Computer underground Digest Sun Feb 14, 1993 Volume 5 : Issue 13 ISSN 1004-042X Editors: J

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Computer underground Digest Sun Feb 14, 1993 Volume 5 : Issue 13 ISSN 1004-042X Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET) Archivist: Brendan Kehoe Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala Copy Editor: Etaion Shrdlu, Seniur CONTENTS, #5.13 (Feb 14, 1993) File 1--Talking with the Underground File 2--System Surfing at U-Cal/Davis File 3--Unemployed Programmers Turning their Talents to Evil File 4--"Hackers" take on the UFOs? Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are available at no cost from tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu. The editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-6430), fax (815-753-6302) or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL 60115. 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Digest contributors assume all responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not violate copyright protections. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: 23 Jan 1993 16:14:31 -0700 (MST) From: Subject: File 1--Talking with the Underground (Previously published in the Computer Security Institute's newsletter - The Alert - and the French Chaos Computer Club's Chaos Digest) Talking with the underground by Ray Kaplan and Joe Kovara Information about system and network vulnerabilities is sparse, not readily available and carefully guarded by those segments of the security community that collect and control it. Given that the legitimate security community won't share information about vulnerabilities with us, isn't it logical that we include outsiders (the computer underground or ex-computer criminals) in these discussions. Amid criticism, we decided to let the community ask the advice of experts the crackers who have successfully cracked computer networks. Exploring the details of vulnerabilities Over 300 participants at 25 sites in US, Canada, Europe and Mexico joined law enforcement, members of the security community, and former members of the computer underground as we explored these questions in the November 24, 1992, audio teleconference entitled System and Network Security: How You Will Be Attacked and What to do About It. Our guests included Kevin Mitnick and Lenny DiCicco, who successfully penetrated a range of networks and telephone systems. They were both sentenced in federal court after successfully penetrating Digital Equipment Corporation's computer network in 1988. They stole the source code to VMS, Digital's widely used operating system. Their exploits were profiled in the book Cyberpunk: Outlaws and Hackers on the Computer Frontier, by Katie Hafner and John Markoff (1991, Simon and Schuster). Our panelists included Hal Hendershot, head of the FBI Computer Crime Unit in Washington D.C.; Don Delaney, Senior Investigator with the New York State Police; Computer security consultant Dave Johnson of Talon Systems (Los Alto, CA); Robert Clyde, V.P. of the Security Products Group, RAXCO, Inc.; and Lew, the organizational director of automation for a medium size company a former cracker. The panelists shared their considerable experience and discussed techniques used to break in to computer networks. Among the penetration techniques discussed were the uses of psychological subversion, telecommunications monitoring techniques, and the exploitation of known system and network bugs. Despite the popularity of these attack techniques, they are little known outside of the computer underground and the computer security community. Panelists issue stern warnings about telecommunications security Don Delaney stated that tremendous loss of money from both toll and Private Branch eXchange (PBX) fraud is whats happening in the telecom area. Since the security of a PBX is the responsibility of its owner, such losses are not being absorbed by the telephone companies involved. These losses have been known to force the owners of compromised PBXs into bankruptcy. Delaney joins us in saying that its not a matter of if you will be hit, but when. According to DiCicco, compromising the telephone system gave he and Kevin the ability to attack systems without the fear of discovery - telco tracebacks were simply ineffective. They could attack networks at many different points of entry all over the country. This is why no one could keep them out, even though their victims knew their systems and networks had been compromised. If all of this does not scare you, consider Lenny's admission that at one point he and Kevin had compromised over 50 telco switches in the United States, including all of California, parts of New Jersey, New York and New Hampshire. At one point they even controlled all three of the switches that provided phone service to Manhattan. Yes, the law is ready to help - but the threat is a tough, sophisticated, international one. Threats from abroad? Yes, the threat does exist according to Hal Hendershot of the FBI. Robert Clyde reports getting many calls from people trying to solve security problems. In keeping with what we know of reported computer crimes, most sites see problems from insiders: employees, consultants and vendors. Robert reports that two companies publicly spoke of being approached by former East German agents for hire for as little as $10,000 at a September conference in Sweden where he spoke in 1992. We appear to be seeing the criminalization of hacker activity that many have long feared: hackers and ex-foreign intelligence agents for hire. James Bond is alive and well, thank you In late 1992 Don Delaney reported the first case he's seen of James Bond techniques. Remote surveillance can be done by intercepting, decoding and displaying the Radio Frequency (RF) emanations of various computing devices such as terminals and network cabling. Delaney reports that in late 1992, an antenna was put up on the balcony of a 19th floor room in New York's Helmsley building pointing at Chemical Bank. He indicated that it was being very carefully adjusted before being locked into position. By the time they were able to investigate, the antenna and its manipulator had vanished - presumably having successfully gathered the intelligence that they were after. This is no longer gee, we knew it was possible, but holy shit, it's happening now. Imagine someone reading your terminal screen from across the street. Management's show me attitude Dave Johnson insists that his biggest problem when he was at Lockheed was getting corporate management to understand that there is a problem. One of the areas in which this type of conference can really help is understanding the enemy. Management simply doesn't understand the thinking of hackers. Since it makes no sense to them, they tend to deny its existence until theres proof. Of course, the proof is usually very expensive: once a system has been compromised the work of cleaning it up is a long, hard and complicated. A well-connected system or network makes an excellent platform from which to launch attacks on other hosts or on other networks. A major problem for Digital in securing their network against Kevin Mitnick and Lenny DiCicco was that only one vulnerable system on Digitals EASYnet was needed. From there, they were able to penetrate other systems. Even nodes that were known to have been penetrated and were secured were penetrated repeatedly by using other vulnerable nodes to monitor either users or network traffic accessing the secured nodes. While at Lockheed, Dave Johnson implemented policies, awareness training and widescale authentication for all external access, including dialup lines and telnet connections using challenge-response tokens or smart cards. He does not trust the phone system and assumes that it has been compromised. Kevin Mitnick and Lenny DiCicco illustrated just how vulnerable the phone system was in 1988 and the MOD bust in July 1992 shows that things have not improved. Kevin reminds us that you must assume the telephone system is insecure: even robust challenge-response systems can be compromised. You simply have to play the telecommunications game for real. Kevin reminds us that unless you use encryption, all bets are off. As an example of how deep, long lived and dedicated a serious attack can be, consider that Kevin and Lenny were in DEC's network for years. They knew exactly what DEC and telco security were doing in their efforts to catch them since they were reading the security personnel's email. They evaded the security forces for over 12 months and they had a pervasive, all powerful, privileged presence on DEC's internal network. I've seen the enemy and them is us (this is a quote from Pogo). Mitnick insists that people are the weakest link. According to his considerable experience, you don't even need to penetrate a system if you can talk someone on the inside into doing it for you. Why bother breaking in to a computer system if you can talk someone in accounts payable into cutting you a check? Using the finely tuned tools of psychological subversion, practiced social manipulators can get most anything that they want from the ranks of the generally unsuspecting (uncaring?) employees that inhabit most of our organizations today. The only cure is a massive and complete educational program that fosters loyalty, awareness and proper skepticism in every employee. In the end Perhaps the strongest message from everyone was that you can't trust the phone system. Telephone companies have been, and continue to be, compromised. While Mitnick & DiCicco's penetration of DEC's internal network happened in 1988, the 1992 MOD bust showed us that the same techniques are still being used successfully today. Data and voice, including FAX transmissions, are subject to eavesdropping and spoofing. Encryption is absolutely required for secure, trustworthy communications. The coupling of social engineering and technical skills is a potent threat. Most sites that have addressed technical security are still wide open to penetration from people who have well-practiced social engineering skills. However, in all, you don't even need social engineering skills to get into most systems. Are your systems and networks secure? Are your systems and networks at risk? What will you do if you are attacked? Although the questions seem simple, they are not. Future teleconferences will explore both the questions and the answers in more detail. ++++ Ray Kaplan and Joe Kovara have been independent computer consultants for more than a decade. They specialize in operating systems, networks and solving system and network security problems. Ray Kaplan is also a well-known writer and lecturer. He is a regular contributor to Digital News and Review and other computer trade publications. Tapes and handout materials for the System and Network Security teleconference series are available from Ray Kaplan, P.O. Box 42650, Tucson, AZ USA 85733 FAX (602) 791-3325 Phone (602) 323-4606. ------------------------------ From: sc03281@LLWNET.LINKNET.COM(Cheshire HS) Subject: File 2--System Surfing at U-Cal/Davis Date: Mon, 1 Feb 93 17:44:45 EST FROM THE 2-1-93 ISSUE OF INFORMATION WEEK (page 16) HACKER JOYRIDE: Using the University of California at Davis's computer system to access government networks, more than 100 young hackers went for a "joyride" that elicited an FBI investigation. The suspects range in age from 12 to 22 and hail from several states and countries, including Finland, Australia, and the former Czechoslovakia. No arrests have been made as yet pending a formal investigation, according to John Crowell, manager of workstation support for UC Davis's IT division. The hackers were detected in mid-October when charges began piling up on a dormant computer account. Using the Internet network, the hackers raided systems belonging to the CIA, the Defense Department, and NASA, among others. del 1/15 19 21;num;l ------------------------------ Date: 03 Feb 93 18:04:58 EST From: Gordon Meyer <72307.1502@COMPUSERVE.COM> Subject: File 3--Unemployed Programmers Turning their Talents to Evil Computer hackers in former communist countries are creating mischievous and sometimes costly viruses that threaten computers around the world. Anti-virus researchers and special police units in the US and Europe are trying to thwart the viruses and find the culprits, US and British authorities say. "You've got a lot of frustrated programmers in the East who've turned their attention to creating viruses," says Detective Constable Chris Pierce, a member of Scotland Yard's 5-member computer crime unit. Investigators say Bulgaria is the source of more than 200 viruses that threaten Western computers, including the irritating Yankee Doodle, which makes infected machines stop normal functions to play the all-American song. The Bulgarian virus industry developed, Pierce says, because programmers there have a lot of knowledge and skill but no market for their services in the economically depressed country. Computer viruses are commands usually hidden in legitimate programs and designed to attach themselves to files on the computer's "hard drive" data storage device. Once on the hard drive, viruses perform pranks, ranging from emitting harmless noises to eating up files. They can foul up home computers, and companies have lost hundreds of thousands of dollars rooting them out. Some of the newest and most insidious viruses reportedly are coming from Russia, including one called LoveChild, which lies dormant but sets up a countdown that could take years. After an infected computer is turned on the 5000th time, all its memory is erased. Paul Mungo and Bryan Clough, in the February issue of Discover magazine, say an unidentified East Coast company lost $1 million because of a virus created by a Bulgarian known as the Dark Avenger. The article, excerpted from an upcoming book, describes the electronic exploits of the Avenger, whose work is known to Western police agencies. The authors call 1 of his latest creations, Mutating Engine, "the most dangerous virus ever" because it can disguise itself 4 billion ways and has no constant characteristic that would let anti-virus scanners detect it. Little is known of the Avenger, the authors say, except that he probably graduated from Sofia University in math or science, needs money and is infatuated with Diana, princess of Wales, whose name pops up in some of his viruses. Mungo and Clough chronicle the Dark Avenger's appearances on international computer bulletin boards. One Bulgarian-based board, they say, has been set up just to exchange viruses. Pierce says most viruses written in Bulgaria and Russia are not actually "out in the wild," where they can get into foreign computers. ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 23 Jan 93 01:15:50 PST From: Ann_Dromeda@orion.nebula.com Subject: File 4--"Hackers" take on the UFOs? ((MODERATORS' COMMENT: We've read a bit of discussion about UFOs, "hackers," and guerilla investigators. Whether myth or reality, the discussions represent a segment of computer culture that others might find interesting. So, we run the following as a reflection of one segment of the culture that, even if myth, raises that age-old question: Is it live, or is it memorex?)). Rumors have begun to surface about a group of hackers who were involved in a project to uncover information regarding the existence of UFOs. The most public example pertaining to this alleged project was seen on Dateline NBC on the screen of the mystery hacker "Quentin." The story goes that this group of individuals decided to put their skills to work on a project that, if successful, would legitimize the hacking process by uncovering information on what has been called the greatest cover-up in the history of the world. Milnet TAC ID cards were obtained through military officials sympathetic to the cause. Several sites and networks were targeted that had in the past been linked to UFO activity. These were sites like the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Sandia Labs, TRW Space Research, American Institute of Physics, and various other educational, government and military sites. The rumors also emphasize that several sites had what these individuals called "particularly heavy security." Within several seconds after connection had been established, system administrators of sites used in this project were contacted. Further rumors state that there was information regarding a propulsion system designed utilizing what is termed "corona discharge" being analyzed at one site. The most sinister of all rumors states that one particular participant who was allegedly deeply immersed in TRWs internal network has not been heard from since uncovering data regarding a saucer being housed at one of their Southern California installations. Believe what you will about the reality of this project. Much will be dismissed as hacker lore, but within the core of every rumor lies a grain of truth. Are we being lied to? Why is this information still classified by the NSA? What are they hiding from us behind a maze of security? Will we continue to stand idly by and let an uncaring and deliberately evasive government shield us from what may be the most important, and potential dangerous news to ever surface? Information wants to be free, and only a concerted group effort can make this happen. How much do you really want to know about what is really going on? What follows is information that has been released regarding this project... ++++++++++++++++++++++++ PROJECT ALF-1 A Planetary Effort TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET These are the raw data. Where comments are appropriate, they will be included. The data will be grouped together with dates, names etc. to make correlations easier. There are countless references to the aliens, their down space craft and what the Government is doing with them. If, as is supposed, the research on the craft and the 'ufonauts' continues today, then undoubtedly there are computer records, somewhere. I. Searching the Skies; Tripping the Electronic Fence around the USA. US Space Command Space Surveillance Center, Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado Springs, Box Nine (Electronic Surveillance Room) (This is where they search for and track UFO activity.) U.S. Naval Space Surveillance System, Dahlgreen, Virginia, (Main computer), Lake Kickapoo, Texas (listening post): Search for 'Flash Traffic' Commander Sheila Mondran CINC-NORAD Space Detection and Tracking System Malabar, Florida 'Teal Amber' search National Military Command Center - Pentagon (These are the areas where UFO activity is tracked. There is a radar shield around the country that is 'tripped' by UFO's. All tracking and F14 scrambling is done through this system.) II. The Second Cover Up Defense Intelligence Agency Directorate for Management and Operations Project Aquarius (in conjunction with SRI) Colonel Harold E. Phillips, Army (where/what Feb. 1987) UFO Working Group, (formed Dec 1987) Major General James Pfautz, USAF, Ret. (March 87) US Army experiments -(Monroe Institute, Faber, VA) Major General Albert Stubblebine Capt. Guy Kirkwood, (thousands of feet of film of UFO's catalogued and on record somewhere.) The UFO Working Group was formed because one arm of the Govt doesn't know what the other is doing.) III. National Security NSA NAtional Security Agency, Dundee Society (Super secret elite who have worked on UFO's.) NSA - Research and Engineering Division NSA - Intercept Equipment Division Kirtland Force Base, Office of Special Investigations, Project Beta. 1979-83-? (Sandia Labs are here.) Paul Bennewitz Project Blue Project Blue Book (NSA computers do analysis for Pentagon.) IV. More Secret Players NASA, Fort Irwin, Barstow, CA NASA Ames Research Center, Moffet Field Naval Base SETI State Dept. Office of Advanced Technology Any Astronauts from Mercury, Gemini and Apollo CIA - Office of Scientific Investigation CIA - Domestic Collection Division (NASA has known about UFO's since the astronauts saw and photoed them. Records somewhere.) V. Dealing with the Secret MJ-12 (1952) Majectic 12 Operation Majestic 12 MAJIC-12 Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter Dr. Vannevar Bush Dr. Detlev Bronk Dr. Jerome Hunsaker Dr. Donald Menzel Dr. Lloyd Berkner General Robt. Montague Sidney Souers Gordon Gray General Hoyt Vandenberg Sect State James Forrestal General Nathan Twining Pres. Truman Pres. Eisenhower (One of the biggest secrets ever.) Nevada Desert, Area 51, S4 (houses UFO's) (Robert Lazar talked!) 9 space ships on storage. Propulsion by corona discharge. (Area 51 is the most protected base on the planet.) VI. ROSWELL, NM Crashes Mac Brazel (farmer) Major Jesse A. Marcel 509th. Bomber Group Lewis Rickett, CIC Officer Colonel William Blanchard Gerald Anderson, witness to crash and aliens Wright Patterson Air Force Base, (parts lists of UFO's catalogued; autopsies on record) (Bodies in underground facility) Foreign Technology Building USAAF (United States Army Air Force reports: "Early Automation" Muroc, CA (Base with UFO's for study) (1 saucer with 4 aliens. They were transported to Wright and then saved, catalogued and autopsied.) VII. THOSE ON GOVT SHIT LIST (People who have gotten close.) Robert Lazar Major Donald Keyhoe William Moore Stanton Friedman Jaime Shandera Whitley Streiber Timothy Goode, UK Other UFO Crashes Del Rio, TX 12/50, Colonel Robert Willingham Las Vegas, 4/18/62 Kecksburg, PA 12/9/65 VIII. International Belgian Air Force. (They are going public and have records. Press conference held 7/12/91.) Australian Air Force UK; GCHQ British Air Force Belgium: NATO Radar Stations IX. UFO Civilian Groups. (What do they really know?) NICAP, National Investigations Committee on Aerial Phenomena (private company.) APRO, Tucson, AZ (Aerial Phenomena Research Organization, private company.) MUFON Mutual UFO Network X. GENERAL Kenneth Arnold, June 24, 1947 Cattle and Sheep Mutilations General and Pres. Eisenhower, (private files and library) President Truman Wright Field or Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, OH, (Air Force Foreign Technology Division) USAF Project Saint USAF Project Gemini Project Moon Dust Project Sign Project Grudge General Hoyt Vandenberg (1940-1960) Air Force Regulation 200-2 (8/12/54) Holloman AFB, NM Roswell, NM July 7, 1947 XI. Possible Searches Presidential Libraries Old USAAF, (United States Army Air Force) NASA Astronaut Frank Borman, Gemini 7, pictures of UFO Neil Armstrong, Apollo 11, saw UFO's on moon. Colonel Gordon Cooper saw a bunch of them James McDivitt, 6/66 United Nations NATO; General Lionel Max Chassin, French Air Force Star Wars, United Kingdom, 23 scientists killed in 6 years. Gulf Breeze, FL Additional UFO records at NSA, CIA, DIA, FBI Good Searching. +++++++++++++++++ Project ->Green Cheese<- Data Base ++++++++++++++++++ Holloman AFB Location: New Mexico. Preconceived landing 15 years ago. DDN Locations: +++++++ NET : 132.5.0.0 : HOLLOMAN : GATEWAY : 26.9.0.74, 132.5.0.1 : HOLLOMAN-GW.AF.MIL : CISCO-MGS :: EGP,IP/GW : GATEWAY : 26.9.0.74, 132.5.0.1 : HOLLOMAN-GW.AF.MIL : CISCO-MGS :: EGP,IP/GW : HOST : 26.10.0.74 : HOLLOMAN-TG.AF.MIL : VAX-8650 : VMS : TCP/FTP,TCP/TELNET,TCP SMTP : HOST : 26.6.0.74 : HOLLOMAN-AM1.AF.MIL : WANG-VS100 : VSOS : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP, TCP/SMTP : Host: DDNVAX2.6585TG.AF.MIL 156.6.1.2 +++++++++++++++++++++++ Kirtland Air Force Base Office Of Special Investigations. Sandia Labs are here. Also part of NSA Intercept Equipment Division. Key Words/names: ++++++++ Sandia Labs Project Beta (1979-83-?) Paul Bennewitz Project Blue Project Blue Book DDN Locations: +++++++ NET : 131.23.0.0 : KIRTLAND-NET : NET : 132.62.0.0 : KIRTLAND2 : GATEWAY : 26.17.0.48, 131.23.0.1 : KIRTLAND2-GW.AF.MIL,KIRTLAND-GW.AF.MIL : CISCO-MGS : UNIX : IP/GW,EGP : GATEWAY : 26.18.0.87, 132.62.0.1 : KIRTLAND1-GW.AF.MIL,KIRTLAND1606ABW-GW.AF.MIL : CISCO-MGS : : EGP,IP/GW : HOST : 26.0.0.48 : KIRTLAND.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP : HOST : 26.0.0.87 : KIRTLAND2.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP : HOST : 26.6.0.87 : KIRTLAND-AM1.AF.MIL : WANG-VS300 : VS :: +++++++++++++++++++++++ NASA What can I say about NASA that you couldn't guess for yourself.... (Except that the following sights are SPECIFIC NASA sights, not just randomly suspected sights). DDN locations: +++++++ Fort Irwin, Barstow, CA: +++++++++ NET : 134.66.0.0 : IRWIN : NET : 144.146.0.0 : FTIRWIN1 : NET : 144.147.0.0 : FTIRWIN2 : GATEWAY : 26.24.0.85, 26.7.0.230, 144.146.0.1, 144.147.0.0 : FTIRWIN-GW1.ARMY.MIL : CISCO-GATEWAY : CISCO : IP/GW,EGP : HOST : 26.14.0.39 : IRWIN-ASBN.ARMY.MIL : NCR-COMTEN-3650 : COS2 :: HOST : 26.13.0.85 : FTIRWIN-AMEDD.ARMY.MIL : ATT-3B2-600G : UNIX : TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP,TCP/TELNET : HOST : 26.14.0.85 : FTIRWIN-IGNET.ARMY.MIL : DATAPOINT-8605 : RMS :: HOST : 26.15.0.85 : IRWIN-EMH1.ARMY.MIL,FTIRWIN-EMH1.ARMY.MIL : SPERRY-5000 : UNIX : TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP,TCP/TELNET : Moffet Field Naval Base (Ames Research Center): +++++++++++++++++++++ GATEWAY : 26.20.0.16, 192.52.195.1 : MOFFETT-FLD-MB.DDN.MIL,AMES-MB.DDN.MIL : C/70 : CHRYSALIS : IP/GW,EGP : HOST : 26.0.0.16 : MOFFETT.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP : +++++++++++++++++++++++ Pentagon (National Military Command Center) One of many places in charge of tracking UFO activity. Possible DDN sights: +++++++ GATEWAY : 26.9.0.26, 134.205.123.140 : PENTAGON-GW.HQ.AF.MIL : CISCO-AGS : : EGP,IP/GW : GATEWAY : 26.25.0.26, 131.8.0.1 : PENTAGON-GW.AF.MIL,HQUSAFNET-GW.AF.MIL : CISCO-MGS :: IP/GW,EGP : GATEWAY : 26.10.0.76, 192.31.75.235 : PENTAGON-BCN-GW.ARMY.MIL : SUN-360 : UNIX : IP/GW,EGP : GATEWAY : 26.26.0.247, 192.31.75.1 : PENTAGON-GW.ARMY.MIL : SUN-3/160 : UNIX : EGP,IP/GW : GATEWAY : 26.31.0.247, 26.16.0.26, 141.116.0.1 : PENTAGON-GW1.ARMY.MIL : CISCO : CISCO : IP/GW,EGP : HOST : 26.0.0.26 : PENTAGON.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP : HOST : 26.24.0.26 : OPSNET-PENTAGON.AF.MIL : VAX-8500 : VMS : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP : HOST : 26.10.0.76, 192.31.75.235 : PENTAGON-BCN.ARMY.MIL : SUN-360 : UNIX : TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP,TCP/TELNET : HOST : 26.0.0.247 : PENTAGON2.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP : HOST : 26.7.0.247 : PENTAGON-AMSNET.ARMY.MIL : AMDAHL : MVS : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP : HOST : 26.14.0.247 : NSSC-PENTAGON.NAVY.MIL : ALTOS-3068A : UNIX : TCP/FTP,TCP/TELNET,TCP/SMTP : HOST : 26.18.0.247 : PENTAGON-EMH4.ARMY.MIL : SPERRY-5000/80 : UNIX : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP : HOST : 26.26.0.247, 192.31.75.1 : PENTAGON-AI.ARMY.MIL : SUN-3/160 : UNIX : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP,TCP/FINGER : +++++++++++++++++++++++ Raddaman Location of infamous building 18a. Suspected saucers and others? DDN location, yet unknown. ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ SECI ? DDN Locations: +++++++ NET : 192.108.216.0 : ARC-SETI-NET : ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Utah Locations: GATEWAY : 26.18.0.20, 131.27.0.1 : HILL-GW.AF.MIL,HILLAFBNET-GW.AF.MIL : CISCO-MGS :: IP/GW,EGP : GATEWAY : 26.18.0.20, 131.27.0.1 : HILL-GW.AF.MIL,HILLAFBNET-GW.AF.MIL : CISCO-MGS :: IP/GW,EGP : HOST : 26.5.0.20 : HILL.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP : HOST : 26.0.0.99 : HILL2.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP : HOST : 26.12.0.99 : HILL-AM1.AF.MIL : WANG-VS100 : VS : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP : ++++++++++++++++++++++++ Wright Patterson AFB Catalogued UFO parts list. Autopsies on record. Bodies located in underground facility of Foreign Technology Building. DDN Locations: +++++++ HOST : 26.0.0.47 : WRIGHTPAT.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP : HOST : 26.8.0.123 : WRIGHTPAT2.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP : HOST : 26.0.0.124 : WRIGHTPAT3.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP : HOST : 26.3.0.170 : WAINWRIGHT-IGNET.ARMY.MIL : CONVERGENT-TECH-CN-100 : CTOS :: HOST : 26.0.0.176 : WRIGHTPAT4.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP : ++++++++++++++++++++++++ Nevada: NET : 131.216.0.0 : NEVADA : ++++++++++++++++++++++++ Random Suspected Nets: WIN: Top Secret Network. All coordinator's have last name Win. NET : 141.8.0.0 : DFN-WIN8 : NET : 141.9.0.0 : DFN-WIN9 : NET : 141.10.0.0 : DFN-WIN10 : NET : 141.15.0.0 : DFN-WIN15 : NET : 141.25.0.0 : DFN-WIN25 : NET : 141.26.0.0 : DFN-WIN26 : NET : 141.28.0.0 : DFN-WIN28 : NET : 141.57.0.0 : DFN-WIN57 : NET : 141.58.0.0 : DFN-WIN58 : NET : 141.59.0.0 : DFN-WIN59 : NET : 141.60.0.0 : DFN-WIN60 : NET : 141.61.0.0 : DFN-WIN61 : NET : 141.62.0.0 : DFN-WIN62 : NET : 141.63.0.0 : DFN-WIN63 : NET : 141.64.0.0 : DFN-WIN64 : NET : 141.65.0.0 : DFN-WIN65 : NET : 141.66.0.0 : DFN-WIN66 : NET : 141.67.0.0 : DFN-WIN67 : NET : 141.68.0.0 : DFN-WIN68 : NET : 141.69.0.0 : DFN-WIN69 : NET : 141.70.0.0 : DFN-WIN70 : NET : 141.71.0.0 : DFN-WIN71 : NET : 141.72.0.0 : DFN-WIN72 : NET : 141.73.0.0 : DFN-WIN73 : NET : 141.74.0.0 : DFN-WIN74 : NET : 141.75.0.0 : DFN-WIN75 : NET : 141.76.0.0 : DFN-WIN76 : NET : 141.77.0.0 : DFN-WIN77 : NET : 141.78.0.0 : DFN-WIN78 : NET : 141.79.0.0 : DFN-WIN79 : NET : 141.80.0.0 : DFN-WIN80 : NET : 141.81.0.0 : DFN-WIN81 : NET : 141.82.0.0 : DFN-WIN82 : NET : 141.83.0.0 : DFN-WIN83 : NET : 141.84.0.0 : DFN-WIN84 : NET : 141.85.0.0 : DFN-WIN85 : NET : 141.86.0.0 : DFN-WIN86 : NET : 141.87.0.0 : DFN-WIN87 : NET : 141.88.0.0 : DFN-WIN88 : NET : 141.89.0.0 : DFN-WIN89 : NET : 141.90.0.0 : DFN-WIN90 : NET : 141.91.0.0 : DFN-WIN91 : NET : 141.92.0.0 : DFN-WIN92 : NET : 141.93.0.0 : DFN-WIN93 : NET : 141.94.0.0 : DFN-WIN94 : NET : 141.95.0.0 : DFN-WIN95 : NET : 141.96.0.0 : DFN-WIN96 : NET : 141.97.0.0 : DFN-WIN97 : NET : 141.98.0.0 : DFN-WIN98 : NET : 141.99.0.0 : DFN-WIN99 : NET : 188.1.0.0 : WIN-IP : NET : 192.80.90.0 : WINDATA : +++++++++++++++ Scinet: Sensitive Compartmented Information Network NET : 192.12.188.0 : BU-SCINET : +++++++++++++++ Disnet: Defense Integrated Secure Network. Composed of SCINET, WINCS ([World Wide Military and Command Control System] Intercomputer Network Communication Subsystem), and Secretnet(WIN). NET : 22.0.0.0 : DISNET : ------------------------------ End of Computer Underground Digest #5.13 ************************************

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