The following was originally issued as a supplement to the July 1988 issue of the _America

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The following was originally issued as a supplement to the July 1988 issue of the _American Atheist_ magazine. ***************************** THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISION Just twenty-five years ago, June 17, 1963, the Supreme Court of the United States kicked reverential Bible reading and prayer recitation out of the nation's public schools. To celebrate that decision, which upheld our First Amendment right to freedom _from_ religious ceremonies, the _American Atheist_ presents its readers with a commemorative reprint of the Supreme Court's opinion. INTRODUCTION In late 1959, Madalyn Murray (O'Hair) entered a son in the public schools of Baltimore, Maryland, only to discover that he would be forced to participate in reverential Bible reading and unison prayers. The only "relief" that the public school system would offer to an Atheist child was that he could sit in the hallway while his peers prayed. She therefore began the legal proceedings which would culminate in the United States Supreme Court decision on school prayer in _Murray v. Curlett._ While the case worked its way to the Supreme Court over a four-year span, the Murray family suffered abuse both petty and profound, physical and psychological. Yet there was one last act of pettiness committed by the Supreme Court of the United States itself. The _Murray v. Curlett_ case was logged as No. 119 and its arguments were heard before the Court on February 27, 1963. A second case regarding school prayers in Pennsylvania, _Abington Township v. Schempp,_ was later accepted for review by the Court and logged as No. 142. Its arguments were heard after the arguments in _Murray._ The cases were, however, decided together. Traditionally, when cases are joined by the Supreme Court, the case accepted and heard first is the case for which the decision is named. But this decision is noted in law books as _Abington v. Schempp._ Why? The plaintiffs in _Murray v. Curlett_ were the most notorious Atheists in the nation. The plaintiffs in the Pennsylvania case of _Abington_ were Unitarians who described themselves as regularly attending "religious services." The Atheists were to be deprived, in legal history, of any recognition. The portion of the decision dealing with the _Murray_ case is reprinted here for your edification. ************************ William J. MURRAY III, etc., et al. Petitioners, v. John N. CURLETT, President, et al., Individually, and Constituting the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City. 374 U.S. 203, 83 S. Ct. 1560. No. 119 Argued Feb. 27, 1963. Decided June 17, 1963. Mr. Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. Once again we are called upon to consider the scope of the provision of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution which declares that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ." These companion cases present the issues in the context of state action requiring that schools begin each day with readings from the Bible. While raising the basic questions under slightly different factual situations, the cases permit of joint treatment. In light of the history of the First Amendment and of our cases interpreting and applying its requirements, we hold that the practices at issue and the laws requiring them are unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. I. _The Facts in Each Case:_ . . . No. 119. In 1905 the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City adopted a rule pursuant to Art. 77, Sec. 202 of the Annotated Code of Maryland. The rule provided for the holding of opening exercises in the schools of the city, consisting primarily of the "reading, without comment, of a chapter in the Holy Bible and/or the use of the Lord's Prayer." The petitioners, Mrs. Madalyn Murray and her son, William J. Murray III, are both professed atheists. Following unsuccessful attempts to have the respondent school board rescind the rule, this suit was filed for mandamus to compel its rescission and cancellation. It was alleged that William was a student in a public school of the city and Mrs. Murray, his mother, was a taxpayer therein; that it was the practice under the rule to have a reading on each school morning from the King James version of the Bible; that at petitioners' insistence the rule was amended [Fn. 1: The rule as amended provided as follows: "Opening Exercises. Each school, either collectively or in classes, shall be opened by the reading, without comment, of a chapter in the Holy Bible and/or the use of the Lord's Prayer. The Douay version may be used by those pupils who prefer it. Appropriate patriotic exercises should be held as a part of the general opening exercise of the school or class. Any child shall be excused from participating in the opening exercises or from attending the opening exercises upon the written request of his parent or guardian."] to permit children to be excused from the exercise on request of the parent and that William had been excused pursuant thereto; that nevertheless the rule as amended was in violation of the petitioners' rights "to freedom of religion under the First and Fourteenth Amendments" and in violation of "the principle of separation between church and state, contained therein. . . . " The petition particularized the petitioners' atheistic beliefs and stated that the rule, as practiced, violated their rights "in that it threatens their religious liberty by placing a premium on belief as against non-belief and subjects their freedom of conscience to the rule of the majority; it pronounces belief in God as the source of all moral and spiritual values, equating these values with religious values, and thereby renders sinister, alien and suspect the beliefs and ideals of your Petitioners, promoting doubt and question of their morality, good citizenship and good faith." The respondents demurred and the trial court, recognizing that the demurrer admitted all facts well pleaded, sustained it without leave to amend. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed, the majority of four justices holding the exercise not in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, with three justices dissenting. 228 Md. 239, 179 A.2d 698. We granted certiorari. 371 U.S. 809, 83 S.Ct. 21, 9 L.Ed.2d 52. II. It is true that religion has been closely identified with our history and government. As we said in _Engel v. Vitale,_ 370 U.S. 421, 434, 82 S.Ct. 1261, 1268, 8 L.Ed.2d 601 (1962), "The history of man is inseparable from the history of religion. And . . . since the beginning of that history many people have devoutly believed that `More things are wrought by prayer than this world dreams of.' " In _Zorach v. Clauson,_ 343 U.S. 306, 313, 72 S.Ct. 679, 684, 96 L.Ed. 954 (1952), we gave specific recognition to the proposition that "[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." The fact that the Founding Fathers believed devotedly that there was a God and that the unalienable rights of man were rooted in Him is clearly evidenced in their writings, from the Mayflower Compact to the Constitution itself. This background is evidenced today in our public life through the continuance in our oaths of office from the Presidency to the Alderman of the final supplication, "So help me God." Likewise each House of the Congress provides through its Chaplain an opening prayer, and the sessions of this Court are declared open by the crier in a short ceremony, the final phrase of which invokes the grace of God. Again, there are such manifestations in our military forces, where those of our citizens who are under the restrictions of military service wish to engage in voluntary worship. Indeed, only last year an official survey of the country indicated that 64% of our people have church membership, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, _Statistical Abstract of the United States_ (83d ed. 1962), 48, while less than 3% profess no religion whatever. Id., at p. 46. It can be truly said, therefore, that today, as in the beginning, our national life reflects a religious people who, in the words of Madison, are "earnestly praying, as . . . in duty bound, that the Supreme Lawgiver of the Universe . . . guide them into every measure which may be worthy of his [blessing . . .]" Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, quoted in _Everson v. Board of Education,_ 330 U.S. 1, 71-72, 67 S.Ct. 504, 538-539, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947) (Appendix to dissenting opinion of Rutledge, J.) This is not to say, however, that religion has been so identified with our history and government that religious freedom is not likewise as strongly imbedded in our public and private life. Nothing but the most telling of personal experiences in religious persecution suffered by our forebears, see _Everson v. Board of Education,_ supra, 330 U.S., at 8-11, 67 S.Ct., at 507-509, 91 L.Ed. 711, could have planted our belief in liberty of religious opinion any more deeply in our heritage. It is true that this liberty frequently was not realized by the colonists, but this is readily accountable by their close ties to the Mother Country. [Fn. 2: There were established churches in at least eight of the original colonies, and various degrees of religious support in others as late as the Revolutionary War. See _Engel v. Vitale,_ supra, 370 U.S., at 428, n. 10, 82 S.Ct., at 1265, 8 L.Ed.2d 601.] However, the views of Madison and Jefferson, preceded by Roger Williams, [Fn. 3: "There goes many a ship to sea, with many hundred souls in one ship, whose weal and woe is common, and is a true picture of a commonwealth, or human combination, or society. It hath fallen out sometimes, that both Papists and Protestants, Jews and Turks, may be embarked in one ship; upon which supposal, I affirm that all the liberty of conscience I ever pleaded for, turns upon these two hinges, that none of the Papists, Protestants, Jews, or Turks be forced to come to the ship's prayers or worship, nor compelled from their own particular prayers or worship, if they practice any."] came to be incorporated not only in the Federal Constitution but likewise in those of most of our States. This freedom to worship was indispensable in a country whose people came from the four quarters of the earth and brought with them a diversity of religious opinion. Today authorities list eighty-three separate religious bodies, each with membership exceeding 50,000, existing among our people, as well as innumerable smaller groups. Bureau of the Census, op. cit., supra, at 46-47. III. Almost a hundred years ago in _Minor v. Board of Education of Cincinnati,_ [Fn. 4: Superior Court of Cincinnati, February 1870. The opinion is not reported but is published under the title, _The Bible in the Common Schools_ (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co. 1870). Judge Taft's views, expressed in dissent, prevailed on appeal. See _Board of Education of Cincinnati v. Minor,_ 23 Ohio St. 211, 253 (1872), in which the Ohio Supreme Court held that: "The great bulk of human affairs and human interests is left by any free government to individual enterprise and individual action. Religion is eminently one of these interests, lying outside the true and legitimate province of government."] Judge Alphonso Taft, father of the revered Chief Justice, in an unpublished opinion stated the ideal of our people as to religious freedom as one of "absolute equality before the law, of all religious opinions and sects . . . The government is neutral, and, while protecting all, it prefers none, and it _disparages_ none." Before examining this "neutral" position in which the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment place our Government it is well that we discuss the reach of the Amendment under the cases of this Court. [1] First, this Court has decisively settled that the First Amendment's mandate that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" has been made wholly applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Twenty-three years ago in _Cantwell v. Connecticut,_ 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940), this Court, through Mr. Justice Roberts, said: "The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that [Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws. . . .[Fn. 5: Application to the States of other clauses of the First Amendment obtained even before Cantwell. Almost 40 years ago in the opinion of the Court in Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666, 45 S.Ct. 625, 630, 69 L.Ed. 1138 (1925), Mr. Justice Sanford said: "For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press _ which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress _ are among the fundamental personal rights and `liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States."]" In a series of cases since _Cantwell_ the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that doctrine, and we do so now. _Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,_ 319 U.S. 105, 108, 63 S.Ct. 870, 872, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943); _Everson v. Board of Education,_ supra; Illinois ex rel. _McCollum v. Board of Education,_ 333 U.S. 203, 210-211, 68 S.Ct. 461, 464-465, 92 L.Ed. 648 (1948); _Zorach v. Clauson,_ supra; _McGowan v. Maryland,_ 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed. 2d 393 (1961); _Torcaso v. Watkins,_ 367 U.S. 488, 81 S.Ct. 1680, 6 L.Ed.2d 982 (1961); and _Engel v. Vitale,_ supra. [2] Second, this Court has rejected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids only governmental preference of one religion over another. Almost 20 years ago in _Everson,_ supra, 330 U.S., at 15, 67 S.Ct., at 511, 91 L.Ed. 711, the Court said that "[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." And Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting, agreed: "There is no answer to the proposition . . . that the effect of the religious freedom Amendment to our Constitution was to take every form of propagation of religion out of the realm of things which could directly or indirectly be made public business and thereby be supported in whole or in part at taxpayers' expense. . . . This freedom was first in the forefathers' minds; it was set forth in absolute terms, and its strength is its rigidity. Id., 330 U.S., at 26, 67 S.Ct., at 516, 91 L.Ed. 711." Further, Mr. Justice Rutledge, joined by Justices Frankfurter, Jackson and Burton, declared: "The [First] Amendment's purpose was not to strike merely at the official establishment of a single sect, creed or religion, outlawing only a formal relation such as had prevailed in England and some of the colonies. Necessarily it was to uproot all such relationships. But the object was broader than separating church and state in this narrow sense. It was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion. Id., 330 U.S., at 31-32, 67 S.Ct., at 519, 91 L.Ed. 711." The same conclusion has been firmly maintained ever since that time, see _Illinois ex rel. McCollum,_ supra, 333 U.S., at pp. 210-211, 68 S.Ct., at pp. 464-465, 92 L.Ed. 648; _McGowan v. Maryland,_ supra, 366 U.S., at 442-443, 81 S.Ct., at 1113-1114, 6 L.Ed.2d 393; _Torcaso v. Watkins,_ supra, 367 U.S., at 492-493, 495, 81 S.Ct., at 1682-1683, 1684, 6 L. Ed.2d 982, and we reaffirm it now. While none of the parties to either of these cases has questioned these basic conclusions of the Court, both of which have been long established, recognized and consistently reaffirmed, others continue to question their history, logic and efficacy. Such contentions, in the light of the consistent interpretation in cases of this Court, seem entirely untenable and of value only as academic exercises. IV. The interrelationship of the Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses was first touched upon by Mr. Justice Roberts for the Court in _Cantwell v. Connecticut,_ supra, 310 U.S., at 303-304, 60 S.Ct., at 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213, where it was said that their "inhibition of legislation" had "a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts, -- freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be." A half dozen years later in _Everson v. Board of Education,_ supra, 330 U.S., at 14-15, 67 S.Ct., at 511, 91 L.Ed. 711, this Court, through Mr. Justice BLACK, stated that the "scope of the First Amendment . . . was designed forever to suppress" the establishment of religion or the prohibition of the free exercise thereof. In short, the Court held that the Amendment "requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions, than it is to favor them. Id., 330 U.S., at 18, 67 S.Ct. at 513, 91 L.Ed. 711." And Mr. Justice Jackson, in dissent, declared that public schools are organized "on the premise that secular education can be isolated from all religious teaching so that the school can inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and also maintain a strict and lofty neutrality as to religion. The assumption is that after the individual has been instructed in worldly wisdom he will be better fitted to choose his religion. Id., 330 U.S., at 23-24, 67 S.Ct. at 515, 91 L.Ed. 711." Moreover, all of the four dissenters, speaking through Mr. Justice Rutledge, agreed that "Our constitutional policy . . . does not deny the value or the necessity for religious training, teaching or observance. Rather it secures their free exercise. But to that end it does deny that the state can undertake or sustain them in any form or degree. For this reason the sphere of religious activity, as distinguished from the secular intellectual liberties, has been given the twofold protection and, as the state cannot forbid, neither can it perform or aid in performing the religious function. The dual prohibition makes that function altogether private. Id., 330 U.S., at 52, 67 S.Ct., at 529, 91 L.Ed. 711." Only one year later the Court was asked to reconsider and repudiate the doctrine of these cases in _McCollum v. Board of Education._ It was argued that "historically the First Amendment was intended to forbid only government preference of one religion over another . . . In addition they ask that we distinguish or overrule our holding in the _Everson_ case that the Fourteenth Amendment made the `establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment applicable as a prohibition against the States." 333 U.S., at 211, 68 S.Ct., at 465, 92 L.Ed. 648. The Court, with Mr. Justice Reed alone dissenting, was unable to "accept either of these contentions." Ibid. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Jackson, Rutledge and Burton, wrote a very comprehensive and scholarly concurrence in which he said that "[s]eparation is a requirement to abstain from fusing functions of Government and of religious sects, not merely to treat them all equally." Id., 333 U.S., at 227, 68 S.Ct., at 473, 92 L.Ed. 648. Continuing, he stated that: "the Constitution . . . prohibited the Government common to all from becoming embroiled, however innocently, in the destructive religious conflicts of which the history of even this country records some dark pages. Id., 333 U.S., at 228, 68 S.Ct., at 473, 92 L.Ed. 648." In 1952 in _Zorach v. Clauson,_ supra, Mr. Justice DOUGLAS for the Court reiterated: "There cannot be the slightest doubt that the First Amendment reflects the philosophy that Church and State should be separated. And so far as interference with the 'free exercise' of religion and an 'establishment' of religion are concerned, the separation must be complete and unequivocal. The First Amendment within the scope of its coverage permits no exception; the prohibition is absolute. The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the other. That is the common sense of the matter. 343 U.S., at 312, 72 S.Ct., at 683, 96 L.Ed. 954. And then in 1961 in _McGowan v. Maryland_ and in _Torcaso v. Watkins_ each of these cases was discussed and approved. Chief Justice WARREN in McGowan, for a unanimous Court on this point, said: "But, the First Amendment, in its final form, did not simply bar a congressional enactment _establishing_a_church;_it_forbade_all_laws_ respecting an establishment of religion. Thus, this Court has given the Amendment a 'broad interpretation . . .' in the light of its history and the evils it was designed forever to suppress. . . . 366 U.S., at 441-442, 81 S.Ct., at 1113, 6 L.Ed.2d 393." And Mr. Justice BLACK for the Court in _Torcaso,_ without dissent but with Justices FRANKFURTER and HARLAN concurring in the result, used this language: "We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person 'to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.' Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs. 367 U.S., at 495, 81 S.Ct., at 1683, 6 L.Ed.2d 982." Finally, in _Engel v. Vitale,_ only last year, these principles were so universally recognized that the Court, without the citation of a single case and over the sole dissent of Mr. Justice STEWART, reaffirmed them. The Court found the 22-word prayer used in "New York's program of daily classroom invocation of God's blessings as prescribed in the Regents' prayer . . . [to be] a religious activity." 370 U.S., at 424, 82 S.Ct., at 1264, 8 L.Ed.2d 601. It held that "it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government." Id., 370 U.S., at 425, 82 S.Ct., at 1264, 8 L.Ed.2d 601. In discussing the reach of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment the Court said: "Although these two clauses may in certain instances overlap, they forbid two quite different kinds of governmental encroachment upon religious freedom. The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not. This is not to say, of course, that laws officially prescribing a particular form of religious worship do not involve coercion of such individuals. When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain. Id., 370 U.S., at 430-431, 82 S.Ct., at 1267, 8 L.Ed.2d 601." And in further elaboration the Court found that the "first and most immediate purpose [of the Establishment Clause] rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion." Id., 370 U.S. at 431, 82 S.Ct., at 1267, 8 L.Ed.2d 601. When government, the Court said, allies itself with one particular form of religion, the inevitable result is that it incurs "the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs." Ibid. V. [3-9] The wholesome "neutrality" of which this Court's cases speak thus stems from a recognition of the teachings of history that powerful sects or groups might bring about a fusion of governmental and religious functions or a concert or dependency of one upon the other to the end that official support of the State or Federal Government would be placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies. This the Establishment Clause prohibits. And a further reason for neutrality is found in the Free Exercise Clause, which recognizes the value of religious training, teaching and observance and, more particularly, the right of every person to freely choose his own course with reference thereto, free of any compulsion from the state. This the Free Exercise Clause guarantees. Thus, as we have seen, the two clauses may overlap. As we have indicated, the Establishment Clause has been directly considered by this Court eight times in the past score of years and, with only one Justice dissenting on the point, it has consistently held that the clause withdrew all legislative power respecting religious belief or the expression thereof. The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. _Everson v. Board of Education,_ supra; _McGowan v. Maryland,_ supra, 366 U.S., at 442, 81 S.Ct. at 1113-1114, 6 L.Ed.2d 393. The Free Exercise Clause, likewise considered many times here, withdraws from legislative power, state and federal, the exertion of any restraint on the free exercise of religion. Its purpose is to secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority. Hence it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion. The distinction between the two clauses is apparent -- a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended. [10] Applying the Establishment Clause principles to the cases at bar we find the States are requiring the selection and reading at the opening of the school day of verses from the Holy Bible and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer by the students in unison. These exercises are prescribed as part of the curricular activities of students who are required by law to attend school. They are held in the school buildings under the supervision and with the participation of teachers employed in those schools. None of these factors, other than compulsory school attendance, was present in the program upheld in _Zorach v. Clauson._ The trial court in No. 142 has found that such an opening exercise is a religious ceremony and was intended by the State to be so. We agree with the trial court's finding as to the religious character of the exercises. Given that finding, the exercises and the law requiring them are in violation of the Establishment Clause. [11] There is no such specific finding as to the religious character of the exercises in No. 119, and the State contends (as does the State in No. 142) that the program is an effort to extend its benefits to all public school children without regard to their religious belief. Included within its secular purposes, it says, are the promotion of moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic trends of our times, the perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature. The case came up on demurrer, of course, to a petition which alleged that the uniform practice under the rule had been to read from the King James version of the Bible and that the exercise was sectarian. The short answer, therefore, is that the religious character of the exercise was admitted by the State. But even if its purpose is not strictly religious, it is sought to be accomplished through readings, without comment, from the Bible. Surely the place of the Bible as an instrument of religion cannot be gainsaid, and the State's recognition of the pervading religious character of the ceremony is evident from the rule's specific permission of the alternative use of the Catholic Douay version as well as the recent amendment permitting nonattendance at the exercises. None of these factors is consistent with the contention that the Bible is here used either as an instrument for nonreligious moral inspiration or as a reference for the teaching of secular subjects. [12-16] The conclusion follows that in both cases the laws require religious exercises and such exercises are being conducted in direct violation of the rights of the appellees and petitioners. [Fn. 6: It goes without saying that the laws and practices involved here can be challenged only by persons having standing to complain. But the requirements for standing to challenge state action under the Establishment Clause, unlike those relating to the Free Exercise Clause, do not include proof that particular religious freedoms are infringed. _McGowan v. Maryland,_ supra, 366 U.S., at 429-430, 81 S.Ct., at 1106-1107, 6 L.Ed.2d 393. The parties here are school children and their parents, who are directly affected by the laws and practices against which their complaints are directed. These interests surely suffice to give the parties standing to complain. See _Engel v. Vitale,_ supra. Cf. _McCollum v. Board of Education,_ supra; _Everson v. Board of Education,_ supra. Compare _Doremus v. Board of Education,_ 342 U.S. 429, 72 S.Ct. 394, 96 L.Ed. 475 (1952), which involved the same substantive issues presented here. The appeal was there dismissed upon the graduation of the school child involved and because of the appellants' failure to establish standing as taxpayers.] Nor are these required exercises mitigated by the fact that individual students may absent themselves upon parental request, for that fact furnishes no defense to a claim of unconstitutionality under the Establishment Clause. See _Engel v. Vitale,_ supra, 370 U.S., at 430, 82 S.Ct., at 1266-1267, 8 L.Ed.2d 601. Further, it is no defense to urge that the religious practices here may be relatively minor encroachments on the First Amendment. The breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging torrent and, in the words of Madison, "it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties." Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, quoted in _Everson,_ supra, 330 U.S., at 65, 67 S.Ct., at 536, 91 L.Ed. 711. [17, 18] It is insisted that unless these religious exercises are permitted a "religion of secularism" is established in the schools. We agree of course that the State may not establish a "religion of secularism" in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus "preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe." _Zorach v. Clauson,_ supra, 343 U.S., at 314, 72 S.Ct., at 684, 96 L.Ed. 954. We do not agree, however, that this decision in any sense has that effect. In addition, it might well be said that one's education is not complete without a study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment. But the exercises here do not fall into those categories. They are religious exercises, required by the States in violation of the command of the First Amendment that the Government maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding nor opposing religion. [19, 20] Finally, we cannot accept that the concept of neutrality, which does not permit a State to require a religious exercise even with the consent of the majority of those affected, collides with the majority's right to free exercise of religion. [Fn. 7: We are not of course presented with and therefore do not pass upon a situation such as military service, where the Government regulates the temporal and geographic environment of individuals to a point that, unless it permits voluntary religious services to be conducted with the use of government facilities, military personnel would be unable to engage in the practice of their faiths.] While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to _anyone,_ it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs. Such a contention was effectively answered by Mr. Justice Jackson for the Court in _West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,_ 319 U.S. 624, 638, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1185, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943): "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to . . . freedom of worship . . . and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." [21] The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved through a long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable citadel of the individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize through bitter experience that it is not within the power of government to invade that citadel, whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance or retard. In the relationship between man and religion, the State is firmly committed to a position of neutrality. Though the application of that rule requires interpretation of a delicate sort, the rule itself is clearly and concisely stated in the words of the First Amendment. Applying that rule to the facts of these cases, we affirm the judgment in No. 142. In No. 119, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the Maryland Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, CONCURRING. I join the opinion of the Court and add a few words in explanation. While the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment is written in terms of what the State may not require of the individual, the Establishment Clause, serving the same goal of individual religious freedom, is written in different terms. Establishment of a religion can be achieved in several ways. The church and state can be one; the church may control the state or the state may control the church; or the relationship may take one of several possible forms of a working arrangement between the two bodies. [Fn. 8: See Bates, _Religious Liberty: An Inquiry_ (1945), 9-14, 239-252; Cobb, _Religious Liberty in America_ (1902), 1-2, cc. IV, V; Gledhill, _Pakistan, The Development of its Laws and Constitution_ (8 British Commonwealth, 1957), 11-15; Keller, _Church and State on the European Continent_ (1936), c. 2; Pfeffer, _Church, State, and Freedom_ (1953), c. 2; I Stokes, _Church and State in the United States_ (1950), 151-169/] Under all of these arrangements the church typically has a place in the state's budget, and church law usually governs such matters as baptism, marriage, divorce and separation, at least for its members and sometimes for the entire body politic. [Fn. 9: See III Stokes, op. cit., supra, n. 1, 42-67; Bates, op. cit., supra, n. 1, 9-11, 58-59, 98, 245; Gledhill, op. cit., supra, n. 1, 128, 192, 205, 208; Rackman, _Israel's Emerging Constitution_ (1955), 120-134; Drinan, _Religious Freedom in Israel,_ America (Apr. 6, 1963), 456-457.] Education, too, is usually high on the priority list of church interests. [Fn. 10: See II Stokes, op. sit., supra, n. 1, 488-548; Boles, _The Bible, Religion, and the Public Schools_ (2d ed. 1963), 4-10; Rackman, op. cit., supra, n. 2, at 136-141; O'Brien, _The Engel Case From A Swiss Perspective,_ 61 Mich.L.Rev. 1069; Freund, _Muslim Education in West Pakistan,_ 56 Religious Education 31.] In the past schools were often made the exclusive responsibility of the church. Today in some state-church countries the state runs the public schools, but compulsory religious exercises are often required of some or all students. Thus, under the agreement Franco made with the Holy See when he came to power in Spain, "The Church regained its place in the national budget. It insists on baptizing all children and has made the catechism obligatory in state schools." [Fn. 11: Bates, op. cit., supra, n. 1, at 18; Pfeffer, op. cit., supra, n. 1, at 28-31; Thomas, _The Balance of Forces in Spain,_ 41 Foreign Affairs 208, 210.] The vice of all such arrangements under the Establishment Clause is that the state is lending its assistance to a church's efforts to gain and keep adherents. Under the First Amendment it is strictly a matter for the individual and his church as to what church he will belong to and how much support, in the way of belief, time, activity or money, he will give to it. "This pure Religious Liberty declared . . . [all forms of church-state relationships] and their fundamental idea to be oppressions of conscience and abridgments of that liberty which God and nature had conferred on every living soul." [Fn. 12: Cobb, op. cit., supra, n. 1, at 2.] In these cases we have no coercive religious exercise aimed at making the students conform. The prayers announced are not compulsory, though some may think they have that indirect effect because the nonconformist student may be induced to participate for fear of being called an "oddball." But that coercion, if it be present, has not been shown; so the vices of the present regimes are different. These regimes violate the Establishment Clause in two different ways. In each case the State is conducting a religious exercise; and, as the Court holds, that cannot be done without violating the "neutrality" required of the State by the balance of power between individual, church and state that has been struck by the First Amendment. But the Establishment Clause is not limited to precluding the State itself from conducting religious exercises. It also forbids the State to employ its facilities or funds in a way that gives any church, or all churches, greater strength in our society than it would have by relying on its members alone. Thus, the present regimes must fall under that clause for the additional reason that public funds, though small in amount, are being used to promote a religious exercise. Through the mechanism of the State, all of the people are being required to finance a religious exercise that only some of the people want and that violates the sensibilities of others. _The most effective way to establish any institution is to finance it; and this truth is reflected in the appeals by church groups for public funds to finance their religious schools._ [Fn. 13: See II Stales, op. cit., supra, n. 1, at 681-695.] Financing a church either in its strictly religious activities or in its other activities is equally unconstitutional, as I understand the Establishment Clause. Budgets for one activity may be technically separable from budgets for others. [Fn. 14: See _Accountants' Handbook_ (4th ed. 1956) 4.8-4.15.] But the institution is an inseparable whole, a living organism, which is strengthened in proselytizing when it is strengthened in any department by contributions from other than its own members. Such contributions may not be made by the State even in the minor degree without violating the Establishment Clause. It is not the amount of public funds expended; as this case illustrates, it is the use to which public funds are put that is controlling. For the First Amendment does not say that some forms of establishment are allowed; it says that "no law respecting an establishment of religion" shall be made. What may not be done directly may not be done indirectly lest the Establishment Clause become a mockery. ************************************************************* Text prepared and distributed by American Atheist Online Services, P O Box 140195, Austin, TX 78714-0195. Voice: (512) 458-1244. BBS: (512) 302-0223. This text may be freely downloaded, reprinted, and/other otherwise redistributed, provided its contents are not changed and appropriate point of origin credit is given to American Atheist Online Services.

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