Based on the committees investigation and two separate court rulings, it is clear that hig

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Based on the committee's investigation and two separate court rulings, it is clear that high level Department of Justice officials deliberately ignored INSLAW's proprietary rights in the enhanced version of PROMIS and misappropriated this software for use at locations not covered under contract with the company. Justice then proceeded to challenge INSLAW's claims in court even though it knew that these claims were valid and that the Department would most likely lose in court on this issue. After almost 7 years of litigation and $1 million in cost, the Department is still denying its culpability in this matter. Instead of conducting an investigation into INSLAW's claims that criminal wrongdoing by high level Government officials had occurred, Attorney Generals Meese and Thornburgh blocked or restricted congressional inquiries into the matter, ignored the findings of two courts and refused to ask for the appointment of an independent counsel. These actions were taken in the face of a growing body of evidence that serious wrongdoing had occurred which reached to the highest levels of the Department. The evidence received by the committee during its investigation clearly raises serious concerns about the possibility that a high level conspiracy against INSLAW did exist and that great efforts have been expended by the Department to block any outside investigation into the matter. Based on the evidence presented in this report, the committee believes that extraordinary steps are required to resolve the INSLAW issue. The Attorney General should take immediate steps to remunerate INSLAW for the harm the Department has egregiously caused the company. The amount determined should include all reasonable legal expenses and other costs to the Hamiltons not directly related to the contract but caused by the actions taken by the Department to harm the company or its employees. To avoid further retaliation against the company, the Attorney General should prohibit Department personnel who participated in any way in the litigation of the INSLAW matter from further involvement in this case. In the event that the Attorney General does not move expeditiously to remunerate INSLAW, then Congress should move quickly under the congressional reference provisions of the Court of Claims Act to initiate a review of this matter by that court. Finally, the committee believes that the only way the INSLAW allegations can be adequately and fully investigated is by the appointment of an independent counsel. The committee is aware that on November 13, 1991, newly confirmed Attorney General Barr finally appointed Nicholas Bua, a retired Federal judge from Chicago, as his special counsel to investigate and advise him on the INSLAW controversy. However, at that time the Attorney General had not empowered Judge Bua to subpoena witnesses, convene a grand jury or compel the Department to produce key documents. INSLAW officials have voiced concerns that Judge Bua, lacking independent counsel status, would not be able to entice Department employees who were knowledgeable of the INSLAW matter to come forward and assist Judge Bua in bringing this matter to closure. Consequently, they are concerned that Judge Bua will not be able to get to the bottom of the matter, and they believe his investigation will end up being subverted by the Department. The inability to subpoena and/or to convene a grand jury was apparently of concern to Judge Bua and, after a meeting on January 28, 1992, the Attorney General granted Judge Bua broad investigative authority which included the power to subpoena witnesses and to convene special grand juries. However because of the actions by the Department regarding potential whistleblowers such as Anthony Pasciuto, it is very likely witnesses will still feel intimidated by the Department. This problem was present throughout the committee's investigation and remains a potential problem today. Without independent counsel status, Judge Bua remains an employee of the Department of Justice. The image problem is illustrated in a recent interview with Roger M. Cooper, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Administration. In an interview with the Government Computer News, Mr. Cooper stated that: The judge (Bua) will do as the attorney general wants him to do, and that's fine. I think all of us in the department would like to get it [the INSLAW matter] behind us. It's sort of an albatross. Mr. Cooper may have meant that Attorney General Barr wants Judge Bua to conduct a thorough investigation. The committee has no reason to doubt the commitment of Judge Bua or Attorney General Barr to do a thorough investigation of this matter-the problem rests with the fact that, as long as the investigation of wrongdoing by former and current high level Justice officials remains under the control of the Department, there will always be serious doubt about the objectivity and thoroughness of the work. This matter has caused great harm to several individuals involved and has severely undermined the Department's credibility and reputation. Congress and the executive branch must take immediate and forceful steps to restore the public confidence and faith in our system of justice which has been severely eroded by this painful and unfortunate affair. As such, the independent counsel should be appointed with full and broad powers to investigate all matters related to the allegations of wrongdoing in the INSLAW matter, including Mr. Casolaro's death and its possible link to individuals associated with organized crime. X. FINDINGS 1. The Department, in an attempt to implement a standardized case management system, ignored advice from vendors-including INSLAW-that PROMIS should not be adapted to word processing equipment. As predicted, problems arose with adapting PROMIS to word processing equipment. The Department immediately set out to terminate that portion of the contract and blamed INSLAW for its failure. 2. The Department exhibited extremely poor judgment by assigning C. Madison Brewer to manage the PROMIS implementation contract. Mr. Brewer had been asked to leave his position as general counsel of INSLAW under strained relations with INSLAW's owner, Mr. William Hamilton. INSLAW's problems with the Department, which started almost immediately after the award of the contract in March 1982, were generated in large part by Mr. Brewer, with the support and direction of high level Department officials. The potential conflict of interest in the hiring of Mr. Brewer was not considered by Department officials. However, Mr. Brewer's past strained relationship with Mr. Hamilton, and the fact that he lacked experience in ADP management and understanding of Federal procurement laws, raises serious questions about why he was selected as the PROMIS project manager. 3. Mr. Brewer's attitude toward INSLAW, combined with Mr. Videnieks' harsh contract philosophy, led to the rapid deterioration of relations between the Department and INSLAW. Any semblance of fairness by key Department officials toward INSLAW quickly evaporated when Mr. Hamilton attempted to protect his companies' proprietary rights to a privately funded enhanced version of the PROMIS software. In a highly unusual move, Mr. Brewer recommended just 1 month after the contract was signed that INSLAW be terminated for convenience of the Government even though INSLAW was performing under the contract. From that point forward there is no indication that Mr. Brewer or Mr. Videnieks ever deviated from their plan to harm INSLAW. The actions taken by Messrs. Brewer and Videnieks were done with the full knowledge and support of high level Department officials. 4. Peter Videnieks, the Department's contracting officer, negotiated Modification 12 of the contract which resulted in INSLAW agreeing to provide its proprietary Enhanced PROMIS software for the Department's use. This negotiation was conducted in bad faith because Justice later refused to recognize INSLAW's rights to privately financed PROMIS enhancements. Mr. Videnieks and Mr. Brewer, supported by Deputy Attorney General Jensen and other high level officials, unilaterally concluded that the Department was not bound by the property laws that applied to privately developed and financed software. 6. Thereafter, the Department ignored INSLAW's data rights to its enhanced version of its PROMIS software and misused its prosecutorial and litigative resources to legitimize and coverup its misdeeds. This resulted in extremely protracted litigation and an immense waste of resources both for the Government and INSLAW. These actions were taken even though the Department had already determined that INSLAW's claim was probably justified and that the Department would lose in court. In fact, Deputy Attorney General Burns acknowledged this fact to OPR investigators. 6. Department of Justice documents show that a "public domain" version of the PROMIS software was sent to domestic and international entities including Israel. Given the Department's position regarding its ownership of all versions of PROMIS, questions remain whether INSLAW's Enhanced PROMIS was distributed by Department officials to numerous sources outside the Department, including foreign governments. 7. Several witnesses, including former Attorney General Elliot Richardson, have provided testimony, sworn statements or affidavits linking high level Department officials to a conspiracy to steal INSLAW's PROMIS software and secretly transfer PROMIS to Dr. Brian. According to these witnesses, the PROMIS software was subsequently converted for use by domestic and foreign intelligence services. This testimony was provided by individuals who knew that the Justice Department would be inclined to prosecute them for perjury if they lied under oath. No such prosecutions have occurred. 8. Justice had made little effort to resolve conflicting and possibly perjurious sworn statements by key departmental witnesses about the alleged attempt by high level Department officials to liquidate INSLAW and steal its software. It is very possible that Judge Blackshear may have perjured himself and even today his explanations for his recantation of his sworn statement provided to INSLAW are highly suspicious. The investigation of this matter by the Department's Office of Professional Responsibility was superficial. 9. The Department's response to INSLAW's requests for investigations by an independent counsel and the Public Integrity Section was cursory and incomplete 10. The reviews of the INSLAW matter by Congress were hampered by Department tactics designed to conceal many significant documents and otherwise interfere with an independent review. The Department actions appear to have been motivated more by an intense desire to defend itself from INSLAW's charges of misconduct rather than investigating possible violations of the law. 11. Justice officials have asserted that, as a result of the recent ruling by the Appeals Court and the refusal of the Supreme Court to hear INSLAW's appeal, the Findings and Conclusions of Bankruptcy Judge George Bason and senior Judge William Bryant of the District Court are no longer relevant. The Appeals Court decision, in fact, did not dispute the Bankruptcy Court's ruling that the Department "stole through trickery, fraud and deceit" INSLAW's PROMIS software. Its decision was based primarily on the narrow question of whether the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction; the Appeals Court ruled that it did not. This decision in no way vindicates the Department nor should it be used to insulate Justice from the criticism it deserves over the mishandling of the INSLAW contract. 12. The Justice Department continues to improperly use INSLAW's proprietary software in blatant disregard of the findings of two courts and well established property law. This fact coupled with the general lack of fairness exhibited by Justice officials throughout this affair is unbefitting of the agency entrusted with enforcing our Nation's laws. 13. Further investigation into the circumstances surrounding Daniel Casolaro's death is needed. 14. The following criminal statutes may have been violated by certain high level Justice officials and private individuals: 18 U.S.C. 371-Conspiracy to commit an offense. 18 U.S.C. 654-Officer or employee of the United States converting the property of another. 18 U.S.C. 1341-Fraud. 18 U.S.C. 1343-Wire fraud. 18 U.S.C. 1505-Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies and committees. 18 U.S.C. 1512-Tampering with a witness. 18 U.S.C. 1513-Retaliation against a witness. 18 U.S.C. 1621-Perjury. 18 U.S.C. 1951-Interference with commerce by threats or violence (RICO). 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.-Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations. 18 U.S.C. 2314- Transportation of stolen goods, securities, moneys. 18 U..S.C. 2315-Receiving stolen goods. 15. Several key documents subpoenaed by the committee on July 26, 1991, were reported missing or lost by the Department. While Justice officials have indicated that this involves only a limited number of documents, it was impossible to ascertain how many documents or files were missing because the Department did not have a complete index of the INSLAW materials. The Department failed to conduct a formal investigation to determine whether the subpoenaed documents were stolen or illegally destroyed. XI. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. The committee recommends that Attorney General Barr immediately settle INSLAW's claims in a fair and equitable manner. These payments should account for the Department's continued unauthorized use of INSLAW's Enhanced PROMIS and other costs attributed to INSLAW's ongoing attempt to obtain a just settlement for its struggle with the Department, including all reasonable attorneys' fees. If there continue to be efforts to delay a fair and equitable result, the committee should determine whether legislation is required to authorize a claim by INSLAW against the United States, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1492. 2. The Attorney General should require that any person in the Department that participated in any way in the litigation of the INSLAW matter be excluded from further involvement in this case, with the exception of supplying information, as needed, to support future investigations by a independent counsel or litigation, as appropriate. 3. The committee strongly recommends that the Department appoint an independent counsel to conduct a full, open investigation of the INSLAW allegations of a high level conspiracy within the Department to steal Enhanced PROMIS software to benefit friends and associates of former Attorney General Meese, including Dr. Earl Brian, as discussed in this report. Among other matters, the investigation should also: Ascertain whether there was a strategy by former Attorneys General and other Department officials to obstruct this and other investigations through employee harassment and denial of access to Department records. Investigate Mr. Casolaro's death. Determine whether current and former Justice Department officials and others involved in the INSLAW affair resorted to perjury and obstruction in order to coverup their misdeeds. Determine whether the documents subpoenaed by the Committee and reported missing by the Department were stolen or illegally destroyed. Determine if private sector individuals participated in (1) the alleged conspiracy to steal INSLAW's PROMIS software and distribute it to various locations domestically and overseas, and (2) the alleged coverup of this conspiracy through perjury and obstruction. Determine if other criminal violations occurred involving: 18 U.S.C. 371-Conspiracy to commit an offense. 18 U.S.C. 654-0fficer or employee of the United States converting the property of another. 18 U.S.C. 1341-Fraud. 18 U.S.C. 1343-Wire fraud. 18 U.S.C. 1505-Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies and committees. 18 U.S.C. 1512-Tampering with a witness. 18 U.S.C. 1513-Retaliation against a witness. 18 U.S.C. 1621-Perjury. 18 U.S.C. 1951-Interference with commerce by threats or violence (RICO). 18 U.S.C. 1951 et seq.-Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations. 18 U.S.C. 2314-Transportation of stolen goods, securities, moneys. 18 U.S.C. 2315-Receiving stolen goods.


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