Computer Underground Digest--Sat July 27 19:39:41 CDT 1991 (Vol #3.27) Moderators: Jim Tho

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Computer Underground Digest--Sat July 27 19:39:41 CDT 1991 (Vol #3.27) Moderators: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET) Contents, #3.27 (July 27, 1991) Subject: File 1-- Response to "The Terminus of Len Rose"(1) Subject: File 2-- Response to "The Terminus of Len Rose"(2) Subject: File 3-- Response to Neidorf's "Terminus of Len Rose"(3) Subject: File 4-- chinet review Subject: File 5-- Comsec Data Security Article Corrections Subject: File 6-- Crypto-conference statement Subject: File 7-- Reasonable laws on computer crime Subject: File 8-- re: Bill Vajk's latest comments Subject: File 9--Chaos Computer Club archives at Subject: File 10--Late reply to Dutch Crackers article (CUD3.19) Administratia: ARCHIVISTS: BOB KUSUMOTO BRENDAN KEHOE BOB KRAUSE CuD is available via electronic mail at no cost. Printed copies are available by subscription. Single copies are available for the costs of reproduction and mailing. Issues of CuD can be found in the Usenet news group, on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of LAWSIG, and DL0 and DL12 of TELECOM, by FidoNet file request from 1:100/345, on Genie, on the PC-EXEC BBS at (414) 789-4210, and by anonymous ftp >from,, and To use the U. of Chicago email server, send mail with the subject "help" (without the quotes) to COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted as long as the source is cited. Some authors do copyright their material, and they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles relating to the Computer Underground. Articles are preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts unless absolutely necessary. DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not violate copyright protections. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 19 Jul 1991 09:59:30 -0500 From: chris@Cinnabar (Chris Johnson) Subject: File 1--Response to "The Terminus of Len Rose" Regarding: > Computer Underground Digest--Thu Jul 18 17:22:30 CDT 1991 (Vol #3.26) > > Contents, #3.26 (June 18, 1991) > File 3: The TERMINUS of Len Rose > Regarding Craig Neidorf's article 'The TERMINUS of Len Rose' and his follow-up backing down on his position on the prosecutors involved: This sounds amazingly like law enforcement personnel have put the screws to him. Yes, it is true, people like William Cook and Tim Foley are ordinary people like you and me, with hobbies and families and all that nonsense. As anyone who stops and thinks for a moment will realize, that also means they are subject to the same human foibles of pride, self-doubt, need for recognition and so forth. It's been my experience that most trial lawyers and law enforcement officers are cocky, arrogant people with a great need for recognition and success, and the need to win, to beat the opposition. They're often hard-headed and stubborn. Now, other than what I've read about these two law enforcement men, I don't know them. But Craig's remarks "Illinois State Police and SSA Tim Foley (what is HE doing here!?) came to Len's new home..." and "Assistant U.S. Attorney William Cook in Chicago wanted a piece of the action, in part perhaps to redeem himself from his highly publicized defeat in U.S. v. Neidorf..." are particularly telling. Those remarks are particularly reflective of men who need to make a name for themselves to feel good. It all fits very well. That doesn't mean they are not in the profession because "They believe in their work like a sacred religious mission", but that perhaps they let their personal wants and needs get in the way of objective vision, just like the rest of humanity. I'm sorry, but I just don't buy "that the prosecutors and law enforcement officials in our system overall are dedicated to doing the right thing and going after offenders that they truly believe to be committing real crimes." Some are, no doubt, doing just that. Some make honest mistakes, too. But I think there are far more bad apples than Craig is willing to admit publicly. Law enforcement does not gain a universal, wide reputation as being corrupt, or abusive, or ineffectual, or whatever bad image they might hold because there is a very few bad apples. Does anyone here really believe the LA cops who beat the motorist on video tape were dedicated to doing the right thing? I think Mr. Foley and Mr. Cook let their egos get in the way, big-time. ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 23 Jul 91 12:20:22 PDT From: nelson@BOLYARD.WPD.SGI.COM(Nelson Bolyard) Subject: File 2--Response to "The Terminus of Len Rose" In article <> "Craig Neidorf" wrote one of the first articles I've read that actually gave facts about what happened to Len Rose after he moved to Illinois. I appreciate that. But then he wrote (about the law enforcement folks who were involved): >A Few Words About Law Enforcement and the Len Rose case... >[...] These people are decent folks just like you and me. Despite the >highly publicized incidents of the past couple of years, the vast >majority of these people are not out there trying to destroy someone's >life just to make a name for themselves or to put a notch on their >desk. They believe in their work like a sacred religious mission. At >the same time they have families, hobbies, like to go to the movies, >play video games, take vacations during the holidays, and everything >else. > [...] I believe that the prosecutors >acted in the way they thought best and were not out to deny Rose of >his constitutional rights, [...] > While I believe that the prosecutors involved with his case are >honest, hardworking, and highly motivated people, [...] >As a group in general, the law enforcement community has >earned my respect and appreciation. This is sad. During World War II, millions of innocent and less-than-innocent people were put to death in concentration camps by "decent folks" who "believe in their work like a sacred religious mission", who "have families, hobbies, like to go to the movies, play video games, take vacations during the holidays, and everything else." They were just soldiers in a war, who did what they believed their superiors expected of them, without questioning the morality of their actions. Some of them actually believed the pseudo-religious Nazi doctrines that the jews were the cause of all their people's problems. The lesson we and all the world's inhabitants should have learned from WW2 is that each of us is responsible for the consequences of his actions, and it is up to each of us to be sure that our actions are moral and just. None of us can hide his actions behind the excuse that his superiors, or some recent and hastily-enacted law, justifies an immoral act. If the law enforcement community of the US has failed to learn this lesson, then we are doomed to repeat an awful history. ------------------------------ From:!dogface!wnss!las Lance Spangler Date: Wed, 24 Jul 91 11:35:13 CDT Subject: File 3--Response to Neidorf's "Terminus of Len Rose" In CuD 3.26, Craig Neidorf looks at the issues surrounding the Len Rose case from his unique perspective: >A Few Words About Law Enforcement and the Len Rose case... > Text deleted > > In conclusion I think there may be a rare bad apple mucking up >the legal process from time to time, but it is my firm belief that the >prosecutors and law enforcement officials in our system overall are >dedicated to doing the right thing and going after offenders that they >truly believe to be committing real crimes. Up to this point I've >only been able to watch and learn about their work from an outsider's >viewpoint, but one day I may be interested in participating from their >perspective. As a group in general, the law enforcement community has >earned my respect and appreciation. I have had considerable first hand experience with the "Justice System" at a civil level, but never any at the criminal level other than as an observer because of my profession. I will always remember what my first lawyer said once, which at the time I dismissed. Today though, I am absolutely convinced his comments are completely true: "The system ALWAYS works, EXCEPT in individual cases." Looking specifically at the legal difficulties some individuals have experienced recently, my belief in the above statement is once again reconfirmed. But there is hope! In the article following Craig Neidorf's posting, the sentence given Doc Savage in Arizona seems most fair. Perhaps there is light at the end of the tunnel. ------------------------------ Subject: File 4--chinet review Date: Sat Jul 13 11:05:05 1991 From: We don't ordinarily review electronic bulletin boards (bbs), but we feel one deserves honorable mention for the well balanced offerings which have been made available by system administrator Randy Suess for a number of years. Randy is the hardware half of the original Ward & Randy CBBS, the first ever public access bbs. The original CBBS is still operated by Ward, at (312) 545-8086. It is a purely technical bbs related to computer hardware and software. My personal exposure to home computing arrived the day that Commodore dropped their price for the C-64 to $ 189 through discount merchandisers. I went the day after I saw the first ad and purchased the machine, a disk drive, and a tape unit. Some time later, I acquired a modem and found chinet. This was my baptism into the UNIX religion. I became a convert and completely skipped CPM. I found multi-conference multi-thread conferencing, and USENET. Within a year I had my own unix system, and opened it to share with others on two phone lines. For those of you unfamiliar with the term, usenet is an anarchistic association of machines which forwards text in some 1000 organized topics to every major college, university, corporation, research facilities, and public access sites on five continents. The traffic is on the order of some 16 to 18 million characters of text per day. Much of the distribution takes place over the INTERNET which is funded by the National Science Foundation. Topics range from mathematics in contexts barely resembling human thought, to interactive social studies. The local bbs has a number of conferences covering both technical and humanist disciplines. There is a massive database of source code which may be downloaded without any uploads required. Electronic mail (e-mail) is available to those who learn to use it. Such mail, within reason, is forwarded without charge to any other linked site in the world. I have had three complete two way exchanges from Chicago to Boston in a single business day. PC Pursuit is a common carrier service using dedicated lines with computer mainframe interfaces. They sell time blocks on an as available basis after business hours to people wishing to access computers in distant cities. For information on this service, call (800) 736-1130. CHINET may be reached by PC Pursuit. Randy has two guest lines at (312) 283-0559. Additional services (more lines, fewer restrictions on usenet availability) can be arranged upon an annual contribution. Newuser registration is online and immediate access is permitted. Remember to mention Full Disclosure during the online registration. Don't expect to find any secret boards hidden from the general public. Do expect to find all sorts of surprises once you learn your way around the system. ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 20 Jul 91 18:17:08 CDT From: @uunet.UU.NET,@chron:edtjda@magic322 (Joe Abernathy) Subject: File 5--Re: Comsec Data Security There were two inaccuracies in the type-up copy of my recent Legion of Doom story that was distributed in CuD. The correct name of the consulting firm is Comsec Data Security. And the handles used by Kenyon Shulman were Malefactor and Jack the Ripper. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 17 Jul 1991 14:47:33 EDT From: Dave Banisar Subject: File 6--Crypto-conference statement CRYPTO-CONFERANCE STATEMENT On July 10, 1991, the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and RSA Data Security Inc. sponsored a conference on cryptography and privacy. The conference was organized in response to S-266, a Senate bill which mostly dealt with terrorism but had a provision which required telecommunications equipment manufacturers and service providers to provide a way for legally authorized law enforcement agencies to get "plaintext" transcriptions of messages sent by indviduals. The conference was attended by industry, congressional and agency staff, privacy advocates and experts in cryptography and computer security. The purpose of the conference was to inform the Congress and administration about the privacy concerns regarding of government control of cryptographic research, export controls of encryption systems and S-266. Conference materials are available for a nominal fee from CPSR. Contact Marc Rotenberg at or (202) 544-9240 for more information. STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY Washington, DC June 10, 1991 As representatives of leading computer and telecommunications companies, as members of national privacy and civil liberties organizations, as academics and researchers across the country, as computer users, as corporate users of computer networks, and as individuals interested in the protection of privacy and the promotion of liberty, we have joined together for the purpose of recommending that the United States government undertake a new approach to support communications privacy and to promote the availability of privacy-enhancing technologies. We believe that our effort will strengthen economic competitiveness, encourage technological innovation, and ensure that communications privacy will be carried forward into the next decade. In the past several months we have become aware that the federal government has failed to take advantage of opportunities to promote communications privacy. In some areas, it has considered proposals that would actually be a step backward. The area of cryptography is a prime example. Cryptography is the process of translating a communication into a code so that it can be understood only by the person who prepares the message and the person who is intended to receive the message. In the communications world, it is the technological equivalent of the seal on an envelope. In the security world, it is like a lock on a door. Cryptography also helps to ensure the authenticity of messages and promotes new forms of business in electronic environments. Cryptography makes possible the secure exchange of information through complex computer networks, and helps to prevent fraud and industrial espionage. For many years, the United States has sought to restrict the use of encryption technology, expressing concern that such restrictions were necessary for national security purposes. For the most part, computer systems were used by large organizations and military contractors. Computer policy was largely determined by the Department of Defense. Companies that tried to develop new encryption products confronted export control licensing, funding restrictions, and classification review. Little attention was paid to the importance of communications privacy for the general public. It is clear that our national needs are changing. Computers are ubiquitous. We also rely on communication networks to exchange messages daily. The national telephone system is in fact a large computer network. We have opportunities to reconsider and redirect our current policy on cryptography. Regrettably, our government has failed to move thus far in a direction that would make the benefits of cryptography available to a wider public. In late May, representatives of the State Department met in Europe with the leaders of the Committee for Multilateral Export Controls ("COCOM"). At the urging of the National Security Agency, our delegates blocked efforts to relax restrictions on cryptography and telecommunications technology, despite dramatic changes in Eastern Europe. Instead of focusing on specific national security needs, our delegates continued a blanket opposition to secure network communication technologies. While the State Department opposed efforts to promote technology overseas, the Department of Justice sought to restrict its use in the United States. A proposal was put forward by the Justice Department that would require telecommunications providers and manufacturers to redesign their services and products with weakened security. In effect, the proposal would have made communications networks less well protected so that the government could obtain access to all telephone communications. A Senate Committee Task Force Report on Privacy and Technology established by Senator Patrick Leahy noted that this proposal could undermine communications privacy. The public opposition to S. 266 was far-reaching. Many individuals wrote to Senator Biden and expressed their concern that cryptographic equipment and standards should not be designed to include a "trapdoor" to facilitate government eavesdropping. Designing in such trapdoors, they noted, is no more appropriate than giving the government the combination to every safe and a master key to every lock. We are pleased that the provision in S. 266 regarding government surveillance was withdrawn. We look forward to Senator Leahy's hearing on cryptography and communications privacy later this year. At the same time, we are aware that proposals like S. 266 may reemerge and that we will need to continue to oppose such efforts. We also hope that the export control issue will be revisited and the State Department will take advantage of the recent changes in East-West relations and relax the restrictions on cryptography and network communications technology. We believe that the government should promote communications privacy. We therefore recommend that the following steps be taken. First, proposals regarding cryptography should be moved beyond the domain of the intelligence and national security community. Today, we are increasingly dependent on computer communications. Policies regarding the appropriate use of cryptography should be subject to public review and public debate. Second, any policy proposal regarding government eavesdropping should be critically reviewed. Asking manufacturers and service providers to make their services less secure will ultimately undermine efforts to strengthen communications privacy. While these proposals may be based on sound concerns, there are less invasive ways to pursue legitimate government goals. Third, government agencies with appropriate expertise should work free of NSA influence to promote the availability of cryptography so as to ensure communications privacy for the general public. The National Academy of Science has recently completed two important studies on export controls and computer security. The Academy should now undertake a study specifically on the use of cryptography and communications privacy, and should also evaluate current obstacles to the widespread adoption of cryptographic protection. Fourth, the export control restrictions for computer network technology and cryptography should be relaxed. The cost of export control restrictions are enormous. Moreover, foreign companies are often able to obtain these products from other sources. And one result of export restrictions is that US manufacturers are less likely to develop privacy-protecting products for the domestic market. As our country becomes increasingly dependent on computer communications for all forms of business and personal communication, the need to ensure the privacy and security of these messages that travel along the networks grows. Cryptography is the most important technological safeguard for ensuring privacy and security. We believe that the general public should be able to use this technology free of government restrictions. There is a great opportunity today for the United States to play a leadership role in promoting communications privacy. We hope to begin this process by this call for a reevaluation of our national interest in cryptography and privacy. Mitchell Kapor, Electronic Frontier Foundation Marc Rotenberg, CPSR John Gilmore, EFF D. James Bidzos, RSA Phil Karn, BellCore Ron Rivest, MIT Jerry Berman, ACLU Whitfield Diffie, Northern Telecom David Peyton, ADAPSO Ronald Plesser, Information Industry Association Dorothy Denning, Georgetown University David Kahn, author *The Codebreakers* Ray Ozzie, IRIS Associates Evan D. Hendricks, US Privacy Council Priscella M. Regan, George Mason University Lance J. Hoffman, George Washington University David Bellin, Pratt University Eugene Spafford, Purdue University Steve Booth, Hewlett-Packard Steve Kent Dave Farber, University of Pennsylvania ------------------------------ Date: 20 Jul 91 18:12:23 GMT From: Subject: File 7--Reasonable laws on computer crime All this talk of clamping down on hackers has made me think about what would make good laws on computer crime. Below is a summary of what I think would make for resonable laws on hacking (or cracking, whatever you like to call it.) Note, I have probably left out several things. I hope that a little bit of discussion will hone the list a bit and make it nice and pretty. (Optimistic aren't I :-) ) I try to separate several of the activities into different crimes that vary in seriousness. This list should go from the least serious to the most serious, more or less. 1. Computerized Nuisance: Using a computer system and/or network or communication system with intent to create a public nuisance. This would be a light misdemeanor. (This is meant to deal with those who do things like dial the entire phone exchange or any like thing to make themself a pest. I included intent to try to exclude those who are just incompetent and didn't realize what they were doing.) 2. Computer Trespass: This would include accessing a computer system without permission from the owner/operator. This does not include failed attempts to login and would also be a misdemeanor. (This is meant to cover those who break into a system and just look around without causing damage.) 3. Computer Vandalism: Using a computer to access a computer system or other service with intent to cause damage, but without intent to profit financially. Dammage would include deleting files, reformating disks, causing a crash, or depriving the owner/operator from using the system or the data on the system. On a first offense with minimal damage, this would be a misdemeanor. On second offenses or cases where the damage was estimated to cost over $5,000? this could be a 3rd degree felony. (This should cover hackers who deliberatly crash a system as well as ex-employees looking to get even. The latter is more likely IMHO. The estimation of value would need to be done by an unbiased third party.) 4. Computer Sabotage: As #3, but with intent to profit financially or commercially. This would be a felony, possibly a 2nd degree if the stakes were high enough. (I don't know how much this would be used, but it's a possibility.) 5. Theft of Information: Using a computer and/or network or communications system to obtain a copy of proprietary (non-public) data, information or software that is of significant value ($1000? determined by a third party) to the owner. I would divide this into two sections. The first would be for people who never intended to profit from the stolen information. This would be serious misdemeanor on the first offence, and a felony on any following offenses. The second would be for those who intended to make a profit. This would be a third degree felony or perhaps a second degree felony if the value were high enough and the offender had a record of this in the past. Credit cards, calling cards: I think misuse of these should be covered separately. Though if some one hacks a computer to get the card numbers it would probably be covered by the above laws. (I think they are already, perhaps some one who knows more about credit card laws could add more.) I haven't addressed laws about e-mail and the like, because I wanted to keep it as specific to computer break-ins as posible. (And I'm out of time :-) ) So, what do you think? Wait a minute! I've got to get my asbestos suit on. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 26 Jul 91 16:34:22 EDT From: Jerry Leichter Subject: File 8--re: Bill Vajk's latest comments I found Bill Vajk's comments in Cu Digest, #3.26 somewhat depressing. Here's a bright guy, willing to take the time to, for example, wade through legal texts, who still seems unable to separate what he WANTS the law to say, so as to get the RIGHT outcome in some PARTICULAR case, from what it either DOES say or SHOULD say as a matter of good social policy. Let's look at the matter of copyrights an publication first. >I was unable to discover the exact requirements currently mandate for >deposit of software in order to support a copyright. First we need to get the language right. I know of no legal significance to the term "support" with respect to a copyright. In order to sue for copyright infringement (and ONLY in that case is such action REQUIRED), you must first register the copyright with the Copyright Office. The Office has regulations governing mandatory deposit for registration (37 C.F.R. Chapter II, Sections 202.19 - 202.21). The regulations, as published in 1978, contain exceptions, including (Section 202.19(c)(5)) "computer programs [and other things, like databases] ... published ... only in the form of machine-readable copies ... from which the work could not ordinarily be visually perceived except with the aid of a machine...." In October 1989, the Copyright Office issued final regulations governing machine-readable copies. These regulations eliminated the exception of 202.19(c)(5), authorizing the Office to demand deposit. Note, however, that the demand is not automatic. Normally, the Copyright Office only issues demands for material the Library of Congress tells it it wants. Appendix B to Part 202 includes a statement that the current policy of the Copyright Office and the Library of Congress is to demand the deposit only of materials in PC-DOS, MS-DOS or "other compatible formats such as Xenix [?]", or Macintosh formats. So, deposit MAY be required. But WHAT must be deposited? If the October 1989 regulations follow the proposed regulations issued for comment in September 1986 - which I believe is the case - then deposit of computer programs for which trade secret protection is also claimed, which have been published only in machine-readable form, can take one of four forms: The first and last 25 pages (or equivalent) of source code, with no more than half the material blacked out; the complete first and last 10 pages of source code; the first and last 25 pages of object code, containing at least 10 consecutive pages with nothing blacked out; or, for programs of less then 25 pages, the whole thing with no more than half blacked out. In addition, it is possible to petition for exceptions or suggest alternative forms of deposit. It's worth noting that, even if a full deposit were required, the deposited information, while a matter of public record, is NOT really fully public: It can be examined at the Copyright Office but may not be removed or copied. It's also worth noting that there is a completely separate deposit requirement for the Library of Congress, mandated under a different part of the law (Section 407 of the 1976 Copyright Act). This applies only to published material, and there are a variety of exceptions. As I noted before, failure to deposit under this regulation has no effect on copyright, although it may subject you to fines. >The Rose indictment calls the source code "confidential and >proprietary." It is confidential in an AT&T security employee's dream, >and that's about the extent. AT&T provides copies of this software only under strict licenses. It goes after violaters, and they've done so for years. (Consider the Lyons book case.) While copies have "leaked", copies of the Unix sources are by no means freely available. I think AT&T could make a strong case for the claim that the sources remain "confidential and proprietary". >Leichter suggests that AT&T could claim to have never published the >source code. This would be true if sale or offer to sell were a >requirement. 17 USC addresses these issues with the term "vend" >instead of "sell." The source code we're talking about has been >published all right, and is in no way entitled to a "trade secret" >status. Nonsense. It's been licensed on a restricted basis. (Hardly anyone sells software - you lose control of it too easily. No one I know of sells sources.) Two kinds of words occur in legal documents: "Terms of art" (technical terms that have taken on specific legal meanings) and normal English words. In copyright law, "publication" has essentially its normal English meaning. Black's Law Dictionary, for example, defines it as "The act of making public a book, writing, map, chart, etc.; that is, offering or communicating it to the public for sale or distribution of copies." ("Publication" used to be a very significant event because it terminated the common-law copyright that protected unpublished works, and started the clock running on statutory copy-right protections. The 1976 Copyright Revision Act abolished common law copy-rights, and the enabling registration under the Berne treaty revised this area yet again, so the old concept is long dead. Curiously, "publication" IS a term of art in another context: For a will to be valid, it must be "pub-lished". However, in this case, "publication" is accomplished by showing it to two (three?) witnesses, whose signature is proof of such publication. "Publication" can also become an issue in tort law: To sue for libel, you have to show the material as "published". Again, there is a special meaning.) Given the way AT&T licenses its source code, it is clear that they don't intend to publish it. In fact, later in the same issue of Cud, Craig Neidorf even includes a copy of AT&T's notice: Copyright (c) 1984 AT&T All Rights Reserved * THIS IS UNPUBLISHED PROPRIETARY SOURCE CODE OF AT&T * * The copyright notice above does not evidence any * * actual or intended publication of such source code. * AT&T is hardly alone in taking this route to protecting its sources: It's a commonly-recognized technique, recommended by practitioners in the field. I don't know if this has been tested in court, but keep in mind that the judges who decide on the issue will come from the same basic legal community that recommends the technique today. Mr. Vajk, who thinks he knows better, will not be asked for his opinion. Even in the unlikely case that a court threw out this method of protection, I'll give you excellent odds that legislation would be introduced in Congress within a very short time to restore it: The computer business is just too important to this country, and too much of the competitive advantage of American companies stems from software protected under these terms. Congress won't care a whit about the Len Rose's of this world, but they WILL act if they can be convinced that the Japanese or the Koreans or whoever are about to walk in and copy all this important American software, and that no one will be able to stop them. >Leichter defends the errors made by law enforcement, stipulating that >they have to learn how to deal with computer crime. Agreed, in >principle, but not in detail. The problems I am addressing have to do >with the general approach law enforcement seems to be taking to >solving all crime these days. The Constitution hasn't changed >recently. I suggest Mr. Vajk learn a little history. He might try, for example, to talk to a Japanese-American citizen who spent time in American internment camps in World War II. Or to a woman who needed an abortion before Roe v. Wade. (Actually, he may soon be able to find many women to talk to on that issue.) >Essentially the same rules have applied to investigations. What does >an officer have to learn about computer criminality in order to keep >him from kicking in two doors because some law abiding individual >tried to get into a bbs that was no longer a bbs? What does he have >to be taught in order to have the patience necessary to simply wait >for the guy to get home from work, and ask a few questions? The reasoning here is typical of Mr. Vajk's approach: He KNOWS that the individual involved was law-abiding, so he reasons backwards to find that the police acted unreasonably. He takes the approach to an extreme in later responses to Gene Spafford, in which he demands, in effect, that "innocent until proven guilty" should mean that we, as individuals, should not even describe as guilty someone whom we witnessed committing a crime - until a jury finds him so. It may come as a shock to Mr. Vajk, but "innocent until proven guilty" has a fairly limited meaning in the legal system: It means that the burden is on the prosecution to prove the accused guilty, not on the accused to prove himself innocent. The accused only has to show "reasonable doubt" that the charges are true. "Innocent until proven guilty" does NOT mean that those charged with a crime are entitled to all the rights of those not charged. Unless they can put up bail, these "innocents" will sit in jail. If they are charged with certain crimes, or if a judge thinks they are likely to flee - he does NOT need proof, much less proof beyond a reasonable doubt! - bail isn't even available. The accused's dignity is of little importance to the law: When arrested, he will be led out in handcuffs in front of family, friends, and waiting TV camera's. There's nothing at all new about this; the availability of mass media has certainly encouraged political grandstanding, of course, but I'm not at all sure that more of this goes on today than in the past. Anyhow, let's get back to the case at hand and look at it from the side of the police. They receive a report from a doctor's office saying that someone is trying to break into their system. So, as a start we have a complaint from a high-status individual. Beyond that, if someone IS trying to break in, there is potential for serious harm: Beyond the issues of privacy, ANY unauthorized access to medical records has at least the potential to lead to incorrect diagnosis and treatment, possibly causing someone grave harm. So this is certainly worth investigating. Anyhow, relying on the doctors, who the police assume know more about their system than the police do, the police assume someone IS trying to break in. They check the phone records and find one or two suspects. The evidence available is sufficient to convince a judge to issue a search warrant. Now, you can already object and say "why not talk to the suspects first". For a very simple reason: If they are, in fact, guilty you'll likely find out nothing of value from them, but you'll tip your hand and perhaps give them the chance to destroy evidence, something that can be done very quickly on a computer. No, much safer to get the search warrant first; that's exactly what search warrants are supposed to be for. Finally, the police show up at the suspect's house and find no one there. The search warrant authorizes them to gain access to the house and search it. It includes the authority to break in if necessary; and policy probably says that a warrant should normally be executed as quickly as possible. Why? I can think of at least two reasons: Waiting may lead to someone being warned that the police have been around (and consider how quickly evidence on a computer could be destroyed by a simple phone call while the police wait patiently outside); and, besides, posting an officer to wait for the return of the suspect is expensive. Police departments are perpetually under-manned, and if you phrase the question as "is the guy's front door more important than the taxpayer's money, not to mention the protection a cop doing something more useful than baby-sitting a front door could provide" and you may see things a bit differently. Does that mean that I think the action of the police was correct in this instance? With 20-20 hindsight, it's easy to see that they too quickly came to the conclusion that a crime was taking place. That's a direct result of lack of training and experience with the computing world. I hope they've learned from this experience; I'd bet they have. Given the realities of day-to-day law enforcement, I think they acted reasonably given the limited time, data, and resources available to them. I wish it could have come out differently, and I sympathize with the computer owners who got so unlucky, but this is not a perfect world and mistakes can and do happen. >We are seeing some of the fallout from our permissiveness regarding ?RICO. Actually, I don't really disagree with you here. What the police did in this case is NOTHING compared to what Federal prosecutors under Rudolph Guilliani did in various insider-trading cases. The publicity almost got Guilliani elected mayor of New York; now, most of the cases are collapsing in the courts. >These issues have nothing to do with computer criminality as opposed >to using sensible investigative techniques. Are we in an age where >we've been subjected to so many shoot-em-up cops versus the bad guys >TV shows that people here on usenet, among the best educated, most >sensible souls in the US, can accept kicking in doors and summary >confiscation of personal property as a valid and reasonable outcome >from calling the wrong phone number a few times? I don't accept it as a reasonable outcome; I accept that this is not a perfect world, that law enforcement personnel must work under conditions of limited training, information, resources, and time, and under pressure from the public to "do something" about crime. Errors happen. Sometimes the system is too rough; sometimes it's too lenient. (Don't believe that? Try reading Cuckoo's Egg.) If you know of a way to improve it, given the real world - not some ideal world in which everyone is reasonable and honest - please, let's hear about it. ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 27 Jul 91 14:51:21 EDT From: Edward Vielmetti Subject: File 9--Chaos Computer Club archives at The archives of the Chaos Computer Club are at Here's a rough translation into English of their READ_ME file. - translation of If almost all of the texts in the CCC Archive are in German, shouldn't the READ_ME file be called LIES_MICH, eh? :-) Here follows our electronic CCC Archive; everything about the CCC that flies around on the networks should land here. Should. Anyone who has anything else, texts or questions, or... ==> mail to For reasons of space most everything is in UNIX compress format. You must transfer them in binary mode! To transport them to VMS you must rename the files, since VMS has room for only one "." in the filename and the VMS compress uses the suffix _Z. ==> ftp> binary ftp> get "blubber.blaeh.Z" blubber.bleah_z (should work with most VMS ftps, or try it without the "") If you want to transfer the files through a gateway, like e.g. BITFTP, then they need to be uuencoded, otherwise you get data salad [Datensalat]. See bitftp.txt. First uudecode, then decompress, and the text files will be readable. For VMS, Atari-ST, MS-DOOF uhh.. MS-DOS and Amiga there are files in the directories under soft/tools to for unpacking. If you have compress and uudecode for other operating systems, please send me the programs. Contents: ========= chalisti Network newspaper congress Text and documentation from the yearly Chaos Communication Congress dokumente diverse and various documents eV Information about the organization itself listen Lists of NUAs, BBSes etc. [NUA? --Ed] virun Documents about computer viruses have phun Framstag ( -- MSEN Archive Service file verification total 16 drwxrwsr-x 2 ftp-adm 512 Jun 8 12:06 chalisti -rw-rw-r-- 1 ftp-adm 5491 May 15 13:21 LIES_MICH -rw-rw-r-- 1 ftp-adm 3890 May 15 01:41 ls-lR drwxrwsr-x 2 ftp-adm 512 May 14 21:03 listen drwxrwsr-x 4 ftp-adm 512 Apr 21 19:33 congress drwxrwsr-x 2 ftp-adm 512 Apr 19 21:10 eV drwxrwsr-x 2 ftp-adm 512 Apr 19 19:43 dokumente drwxrwsr-x 2 ftp-adm 512 Apr 18 21:29 viren found chaos-computer-club ok ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 22 Jul 91 14:44:12 MET From: afp!gna!comsat!coop@TFD.COM (Agent Cooper) Subject: File 10--Late reply to Dutch Crackers article (CUD3.19) First I want to make clear that I'm not one of the 'hackers' who broke into american military computers. I'm a friend of them and was asked to reply on the article in the last CUD. There doesn't exist an organized group in Holland that is 'hacking' american military computers, about 8 'hackers' not organized as a group which are in some case friends of eachother but in most cases don't know eachother were targeting military computers in 1990. Some of them are still doing this others switched to other systems and areas of 'hacking' in search of new challenges. The 'hackers' are high-school-students, programmers, university students and software developers, all with a considerable knowledge of various computer systems. They didn't use 'hacker cook-books' but used mostly new /forgotten software bugs which they found themselves. Many CERT advisories conceirning system security in 1990 were a direct cause of this. Their main goal wasn't only finding new bugs, curiosity or boredom it was a mixture of those. Because they sometimes 'hacked' over 400 computers per day (per hacker) their activities looked pre-fabricated. Not only military computers on the internet were searched but also systems on X.25 and dialups. The information was in some cases confidential. Files which I have seen contained very sensitive (marked confidential etc.) information (from accidents to spy reports & such) that made the information found by the hackers from 'the cuckoo's egg' and the 'LOD E911' people look like child-play. The information was not falsified as far as I could see, things I checked were all true. Most of the 'hackers' are conceirned about what they found and some even contacted U.S. government agencies. What was shown on dutch television didn't have to do much with this. The person on TV. was no 'hacker'. It was a friend of a 'hacker' in need of money who got a harmless account on a U.S. military computer. The Utrecht university gateway shown was seldomly used by the real 'hackers' and was expendable for the TV show. At the end of 1990 some of the hackers noticed certain gateways & system were being monitored, which didn't really bother them cause they switched paths & routines regularly. In the last issue of the dutch hacker magazine 'Hacktic' (C. Stoll seems to read it looking at his remarks) there was an article in which they published traces, logfiles and personal mail of system operators and security people. >From these files you can see that the problem in Holland isn't that there is no real law against hacking but that the problem is that they can't find the 'hackers'. There have been cases in Holland in which 'hackers' were convicted. ------------------------------ ************************************ End of Computer Underground Digest #3.27


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