty days
following publication of this FIPS PUB.
Specifications: Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS
a. FIPS PUB 46-2, Data Encryption Standard.
b. FIPS PUB 81, Modes of Operation of the DES
c. FIPS PUB 140-1, Security Requirements for Cryptographic
The following terms are used as defined below for purposes of
Data-Voice, facsimile and computer information communicated in
a telephone system.
Decryption-Conversion of ciphertext to plaintext through the
use of a cryptographic algorithm.
Device (cryptographic)-An electronic implementation of the
encryption/decryption algorithm and the LEAF creation method as
specified in this standard.
Digital data-Data that have been converted to a binary
Encryption-Conversion of plaintext to ciphertext through the
use of a cryptographic algorithm.
Key components-The values from which a key can be derived (e.g., KU
sub 1 + KU sub 2).
Key escrow -A process involving transferring one or more components
of a cryptographic key to one or more trusted key component escrow
agents for storage and later use by government agencies to decrypt
ciphertext if access to the plaintext is lawfully authorized.
LEAF Creation Method 1-A part of a key escrow system that is
implemented in a cryptographic device and creates a Law Enforcement
Type I cryptography-A cryptographic algorithm or device approved by
the National Security Agency for protecting classified information.
Type II cryptography-A cryptographic algorithm or device
approved by the National Security Agency for protecting sensitive
unclassified information in systems as specified in section 2315
of Title 10 United State Code, or section 3502(2) of Title 44,
United States Code.
Type III cryptography-A cryptographic algorithm or device
approved as a Federal Information Processing Standard.
Type III(E) cryptography-A Type III algorithm or device that is
approved for export from the United States.
Qualifications. The protection provided by a security product or
system is dependent on several factors. The protection provided by
this standard against key search attacks is greater than that
provided by the DES (e.g., the cryptographic key is longer).
However, provisions of this standard are intended to ensure that
information encrypted through use of devices implementing this
standard can be decrypted by a legally authorized entity.
Where to Obtain Copies of the Standard: Copies of this
publication are for sale by the National Technical Information
Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, VA 22161. When
ordering, refer to Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication XX (FIPS PUB XX), and identify the title. When
microfiche is desired, this should be specified. Prices are
published by NTIS in current catalogs and other issuances. Payment
may be made by check, money order, deposit account or charged to a
credit card accepted by NTIS.
Specifications for the Escrowed Encryption Standard
This publication specifies Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES)
functions and parameters.
This standard specifies use of the SKIPJACK cryptographic algorithm
and the LEAF Creation Method 1 (LCM-1) to be implemented in an
approved electronic device (e.g., a very large scale integration
electronic chip). The device is contained in a logical cryptographic
module which is then integrated in a security product for encrypting
and decrypting telecommunications.
Approved implementations may be procured by authorized
organizations for integration into security equipment. Devices must be
tested and validated by NIST for conformance to this standard.
Cryptographic modules must be tested and validated by NIST for
conformance to FIPS 140-1.
3. Algorithm Specifications
The specifications of the encryption/decryption algorithm
(SKIPJACK) and the LEAF Creation Method 1 (LCM-1) are classified. The
National Security Agency maintains these classified specifications and
approves the manufacture of devices which implement the
specifications. NIST tests for conformance of the devices implementing
this standard in cryptographic modules to FIPS 140-1 and FIPS 81.
4. Functions and Parameters
The following functions, at a minimum, shall be implemented:
1. Data Encryption: A session key (80 bits) shall be used to
encrypt plaintext information in one or more of the following modes of
operation as specified in FIPS 81: ECB, CBC, OFB (64) CFB (1, 8, 16,
2. Data Decryption: The session key (80 bits) used to encrypt the
data shall be used to decrypt resulting ciphertext to obtain the data.
3. Key Escrow: The Family Key (KF) shall be used to create the
Law Enforcement Access Field (LEAF) in accordance with the LEAF
Creation Method 1 (LCM-1). The Session Key shall be encrypted with the
Device Unique Key and transmitted as part of the LEAF. The security
equipment shall ensure that the LEAF is transmitted in such a manner
that the LEAF and ciphertext may be decrypted with legal
authorization. No additional encryption or modification of the LEAF is
The following parameters shall be used in performing the prescribed
1. Device Identifier (DID): The identifier unique to a particular
device and used by the Key Escrow System.
2. Device Unique Key (KU): The cryptographic key unique to a
particular device and used by the Key Escrow System.
3. Cryptographic Protocol Field (CPF): The field identifying the
registered cryptographic protocol used by a particular application and
used by the Key Escrow System (reserved for future specification and
4. Escrow Authenticator (EA): A binary pattern that is inserted in
the LEAF to ensure that the LEAF is transmitted and received properly
and has not been modified, deleted or replaced in an unauthorized
5. Initialization Vector (IV): A mode and application dependent
vector of bytes used to initialize, synchronize and verify the
encryption, decryption and key escrow functions.
6. Family Key (KF): The cryptographic key stored in all devices
designated as a family that is used to create the LEAF.
7. Session Key (KS): The cryptographic key used by a device to
encrypt and decrypt data during a session.
8. Law Enforcement Access Field (LEAF): The field containing the
encrypted session key and the device identifier and the escrow
The Cryptographic Algorithm and the LEAF Creation Method shall be
implemented in an electronic device (e.g., VLSI chip) which is highly
resistant to reverse engineering (destructive or non-destructive) to
obtain or modify the cryptographic algorithms, the KU, the EA, the
CPF, the operational KS, or any KU, the EA, the CPF, the operational
KS, or any other security or Key Escrow System relevant information.
The device shall be able to be programmed/personalized (i.e., made
unique) after mass production in such a manner that the DID, KU (or
its components), KF (or its components) and EA fixed pattern can be
entered once (and only once) and maintained without external
The LEAF and the IV shall be transmitted with the ciphertext. The
specifics of the protocols used to create and transmit the LEAF, IV,
and encrypted data shall be registered and a CPF assigned. The CPF
shall then be transmitted in accordance with the registered
The specific electric, physical and logical interface will vary
with the implementation. Each approved, registered implementation
shall have an unclassified electrical, physical and logical interface
specification sufficient for an equipment manufacturer to understand
the general requirements for using the device. Some of the
requirements may be classified and therefore would not be specified in
the unclassified interface specification.
End of Computer Underground Digest #5.62