Computer underground Digest Sat Apr 25, 1992 Volume 4 : Issue 19 Editors: Jim Thomas and G

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Computer underground Digest Sat Apr 25, 1992 Volume 4 : Issue 19 Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET) Associate Editor: Etaion Shrdlu, Jr. Arcmeisters: Brendan Kehoe and Bob Kusumoto CONTENTS, #4.19 (Apr 25, 1992) File 1--Hacking, Then and Now File 2--Text of Sun Devil ruling File 3--Ralph Nader/Cable TV/Information Networks (corrected) File 4--Battle over Landsat/Public Domain (fr: Corp. Crime Rept) File 5--Internet Society News Issues of CuD can be found in the Usenet news group, on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of LAWSIG, and DL0 and DL12 of TELECOM, on Genie, on the PC-EXEC BBS at (414) 789-4210, and by anonymous ftp from (,, and To use the U. of Chicago email server, send mail with the subject "help" (without the quotes) to European distributor: ComNet in Luxembourg BBS (++352) 466893. COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted as long as the source is cited. Some authors do copyright their material, and they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts unless absolutely necessary. DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not violate copyright protections. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 24 Apr 92 19:01:13 CDT From: Jim Thomas Subject: File 1--Hacking, Then and Now In CuD 4.18, Jerry Leichter raises several points for discussion. Each reveals the rapid changes that continue to occur both in computer technology and computer culture. Jerry writes: 2. "Information" and "computers" should be free, hackers are just trying to learn, there is nothing wrong with learning. Point 2 I don't want to get into; it's old, tired, and if you don't recognize it for its moral bankruptcy by this time, nothing I can say will change your mind. I doubt that Jerry means to imply that the debates over the accessibility of information are morally bankrupt or that the goal of learning through "hacking" is improper. Rather, the cynical use of the rhetoric of freedom by many "wannabe cybernauts" to justify intrusion or blatant predatory behavior distorts the original meaning of the term used by the early hackers. The original hackers found the challenge of the new machine intriguing. Few resources were available for exploring its limits other than hands-on trial-and-error, and there were no ethical or legal models to guide the initial exploration. Two decades ago, control over the new technology appeared limited to a relatively small elite who, if unchecked, would amass what some considered unacceptable power over the dissemination and use of computer technology and use. Things change. This raises Jerry's second point: Whatever one may think of hacking activity, its meaning is not the same in 1992 as it was even as recently as the late-1980s. Bob Bickford's definition of hacking as "the joy of exceeding limitations" is no longer the current dominating ethos of too many of those who have assumed the "hacker" mantle. The label has become a romanticized activity for teenagers and others who see password cracking, simple computer intrusion for its own sake, numbers-running, and credit card fraud as ends in themselves. Like the counter-culture of the sixties, the "hacker culture" emerged quickly, shaped a new generation of youth exploring beyond the confines of conventional culture, and then disintegrated under the excesses of those who adopted the trappings while losing sight of the core of the new cultural message. Like the counter-culture, the ease of access into "hacking, the romanticized media depictions, the focus of newcomers on the fun to the exclusion of corresponding responsibilities, and the critical mass of exploiters able to manipulate for their own ends fed the darkside of the culture. All meanings occur in a broader context, and the context of hacking has changed. Social changes in the past decade have led to changes in the definition of "hacking" and in the corresponding ethos and culture. The increased learning curve required to master contemporary computers, the proliferation of networks to share information, and the ease of distribution of software have reduced much of the incentive for many amateur hackers to invest the time and effort in moving beyond all but the simplest of technological skill. As a consequence, there has emerged a fairly large core of newcomers who lack both the skill and the ethos that guided earlier hackers, and who define the enterprise simplistically. The attraction of original phreaking and hacking and its attendant lifestyle appear to center on three fundamental characteristics: The quest for knowledge, the belief in a higher ideological purpose of opposition to potentially dangerous technological control, and the enjoyment of risk-taking. In a sense, CU participants consciously created dissonance as a means of creating social meaning in what is perceived as an increasingly meaningless world. In some ways, the original CU represents a reaction against contemporary culture by offering an ironic response to the primacy of a master technocratic language, the incursion of computers into realms once considered private, the politics of techno-society, and the sanctity of established civil and state authority. But, the abuses of this ethos have changed the culture dramatically. Consider two fairly typical posts from two defunct self-styled "hacker" boards in the early 1990s: Well, instead of leaving codes, could you leave us "uninformed" people with a few 800 dialups and formats? I don't need codes, I just want dialups! Is that so much to ask? I would be willing to trade CC's {credit cards} for dialups. Lemme know.. or: Tell ya what. I will exchange any amount of credit cards for a code or two. You name the credit limit you want on the credit card and I will get it for you. I do this cause I to janitorial work at night INSIDE the bank when no one is there..... heheheheheh Unfortunately, this is the "hacking" that the public and LE officials dramatize, but it is simply an infantile form of social predation. There is no adventure, no passion for learning, and no innocence reflected in today's CU culture. Jerry is, therefore correct: Times have changed. If Altamont symbolized the death the counter-culture, Cliff Stoll's _The Cuckoo's Egg_ symbolizes the end of the "golden age of hacking." culture and those who participate in it have lost their innocence. Baudrillard observed that our private sphere now ceases to be the stage where the drama of subjects at odds with their objects and with their image is played out, and we no longer exist as playwrites or actors, but as terminals of multiple networks. The public space of the social arena is reduced to the private space of the computer desk, which in turn creates a new semi-public, but restricted, public realm to which dissonance seekers retreat. To participate in the computer underground once was to engage in what Baudrillard describes as "private telematics," in which individuals, to extend Baudrillard's fantasy metaphor, are transported from their mundane computer system to the controls of a hypothetical machine, isolated in a position of perfect sovereignty, at an infinite distance from the original universe. There, identity is created through symbolic strategies and collective beliefs. Sadly, this generally is no longer the case for most young computerists. Times have changed. Very few who currently attempt to justify the "right to hack" as a form of social rebellion recognize--let alone engage in--the tedious struggles of others (such as EFF or CPSR) that would civilize the Electronic Frontier. In the battle to expand civil liberties to cyberspace, contemporary "hackers" have not only *not* been part of the solution, they have become part of the problem. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 24 Apr 1992 17:22:24 EDT From: David Sobel Subject: File 2--Text of Sun Devil ruling Text of Sun Devil ruling On March 12, 1992, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued its ruling in the Freedom of Information Act case brought by Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) seeking disclosure of the Operation Sun Devil search warrant materials. The Court ruled that the Secret Service may withhold the material from public disclosure on the ground that release of the information would impede the government's ongoing investigation. On April 22, CPSR filed an appeal of that ruling. The Court's oral ruling, which was delivered from the bench, has now been transcribed and is set forth below. David Sobel Legal Counsel CPSR Washington Office * * * * * THE COURT: The Court's going to issue its ruling, bench ruling at this time, which will be its opinion in this case in the summary judgment motions. The defendants moved for summary judgment in this FOIA case, and the plaintiffs originally sought discovery under 56(f) to obtain information concerning sealing orders covering certain of the documents at issue in this action. January 16 of this year, I denied the plaintiff's motion that defendants were not relying upon the sealing orders and that the Morgan case was inapposite, although it had been discussed originally at some other status calls before this Court. In this FOIA case, the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility seek these agency records regarding what's called Operation Sun Devil from the Secret Service, which is concededly a criminal investigation that is still ongoing involving information compiled for law enforcement purposes that was, involved alleged computer fraud which began back in May of 1990. The Secret Service has refused to release the search warrants and the applications for the search warrants, the executed warrants, as well as the applications for the inventory lists except as to one Bruce Esquibel, known as Dr. Ripco, who had agreed to have his information released. But as to the remaining 25 -- there were 26 search warrants -- the government has refused to release them, relying upon FOIA exemptions 7(A), (C), and (D) under the statute. The Court's going to grant the summary judgment for the defendant for the following reasons: There's no, as I said, dispute as to whether or not this information has been compiled for law enforcement purposes, which covers -- is covered by exemption 7. 7 says, however, "only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings" and then "(C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, [or] (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source," et cetera. From the Court's view, (A) is the crucial issue in the case and whether or not this would be unwarranted interference with an ongoing investigation by ordering the Secret Service to produce all the records regarding the 25 search warrants. The Secret Service represented as of today, apparently, one individual has pled guilty by way of information, but there have been no indictments, but that Operation Sun Devil continues, obviously, then as an ongoing investigation. The deputy director of the Secret Service by affidavit has stated the evidence in these materials consists of facts that have been gathered against various individuals, information provided by confidential sources, and affidavits establishing probable cause for search of the individual residences or businesses. He argues that any release of this overall information in one package, as opposed to someone finding out an individual search warrant from the individual court, would give this access to the evidence and strategy as being used by the government in this law enforcement proceeding, that this would show the focus, overall focus and the approach and the limits of the government's case, it could have a chilling effect on the witnesses and constitute potential interference with those witnesses by revealing them, and it would give the ability to those who are under investigation, who may not know the scope and the nature of the overall approach of the government, to construct defenses and interfere, obviously, with the ongoing proceedings that they may have, that is, their ongoing investigation. The issue really is whether the government has shown that by the affidavit of Caputo and the other facts in the record. Obviously, the Caputo affidavit is tailored to meet the law, NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber is one of them, 437 U.S. 214, 241, where Congress intended to prevent such interference with law enforcement proceedings as giving a person greater access to the government's case than it ordinarily would have, or Hatcher v. U.S. Postal Service, which is an F. Supp. case here, 566 F. Supp. 331, 333, where it's not necessary to show under exemption 7 the interference with law enforcement proceedings is likely to occur if the documents are disclosed. It's enough that there's a generic showing that disclosure of particular kinds of records would generally interfere with enforcement proceedings. The defendant -- excuse me, the plaintiff has asserted first, that because they're routinely available around the country and rarely filed under seal, and secondly, because some are filed under seal, that they should be producible by the federal government, using a dual argument. One is that if they're already public, then they can't claim there can be any harm done by producing them now, and secondly, if they're under seal, they have to go through a Morgan process before they can rely upon them as being under seal and not producing them under the law of this circuit. The plaintiffs have basically argued that it's a circuitous argument advanced by the defendants that these documents, but for the seals, would be produced, and that they really, that's what they're relying upon. The Court does not see the government's, or defendants' argument in that light or the affidavits that have been filed in this case. First, it seems to me that because some of the information may be available after diligent research around the country and some others may be under seal that could be made public by petition or by the government going through the Morgan exercise doesn't seem to the Court therefore the government has no justification for saying that they can't produce these records because they could interfere with ongoing criminal proceedings, and that is because this would be the only place you could get probably a total overall picture of the government's concerted effort in this investigation. The government obviously has a concerted effort. Whether it's a conspiracy or not and they're related, the government executed these warrants all basically at the same time and place in an overall organized plan in May of 1990. They executed 26 search warrants. It was a concentrated, obviously carefully orchestrated effort to move on several fronts at one time all across the country and not separate, distinct, individual cases coming over a period of years against various individuals. It was obviously an approach the government had designed and planned as part of their criminal investigation, which is still ongoing and has now resulted apparently in at least one guilty plea. So I don't think the availability merely on the case- by-case basis, potentially available, meets the same as having the compilation of all the information the Secret Service can provide in toto in a package which could allow one to see the limits and the scope and the nature of their investigation overall and give them a much better picture. It's the old saw of the seeing a tree or seeing the whole forest basically and having perspective. The second really part of the argument by the plaintiff is that if the Esquibel search can be released without harm to the ongoing investigation, it could release the other investigation without great damage to its work. Again, however, it seems to me the warrant in the Esquibel case was released upon his agreement and request and waiver of his rights, that that is an individual, one individual out of 26, and it seems to me very different from exposing the entire investigative plan that may well be exposed by providing all of the documents that relate to the 25 other searches. The Secret Service has in its affidavits set forth fairly clearly that they have gone through the three-fold process to provide appropriate exemption under 7(A). Under Bevis v. Department of State, 801 F.2d 1386, the court ruled that it must, the government, first define its categories functionally; second, it must conduct a document-by-document review in order to assign documents to the proper category; and finally, it must explain to the court how the release of each category would interfere with enforcement proceedings. And under our Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 789 F.2d 64, this circuit held that the agency must provide this court with enough information to allow it to trace any rational link between the nature of the documents and the alleged likely interference. The Secret Service herein has set forth the following: Information is in three general categories: gathered against particular individuals, provided by confidential sources, and the information for the probable cause of the search of the individual residences, referring to Caputo declaration. This information could be used to avoid prosecution by those who are targets by giving, one, advanced knowledge of the information would enable a suspect to inhibit additional investigation, to destroy undiscovered evidence, to mold defenses to meet the contours of the government's case. Additionally, the release of the information concerning confidential informants and evidence in the possession of the government could lead to attempts at intimidation, fabrication of evidence, and perhaps alibis tailored to rebut the specifics of the government's cases. It seems to the Court that there is a rational link between the nature of the documents that have been discussed and the alleged likely interference. I don't have to say that it's beyond a reasonable doubt that this interference could occur, but it is likely that it could occur. The overall release of these records, in the Court's view the government has established, meets the exemption of 7(A), that it would show an interference with enforcement proceedings is likely to occur if the documents are disclosed, again giving them the entire total package of the government's approach in this case, which is still an ongoing criminal investigation and apparently is still active, it is not dormant, and nothing has happened in two years. It is, rather, apparently, according to the government's most recent evidence, has resulted in at least one guilty plea. Additional exemptions relied upon by the government, 7(C) and 7(D), it's not necessary for the Court to address, but I would just note for the record in case of further review of this, the exemption for disclosure under 7(C) as to unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, it seems to the Court that there's obviously a cognizable interest in the privacy of anyone's involvement in a law enforcement investigation. No one wants to be publicized that they may be the subject of some investigation. They want their participation to remain secret. And the plaintiffs have not, do not seek the identification of these individuals. The interest really at stake is their privacy interest, where they could be exposed by the publication of these affidavits, with their names redacted, and whether or not any other information contained in there would also have to be redacted. If we look at the Esquibel affidavit that came in supporting the search of his home and business, you'll see there are numerous other computer hackers and, presumably, legitimate computer users referred to, and that would be presumably the same in the other affidavits for the other search warrants. Therefore, there would have to be much redacting, if anything could be produced in the other affidavits and the other search warrants for the publication of these individuals who are named, none of who have been indicted apparently, and obviously their interest in, privacy interest should be protected. What information could be redacted and what could be released remains to be seen, but I'll just note for the record it seems to the Court that there would be little that can be produced based upon the Esquibel affidavit at least, but that is a concern to the Court, although I don't think it's a total bar to the production under exemption 7(C). I think 7(D) is under the same formula, that is, could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential sources by the publication of these records. Again, obviously there could be redaction. Again, there would have to be some type of review to see whether redaction can be meaningful or not and anything could be produced. The government's view is it could not, but again, I don't think there's been any attempt yet made to produce anything under that exemption, because the 7(A) exemption is being relied primarily upon. I would note again there would have to be redactions, and whether anything of substance could be produced would have to be seen at a later hearing if this matter goes forward. So I'm going to rule primarily basically on the 7(A) exemption that the production of these documents overall, without relying on the sealing or not and without accepting the circuitous argument that the plaintiff asserts the defendant is engaged in, I think the defendant has not and has elected to stand and fall on exemption 7(A) as applying because of the entire documentation being produced at one time and one place could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted, constitute an interference with the enforcement proceedings that are ongoing. So for those reasons, I'll grant the motion for summary judgment of the defendant, and I'll issue an order incorporating by reference this bench opinion. ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 23 Apr 92 16:52 GMT From: "Essential Information, Inc." <0002633455@MCIMAIL.COM> Subject: File 3--Ralph Nader/Cable TV/Information Networks (corrected) "Ralph Nader/Cable TV/Information Networks" From: Ralph Nader, Washington, DC Date: April 16, 1992 Summary: Your help is needed to secure an amendment to pending cable television legislation. The amendment would create a mechanism to organize local Cable Consumer Action Groups (CCAGs) to represent the interests of consumers directly before regulatory and legislative bodies. This proposal is an innovative way to create countervailing power to some of the large corporate interests that control our information infrastructure, and it is a model that is highly relevant for users of voice and data network services. Readers are asked to sign a letter to Congress supporting this amendment. Action is needed very soon. Respond to Jim Donahue, Teledemocracy Project (Internet: Dear citizen: As you may know, congress is currently considering cable television legislation. Every television consumer should be concerned about the outcome of this legislation, and particularly citizens who are concerned about the future of information technologies. The current fiasco with the cable industry is an important example of the management of information technologies for the benefit of a few corporate monopolists at the expense of the many. Today nearly all americans are confronted with a monopoly provider of cable video signals, who not only has total control over what you can receive, but also what you pay. Over the next 15 years we will see a rapid convergence of information technologies. Soon it will be possible to transmit voice, data, and video signals over the same fiber optic telecommunications infrastructure. The fight over who will control the content of information that flows over that infrastructure, and how it will be priced, will define who can send and who can receive information in digital form. As the use of modern technologies increasingly makes it easier to meter the consumption of information products and services, the gaps between the information rich and information poor will continue to grow. The current battle over the regulation of the cable television industry is an important step in a more general battle over the control of our information infrastructure. This is a battle over power and wealth, and also over democratic values, competition, and enlightenment. Will we harness our great new information technologies to promote a diversity of sources of information, or will these technologies be used primarily as vehicles for narrowly focused commercial interests, exercising monopoly power? CABLE CONSUMER ACTION GROUPS (CCAG) AS COUNTERVAILING POWER A number of consumer groups have asked Congress to adopt an innovative proposal to help cable television subscribers organize to represent their interests. Notices describing local Cable Consumer Action Groups (CCAGs), which would be independent and democratically controlled local organizations, would be placed in the cable companies billings. The notices describe the purposes and goals of the group and solicit funds for membership. The CCAG would be required to reimburse the cable company for the incremental costs of inserting the notice in the bill, so the cost would not be a burden to the cable company or its subscribers. These local subscriber consumer groups would then monitor the policies and practices of the cable company, and represent consumer interests in regulatory and legislative proceedings and with the cable companies directly. The cable industry is extremely active politically, contributing millions of dollars to candidates for political office and spending millions more in lobbying activities before legislative and regulatory bodies. In the absence of something like the CCAG, important public policy issues are debated in an extremely unbalanced way. The CCAG is a modest but important step in addressing a very corrupt system that regularly tramples on the rights and interests of consumers. Among the groups that have endorsed this proposal are: Center for Media Education Consumer Federation of America New York City Commissioner of Consumer Affairs Public Citizen Teledemocracy Project U.S. Public Interest Research Group HAS IT BEEN TRIED BEFORE? This proposal is based on the highly successful Citizen Utility Board (CUB) model, which has represented ratepayers in several states. The most successful CUB, in Illinois, has 170,000 members; its advocacy has saved consumers some $2 billion over the past several years. Other CUBs exist in Wisconsin, Oregon and San Diego. We want to see this innovation used nation wide in the cable television industry. (Of course, it may well be a model that has applications to other telecommunications issues.) WHAT YOU CAN DO The CCAG proposal was included in H.R. 4850, but was deleted by a voice vote (in contrast to a recorded vote) in the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance. The bill is now in the full Energy and Commerce Committee, where committee supporters will seek to restore the provision through an amendment. We are asking you to send us an email message giving permission to use your name in a letter to Congress supporting this amendment. If you are willing to do so send the following information to the Teledemocracy Project (internet:, or fax 202-234-5176). Name: Title: (optional) Affiliation: (optional) Address: City and State: (important, for obvious reasons) telephone: (for verification) email address: optional Thank you very much for your help on this. Sincerely, Ralph Nader A copy of the letter follows: ------------------------------------------------------------- LETTER Chairman Edward Markey Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance Committee on Energy and Commerce Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Chairman Markey: We are writing to support your "consumer representation" amendment to H.R. 4850, the cable re-regulation bill. It is imperative that new cable legislation provide a mechanism that gives consumers a stronger voice in regulatory and legislative debates. This amendment is ideal because it brings citizens into the regulatory process at no cost to the government or the cable industry. Who in Congress can deny the unfairness of a system where the owners of cable monopolies can use subscriber revenues for lobbying purposes while consumers are left powerless and unrepresented? This is only a small step toward curbing the monopolistic power of the cable television industry. We urge the House Energy and Commerce Committee to include your consumer representation amendment in the cable bill. Sincerely, ------------------------ For more information, contact: Jim Donahue Teledemocracy Project voice: 202/387-8030 fax: 202/234-5176 Internet: For a an email copy of the amendment contact Jim Donahue (internet: ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 20 Apr 1992 10:36:58 CDT From: James P Love Subject: File 4--Battle over Landsat/Public Domain (fr: Corp. Crime Rept) ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++Original message++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Reprinted with permission from Corporate Crime Reporter. [Corporate Crime Reporter is published by American Communications and Publishing Co., Inc. 48 times a year. ISSN Number: 0897-4101. Principal Editorial Offices: 1322 18th St, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Telephone: (202) 429-6928. Editor: Russell Mokhiber.] Vol 6, No. 15, April 13, 1992. STATES, ENVIRONMENTALISTS LAUNCH CAMPAIGN TO RETURN LANDSAT TO PUBLIC DOMAIN. "A NASTY FIGHT IS BREWING" A loose coalition of state officials and environmentalists has formed to challenge the 1984 decision by the federal government to privatize Landsat, the first satellite dedicated to the environment. In a letter last month to Congressman James Scheuer (D-New York), Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Environment of the House Science, Space and Technology Committee, a number of environmental groups, including Greenpeace, Sierra Club and the Environmental Defense Fund, called for a "clean break with the patently unsuccessful `experiment in commercialization'." Landsat was first launched in 1972. Until 1984, the satellite was in the public domain. State governments, environmental groups, and universities used the data for a range of purposes, including environmental management and enforcement of environmental laws. In 1984, the Reagan Administration "commercialized" the satellite, taking it out of the public's hands, and giving the data rights to a private company owned by General Electric and Hughes, to sell on the commercial market. The coalition of users and environmental groups fighting to return Landsat to the public domain argue that the "experiment in commercialization" has been disastrous. High prices have dramatically reduced the availability of the data to researchers, academics, and conservationists. Images that once cost under $100 have now soared to $4,500 per scene. "At a time when destruction of tropical forests is recognized as an international calamity, the Landsat sensors are infrequently even turned on over the most threatened regions," the environmentalists argued. "Those who need remote sensing most, namely conservationists and third world natural resource agencies, are able to afford it least." Congressman George Brown (D-California) has introduced legislation (H.R. 3614) that would take back some public control over the data base. But the environmental groups are not happy with H.R. 3614. They charge that H.R. 3614 sets up "a complicated system of partial commercialization." "It seems to us much better to simply eliminate `commercialization' as rapidly as possible under existing contracts," they write. In the letter to Scheuer, the groups argue for a return to the policy in effect before 1984, thus making data available "to all who request it at marginal cost of copying and distribution." Hill staffers close to the impending battle predicted a bitter fight. "A nasty fight is brewing," said one. "There are some former NASA scientists who are hell-bent on returning Landsat into the public fold. They believe that there is something wrong with commercializing publicly funded data about the environment at prices only industry can afford. And on the other hand, the big aerospace firms know how to play hardball. GE and Hughes are not going to roll over and play dead." ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 21 Apr 92 19:34:20 EDT From: "Ofer Inbar" Subject: File 5--Internet Society News In Cu Digest 4.18, Michael Rosen wrote: > "At negligible cost, in the span of a few weeks, an entirely virtual > global publishing network involving nearly 150 correspondents has been > assembled," Anthony M. Rutkowski, editor in chief of the _Internet > Society News_, wrote in the first issue of the magazine, which was > recently published. > [No e-mail addresses were mentioned in the letter; do you have any > knowledge of the addresses of anyone involved in this publication?] >From the inside front cover of the Internet Society News Vol 1 No 1: Editor-in-Chief: Anthony-Michael Rutkowsky Associate Editor: Joyce K. Reynolds Editorial Advisory Board: Brian Carpenter Christian Huitema Ole Jacobson Carl Malamud Joyce Reynolds Mike Roberts Anthony Rutkowski Mike Schwartz Bernard Stockman Internet Society Board of Trustees: Hideo Aiso Charles Brownstein Vint Cerf Lyman Chapin Ira Fuchs Frode Greisen Juergen Harms Geoff Huston Robert Kahn Tomaz Kalin Kenneth King Lawrence Landweber Anthony Rutkowski [temporary] ------------------------------ End of Computer Underground Digest #4.19 ************************************


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