Computer Underground Digest--Thu Jul 18 17:22:30 CDT 1991 (Vol #3.26) Moderators: Jim Thom

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Computer Underground Digest--Thu Jul 18 17:22:30 CDT 1991 (Vol #3.26) Moderators: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET) Contents, #3.26 (June 18, 1991) File 1: Moderators' Corner File 2: The Vajk-Spaf-Leichter dialogue continues...... File 3: The TERMINUS of Len Rose File 4: "Computer Crime" paper by Brian Peretti available File 5: Doc Savage Sentenced (NEWSBYTES Reprint) File 6: CompuServe Responds to Policy and Operations Questions Administratia: ARCHIVISTS: ROB KRAUSE, BOB KUSUMOTO, AND BRENDAN KEHOE CuD is available via electronic mail at no cost. Printed copies are available by subscription. Single copies are available for the costs of reproduction and mailing. Issues of CuD can be found in the Usenet news group, on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of LAWSIG, and DL0 and DL12 of TELECOM, by FidoNet file request from 1:100/345, on Genie, on the PC-EXEC BBS at (414) 789-4210, and by anonymous ftp >from,, and To use the U. of Chicago email server, send mail with the subject "help" (without the quotes) to COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted as long as the source is cited. Some authors do copyright their material, and they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles relating to the Computer Underground. Articles are preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts unless absolutely necessary. DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not violate copyright protections. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: July 18, 1991 From: "The Moderataors" Subject: File 1-- Moderators' Corner NEW CuD FORMAT: The responses to the new format have been overwhelmingly favorable, so it will replace the old format. Thanks to Gene Spafford who provided us with a digest maker that we hope to have working soon. READING THE NEW FORMAT: Usenet readers should soon be able to read CuD as individual messages, making replies easier (thanks to Chip Rosenthal). Those who get it as "mail" on Unix system can break the single file up into individual files (depending on the system and what's set up on it) with "burst" or, the easiest, with "inc". Those receiving CuD on an IBM-type machine appear limited to a large file, but if anybody has suggests on how to burst on VMS, pass them along. MA/PHD THESES AND DISSERTATIONS: We're compiling a list of anybody currently working on a thesis or dissertation on computer culture, computer crime, or other related topics. If you, or somebody you know, is doing this, please pass along the names and snail-mail and email address. This includes international researchers as well as those in North America. LEN ROSE: Len Rose began his prison term in North Carolina this month. Barring surprises, he should be out next May. He could use some "cheery" mail. His address is: LEN ROSE FEDERAL PRISON CAMP SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB CALLER BOX 8004 GOLDSBORO, NC 27531-5000 ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 15 Jul 91 02:21:46 CDT From: "William Vajk (igloo)" Subject: File 2-- The Vajk-Spaf-Leichter dialogue continues...... More Questions.... ==================== I have read Jerry Leichter's response in CuD 3.24, and have received mail from Thomas Klotzbach which has also been submitted by him for publication in CuD. As a direct result of the issues raised by these two gentlemen, I spent the better part of a day in one of the law libraries provided by Cook County, Illinois, for use by the public. Instead of having answers, the review of copyright laws in 17 USC only created more new questions, which I'll address another time in yet another article. Briefly stated, copyright laws do the best job of protecting tangible goods wherein the expression constitutes the primary value. In other cases where a visual rendition is possible but does not represent the real value of the object, as with musical scores, the public production rights also glean protection, but the primary purpose is to preclude unauthorized reproduction of tangible medium versions. It would seem that copyright protections for source code, as in UNIX source code, is rather minimal. Indeed, rereading the Rose indictment >from Maryland and the plea bargain, copyright is never mentioned. In detail, the Rose case becomes further complicated in that he received the code from a bailee. Klotzbach is correct in one comment that there are criminal aspects to copyright violations. They fall, however, in a particularly narrow range, requiring willful action AND profit motive on part of the miscreant. If you don't sell it, copyright law isn't applicable to prosecution as a criminal. I was unable to discover the exact requirements currently mandate for deposit of software in order to support a copyright. The Rose indictment calls the source code "confidential and proprietary." It is confidential in an AT&T security employee's dream, and that's about the extent. Leichter suggests that AT&T could claim to have never published the source code. This would be true if sale or offer to sell were a requirement. 17 USC addresses these issues with the term "vend" instead of "sell." The source code we're talking about has been published all right, and is in no way entitled to a "trade secret" status. Leichter defends the errors made by law enforcement, stipulating that they have to learn how to deal with computer crime. Agreed, in principle, but not in detail. The problems I am addressing have to do with the general approach law enforcement seems to be taking to solving all crime these days. The Constitution hasn't changed recently. Essentially the same rules have applied to investigations. What does an officer have to learn about computer criminality in order to keep him from kicking in two doors because some law abiding individual tried to get into a bbs that was no longer a bbs ? What does he have to be taught in order to have the patience necessary to simply wait for the guy to get home from work, and ask a few questions ? We are seeing some of the fallout from our permissiveness regarding RICO. These issues have nothing to do with computer criminality as opposed to using sensible investigative techniques. Are we in an age where we've been subjected to so many shoot-em-up cops versus the bad guys TV shows that people here on usenet, among the best educated, most sensible souls in the US, can accept kicking in doors and summary confiscation of personal property as a valid and reasonable outcome >from calling the wrong phone number a few times ? We have a nation which based its laws on personal freedoms and rights before any other consideration. Let's please try to remember the importance of this simple philosophy. CuD 3.25 arrived as I was finishing this article. A couple of points for Gene Spafford to contemplate come to mind. He asks why it is that I criticize him personally. The answer is simple. The way the articles by Spafford have been written, it is impossible to separate the concepts from the man. His style is the same in Communications of the ACM. Interestingly, I have been criticized by him exactly in the same way as he complained regarding my statements about him. I expected it. I suppose Spafford didn't. These opinions are pretty personal. They can hardly be discussed at arm's length. It is not any more remote to ask if readers find statements hypocritical, or the individual (see Spafford's comments in referenced CuD.) I am not insulted by Spafford's opinion. He holds it, he's entitled to it, I won't argue the point. (Where do you cut notches, Spaf? :-) Spafford asks a direct question of me to which I am happy to reply: > If Joe Random were to shoot someone in front of witnesses, he would > be innocent under the law until a jury returned a verdict in a trial, > but he would NOT be innocent of the act. Would any witness to the > crime, or anyone who spoke to the witness, then be equally condemned > by Mr. Vajk for saying "Joe was not innocent of murder" before the > conclusion of the trial? Yes. A witness can justly say "I saw him shoot the guy." A person who spoke to a witness might reasonably say "He said he saw Joe Random shoot the guy." Anyone can say "I believe Joe is guilty" and still be fair and reasonable. But to state someone IS guilty is the duty of the jury (or judge.) We, all of us, have reserved that right to the judicial process. I cannot fathom why anyone would be inclined to change that now. When one begins to assume these responsibilities on themselves, it becomes easy to victimize even individuals who haven't been charged with crimes by painting them with a wide black brush of presumed guilt. We've seen it happen, right here on this network. It has also been called the tyranny imposed by the self-righteous. And finally: > cannot champion free speech without also embracing the responsibility > to to respect others who choose to exercise that right -- disagreement with > views should not become contempt for people who (appear to) espouse them. Of course it is possible to respect another's right to freedom of expression while holding them in contempt. I respect the rights of Nazis to march in Skokie. If asked to testify regarding their rights, I would most likely state that 'I believe this swill must be permitted to march. Please issue the necessary permits.' I certainly will never respect them in any way. I don't, however, see anything hypocritical about respecting some particular individual for some aspects regarding them, and detest other aspects concurrently. Most of us aren't particularly narrow. ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 09 Jul 91 21:28:26 CDT From: "Craig Neidorf" Subject: File 3-- The TERMINUS of Len Rose The TERMINUS of LEN ROSE by Craig Neidorf ( (Adapted from 2600 Magazine, Spring 1990) As most readers of 2600 Magazine and Computer Underground Digest should know, I am Knight Lightning, and I used to be the editor and publisher of Phrack, a magazine similar to 2600, but not available in a hardcopy format. In my capacity as editor and publisher I often received text files and other articles submitted for publication. Actually, this is how the majority of the material found in Phrack was acquired. Outside of articles written by Taran King or myself, there was no staff, merely a loose, unorganized group of free-lancers who sent us material from time-to-time. One such free-lance writer was Len Rose, known to some as Terminus. To the best of my knowledge at the time, Len was a Unix consultant who ran his own system on UUCP called Netsys. Netsys was a major electronic mail station for messages passing through UUCP. Terminus was no stranger to Phrack. Taran King had interviewed him for Phrack Pro-Phile 10, found in Phrack's fourteenth issue. Prior to the end of 1988, I had very little contact with Terminus and we were reintroduced when he contacted me through the Internet. He was very excited that Phrack still existed over the course of the years and he wanted to send us an article. However, Len was a professional Unix consultant, holding contracts with major corporations and organizations across the country and quite reasonably (given the corporate mentality) he assumed that these companies would not understand his involvement with Phrack. Nevertheless, he did send Phrack an article back in 1988. It was a computer program actually that was called "Yet Another File on Hacking Unix" and the name on the file was >Unknown User<, adopted from the anonymous posting feature of the once famous Metal Shop Private bulletin board. The file itself was a password cracking program. Such programs were then and are still today publicly available intentionally so that system managers can run them against their own password files in order "An example is the password cracker in COPS, a package that checks a Unix system for different types of vulnerabilities. The complete package can be obtained by anonymous FTP from Like the password cracker published in Phrack, the COPS cracker checks whether any of the words in an on-line dictionary correspond to a password in the password file." (Dorothy Denning, Communications of the ACM, March 1991, p. 28) Perhaps if more people used them, we would not have incidents like the Robert Morris Worm, Cliff Stoll's KGB agents, or the recent crisis involving system intruders from the Netherlands. Time passed and eventually we come to January 1990. At some point during the first week or two of the new year, I briefly logged on to my account on the VM mainframe on the University of Missouri-Columbia and saw that I had received electronic mail from Len Rose. There was a brief letter followed by some sort of program. >From the text I saw that the program was Unix-based, an operating system I was virtually unfamiliar with at the time. I did not understand the significance of the file or why Len had sent it to me, however, since I was logged in remotely from St. Louis, I decided to let it sit until I arrived back at school a few days later. In the meantime I had noticed some copyright markings on the file and sent a letter to a friend at Bellcore Security asking about the legalities in having or publishing such material. As it turns out this file was never published in Phrack. Although Taran King and I had already decided not to publish this file, other events made sure that our decision was mandatory. Upon returning to University of Missouri-Columbia (for the new semester) on January 12, 1990, we discovered that all access to our accounts on the mainframe of the University of Missouri had been revoked without explanation. On January 18, 1990 I was visited by the U.S. Secret Service for reasons unrelated to the Unix program Len Rose had sent. That same day under obligation from a subpoena issued by a Federal District Court judge, the University turned over all files from my mainframe account to the U.S. Secret Service including the Unix file. Included below is the text portion of that file: "Here is a specialized login for System V 3.2 sites. I presume that any competent person can get it working on other levels of System V. It took me about 10 minutes to make the changes and longer to write the README file and this bit of mail." "It comes from original AT&T SVR3.2 sources, so it's definitely now something you wish to get caught with. As people will probably tell you, it was originally part of the port to an AT&T 3B2 system. Just so that I can head off any complaints, tell them I also compiled it with a minimal change on a 386 running AT&T Unix System V 3.2 (they'll have to fiddle with some defines, quite simple to do). Any changes I made are bracketed with comments, so if they run into something terrible tell them to blame AT&T and not me." "I will get my hands on some Berkeley 4.3 code and do the same thing if you like (it's easy of course)." In the text of the program it also reads: "WARNING: This is AT&T proprietary source code. Do NOT get caught with it." and; " Copyright (c) 1984 AT&T All Rights Reserved * THIS IS UNPUBLISHED PROPRIETARY SOURCE CODE OF AT&T * * The copyright notice above does not evidence any * * actual or intended publication of such source code. *" As it turned out the program that Len Rose had sent was modified to be a Trojan horse program that could capture accounts and passwords, saving them into a file that could later be retrieved. However, knowing how to write a Trojan horse login program is no secret. For example; "such programs have been published in The Cuckoo's Egg by Clifford Stoll and an article by Grampp and Morris. Also in his ACM turing lecture, Ken Thompson, one of the Bell Labs coauthors of Unix, explained how to create a powerful Trojan horse that would allow its author to log onto any account with either the password assigned to the account or a password chosen by the author."(Dorothy Denning, Communications of the ACM, March 1991, p. 29-30) Between the Unix 3.2 source code, the Unix password cracking file, and the added fact that Terminus was a subscriber to Phrack, Len Rose was raided by the United States Secret Service (including SSA Tim Foley who was the case agent in U.S. v. Neidorf) at his Middletown, Maryland home on February 1, 1990. The actual search on his home was another atrocity in and of itself. "For five hours, the agents -- along with two Bellcore employees -- confined Rose to his bedroom for questioning and the computer consultant's wide, Sun, in another room while they searched the house. The agents seized enough computers, documents, and personal effects -- including Army medals, Sun Rose's personal phone book, and sets of keys to their house -- to fill a 14-page list in a pending court case." (No Kid Gloves For The Accused, Unix Today!, June 11, 1990, page 1) It was also reported that the agents did serious damage to the physical house itself. Len was left without the computers that belonged to him and that he desperately needed to support himself and his family financially. Essentially Len went into bankruptcy and furthermore now he was blacklisted by AT&T. This culminated in a May 15, 1990 indictment of Len Rose at age 31. There were five counts charging Len with violations of the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and Wire Fraud. The total maximum penalty he faced was 32 years in prison and fines of $950,000. Furthermore, the U.S. Attorney's office in Baltimore insisted that Len was a member of the Legion of Doom, a claim that Len and known LOD members have consistently denied. It did finally become clear that Terminus was not a member. This was just the beginning of another long saga of bad luck for Len Rose. He had no real lawyer, he had no money, and he had no job. Furthermore, Len suffered a broken leg after rescuing his son during a camping trip. Eventually Len found work with a company in Naperville, Illinois (DuPage County ) with a Unix consulting firm called InterActive and he had a new lawyer named Jane Macht. The future began to look a little brighter temporarily. The problem was that within a week InterActive was making claims that Len had copied Unix source code from them. Illinois State Police and SSA Tim Foley (what is HE doing here!?) came to Len's new home and took him away. In addition to the five count indictment in Baltimore, now Len was facing criminal charges from the State of Illinois. It was at this point, attorney Sheldon T. Zenner, who had successfully defended me took on the responsibility of defending Len against the state charges. Len's spin of bad luck was not over yet. Assistant U.S. Attorney William Cook in Chicago wanted a piece of the action, in part perhaps to redeem himself from his highly publicized defeat in U.S. v. Neidorf. A third possible indictment for Len seemed inevitable. In fact, there were statements made that I personally was to have been subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury about Len, but this never took place. As time passed and court dates kept being delayed, Len was barely surviving; running out of money and options. His wife wanted to leave him and take away his children, he could not find work, he was looking at two serious indictments for sure, and a possible third, and he just could not take it any longer. Len's legal arguments were strong in many respects and it is widely believed that if he had fought the charges that he may very well have been able to prove his innocence. Unfortunately, the pile up of multiple indictments, in a legal system that defines justice in terms of how much money you can afford to spend defending yourself, took its toll. The U.S. Attorney in Baltimore did not want to try the case and they offered Len a deal, part of which was that Assistant U.S. Attorney Cook got something as well. Len would agree to plead guilty to two wire fraud charges, one in Baltimore, one in Chicago. The U.S. Attorney's office would offer a recommendation of a prison sentence of 10 months, the State of Illinois would drop it's charges, and Len would eventually get his computer equipment back. In the weeks prior to accepting this decision I often spoke with Len, pleading with him to fight based on the principles and importance of the issues, no matter what the costs. However, I was blinded by idealism while Len still had to face the reality. Len Rose was sentenced in June and began serving his time on July 10, 1990. He got his computer equipment back, but only under the agreement that he sell all of it. United States v. Rose was not a case about illegal intrusion into other people's computers. Despite this the Secret Service and AT&T called his case a prime example of a hacker conspiracy. In reality it was only an example of blind justice and corporate power. Like many criminal cases of this type, it is all a question of how much justice can a defendant afford -- How much of this type of *injustice* can the American public afford? -- -- -- -- -- A Few Words About Law Enforcement and the Len Rose case... As a person who has been involved with the legal process repeatedly over the last couple of years I have learned and discovered some of the realities behind the rumors and the myths. In the Spring 1991 issue 2600, I authored an article titled "The Terminus of Len Rose" and unfortunately the meaning behind the article was lost on some of the readers whom I admire greatly. Through my unique experiences at meetings like the 13th Annual National Computer Security Conference in Washington D.C. and the first conference on Computers, Freedom, & Privacy in San Francisco, I have come into contact and had discussions with both the people who help create the laws as well as those who actively enforce them. I have learned a lot about what actually takes place behind the scenes and why. More than anything else, I discovered that my views on several issues were not so very far from theirs and they taught me why certain realities were so. What they said made sense and I realized that I was indeed wrong about some issues and situations. I was even more wrong in my expectations of the individuals themselves. These people are decent folks just like you and me. Despite the highly publicized incidents of the past couple of years, the vast majority of these people are not out there trying to destroy someone's life just to make a name for themselves or to put a notch on their desk. They believe in their work like a sacred religious mission. At the same time they have families, hobbies, like to go to the movies, play video games, take vacations during the holidays, and everything else. In the article about Len Rose, I did not intend to imply that the prosecution or the prosecutors were malicious (although the frantic raid on Len's house may have been a bit out of order), but rather that the legal process itself can be a difficult road for a non-wealthy defendant to travel, especially when faced with many indictments at once. Len Rose was never charged with actually breaking into a computer, but he was called a hacker (under the negative definition) just the same. That is not fair. I believe that the prosecutors acted in the way they thought best and were not out to deny Rose of his constitutional rights, but the issues of law and computers that clashed here make things confusing for everyone including myself. The fact of the matter is that the system does have flaws in it which arise and are corrected over time. These flaws arose in my own case and cost me dearly until the system caught its flaw and corrected itself. I am not here to tell you that Len Rose was a saint or that he did not do anything wrong. Indeed in the past month I have heard complaints from several people about bad business deals with Len and mishaps concerning stolen computer equipment. I don't know all of the details behind those allegations and considering where Len is today, those questions are moot. I must admit that Len's transportation of Unix source code strikes me as a form of copyright infringement or perhaps software piracy, but Rose did not even make an attempt to profit financially from this venture. The value of what he actually transported and his guilt or innocence of these statutes was never put to the test because the prosecution did not seek to use these more appropriate statutes concerning piracy or copyright infringement. I still wonder why. While I believe that the prosecutors involved with his case are honest, hardworking, and highly motivated people, it strikes me as being overly harsh to see a very bright, non-violent offender who did not even commit a crime for money go to prison when his formidable talents could have been put to good use elsewhere. In conclusion I think there may be a rare bad apple mucking up the legal process from time to time, but it is my firm belief that the prosecutors and law enforcement officials in our system overall are dedicated to doing the right thing and going after offenders that they truly believe to be committing real crimes. Up to this point I've only been able to watch and learn about their work from an outsider's viewpoint, but one day I may be interested in participating from their perspective. As a group in general, the law enforcement community has earned my respect and appreciation. ------------------------------ Date: July 28, 1991 From: "The Moderataors" Subject: File 4-- "Computer Crime" paper by Brian Peretti available Brian J. Peretti has finished the latest draft of his paper: "Computer Crime: Current Practices, Problems and Proposed Solutions". Here is a brief excerpt from the introduction. The complete paper is available in the CuD ftp sites. ++++++++++++++++++ Within recent years, computer crime has become a preoccupation with law enforcement officials. In California, a group of West German hackers using phone lines and satellite hookups, gained unauthorized access into civilian and military computers and stole sensitive documents that were sold to the Soviet Union. A young New York programmer broke into a Washington computer to run a program that he could not run from his personal computer. After Southeastern Bell Stated that a document published in an electronic publication was valued at more than $75,000 the publisher was arrested and brought to trial before the discovery that the document could be publicly bought from the company for $12.6 The Chaos Computer Club, a Hamburg, Germany, club, went into government computers and access information and gave it to reporters. In May, 1988, the United States government launched Operation Sun Devil, which lead to the seizure of 23,000 computer disks and 40 computers. In addition, poor police performance has also been blamed on computers. Since its creation, the computer has become increasing important in society. The law, as in the past, has not been able to evolve as quickly as the rapidly expanding technology. This lack of movement on the part of governments shows a lack of understanding with the area. The need to create a comprehensive regulation or code of ethics has become increasing necessary. Due to the nature of computer systems and their transnational connections through telephone lines, an individual state's action will only stop the problems associated with computer crime if many states join together. The patchwork of legislation that exists covers only a small part of the problem. To adequately address computer crime, greater efforts must be made within the computer community to discourage unauthorized computer access, countries must strengthen and co-ordinated their computer related laws, as well as proper enforcement mechanism created, computer program copyright laws be enhanced and computer systems should be created to allow those who wish to explore computer systems which will not disrupt the users of computer systems. This paper will first set out a definition of computer crime and why laws or regulation by the computer community must be created. Section II will then discuss the United States law concerning computer crime and why it needs to be strengthened. Section III will discuss the proposed Israeli computer crime bill, Britain's Computer Misuse Act and Ghana's proposed law. Section IV will discuss what can be done by both the government and computer owners and users to make computer crime less possible. ------------------------------ Date: July 28, 1991 From: "The Moderataors" Subject: File 5-- Doc Savage Sentenced (NEWSBYTES Reprint) (Moderators' Note: Readers should note well the final paragraphs of this article. It is the first case that we're aware of in which the prosecutor opposed the judges intention to imprison. Gail Thackeray's arguments against incarceration are compelling and productive. Sadly, such logic is the exception and not the rule, but perhaps her example will spread). SUNDEVIL DEFENDANT "DOC SAVAGE" SENTENCED 7/17/91 PHOENIX, ARIZONA, U.S.A., 1991 JUL 17(NB) -- The Maricopa County Arizona County Attorney's Office has announced the sentencing Baron Majette, 20 , also known as "Doc Savage", for computer-related crimes uncovered in the joint federal / state investigation known as "Sundevil". Majette was arrested on March 27th of this year and charged with a number of felony charges relating to unauthorized use of telephone facilities of Toys 'R Us to make calls worth approximately $8,000, illegal access of TRW's credit data base and use of information obtained therein to obtain in excess of $50,000 in cash, goods, and services, and stealing of credit cards from U.S. Mail boxes and use of the cards to obtain approximately $10,000 in cash, goods and services. If convicted of the charges, Majette faced a possible jail sentence of 15 years and the requirement to make restitution for the full amount of the alleged losses endured by the firms and individuals. In late May, Majette pleaded guilty to an amended charge of a single count of computer fraud, felony third degree. The reduced charge was a result of an agreement between Mark Berardoni, the public defender assigned to Majette; Janet Black, Majette's probation officer and the Maricopa County Arizona County Attorney's Office. Under the reduced charges, Majette's maximum term of incarceration was reduced from the aforementioned 15 years to 5. On July 16th, when the actual sentence was to be imposed, a further agreement between the prosecution, defense and parole service was presented to the presiding judge, Justice Gottsfield, and, after discussion, became the actual sentence. The court decision imposed the following: -- Majette will remain in jail for up to two months while he awaits placement in a "Shock Incarceration" program (Majette has been in jail since his March 27th arrest because of parole violation related to an earlier crime). Assistant County Attorney Gail Thackeray told Newsbytes that Shock Incarceration is a 120 day program which "provides both intensive counseling and military-like discipline and exercise." -- Upon his release from Shock Incarceration, Majette will enter a 5 year period of "intensive probation". Under Arizona procedures, the subject must provide the probation officer, on a weekly basis, a schedule for the next week's activities. In the event that the schedule has to be modified in any way, the probation office must be called before the new schedule is acted on. -- During the time of intensive probation, the probation officer may visit or call the subject at any time of day or night to insure compliance with the schedule. -- If, at some point after a year of intensive probation, the probation officer feels that the subject has followed the rules and shown that intensive procedure is no longer warranted, the subject and probation officer may recommend to the sentencing judge that the subject be transferred to normal probation. In normal probation, the subject advises the officer weekly of progress and problems. There is not the hovering presence felt in intensive probation, according to Thackeray. Additionally, the subject may be released from any form of probation at the petition of the probation office and subject and approval, after hearing, of the sentencing judge. -- If, on the other hand, Majette violates the terms of his probation, he is liable for incarceration in prison for the remainder of his probationary period. -- Majette was also ordered to make restitution to the parties victimized by his activities by paying a sum of $19,774.03 to those involved. The sum is to be paid on a monthly basis over the course of his sentence. Additionally, he was ordered to make payments to help defray the cost of his probationary supervision. Under the terms of his probation, Majette is subject to the following conditions said by Thackeray to be unique to his type of offense: -- He may not use any computer connected to a modem or communications network without the prior permission of his probation officer. In the event that he takes a job that brings him into contact with computer activities, he must notify someone in the employer's office of the restrictions on his computer use and must discuss the planned activities with his probation officer. -- He is not to communicate or associate with "members of the computer underground" (defined as persons such as those known to have or reasonably believed to have been involved in theft of communications services, computer fraud or related activities). In the event that any such individuals contact him, he must report the contact to his probation officer (According to Thackeray, this stipulation is intended for Majette' s protection -- "In the event that the contacting party is investigated or arrested and phone records show a call to Majette, his notification to his probation officer of the call will stand as proof that he was not involved in any conspiracy with the other individual. His notification responsibility in no way requires him to cooperate with authorities in the location or apprehension of another individual and such cooperation is neither expected nor desired."). Transcripts of the sentencing hearing reportedly show that it was the intention of Judge Gottsfield to sentence Majette to a straight five years in prison but was dissuaded by the combined recommendations of the prosecution, defense and probation office. Thackeray explained to Newsbytes the rationale of the prosecution in recommending a lighter sentence -- "Usually computer hackers who get into trouble for activities of this nature are kids or young adults who are not the type to be in trouble for any other criminal activities. The point of sentencing in these cases should be rehabilitation. If we can break the pattern of illegal behavior, society will benefit from Majette's participation. If we simply locked him up for 5 years, neither he nor society would benefit." (Barbara E. McMullen & John F. McMullen/19910717) ------------------------------ Date: 02 Jul 91 19:15:10 EDT From: "76012,300 Brad Hicks" <76012.300@COMPUSERVE.COM> Subject: File 6-- CompuServe Responds to Policy and Operations Questions Attn: Computer Underground Digest In TELECOM Digest #11.507, John Higdon writes: > If I really am responsible for every article and pass-through > e-mail message that writes to my disk drive, then I lack the > facilities (mostly manpower) to remain an intermediate UUCP site. John, in every meeting of four or more sysops I have been at in the last three years, I have heard this one argued. I have submitted this exact question to maybe a half-dozen lawyers. The only thing that ALL agreed upon was that until we have three or more cases prosecuted in the federal courts, no one knows whether you are liable or not. Mike Godwin, the EFF's attorney, told a bunch of us that he's been researching this exact question for most of a year, and so far it comes down to three broad categories: (1) ENTIRELY PRIVATE, ONE-TO-ONE MAIL Covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Sysop/sysadmin is not liable for content; may read for technical reasons such as to check service; may not disclose to anyone for any reason without a court order. (Aside: Since the search warrant at Steve Jackson Games said nothing about third-party mail, in the seizure of Illuminati BBS the aptly-acronymed SS almost certainly violated ECPA over this very issue.) (2) ENTIRELY PUBLIC MAIL ON ONLY ONE SYSTEM (local BBS messages) Only limited case law, but it does appear that the sysop is liable in general. More cases or new laws will be necessary to determine WHEN the sysop becomes liable ... e.g., if somebody posts a Sprint access number on your BBS, you are definitely liable if it is still there a month later. But what about the next day? An hour later? Five seconds later? Nobody knows until the lawyers fight it out. Godwin thinks it comes down to "if the sysop could reasonably have known about it"--and then some poor ignorant bunch of jurors will get to decide how often a "resonable sysop" checks his mail. (3) WIDELY-DISTRIBUTED PUBLIC MAIL (newsgroups, echomail, mail lists, etc.) No readily applicable law. No CLEAR precedent ... but the few half-precedents, taken from the world of ham packet-radio repeaters, suggests that in fact, you are liable for any public message residing on your system, even if it originated elsewhere. If you allow your system to forward public messages before you clear them, you may find yourself charged with moving illegal messages across state lines. As an ex-sysop of seven years' experience, #3 horrifies and terrifies me. I almost got caught in this trap myself, when a Dallas TV station tried to persuade police that as the conference moderator on MagickNet, I personally was responsible for a message on MagickNet offering assistance to a man seeking to smuggle his daughter out of the country so his inlaws couldn't take her away. (Note: message from someone else, to a third party outside the country, and the hue and cry arose two days before I even saw the message.) Maybe common sense will prevail in the courtroom. (And maybe chickens have teeth.) Maybe Congress will pass clear, reasonable, technically feasible legislation to clarify the issue and President Bush will sign it. (And maybe we =can= balance the budget in 1993.) Or maybe the Rehnquist court will recognize this as an important freedom-of-speech, freedom-of-association, freedom-of-press issue and grant appropriate protection. (And maybe we'll find a universally popular solution to the abortion issue tomorrow after lunch, and everybody will agree to it.) ------------------------------ ************************************ End of Computer Underground Digest #3.26


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