One person has asked how could the government control the
television picture of the major networks. Another person
asked how is it that much of what we know about the assault
at Waco is government propaganda. The answers to both of
these questions is that the press was not allowed to get any
closer than three miles to the Branch Davidians. Almost the only
source of news that the press had was the daily briefings
from the FBI, and BATF. Sadly, investigative journalism
seems like a dead skill in America. I've included one of the
best articles I've read so far on this topic. The article
is long, but well worth the read. The article addresses
various points of interest.
[Author's note: the author gives permission for the unrestricted
reproduction of the following article, which was written for the
January/February 1994 issue of _The American_.]
Assault on Waco
by Kevin S. Van Horn
On January 10 the trials of those few Branch Davidians who
survived the Waco Massacre begin. With their home, the Mt.
Carmel complex, in ruins, and families and friends dead, they
remain stigmatized by the government and press as dangerous,
lunatic "cultists." This article is an attempt to counter the
defamation they have suffered and publicize the crimes committed
against them by the government. Given the limited space
available, I have chosen to trade breadth for depth; thus this
article will consider only the accusations made against the
Davidians, the events leading up to the ATF assault on their
home, and the assault itself.
Who Were the Branch Davidians?
Immediately after the ATF assault on Mount Carmel the Federal
Government began a campaign of vilification against the Branch
Davidians. They were repeatedly portrayed in the press as
dangerous, insane, bloodthirsty fanatics. Yet this supposedly
sociopathic sect had lived peacefully in and near Waco for over
half a century. Let's see what their neighbors have to say about
According to the Houston Post, Gene Chapman, owner of Chapman's
Fruit Market, has nothing but kind words for the Davidians.
"They're just all nice, decent, normal people," he said. "Well,
not normal." 
A.L. Dreyer, an 80-yr-old farmer, owns a ranch adjoining the
Mt. Carmel property. "I've never had no trouble with them
people," he said. "I've always said if they stay on their side
of the fence, I'll stay on mine... I have no fear of those
The ATF's "storm trooper tactics" were "a vulgar display of
power on the part of the feds," said former Waco District
Attorney Vic Feazell. Feazell unsuccessfully prosecuted seven
Branch Davidians in 1988. "We treated them like human beings,
rather than storm-trooping the place," he told the Houston
Chronicle. "They were extremely polite... They're protective of
what's theirs..." 
"[T]hey were basically good people," said McLennan County
Sheriff Jack Harwell. "All of 'em were good people." 
Henry McMahon, a former Waco resident and gun store owner,
described David Koresh as a likable guy. "There was nothing out
of the ordinary (about Koresh's personality)," McMahon said,
adding that Koresh was "an average Joe." [41,43]
"He (Koresh) is a very gentle man," said a Waco doctor who
had treated Koresh for three years prior to the ATF assault. "He
is very intelligent and articulate. They made him sound like a
ruthless killer and that's just absurd." 
Gary Coker, a Waco lawyer, said he believed Koresh wouldn't
hurt anyone unless he was bothered by outsiders. "It's sort of
like a rattlesnake. Unless you step on him, he's not going to
hurt anybody." 
Steve Schneider emerged as a chief negotiator during the
standoff, and was considered Koresh's lieutenant. FBI Special
Agent Bob Ricks called Schneider "a cool, calm, deliberate
individual." Cult Awareness Network `deprogrammer' Rick Ross
described Schneider as well-educated, and said he was "a man with
a history of deep religious conviction, honesty and integrity."
Douglas Wayne Martin held a position of major responsibility
among the Davidians; only he and Steve Schneider ever spoke face-
to-face with federal negotiators during the siege. Martin was a
42-year-old black lawyer and graduate of Harvard Law School. For
seven years he was an assistant professor at the North Carolina
Central University School of Law. After moving to Waco he
maintained a law practice near Mount Carmel. He had a wife and
seven children. [38,42]
Martin was viewed by many who knew him as a quiet, jovial
and religious person . He was routinely described as
professional and competent in court .
"People may tend to dismiss this event as just a bunch of
religious fanatics, but having known Doug humanizes it for me,"
said Mark Morris, a law professor at NCCU. "He was a very
bright, smart, able, kind person, and it's a real shock (Martin's
"He left about a year after I got here, but he seemed to be
a very nice and personable guy," Associate Law School Dean Irving
Joyner said .
McLennan County Commissioner Lester Gibson said he and
others who knew Martin found it hard to believe he could have
been involved in anything so violent. "He was very friendly and
quiet," said Gibson. "It was common knowledge that he was a
Davidian, but he never talked religion." 
Gary Coker, a Waco lawyer, described Martin as a kind man
and a particularly devoted father.
Waco city council member Lawrence Johnson had known Martin
for five years at the time of the assault. He described Martin
as a computer whiz and as a diligent lawyer. "I enjoyed working
with him. He was smart, he was well-educated," Johnson said.
After the raid, Martin, still the conscientious lawyer,
managed to send Johnson money to reimburse clients he was unable
to represent while he was holed up in the compound. "That was
his sense of responsibility coming out." 
Perry Jones was Koresh's father-in-law. News reports described
him as a polite older man, bespectacled and somewhat frail, and
well known at various businesses in the Waco community. Jones
was once called "the kindest man and a perfect gentleman." "He
was nice and he had good manners," said Tim Jander, general
manager of Star Tex Propane in Waco.
Jones died a slow and painful death after ATF agents shot
him in the abdomen. 
Unsurprisingly, the feds decided that they did not want to hold
the trials of the surviving Branch Davidians in Waco. Instead
they got a change of venue to San Antonio, nearly 200 miles away,
where the jury members would be unlikely to have independent
knowledge of the Davidians' character.
The Roden Gunfight
One incident which the government and press used to paint the
Branch Davidians as dangerous and violent was the gunfight with
George Roden that took place at Mt. Carmel in 1988. But it was
George Roden who was dangerous, violent, murderous and insane.
In 1984 a dispute arose between George Roden and David
Koresh over leadership of the Davidians. This culminated in
Roden forcing Koresh and his followers off of the Mt. Carmel
property at gunpoint . Koresh led his group to the city of
Palestine, Texas .
By late 1987 things were faring badly for George Roden. He
had almost no money, few followers, mounting debts and an angry
Texas Supreme Court Justice on his trail . So Roden decided
to conclusively settle the leadership dispute with Koresh. He
went to a graveyard and dug up the body of a man who had been
dead 25 years, put the casket in the Mt. Carmel chapel, and said
that whoever could raise this man from the dead was the one to
lead the Davidians.
Koresh reported the action to the Sheriff's Department. He
was told that his word alone wasn't enough -- proof was needed.
So on November 3, 1987, Koresh and several men went out to Mt.
Carmel to take pictures of the body in the casket. The Sheriff
had warned them to be careful, because Roden was dangerous, so
they armed themselves. The plan was to open the casket, take the
pictures, and leave, but Roden caught them, and a gunfight ensued
in which Roden was wounded .
Koresh and seven other Davidians were charged with attempted
murder . Jack Harwell, McLennan County Sheriff, called
Koresh on the phone and informed him of the charges. He asked
Koresh and the others to turn themselves in, and to surrender
their weapons. When deputies arrived at Mount Carmel, Koresh and
the other Davidians peacefully complied . Officials traced
the weapons and found that each was legally purchased .
On March 21, 1988, Roden was served with a citation for
contempt of court. U.S. District Judge Walter S. Smith, Jr.
sentenced him to six months in jail for continuing to file
expletive-filled motions threatening the justices with AIDS and
herpes, despite orders to cease and desist [70,65,30].
On April 25, Koresh's seven followers were acquitted, and
the jury hung 9-3 in favor of Koresh's acquittal. The state then
dropped the charges against him [68,20].
Koresh paid up 16 years of delinquent taxes on the Mount
Carmel property, which allowed him and his followers to move in
. Upon returning to the property they found a
methamphetamine lab and large piles of pornographic material.
They burned the pornography and reported the meth lab to the DA's
Fifteen months after Koresh's trial, in the summer of 1989,
Roden was approached by a man who claimed to be the Messiah.
Roden split the man's head open with an ax . Odessa police
charged Roden with murder. The following year he was found not
guilty by reason of insanity and sent to a state mental hospital
, where he remains to this day .
Allegations of Child Abuse
Another tactic the federal government used to demonize the
Davidians was to accuse them of child abuse. These accusations
originally arose from Marc Breault, a former follower of Koresh
who had a bitter falling out with him. Breault quit the sect at
the end of 1989 and moved to Australia. He then threw himself
into a campaign to discredit his former mentor, in the process
leading away most of the Australian members of the sect.
In March 1990 Breault, his wife and a number of his
Australian followers swore out more than 30 pages of affidavits
claiming that Koresh was abusing children. A second set of
affidavits was sworn out for use in a child custody hearing in
early 1992, in which a Michigan man named David Jewell petitioned
to gain custody of his daughter, then living at Mt. Carmel with
Jewell's ex-wife. However, the allegations were mostly general
and lacking in detail .
Thus the allegations of child abuse sprung from two sources:
(1) a man who hated Koresh and was obsessed with discrediting
him; and (2) a child-custody dispute. Note that allegations of
child abuse are a common tactic in child-custody disputes.
As a result of Breault's efforts, local authorities began an
investigation of the child abuse charges. Officials of the Child
Protective Services division of the Texas Department of
Protective and Regulatory Services, and the McLennan County
sheriff's office, visited Mt. Carmel in February and March 1992.
They found no evidence of child abuse .
On April 23, 1993, in response to the Clinton
administration's continued claims of child abuse, the Texas
Department of Protective and Regulatory Services offered the
following summary of its nine-week investigation: "None of the
allegations could be verified. The children denied being abused
in any way by any adults in the compound. They denied any
knowledge of other children being abused. The adults
consistently denied participation in or knowledge of any abuse to
children. Examinations of the children produced no indication of
current or previous injuries." Texas child protection officials
also said they received no further abuse allegations after that
Breault had also contacted the FBI, accusing Koresh of a
number of other crimes besides child abuse. A February 23, 1993
FBI memo, obtained by the Dallas Morning News, stated that no
information had been developed to verify the allegations of
"child abuse and neglect, tax evasion, slavery and reports of
possible mass destruction."
The Clinton administration alleged that the Davidians were
abusing children during the siege of Mt. Carmel. This was
contradicted by those who actually saw the children. During the
siege a man named Louis Alaniz managed to sneak past federal
officials to visit the Davidians (he was not a Davidian himself).
After leaving, he reported that the children at Mt. Carmel
appeared happy, playing and laughing continuously, and that there
were no outward signs of child abuse .
Sheriff Jack Harwell, who was the only outside negotiator
brought into the Mount Carmel siege, said there was never any
proof that children were being abused inside the compound. None
of the children who were released from the compound, Harwell
said, showed any signs of physical abuse .
According to Texas child protective services officials, none
of the 21 children released to the authorities showed signs of
abuse, and none of them confirmed that any abuse was committed.
The children were physically and psychologically examined [45,
47]. Dr. Bruce Perry, the head of the team treating the children,
stated flatly: "(N)one of the 21 children had been sexually
abused or molested." 
After the blaze that killed most of the Davidians, the
Clinton administration stepped up its "child abuse" offensive.
White House communications director George Stephanopoulos claimed
that "there was overwhelming evidence of child abuse in the Waco
compound."  But this claim was contradicted by others within
the federal government itself.
FBI director William Sessions said his agency had "no
contemporaneous evidence" of child abuse in the compound during
the siege . "[T]here had been no recent reports of the
beating of children." In response to Janet Reno's claim of
reports that "babies were being beaten," Sessions said, "I do
not know what the attorney general was referring to
The Justice Department itself put the lie to Clinton's and
Reno's wild accusations. In a report released in early October,
the Justice Department said there was no evidence of child abuse
at the compound during the siege or even enough evidence to
arrest Koresh on such charges before the February 28 raid .
The Gun Arsenal
The press and the federal government made much of the Davidians'
collection of guns. President Clinton claimed the Davidians had
"illegally stockpiled weaponry and ammunition."  But there is
no law limiting the number of legal weapons one may accumulate.
Furthermore, by Texas standards the Davidians' gun collection was
rather small. After the siege investigators found only 200
firearms in the ruins of Mt. Carmel , which amounts to about
two guns per adult. But Texas' 17 million residents own a total
of 68 million guns, for an average of four guns apiece, while
16,600 Texans legally own machine guns .
The government also claimed that the Davidians were planning
an assault on Waco. This claim was based on third-hand
information related to ATF Special Agent Davy Aguilera, who filed
the affidavit for the original raid on Mt. Carmel. Aguilera had
interviewed ATF Special Agent Carlos Torres, who had interviewed
Joyce Sparks, an investigator with the Texas Department of Human
Services. According to Aguilera's affidavit, Torres told
Aguilera that Sparks had told him that Koresh had told her "that
he was the `Messenger' from God, that the world was coming to an
end, and that when he `reveals' himself the riots in Los Angeles
would pale in comparison to what was going to happen in Waco,
Texas." Furthermore, this self-revelation "would be a `military
type operation' and... all the `non-believers' would have to
suffer." Koresh supposedly said this on Sparks' second and final
visit to Mt. Carmel to investigate child-abuse charges, on April
6, 1992 . But the LA riots broke out on April 29, more than
three weeks after Sparks last visited Koresh!
Enter the ATF
In Feb. 1982, the Senate Judiciary Committee said in a report
that the ATF had "disregarded rights guaranteed by the
Constitution and laws of the United States." Illegal ATF actions
included entrapment and secret lawmaking via unpublished
administrative interpretations of gun laws. The report noted
that "expert evidence was submitted establishing that
approximately 75 percent of BATF gun prosecutions were aimed at
ordinary citizens who had neither criminal intent nor knowledge,
but were enticed by agents into unknowing technical violations."
In the wake of the report, plans to abolish the agency were
shelved after neither the U.S. Customs Bureau nor the Secret
Service would accept the transfer of the discredited ATF agents
into their organizations .
The ATF acted true to form in its investigation of the
Davidians -- the purpose of the raid appears to have been to
bolster the ATF's image, rather than any protection of the public
safety. From Aguilera's affidavit it appears that the ATF
collected no reliable new information for its investigation after
June 23, 1992. But in mid-November "60 Minutes" began contacting
ATF personnel about allegations of sexual harassment in the
agency . In early December the investigation picked up
again, after a lapse of 5-1/2 months .
On January 12, 1993 the segment aired. It presented
allegations by female ATF agents that they had been sexually
harassed on the job and that the agency intimidated victims and
witnesses who had pressed sexual harassment claims. Among the
charges was one of near-rape: agent Michelle Roberts charged that
another agent had pinned her against the hood of a car while two
others tore at her clothes. ATF agent Bob Hoffman told "60
Minutes" that he had verified the complaints of one female agent,
and said, "In my career with ATF, the people that I put in jail
have more honor than the top administration in this
organization." Shortly afterwards, there was also a front-page
article in the The Washington Post about racial discrimination in
The "60 Minutes" story devastated both the public image and
morale of the ATF. ATF Director Stephen Higgins must have been
in a panic. A Republican appointee, he stood a good chance of
losing his job with a Democratic administration coming in. Even
if he didn't, he was going to have a rough time at the
congressional budget hearings coming up on March 10. Said one
high-level former ATF senior official who requested anonymity,
"The show had great repercussions within the bureau... [S]ome
[within the ATF] concluded that he [Higgins] was... looking for a
high-profile case to counteract the negative image and enable him
to go to the budget appropriations hearings with a strong hand."
This analysis was supported by a follow up "60 Minutes"
report on May 23. Based on statements from ATF agents, Mike
Wallace concluded the report by saying, "Waco was a publicity
stunt, which was intended to improve the ATF's tarnished image."
Consistent with this interpretation, the ATF notified the media
before the raid [50,56,35], and there were a large number of
television and newspaper reporters at the site on the morning of
the raid .
Appendix G of the Treasury Department report on Waco
suggests another, more disturbing motive for the raid. The
appendix, entitled "A Brief History of Federal Firearms
Enforcement," contains the following statement:
In a larger sense, however, the raid fit within an historic,
well-established and well-defended government interest in
prohibiting and breaking up all organized groups that sought
to arm or fortify themselves... From its earliest formation,
the federal government has actively suppressed any effort by
disgruntled or rebellious citizens to coalesce into an armed
group, however small the group, petty its complaint, or
grandiose its ambition.
In other words: regardless of whether you break any law, if some
federal official doesn't like your politics and thinks you have
too many weapons, you will be exterminated.
Serving the Warrant
On February 25 ATF Special Agent Davy Aguilera filed for and
received a warrant to search the premises of Mt. Carmel, claiming
evidence of illegal conversion of (legal) semiautomatic weapons to
automatic. Contrary to early ATF claims, there was no arrest
warrant for Koresh. The affidavit supporting the warrant was
seriously flawed, containing many inaccuracies and patently false
statements (such as the "LA riots" quote). According to several
legal experts, including a former ATF senior enforcement official
with more than 20 years' federal firearms experience, it is
questionable that the affidavit demonstrated probable cause for a
Steve Holbrook, an attorney in Washington, D.C. area, whose
law practice specializes in gun-related offenses, was
unequivocal: "Probable cause did not exist. There was evidence
cited of a large quantity of legal firearms and parts, including
interchangeable parts... Nowhere in the affidavit is it said all
necessary parts and materials to convert semiautomatic weapons
into machine guns were obtained [by Koresh]." 
The claimed violation itself is a tricky area of the law.
"This is a very, very convoluted, technical, angels-dancing-on-
the-head-of-a-pin kind of argument," says Robert Sanders, former
enforcement chief of the ATF. "And there are no published rulings
telling you what is and isn't [a violation]." 
Importantly, this was not a no-knock search warrant, in
which agents may knock down doors and burst in heavily armed
without prior warning to occupants; such warrants must be
specifically applied for, which the ATF failed to do . Nor
was a no-knock approach necessary. As we have seen, Koresh and
his followers had peacefully cooperated with law enforcement
officers on at least three occasions in the past (once after the
Roden gunfight, twice during the child-abuse investigation). And
in July 1992 Koresh had actually invited ATF investigators to
come out to Mt. Carmel and inspect the Davidians' guns [4,6,55],
but he was angrily told "we don't want to do it that way." 
Furthermore, the ATF knew that nearly all the guns at Mt.
Carmel were locked up and only Koresh had a key . To avoid
any possibility of armed resistance from the Davidians, they
could have simply detained Koresh during one of his frequent
excursions outside of Mt. Carmel [18,29] and had him unlock the
store of guns in their presence.
Absent a no-knock warrant, U.S. law (Title 18, U.S.C. 3109)
states that an officer must give notice of his legal authority
and purpose before attempting to enter the premises to be
searched. Only if admittance is refused after giving such notice
is it legal for an officer to use force to gain entry. Said one
former senior ATF official, "Irrespective of the situation
inside, the notice of authority and purpose must be given...
Unless the occupants of a dwelling are made aware that the
persons attempting to enter have legal authority and a legal
warrant to enter, the occupants have every right to defend
Dick DeGuerin, a well-known Houston lawyer, put it more
bluntly: "...if a warrant is being unlawfully executed by the use
of excessive force, you or I or anybody else has a right to
resist that unlawful force. If someone's trying to kill you,
even under the excuse that they have a warrant, you have a right
to defend yourself with deadly force, and to kill that person."
It appears that the ATF never intended to serve the warrant
in a lawful manner. ATF agents told the Houston Post that before
the raid they had practiced to where it took 7 seconds to get out
of their tarp-covered cattle trailers and 12 seconds to get to
the front door. It is absurd to imagine that after such a mad
dash to the door, the ATF agents intended to stop, knock, calmly
state their legal authority and purpose, demand entry, and wait
for a response, all before taking further action.
So how did the ATF serve its warrant? On Sunday morning,
February 28, 1993, 100 federal agents arrived at Mt. Carmel in
cattle cars and helicopters. About 30 agents dressed in black
commando uniforms and armed with machine guns stormed the complex
[9,19]. According to an Associated Press report,
"Witnesses said the law officers stormed the compound's main
home, throwing concussion grenades and screaming `Come out,'
while three National Guard helicopters approached." 
Who Shot First?
The question of who shot first is in a sense irrelevant, as the
ATF agents clearly attacked first when they threw grenades at the
Davidians' home. Once the ATF used unlawful force, the Davidians
had the legal right to resist them with deadly force.
Nevertheless, the Davidians insist that ATF agents shot
first. "They fired on us first," Koresh told CNN. "...I fell
back against the door and the bullets started coming through the
door... I was already hollering, `Go away, there's women and
children here, let's talk.'"  Davidians in another part of
the city-block-sized complex said the battle began when the
helicopters circling overhead fired on them without warning .
David Troy, ATF intelligence chief, said a videotape was
taken of the entire mission . But although parts of this
tape were released to the media, one important part was not: the
start of the raid. It seems unlikely the ATF would have withheld
this footage if it supported the ATF's contention that the
Davidians fired first.
There is evidence to support Koresh's version of events.
Federal law enforcement sources told Soldier of Fortune magazine
* One ATF agent had an accidental discharge getting out of one
of two goose-necked cattle trailers used to transport and
conceal agents -- he wounded himself in the leg and cried out,
"I'm hit!"  Unless you have a very disciplined group, you
can expect all hell to break loose once any shot is fired; and
according to Charles Beckwith, a retired Army colonel and
founder of the military's antiterrorist Delta Force, the ATF's
raid was "very amateur." 
* Steve Willis, one of the ATF agents killed in the raid, was
assigned to "take out" Koresh if necessary. When Koresh came
out, Willis began firing a suppressed MP5 SD submachine gun at
him from the passenger side of the leading pickup. Reporters
kept some distance away from the action would not have heard a
silenced MP5 SD, while the cattle trailer would likely have
blocked their view [14,15].
Concurrent with the attack on the front of the Mt. Carmel complex
were two other attacks on the Davidians.
According to Davidians who surrendered during the siege, the
helicopters circling overhead fired down through the roof into
the complex, killing one man and two women as they lay in their
beds [64,72]. The children, whose dormitory was on the second
floor, crawled under their beds as bullets ripped through the
walls above them [15,25]. Houston attorney Dick DeGuerin viewed
the inside of the complex after the raid, when federal officials
allowed him to meet with the Davidians and try to persuade them
to surrender. He reported seeing bullet holes on the second
story, clearly coming from the outside in, at such an angle that
they could only have come from above the complex .
Moments after the assault began, an 8-man ATF team began
ascending the roof near an upstairs window which they believed to
be in the vicinity of Koresh's bedroom and weapons locker
[12,15]. Video footage of the raid shows the agents breaking the
window, tossing grenades inside, and indiscriminately spraying
A well-placed federal official told the Houston Post that at
least 10 Davidians were killed in the battle. One of those
confirmed dead was Koresh's two-year-old daughter . Another
was Winston Blake, a 28-year-old printer, painter, and welder; he
was shot to death as he stood unarmed by the complex's water tank
Four ATF agents were killed in the gunfight, and numerous
wounded. Dan Hartnett, associate director of the ATF, claimed
that the ATF suffered heavy casualties because of strict rules of
engagement that prohibit shooting without a definite target. "We
had to wait for a target because there are so many women and
children inside," he said. But broadcast video of the raid shows
agents exercising poor fire control, firing over vehicles with
little or no view of what they were shooting at, at a rate of two
rounds per second [11,27].
The ATF's concern for the women and children inside was
further demonstrated by their use of the "9 mm. Cyclone" round in
their submachine guns. This highly-penetrating round is
available only to law-enforcement special operations teams and
the military, and is specifically designed to cut through body
Two separate federal sources told Soldier of Fortune
magazine that such a round was removed from a wounded ATF agent,
and that many, if not most, of the ATF casualties resulted from
"friendly fire."  Newsweek also reported that a federal
source involved in the Waco situation said that "there is
evidence that supports the theory of friendly fire," and that
during the assault "there was a huge amount of cross-fire." 
Furthermore, in the released video footage of the raid, there is
little or no evidence of return fire from the Davidians.
The attack terrified the Davidians, and they were eager for
a cease-fire. Wayne Martin telephoned his friend, Waco city
councilman Lawrence Johnson. According to Johnson, Martin said
"they were in a firefight, they were taking casualties, and a lot
of people were hurt. He asked me to contact the media." 
The New York Times reported that after capturing four federal
agents, the Davidians disarmed and released them during the
firefight. And both Martin and Koresh phoned 911 about the
ABC broadcast portions of the 911 tapes on its Nightline
program. Martin phoned first and spoke with Lieutenant Lynch of
the Waco Sheriff's Department. He told Lynch, "There's about 75
men around our building and they're shooting it up in Mt.
Carmel... Tell them there are women and children in here and to
call it off!" Calling it off took some time. During a later
return phone call, even as Lynch and Martin were trying to
arrange the cease-fire, Martin's location was receiving heavy
gunfire and Martin himself was hit. When requested not to return
fire, an unidentified Davidian replied in a disgusted tone, "We
haven't been." 
In the end, it was not humanitarian concerns or negotiations
that brought an end to the hour-long assault; it was lack of
ammunition. The 100 agents who participated in the assault had a
total of only 40 rounds left among them when they finally backed
1. Press conference given by President Clinton in Washington,
D.C., on April 20, 1993, 1:36 p.m. EDT.
2. Associated Press, March 1, 1993; appeared in Knoxville News-
3. Washington Times, June 1, 1993, p. E3.
4. Houston Press, July 22, 1993.
5. San Francisco Chronicle, October 9, 1993.
6. Houston Chronicle
7. ABC's "Nightline", June 9, 1993.
8. "Was It Friendly Fire?", Newsweek, April 5, 1993, p. 50.
9. Reuters News Service, February 28, 1993.
10. Associated Press, February 28, 1993.
11. "Gun Gestapo's Day of Infamy," Soldier of Fortune, June
1993, p. 48.
12. Ibid., p. 49.
13. Ibid., p. 50.
14. Ibid., p. 51.
15. Ibid., p. 52.
16. Ibid., p. 53.
17. Ibid., p. 62.
18. Ibid., p. 63.
19. Houston Post, March 1, 1993, p. A1.
20. Ibid., p. A8.
21. Ibid., p. A4.
22. Houston Post, March 2, 1993, p. A8.
23. Ibid., p. A13.
24. Houston Post, March 3, 1993, p. A1.
25. Ibid., p. A12.
26. Ibid., p. A18.
27. Houston Post, March 4, 1993, p. A1.
28. Ibid., p. A20.
29. Houston Post, March 5, 1993, p. A1 and A16.
30. Ibid., p. A22.
31. Houston Post, March 8, 1993, p. A1.
32. Ibid., p. A10.
33. Houston Post, March 9, 1993, p. A8.
34. Ibid., p. A13.
35. Houston Post, March 12, 1993, p. A20.
36. Houston Post, March 29, 1993, p. A6.
37. Washington Post, April 21, 1993, p. A15.
38. Houston Post, April 22, 1993, p. A21.
39. Ibid., p. A1.
40. Ibid., p. A21.
41. Ibid., p. A20.
42. Washington Post, April 22, 1993, p. A15-16.
43. Reuters News Service, April 22, 1993.
44. Houston Post, April 23, 1993, p. A5.
45. Houston Post, April 24, 1993, p. A18.
46. Washington Post, April 24, 1993, p. A8.
47. Washington Post, April 25, 1993, p. A1.
48. Ibid., p. A20.
49. Washington Post, April 28, 1993, p. A4.
50. Washington Post, April 30, 1993, p. A1.
51. "Waco's Defective Warrants," Soldier of Fortune, August
1993, p. 46.
52. Ibid, p. 48.
53. Ibid, p. 49.
54. Ibid, p. 74.
55. "Truth and Cover-up," The New American, June 14, 1993, p.
24, quoting an April 21st television interview with Henry
McMahon, the man who relayed the offer to the ATF.
56. Testimony of BATF Director Stephen E. Higgins before the
House Judiciary Committee, April 28, 1993.
57. Associated Press, May 5, 1993.
58. "Gunning for Koresh," The American Spectator, August 1993.
59. Ibid, p. 32.
60. Ibid, p. 33.
61. Ibid, p. 39.
62. Ibid, p. 33.
63. Affidavit to obtain search warrant, submitted by Davy
Aguilera on February 25, 1993.
64. Speech by Ron Engleman on the Waco Massacre. Engleman was a
Dallas radio talk-show host whom the Davidians requested as
a negotiator during the siege. Engleman's speech was based
on his own experiences and interviews with others. A
videotape of the speech may be obtained from Libertarian
Party of Dallas County, P.O. Box 64832, Dallas, TX 75206.
65. Marc Breault and Martin King, Inside the Cult, p. 71 (1993).
66. Ibid, p. 100.
67. Ibid, pp. 106-107.
68. Ibid, p. 369.
69. "The Waco Massacre: A Case Study on the Emerging American
Police State," The McAlvany Intelligence Advisor 19 (July
70. Brad Bailey & Bob Darden, Mad Man in Waco, p. 81 (1993).
71. Ibid, p. 88.
72. Ibid, p. 173.
- John David Munch email@example.com
"I hope you don't like my posts...that is the intent!"
-Brother Orchid, demonstrating how to be christian.