Computer underground Digest Wed May 12 1993 Volume 5 : Issue 35 ISSN 1004-042X Editors: Ji

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Computer underground Digest Wed May 12 1993 Volume 5 : Issue 35 ISSN 1004-042X Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET) Archivist: Brendan Kehoe Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala Ian Dickinson Copy Editor: Etaoin Shrdlu, Senrio CONTENTS, #5.35 (May 12 1993) File 1--My Thoughts/questions on the "Clipper" chip. File 2--Response to Jerry Leichter on Clipper Chip File 3--Response to Rich Mackinnon on Clipper File 4--Another Letter of Concern to "Hate Speech" Inquiry File 5--FBI Raids Telco Manager's Home (TELECOM DIGEST SPECIAL) File 6--DEF CON I Update Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are available at no cost electronically from The editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-6430), fax (815-753-6302) or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL 60115. 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(Finland) in pub/cud (United Kingdom) Back issues also may be obtained through mailserver at: COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long as the source is cited. Authors hold a presumptive copyright, and they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts unless absolutely necessary. DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not violate copyright protections. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 10 May 1993 22:10:03 CDT From: Eric Schnoebelen Subject: File 1--My Thoughts/questions on the "Clipper" chip. I've seen a lot of hoopla on the "Clipper" chip that the (U.S.) government recently announced, and I am not entirely certain what to make of it. I'm a little suspicious of the intent, as well as those who created it (who exactly did?). But, what I am more concerned about is the exportability of it, and how it is going to become a "world-wide" standard, which it will need to do, if it is to become accepted at all. The U.S. is no longer the center of the universe, and U.S. companies cannot afford to make two products, one for distribution in the U.S., and one outside. If forced to choose, many will choose to build the "international" version exclusively. Another concern is the lack of a description of the algorithm. The algorithm is needed if there are to be software implementations, and software implementations are sorely needed. I ask because I have been struggling with trying to get the NSA's last encryption algorithm, the Data Encryption Standard, exported when used for authentication. Our interpretation is that we cannot export any form of user accessible routine that implements DES, not even a crippled edition of crypt(3), which can do only password authentication. Needless to say, this has caused much concern amongst our European distributors and customers. We have spent the last two years trying to get an answer from the Department of Commerce about the legality of exporting a crippled version of crypt(3), which can do only authentication, and gotten basically no where. We were finally given the names of a couple of folks inside the NSA, but we're almost afraid to talk to them... If the "Clipper" chip is to be viable, it cannot have these sorts of problems hanging over it. The algorithms need to be publicly know, and implemented, and no export restrictions placed upon either the chip or the software. Otherwise, it is worse than useless. ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 11 May 93 17:11:42 -0700 From: Russell Brand Subject: File 2--Response to Jerry Leichter on Clipper Chip In CU Digest 5.34, Jerry Leichter attacked Mike Godwin's position on the open design principle. While Leichter is correct that in certain environments, an `open design' is fact neither partical nor appropriate. CLIPPER is doesn't present an instance of this. One of the reasons that an open design is important is so that you don't have to worry what advantage someone can get by stealing it. Because the a well tested is system is supposedly intrinsically strong, you are unlikely to have to replace MILLIONS of them in the field because of a person being single bribed to betray some of the secrets. [Of course in the CLIPPER system there are other people to bribe instead and even if CLIPPER had open design there would be other strong reasons to oppose it.] If CLIPPER is commonly used to protect corporate secrets what is the logical bribe price? I bet it is more than enough to buy a mere government secret but that it isn't enough to quickly factor an product of a pair of well chosen 1000 digit primes. Date: Tue, 11 May 1993 11:13:41 -0400 From: Mike Godwin Subject: File 3--Response to Rich Mackinnon on Clipper In article <> (Rich Mackinnon of the University of Texas government department )writes: >How much will the crippled encryption scheme really "chill" our use of >emergent communications technology, i.e., threaten our free speech protection >to the point that we may opt (if possible) to use other communication >media? The fact that it's an emergent medium increases the risk that it can be chilled. But note that the risk of a "chilling effect" is only one small part of my argument, and not a necessary part. Far more disturbing is the increase in the government's power to tell me what *general* forms I'm allowed to use when I communicate. >The threat of a warrant does not seem to have a wide chilling >effect on the use of standard telephones and postal mail--yet, the possibility >of interception is still ever-present. The use of telephones and mail was already a fait accompli when wiretapping became widespread. There was no chance that wiretapping would chill an emerging technology. Moreover, the character of e-mail is somewhat different from that of telephonic communications--it's less ephemeral and more "broadcastable." That is, it's easier to store and echo to large groups of people. (In comparison, it's somewhat more difficult to tape a voice conversation and echo it to the world.) What's more, encryption is likely to increase the expectation of privacy with regard to e-mail and all other communications that are encrypted. >Does not the warrant sufficiently address this balance? If you are asking whether we should rely on the search-warrant process to protect our privacy when we have access to encryption, my answer is "Why rely on the government to do what you can do yourself?" >If the protection that a warrant offers is not >sufficient to alleviate our fears of unwarranted search, seizure, and arrest, >then perhaps there are bigger problems to deal with other than encryption >schemes. Perhaps there are, but an individual does not have to ask the legislature for permission to use encryption. Not yet, at any rate. So, encryption enables an individual to tackle his own privacy problem without having to lobby for a change in the warrant process. Most theorists would regard this as empowering to the individual. >I'm nowhere near as qualified as Mike to offer an opinion on this issue, >but it seems to me that the "process" is exactly where we should be >focusing--the Constitutional issues are fascinating, but distracting. Sigh. The Constitutional issues will be the only ones we are left with. Imagine that we have improved the process and had lots of dialog with the Administration, and the Clipper initiative remains the result. If the process is wonderful and the result is bad, does this mean we have nothing to criticize the government about? >I have to believe that the warrant is an acceptable safeguard to both >sides of the balance. Given that, it appears that the balance has been >disturbed by an unilateral decision with respect to the Clipper Chip. This is a very charitable picture of the government's mistake, Rich. You seem to be saying that if the decision had been other than "unilateral," the government's decision would be unimpeachable. I beg to differ. The whole point of the Bill of Rights is to remove certain rights from political debate. As Melville Nimmer comments, a "balancing" test is never adequate to protect freedom of speech. As it stands, we have the freedom to say things to each other in secret (through encryption). Must we surrender this right to the government once the process gets better? > The >plan presented by the Clinton Administration, as far as attempting to >balance the concerns of government and the people, seems sound. The problem is that the plan "balances" the concerns of government in the direction of government. Many people have been critical of the government's insistence that being able to guarantee access to private communications is the cornerstone of law enforcement. No study of law enforcement I know of supports this view. >This is a political problem in that a practical solution is available, but >cannot be agreed upon because the process leading to that solution did >not allow for the necessary consultation and input to insure its acceptability. >I'm certain that once bruised egos are attended to and future assurances >of consultation are gained, that the solution settled upon will be very >much like the one that stands. This is the kind of myopia I expect from the University of Texas Department of Government, a department that privileges process over substance. I hope I may be forgiven for being cynical about the willingness of government professors to sign our rights away in the name of "good process." It's true that, historically, government has been able to compel a "balance" between our privacy rights and the government's often-legitimate interests. But now we have a technology that enables us to remove our privacy from the balancing calculation--a technology that restores the status quo ante of the last century, when sophisticated bugging and wiretapping technologies did not exist. I don't think the 19th-century standard of private interpersonal communications is so threatening to government stability as to justify mandatory government access to our communications through Digital Telephony and Clipper. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 10 May 1993 02:33:12 -0500 From: Dave.Harnett@F68.N272.Z1.FIDONET.ORG(Dave Harnett) Subject: File 4--Another Letter of Concern to "Hate Speech" Inquiry 23 Apr 93 Office of Policy Analysis and Development NTIA, US Dept of Commerce 14th St and Constitution Ave NW Washington, DC 20230 In response to Notice of Inquiry, Docket No. 930349-3049: I stand qualified to respond to this inquiry by virtue of my three years experience as the operator of a computer bulletin board and my status as a member of three computer bulletin board networks. In the five years before I established my computer bulletin board, I participated in discussion groups on other computer bulletin boards and networks. I harbor grave concerns regarding your inquiry, particularly your scrutiny of a relationship between computer bulletin boards and "hate crimes." I can summarize my position with a response to one of the questions you pose in IV.A.13 of the Supplementary Information section. Governments, specifically telecommunications regulators, have *no* proper role with respect to the content of messages carried over telecommunications channels. Computer bulletin boards are a truly democratic medium. Unlike traditional broadcast and print media, few barriers exist to preclude an individual from exchanging ideas via computer-based telecommunications. The medium is a great equalizer. In the absence of visual and aural cues that might reveal race, religion, gender, age, education, or disabilities, ideas become more important than the person expressing the ideas. Individuals are free to migrate among discussion areas, bulletin boards, and networks, even to start their own bulletin boards and networks in pursuit of a comfortable niche. This community without boundaries, sometimes known as cyberspace, is self-regulating. I participate in a network of computer bulletin boards that was forced to expunge a participant. This individual repeatedly engaged in offensive behavior. The community treated this individual with respect and tolerance, in the hope that our positive attitudes could deter anti-social behavior. Through informal means, the community reached an consensus for action. Sadly, some members withdrew from the community, to protest what they perceived as authoritarian censorship. However, this situation keenly illustrates that people are capable of resolving problems without interference from government statutes and regulations. My greatest fear is people who fear ideas, people who would use the force of government to stifle the expression of ideas. The legitimate role of government is to punish not ideas, but only actions that violate the rights of another person to life, liberty, and property. It matters not that some groups or individuals find some ideas hateful or offensive, or that ideas can prompt some sociopaths to commit violent criminal acts. Political speech can be highly offensive and even hateful to some people. The rhetoric of politician David Duke comes to mind. Historically though, the courts offer the greatest protection to political speech. Let us not allow the hysteria of political correctness to compromise the principles of a free society. If we have confidence in ourselves and our beliefs, we have nothing to fear from the forces of intolerance and hate. Sincerely, David A. Harnett Computer bulletin board - 914 452 4753 Electronic mail address - USPS - PO Box 188, Poughkeepsie, NY 12602-0188 ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 9 May 1993 14:59:47 -0500 From: TELECOM Moderator Subject: File 5--FBI Raids Telco Manager's Home (TELECOM DIGEST SPECIAL) ((MODERATORS' NOTE: The following is reprinted from Telecom Digest, available as a mailing list or a Usenet Group. For those who forget, Pat Townson, the TD moderator, was the original impetus in the founding of CuD)). This news report from the May 9, 1993 {Omaha World Herald} arrived in my mail just a few minutes ago. PAT (James R. Saker Jr.) Subject--FBI Raid on Curtis Nebr. Telco, Family Organization--University of Nebraska at Omaha Date--Sun, 9 May 1993 16:34:53 GMT The following article detailing a FBI raid on a small-town family and local exchange carrier was printed in this morning's Sunday {Omaha World Herald}: "FBI Probe, Raid Anger Curtis Man" Stephen Buttry, {Omaha World Herald}, Sunday May 9, 1993 Curtis Neb. -- The evening was winding down for the Cole family. Ed Cole, general manager of the Curtis Telephone Co., had dozed off on the living room couch. His wife, Carol, was running water for her bath. The 10-year-old identical twins, Stephanie and Jennifer, had gone to bed. Amanda, 14, was watching "48 Hours" on television in the living room. "It had something to do with fingerprints and catching criminals," Amanda remembers of the TV show. At 9:40 p.m., Amanda heard a knock and answered the door. In marched the FBI. Thus began a year of fear, anger and uncertainty for the Coles. Mrs. Cole, 40, still has nightmares about the night of May 13, 1992, when federal agents stormed into her bedroom, startling her as she was undressing for her bath, naked from the waist up. "I used to go to bed and sleep the whole night," she said last week. "I can't anymore." Federal agents did not find the illegal wiretapping equipment they were seeking, and a year later no one has been charged. The agents seized nothing from the house and later returned the cassette tapes they took from the phone company office. Ronald Rawalt, the FBI agent in North Platte who headed the investigation that led to the raid, declined to comment, referring questions to the Omaha office. "It's still a pending investigation, and we're not allowed to make a statement," said agent Doug Hokenstad of the FBI's Omaha office. If the investigation comes up empty, he said "we normally don't make a statement at the end of the investigation." That infuriates Cole, 39, who says the raid cast suspicion on him and the phone company and left them with no way to clear their names. "Either file charges or say there's nothing there," he said. "This was done in a highly visible manner, and there was no finality to it." Request for Help Cole has asked Sen. Bob Kerrey, D-Neb., to investigate. Beth Gonzales, Kerrey's press secretary, said the senator received Cole's letter and is assessing the situation. The case that brought FBI agents from Washington, Denver, Houston and Omaha, as well as nearby North Platte, to this tiny southwest Nebraska town in the Medicine Creek valley apparently started with a personnel squabble in the phone company office. Cole said two women complained of their treatment by two other workers. The women who complained threatened to quit if the company did not take action against the other women, he said. Cole and his assistant manager, Steve Cole, who is not related, observed the office workers for a while. "We found the same two making the ultimatum were the aggressors," Ed Cole said. He gave the complaining employees written reprimands, and they quit Jan 16, 1992. The two women contended in a hearing concerning state unemployment benefits that personality differences with Ed Cole led to the reprimands and their resignations. Both women declined to comment on the matter. 300-Hertz Tone In an affidavit filed to obtain the search warrants, agent Rawalt said one of the two, Carol Zak, contacted the FBI in March 1992 and told them of "unusual electronic noises (tapping noises) on her telephone line at the inception of a call received." Later in the affidavit, the noise is described not as tapping, but as a 300-hertz tone. Steve and Ed Cole demonstrated the tone last week on phone company equipment. It is caused, they said, by a defective 5-by-7 circuit board, or card. The defect is common, and the company replaces the card if a customer complains. The tone is not heard if a customer answers between rings, but if the customer answers during a ring, the tone blares into the earpiece for an instant, about the duration of the ring. Ed Cole, who has placed wiretaps for law officers with warrants, said wiretaps don't cause such a sound. "Most wiretaps, don't they have a loud, blasting noise to announce there's an illegal wiretap?" he asked sarcastically. Surveillance After Mrs. Zak told agent Rawalt of the noise on her line, the FBI began recording her calls, the affidavit says. On April 30, the affidavit says, the FBI began surveillance of Ed Cole -- not an easy task in a town of 791 people. During the weeks before the raid, phone company employees noticed a stranger watching the office and workers' houses. They guessed that a private investigator was watching, possibly gathering information for the former workers. "When somebody sits around in a car in a small-town Curtis, especially at 3:30 when grade school lets out, people take notice," Steve Cole said. "We had a suspicion that we were under surveillance." The affidavit says agent Robert Howan, an electrical engineer from FBI headquarters, analyzed tapes of Mrs. Zak's phone calls and concluded that a wiretap on the line "is controlled from the residence of Eddie Cole Jr. and is facilitated through a device or computer program at the Curtis Telephone Company." Based on Rawalt's affidavit, U.S. Magistrate Kathleen Jaudzemis in Omaha issued warrants to search Cole's house and company offices. Federal agents gathered in North Platte and headed south to Curtis for the late-evening raid. Flashlights, Commotion When Amanda Cole opened the door, she said "The first people that came in went past me." They rushed through the living room into the kitchen to let more agents in the back door. The agents wore black jackets and raincoats, with large, yellow letters proclaiming "FBI." Neighbors and passersby began to notice the commotion as other agents searched the outside with flashlights. The agents showed Cole the search warrant and told him and Amanda to stay in the living room. The agents asked where the other girls were, and Cole replied that it was a school night and they were in bed. Rather than flipping the hall light switch, the agents went down the darkened hall with flashlights, "like they think my kids are going to jump up and shoot them," Cole said. The twins recalled that they were puzzled, then scared, to wake up as FBI agents shined flashlights on them. The intruders did not enter gently, either. "After they left, our doorknob was broken," Jennifer said. Farther down the hall, the agents found the embarrassed and angry Mrs. Cole. "They didn't knock or anything, and I was undressing," she said. "They told me to get a T-shirt on." After Mrs. Cole put her clothes back on, agents allowed her to go with them to get the frightened twins out of bed. Mrs. Cole and the twins also were instructed to stay in the living room. Interrogation As agents searched the house, Cole said, Rawalt told him to step out on the porch. While he was outside, Mrs. Cole decided to call the phone company's attorney. "They told me I couldn't do that," she said. "I worked at the Sheriff's Office for several years, and I know no matter what you're accused of, you're entitled to an attorney." She called anyway. Meanwhile, according to Cole, Rawalt was interrogating and berating him loudly on the front porch, creating what Cole considered a "public spectacle." "I've lived here 15 years. I've built up a reputation," said Cole, who is president of the Curtis Housing Authority, chairman of the Nebraska Telephone Association, and coach of the twins' softball team. "And there's cars going by real slow. Here Rawalt brings me out on the front porch, turn on the light for everyone to see and starts interrogating me." Cole said Rawalt tried to pressure him to admit he was wiretapping and tell him where the equipment was. "He pointed at my wife and kids and said, 'Look at what you're putting them through,'" Cole said. Three-Hour Search Cole said it would take about 20 minutes for an expert to examine the phones in the house -- a teen line, the main line plus two extensions, a 24-hour repair prone that rings at his home as well as the main office, and an alarm that rings in from the central office. "The search continued for more than three hours, as agents looked in closets, cabinets and drawers. The family could hear Garth Brooks singing as agents played the children's tapes, apparently hunting for recorded phone conversations. At the same time the Coles' house was being searched, agents visited Steve Cole and Roger Bryant, a phone company employee who is a neighbor of Mrs. Zak's. "They insinuated I had broken into my neighbor's house to put in a wiretap," he said. The agents "asked me if I knew if Ed was making electrical devices in his basement." (Cole said he wasn't. Agents found no such devices.) The agents told Steve Cole to take them to the phone company office so they could search the switch room. Number of Agents The Coles were not sure how many agents participated in the raid. They saw at least five at the house but thought they heard others outside and entering the back door and going into the basement. They said seven agents were at the office, but they weren't sure which agents searched both sites. When the agents said they were looking for wiretap equipment, Steve Cole said "I told them it just couldn't be right. If Ed were to do something or I were to do something, the other one would know." Steve Cole said agents searching the phone company, including Howan, did not appear to understand the equipment very well. They would not tell him why they suspected a wiretap. After 1 a.m., Ed Cole said, the search of his house ended, with agents empty-handed and taking him to the office. About 4 a.m., the agents told Steve Cole about the 300-hertz tone. "The minute they told me, I knew what it was," he said. He said he quickly found the defective card for Mrs. Zak's line, demonstrated the sound for the agents, then replaced it and showed that the sound was gone. "I demonstrated it, and then they both got white," Steve Cole said. Card Analyzed Howan then went to Rawalt, who was with Ed Cole outside the switch room and explained what had caused the tone, Ed and Steve Cole said. "I'm jubilant," Ed Cole recalled thinking. "I've been exonerated." But he said Rawalt told him: "I've investigated this for two months. I've flown agents in from around the country ... I may charge you on circumstantial evidence." "My heart just sunk," Cole said, "because that means they're not here to find the truth. They're just trying to support their pre- conceived ideas." He said Rawalt told him he would take the card for analysis. Cole said the searches could have, and should have, been conducted without the embarrassing fanfare -- during normal business hours, while the children were in school and his wife was at work. Because of the highly public nature of the raid, Cole said, the company has hired a lawyer to investigate the investigation. The company is trying, with little success, Cole said, to get information from the FBI so it can reassure regulators, lenders, stockholders and customers of the company's integrity. Tapes of Calls Rawalt visited the Cole's house again in January. Although this time it wasn't a raid, his presence upset the family. He returned tapes seized in the raid but told Cole that the circuit card was still at the FBI lab being analyzed. It still has not been returned, Cole said. "The FBI, the most respected law enforcement agency in the world, has had this card in their laboratory in Washington, D.C., for almost one year, and they still cannot determine if it has a tape recorder strapped to it," Cole said. The bureau also has refused to give the phone company of its tapes of Mrs. Zak's phone calls, which could show whether the sound on her line was the tone from the defective card, Cole said. "It makes one wonder if they'd put a family and a company through this just because they don't want to admit a mistake," he said. "If they'll just give me my life back by making a public statement, it would be over." (End of article forwarded to TELECOM Digest.) Jamie Saker Systems Engineer Business/MIS Major Telenational Communications Univ. Nebraska at Omaha (402) 392-7548 [Moderator's Note: Thank you very much for sending along this report. This is just another example of the clumsy, oafish and unprofessional organization which has become such a big joke in recent years in the USA: The Federal Bureau of Inquisition. Imagine: a telephone line out of order which turns into a massive FBI assault on a private family. And of course there will be no apology; no reparations; nothing like that. The FBI is too arrogant and powerful to bother with making amends for the damage they have done. I hope Ed Cole and his telco demand and obtain revenge on everyone concerned, including first and foremost Mrs. Zak, the scorned woman who set the whole thing in motion when she got fired for her bad attitude at work. I know if it was myself, I would not be content until I had turned the screws very hard on all of them, especially her. PAT] ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 12 May 1993 17:00:53 PDT From: "The Dark Tangent" Subject: File 6--DEF CON I Update D E F C O N I C O N V E N T I O N >> READ AND DISTRIBUTE AND READ AND DISTRIBUTE AND READ AND DISTRIBUTE << Finalized Announcement: 5/08/1993 We are proud to announce the 1st annual Def Con. If you are at all familiar with any of the previous Con's, then you will have a good idea of what DEF CON I will be like. If you don't have any experience with Con's, they are an event on the order of a pilgrimage to Mecca for the underground. They are a mind-blowing orgy of information exchange, viewpoints, speeches, education, enlightenment... And most of all sheer, unchecked PARTYING. It is an event that you must experience at least once in your lifetime. The partying aside, it is a wonderful opportunity to met some of the celebrities of the underground computer scene. And those that shape its destiny - the lawyers, libertarians, and most of all the other There will be plenty of open-ended discussion on security, telephones and other topics. As well as what TIME magazine calls the "Cyberpunk Movement". Las Vegas, is as you might have guessed a great choice for the Con. Gambling, loads of hotels and facilities, cheap air fare and room rates. It's also in the West Coast making it more available to a different crowd than the former Cons have been. Your foray into the scene and your life will be forever incomplete if by some chance you miss out on DEF CON I. Plan to be there! WHO: You know who you are. WHAT: Super Blowout Party Fest, with Speakers and Activities. WHERE: Las Vegas, Nevada WHEN: July 9th, 10th and 11th (Fri, Sat, Sun) 1993 WHY: To meet all the other people out there you've been talking to for months and months, and get some solid information instead of rumors. DESCRIPTION: So you're bored, and have never gone to a convention? You want to meet all the other members of the so called 'computer underground'? You've been calling BBS systems for a long time now, and you definitely have been interacting on the national networks. You've bullshitted with the best, and now it's time to meet them in Vegas! For me I've been networking for years, and now I'll get a chance to meet everyone in the flesh. Get together with a group of your friends and make the journey. We cordially invite all hackers/phreaks, techno-rats, programmers, writers, activists, lawyers, philosophers, politicians, security officials, cyberpunks and all network sysops and users to attend. DEF CON I will be over the weekend in the middle of down town Las Vegas at the Sands Hotel. Why Las Vegas? Well the West Coast hasn't had a good Convention that I can remember, and Las Vegas is the place to do it. Cheap food, alcohol, lots of entertainment and, like us, it never sleeps. We will have a convention room open 24 hours so everyone can meet and plan and scheme till they pass out. Events and speakers will be there to provide distraction and some actual information and experiences from this loosely knit community. This is an initial announcement. It is meant only to alert you to the time, dates and location of the convention. Future announcements will inform you about specific speakers and events. An information pack is FTPable off of the internet at, in the cd/pub/dtangent directory. The IP# is Information updates will be posted there in the future as well as scanned map images and updated speaker lists. FINAL NOTES: COST: How you get there is up to you, but United Airlines will be the official carrier (meaning if you fly you get a 5% to 10% price reduction off the cheapest available fare at the time of ticket purchase) When buying airline tickets, call 1-800-521-4041 and reference meeting ID# 540ii. Hotel Rooms will cost $62 per night for a double occupancy room. Get your friends together and split the cost to $31. Food is inexpensive. The entertainment is free inside the hotel. Reference the DEF CON I convention when registering, as we have a block of rooms locked out, but once they go it will be first come, fist serve. Call 1-800-634-6901 for the reservations desk. The convention itself will cost $30 at the door, or $15 in advance. It pays to register in advance! Also it helps us plan and cover expenses! Mail checks/money orders/cashiers checks to: DEF CON I, 2709 East Madison Street, #102, Seattle, WA, 98112. Make them payable to: "DEF CON" we're not tring to make money, we will be tring to cover costs of the conference room and hotel plus air fair for the speakers who require it. Don't bother mailing it a week in andvance, that just won't happen. Advanced registration gets you a groovy 24 bit color pre-generated name tag. Include with your payment the name you want listed, your association/group affiliation/bbs/whatever, email address, and/or bbs number for sysops. Last day for the registrations to reach me will be July 1st. SPEAKERS: We have solicited speakers from all aspects of the computer underground and associated culture (Law, Media, Software Companies, Cracking Groups, Hacking Groups, Magazine Editors, Etc.) If you know of someone interested in speaking on a self selected topic, please contact The Dark Tangent to discuss it. FOR MORE INFORMATION: For initial comments, requests for more information, information about speaking at the event, or maps to the section where prostitution is legal outside Las Vegas (Just Kidding) Contact The Dark Tangent by leaving me mail at: on the InterNet. Or call: 0-700-TANGENT for conference information/updates and to leave questions or comments. Or Snail Mail (U.S. Postal Service) it to DEF CON, 2709 East Madison Street, #102, Seattle, WA, 98112. Future information updates will pertain to the speaking agenda. ++++++++++++++++++++++ Updates since the last announcement: >> The Secret Service is too busy to attend. >> New Media Magazine, Unix World and Robert X. Cringly have stated they will attend. >> We got a voice mail system working (I think) for comments and questions. >> We don't have enough $$$ to fly out the EFF or Phillip Zimmerman (Author of PGP) or Loyd Blankenship. >> Judy Clark will be representing the CPSR and a few other organizations Don't forget to bring a poster / banner representing any of the groups you belong to. I want to cover the conference room walls with a display of all the various groups / people attending. (Break out the crayons and markers) +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++= DEF CON I CONVENTION [PROPOSED SPEAKING SCHEDULE 5.08.1993] Saturday the 10th of July 10am, Sands Hotel, Las Vegas INTRODUCTION Welcome to the convention *The Dark Tangent (CON Organizer) Keynote speaker Cyberspace, Society, crime and the future. To hack or not to hack, that is not the question *Ray Kaplan Civil Libertarians -CPSR Computer Privacy/1st Amendment/Encryption *Judy Clark -USC Comp. Law Legalities of BBS Operation, message content laws and network concerns. *Allen Grogan, Editor of Computer Lawyer 'The Underworld' -Networking Concerns of National Networking of CCi Net. *Midnight Sorrow. Corporations -Packet Switching SPRINT Concerns/security and the future MCI of packet switching. (*Jim Black, MCI Systems Integrity) System 75 Common misbeliefs and rumors of the underground *Scott Simpson -Virtual Reality The law, and it's intersection with VR *Karnow -System Administrator Security Concerns of an Administrator *Terminus The 'Underworld' -Internet The security problems with Internet/Networks Overview of hacking *Dark Druid -Getting Busted The process of getting "busted" *Count Zero -How to be a nobody Hiding your identity in the high-tech future, or The payphone is your friend. *Anonymous -The Prosecutors Their concerns/problems and Hacker Hunters suggestions for the 'underworld'/Q&A -The Media The effect of the media on public perceptions *Erik Bloodaxe / Phrack Magazine CONCLUSION General Q&A This itinerary is proposed, and topics and speakers will be marked as permanent once a confirmation is recieved. This is by no means the exact format of DEF CON I. Any Questions / Comments Contact: Voice Mail 0-700-TANGENT ++++++++++++++++++++++++ Sorry for the huge signature, but I like privacy on sensitive matters. +-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.2 mQCNAiviMB8AAAEEANO4XmnggG8h8XWtfxShMvRUarlpj2OBSPMrzUNRAKEjupUj f/FfszMk0G60GSiCfiosw/m2JcKPQ6OZgQCxfElFUcYkKx/rYjgU3viEmNasjAwN jR/9l0WSXlv4CjCUtH/t4rm1C1bs8i6iznmu/dCeuUEZQoRm0Lrdt/10TGt3AAUT tCtUaGUgRGFyayBUYW5nZW50IDxkdGFuZ2VudEBkdGFuZ2VudC53YS5jb20+ =DxKN +-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- ------------------------------ End of Computer Underground Digest #5.35 ************************************


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